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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis is concerned with the psychoanalytical concept of narcissism, 
and the effect that texts written by narcissistic writers have upon their 
readers. I use Søren Kierkegaard as an example of a narcissistic writer who 
produced narcissistic texts.  
 
In order to follow through the logic of the thesis, it is necessary to explain 
first the Freudian idea of narcissism, and then narcissism as considered by 
one post-Freudian school called Object Relations theory. It is also necessary, 
second, to summarise a psychoanalytic model of what happens when we 
read any kind of text. The methodology of this thesis is usually called 
psychobiography, the systematic application of psychodynamic principles to 
the study of a life, and so, third, both the principles and some of the issues 
of this methodology are presented.  
 
Having established an operational definition of narcissism, the thesis looks 
first at Kierkegaard’s life, identifying a series of key events or stages that can 
be re-interpreted on the assumption that Kierkegaard was narcissistic. Three 
of his key texts are considered next - Fear and Trembling, Works of Love and 
The Sickness Unto Death. Each of these can be interpreted to show how his 
narcissism influenced his writing. 
 
Two substantial appendices are included. The first is a comment upon the 
relationship between God and psychoanalysis, presented primarily to 
introduce the ideas of Donald Winnicott. The second is on the concept of 
psychopathology, a difficult topic, since it is at once both heavily value 
laden, but is also persistent in any analysis of psychological difference. 
 
In conclusion I refer to several key Kierkegaardian themes, emphasising 
their narcissistic origins, and ask the reader to reflect upon their own 
responses to these issues, to consider how Kierkegaard’s narcissism 
influences their own emotions, and how these in turn affect any cognitive 
understanding of Søren Kierkegaard. 
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A Subjective Preface 
 
Very many people have fallen under the spell of Søren Kierkegaard. Many 
have tried to make sense of what he said. Almost as many, I fear, have had 
but limited success. But what is fascinating, deeply fascinating, is how most 
commentators feel a need to relate personally to this writer: to comment, 
usually for good, but sometimes for ill, on the personal effect Kierkegaard 
has had upon them. So in most instances of the secondary literature, 
somewhere in the introduction, or in some footnote, there is a small though 
often large comment about how that writer first met the ideas or reputation 
of Kierkegaard. It would seem that Kierkegaard is not just another author, 
but one who somehow engages us in an unusual way. Most secondary 
writers have a personal story to tell, but much more interestingly, they want 
to tell it. 
 
Why? What does Kierkegaard do to us that makes our relationship with him 
seemingly qualitatively different from other philosophers or theologians? 
Julia Watkin, for example, one of the most assiduous writers, scholars and 
bibliographers of Kierkegaard's output, tells her story of how at Bristol 
University: 
Dr (later Professor) John Kent, who regularly filleted the big names in 
religious studies like so many fish, was strangely lenient with 
Kierkegaard, thus arousing my curiosity and expectancy. This 
expectancy was not disappointed, since when I began to read 
Kierkegaard in 1972, I saw in a flash of illumination that I was 
encountering a great mind that had something to say to the problems 
of our time. 1 
 
And there is the famous story of how David Swenson, a formidable 
Kierkegaard scholar essentially of the nineteenth century, and the very first 
Kierkegaard translator and champion in the USA, encountered Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript in the Minnesota University library, where in 1898 he 
was a teaching assistant:  
It was quite by accident that one day I picked up a Danish book from 
the shelves of the library, a book which seemed to have philosophical 
content. The name of the author told me nothing, for I had never 
                                                
1 Watkin (1997) Preface. 
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heard of Søren Kierkegaard. On a venture, I took the book home. It 
was Saturday evening, and I did not rise from the reading begun on 
reaching home, until half past two Sunday morning. By Sunday night 
I had finished the more than five hundred closely printed pages of the 
book, so impossible was it for me to lay it aside. 2 
 
In the introduction to a very recent text, Peter Mehl likens his relationship 
with Kierkegaard to that with his wife: 
So too has my relationship with Kierkegaard gone: until now it is a 
mutually critical partnership. We will never divorce and I do not think 
we could. He will always be with me, yet he is not as immediately 
infatuating as he initially was. He now occupies a place in my 
consciousness that is pervasive but not all consuming.  3 
 
And, continuing the theme of post-nuptial surprises, the distinguished 
British Kierkegaardian scholar, George Pattison, admits to something 
similar: 
Hilary, my partner, had no ideas when she married me that she was 
going to have to share so much of her living space with the great 
Danish writer, with whom, like me, she has a love-hate relationship. 
Not quite a ménage a trois, but it sometimes, I fear, feels like it. 4 
 
But long before Kierkegaard became fashionable, or known outside the 
Nordic countries, it was clear that the act of reading the works of this writer 
had an impact on the reader. The Kierkegaard scholar P A Heiberg in his 
1895 text ‘Contributions towards a psychological portrait of Søren 
Kierkegaard in childhood and youth’ commented: 
Søren Kierkegaard’s personality forces the objective scientific 
enquirer, by an arresting glance, as it were, to make a subjective 
“preface”. 5 
 
And Henriksen, in a major analysis of the early reception of Kierkegaard’s 
writings says:  
About him there is something physically present rendering possible 
an intimate reaction. Neither the passionate and penetrative spirit of 
production, or the shocking or mystifying aspect of his personal 
existence, nor what was wounding and goading in his final 
                                                
2 Swenson (1983) p 1 (Later Swenson added ‘I did not wholly understand it at the 
first reading, nor indeed the second or third...’ an admission that surely gives hope to 
us all.) 
3 Mehl (2005) Preface. 
4 Pattison (1992) xii.  
5 P A Heiberg (1895) p 2. 
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unscrupulous behaviour, will fully explain the force of attraction 
issuing from him. 6 
 
In my own case, involvement with Kierkegaard began with my departure for 
university in the early 1960's. A good friend, the local vicar, gave me a copy 
of The Sickness unto Death, saying he thought I might eventually find it a 
good read; it was to be some time before I would agree with him. Against 
advice from many 7, I went up to study psychology. At that time, psychology, 
perhaps surprisingly, was a less than popular subject: there were just nine 
of us in the first year class. 8 Our Professor was the last Freudian to be 
appointed to an undergraduate chair in the UK. He was a caricature of a 
Freudian Professor, anal retentive in the extreme 9, an authoritarian 
personality worthy of a case conference. Even though traditional Freudian 
psychology was under very severe attack from both the behaviourists on one 
side and the newly emerging cognitive scientists on the other, Nero-like he 
lectured on regardless.  
 
The final year was given over almost entirely to Freudian theory. In the last 
spring term, we were required to write a five thousand-word paper on a 
major topic in theory, and then run a two-hour seminar with our peers 
under the evaluating eye of the Professor. In order to allocate topics to the 
nine of us, the Professor, in a still-surreal episode, solemnly tore a sheet of 
paper into nine squares, wrote one topic on each square, and then placed 
the folded notes into his upturned mortar-board.10 We each picked out a 
square. Mine read 'Repression'. This was the very last topic I wanted. 
Perhaps as reaction to so much Freud, or perhaps as evidence of some 
unresolved personal oedipal issues, I was finding both the learned Professor 
and the great Sigmund irksome in the extreme. Besides, at that time I was 
                                                
6 Henriksen (1951) p 13. 
7 I still have a vivid memory of being called to see the Careers Master at school in my 
final year. I told him that I wanted to read Psychology. I watched, bemused, as he 
tried in his notes to spell the word 'Psychology'. After the third failed attempt, he put 
down his pen and said: 'Greenhalgh, I think you might be better off studying 
Chemistry', clearly a word he could spell. So it was, at that time, that entire careers 
of young men were determined in the English Public School system.  
8 This compares, just a generation later, with my daughter’s first year class of some 
nine hundred students. 
9 He collected both stamps and butterflies. 
10 He always wore a mortar board. 
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very influenced by the anti-psychiatry school: Rachmann, the co-inventor of 
behaviour therapy, had been to lecture; R D Laing was my hero. How was I 
to write 5,000 words on something I didn't even believe existed? So I turned 
to The Sickness unto Death. I wrote a very poor paper, and gave an 
exceedingly ungracious seminar, but what I gained was an understanding of 
why Freud’s drive theory was ultimately barren. And my own affair with 
Kierkegaard had begun. 
 
Immediately after graduating, the distancing from Freud continued with a 
second degree in neuropsychology, and I embarked on a career ostensibly 
remote from psychology. But as a very full and happy personal life and 
career began to mellow, the pull of Freud returned. Without knowing exactly 
what it was, I determined to come to terms with Object Relations theory, 
something never even mentioned in my entire undergraduate time, but 
which I knew was important. I found Greenberg and Mitchell’s standard text 
11, and read it over a weekend. I was entranced. The chapter on Ronald 
Fairbairn transformed my understanding of how people relate, and for the 
very first time gave me a model of psychopathology that made sense. The 
sticking point of classical Freudian theory was always with obsessive or 
compulsive behaviours, in the most general sense. Why do individuals 
consistently and repeatedly put themselves into positions of self-harm, 
through relationships, through actions? Fairbairn's tripartite model provided 
such a real and moving answer. 
 
At the same time, I had been reading random bits of Kierkegaard, and after a 
particularly successful client assignment, I purchased the entire Hong set, 
as well as the Journals and Papers. I resolved to read all 25 volumes in 
order, but soon gave up the chronological imperative, concentrating instead 
on the Journals. The Journals were fascinating, easily fulfilling Dru’s 
opinion that ‘to read these journals is to live in the intimacy of one of the most 
extraordinary original men in the whole of the nineteenth century’12. But a 
strange thing happened: I found myself responding over and over again to 
the detail of his life with the thought: ‘this man is not well.' It was not a 
                                                
11 Greenberg and Mitchell (1983). 
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technical or clinical diagnosis, but it was persistent. I had no real label for 
what I was sensing, but something became apparent on almost every page. 
Then as my Object Relations theory reading expanded into Self-Psychology, I 
encountered Heinz Kohut’s text on narcissism. His simple idea, that 
narcissism is a natural stage for us all, and that we grow out of it to a 
greater or lesser extent but never completely, provided a concept that 
avoided heavy handed psychoanalytic theory, yet was focused enough to 
explain what I was reading in the Journals and Papers. The thesis began to 
form, and immediately there was evidence of Kierkegaard's narcissism 
throughout his Journals and major texts. Thus armed, I completed the 
chronological reading task. 
 
Years before, I had read the appropriate texts of psychiatric diagnosis, but 
felt then, as I do now, that much of orthodox psychiatric nosology remains in 
the gift of the US pharmaceutical and insurance companies, designed to 
increase the profits of the former and minimise the claims against the latter. 
So Narcissistic Personality Disorder, the classic modern diagnostic envelope 
for either the Object Relations ideas on narcissism or Kohut’s concept, was 
of little help in understanding Kierkegaard. But late twentieth century 
developments in psychoanalytic theory were. It was the later of work of 
Stephen Mitchell, cutting through so much of the post-modern confusion in 
psychoanalysis that motivated me most. He seemed to have brought about a 
serious reduction, refinement and concentration of core concepts in 
psychoanalysis. The work of Grotstein, the wonderfully transparent writings 
of Patrick Casement, and particularly the revolutionary writings of Harold 
Searle, all emphasised the two key ideas of countertransference and 
projective identification, ideas that stand in such contrast to Freud's original 
thinking.  
   
In Freud's original drive theory, the key processes were Repression and 
Displacement. These 'terrible twins' were the engines that made basic 
psychodynamics happen. Repression is a straightforward process, whereby 
the internal censor finds certain actions or events so unacceptable that the 
                                                                                                                                       
12 Dru (1958) Cover comments. 
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memory of them is pushed below the level of consciousness. There they will 
remain until the process of psychoanalysis permits their release. We all have 
repressed material, and it makes itself known through Freud's classic routes 
of dreams, slips of the tongue and apparently physical ailments. 
Displacement refers to the idiosyncratic process whereby my personal and 
private psychodynamic development leads me have a set of connections for 
any given word or concept. The simple word 'brother' may involve me in 
mainly unconscious memories and fantasies that are unique to me. Many of 
these will be repressed material. So when I use the word 'brother' it has a 
specific set of shades of meaning or implications, most of which remain 
unconscious, but which affect my choice and use of the word. In short, I use 
the word differently, in however subtle and slight a way, from anybody else, 
though I may not be aware of this difference. But when you hear me use the 
word ‘brother’, your own psyche and psychodynamic development results in 
a different set of associations, memories and fantasises, also based on 
repressed material.  
 
These two concepts, it can be argued, were the foundation of the 'Death of 
the Author' school in French writing in the 1960s and later. If the author, by 
definition cannot be sure of the private meaning they intend by the use of 
any word, then authorial intent can at least be questioned. And if I similarly 
am unaware of the meanings and associations I make to that same word, 
then my reading can have no privileged place either. It was this line of 
thinking was to give rise to the beguiling phrase from Jaques Lacan that 'the 
unconscious is structured like a language' 13 
 
However, the assumption implicit on all of the above is that the word, the 
signifier, is transmitted from the author to the reader like some tiny missile, 
some independent object passing through the ether. By contrast Object 
Relations theory suggests that communication is a highly active and 
collaborative process, and without denying repression and displacement, 
both the author and the reader are real people that respond to each other in 
ways that are critical for hermeneutics. While the author may or may not 
                                                
13 Lacan (1966) Ecrits p 444. 
  
 
Page 12 
 
 
know what he or she meant by a word, and while equally I may well not 
know what he or she meant, nor what I mean, nonetheless, the pairing of 
that author with me, the act of my reading that author, is a unique and non-
reproducible process. What happens when I read a text cannot easily be 
explained by Drive theory; for Object Relations theory this is home turf. But 
instead of Drive theory's actuating processes of Repression and 
Displacement, Object Relations theory suggests Projective Identification and 
Countertransference.  
 
Projective identification is a less than straightforward concept, and it will be 
unravelled in some detail below. Essentially, it suggests that when we 
communicate, we send out from our mainly unconscious selves some part of 
us that, at that moment, we wish to be rid of; and we implant this, so to 
speak, in the reader. The reader may not want to receive this gift, but in 
some way it is accepted, for reasons to do with their own psychodynamics. 
Projective identification is essentially about the relationship, the active 
involvement, of the author with the reader. Words are no longer impersonal 
signifiers but are highly charged emotional missiles, literally leaving one 
unconscious and entering into another.  
 
Countertransference can be thought of as the same process viewed from the 
other end. When I listen to an author, I cannot attend only to his words: the 
author is a person modified in my perception by my own psychodynamics, 
modified, in summary, into an object that bears some correspondence to the 
real author, but always an incomplete correspondence. So my response to 
her words are modified and mediated by my response to her, again with 
unconscious and repressed processes informing this perception. 
 
It was these two concepts that finally gave the thesis real shape: Søren 
Kierkegaard wrote uniquely narcissistic texts, and this is why he engages us 
in an unusual way. This is why we feel the need to make some comment 
about our personal relationship with Kierkegaard. Because of his admitted 
style and technology  - the pseudonymous authors, the use of irony, the 
Chinese puzzles - Kierkegaard engages us intellectually like no other author. 
But his narcissism arrests us emotionally, snaring the narcissist in all of us. 
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This is about more than his abstract ideas: Kierkegaard’s writings appeal 
and frustrate and preoccupy us both intellectually and emotionally. 
Kierkegaard the writer, the person, touches something in all of us, and what 
he touches is our resolved or unresolved narcissism. The best way to talk 
about this unadmitted engagement is through the concepts of projective 
identification and countertransference.  
 
So this thesis is an attempt to make sense of Søren Kierkegaard, to make 
sense of how we read his texts and what they do to us. Without admitting 
this unconscious aspects of what goes on when we read Kierkegaard, I 
contend that any hermeneutic is incomplete.
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1  Introduction and Summary 
 
This thesis is about the process of reading, but it is not a general theory of 
reading. It is, in Lyotard's phrase, a mini-narrative. It is about the 
unconscious processes that take place when we read certain kinds of text. 
Texts that are written by people whom I shall call narcissists (to be defined 
below) are unlike other kinds of texts, and affect the reader in particular 
ways. In order to make this idea more meaningful, I use an example of one 
particular thinker and writer, Søren Kierkegaard, and try to give one 
explanation of what happens when we encounter his ideas. 
 
The academic question to be answered is thus: what happens when we read 
narcissistic texts? In particular, what happens when we read texts by 
Kierkegaard?  
 
I am suggesting that, apart from the obvious cognitive and intellectual 
challenge that Kierkegaard poses for every reader, he also touches every 
reader emotionally. For most of us, those with resolved narcissism,14 it is a 
transient touch that can be managed by the psychic reality of how the 
reader responds to these ideas. But for some of us, as unresolved 
narcissists, it opens a deep and terrible wound. Demonstrably, there are 
tens of thousands of secondary texts on Kierkegaard 15. My claim is that 
every one of these may be enriched by at least a moment’s reflection to 
consider the emotional response of the author to Kierkegaard’s narcissism. 
For some of these secondary texts, there might be a need for the author to 
deconstruct their views and comments based on a more reflective perception 
of how their unconscious interaction with Kierkegaard has affected their 
ratiocination. For any reader or commentator of Kierkegaard, without a 
consideration of the emotional effect of Kierkegaard’s narcissism, I suggest 
that their insights, propositions and observations may not be as profound as 
they otherwise might be. 
                                                
14 To be defined below and contrasted with a resolved narcissist. Note again that 
these terms refer to the extremes of a spectrum. 
15 Watkin (2001). 
  
 
Page 15 
 
 
Clearly, I first have to explain the idea of narcissism. It is essentially a 
universal condition, one through which we all pass in early life. Some 
remain forever beholden to it, unable to grow away from it for reasons to do 
with personal nurture; for most it remains a background set of emotions and 
responses, but still present, and capable of being aroused. This is a complex 
story, and involves first the origins of the ideas of psychoanalysis, especially 
drive theory, and the later development that is object relations theory. These 
are, for the purpose of this thesis, viewed as foundational building blocks of 
psychic processes, and no syndrome can be considered without reference to 
these concepts: they provide a language that enables discussion. But this 
language is a private language, private, that is, in origin, designed essentially 
to permit better descriptions of psychopathological processes. It is a 
language for talking about those suffering from what is still called mental 
illness. In this thesis I refer to narcissism as a syndrome, a way of being in 
the world, and try to avoid reference to normality and abnormality (other 
than for historical reasons). Narcissism is not a state of being but a way of 
being: it involves dynamic processes. All of us have access to these 
processes, but those to be called unresolved narcissists use them to a degree 
that resolved narcissists would find unreasonable. There are certain 
processes, unique in their constellation, that inform and underpin how 
narcissists think, believe and behave. In this sense, the narcissistic 
syndrome is different from any other. Only by first understanding and 
identifying these processes can we discuss the narcissistic syndrome.  
 
I make the important difference between those who have resolved their 
narcissism, and those that have not. Narcissism begins as a universal 
process in infancy, 16 but for most it becomes resolved sufficiently enough 
that we can lead lives that we might term good-enough. 17 But for some, 
their neonatal narcissism is never resolved, and remains to afflict and colour 
every aspect of their lives. 
                                                
16 This is a basic psychodynamic view. There are of course others. This thesis is an 
object relations study, and I do not consider Biosocial Learning models, Cognitive 
approaches or Social approaches. See Ronningstam (2005) Ch 1. 
17 The term is borrowed from Winnicott, introduced in Appendix II. 
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But why pick Kierkegaard as an example of the narcissist? Kierkegaard 
writes about topics exceptionally dear to every narcissist’s heart – the self, 
the importance of the subjective, approaching God – and he does this with 
unique intensity. Can I show that Kierkegaard was narcissistic, leaving aside 
a few anecdotes? Can a more scientific or substantial case be made that this 
was how he lived his life? How can this be shown, how can it be 
demonstrated?  
 
To do this, I use a methodology called psychobiography. This is not to show 
the true explanation of a life, but to create what is perhaps a new life, a new 
version of a life. Lives are not recreated through psychological analyses 
about causative factors, but are created in the here and now. There is not a 
single explanation, there is never a ‘true’ reading of a whole life: making 
sense of a life depends on why we want to make sense of it.  
 
If, at the end of all this, having gone through the processes described above, 
and with all the caveats listed, I can claim that a very plausible way of 
viewing the life and work of Kierkegaard is through, as it were, narcissistic 
spectacles, how does this one example help our understanding of the 
reading process? 
 
The unconscious of the narcissistic writer speaks directly, without conscious 
mediation, to the unconscious of the narcissistic reader, and we are all 
narcissists to some degree. There are certain psychodynamic processes that 
give a foundation to what happens when we read a narcissistic text. I do not 
claim objectivity for these processes: they are probably of our time and 
subject to future modification or even eclipse, but for now they are a most 
competent working model; they can be readily applied to Kierkegaard’s life 
and his writings. These processes help us understand how narcissism in a 
writer affects what happens when we read their texts. To read Kierkegaard's 
texts in the light of a more profound recognition of his narcissism greatly 
enriches these texts, and by implication allows us a new way into reading 
similar texts. 
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The structure of the thesis is as follows.  
 
There are three key concepts or ideas to explain. The first is the concept of 
narcissism, the second, the impact of psychodynamics on the reading 
process; and the third is psychobiography itself. There must also be an 
introduction to the person and persona that is Søren Kierkegaard. Further, 
there are two other prefaces, relegated to appendices. First I must declare 
my own position on the very notion of the psychologically abnormal, the 
mentally ill, on psychopathology. Much of the explication in this thesis uses 
classical medical language. And much of this is extensively, perhaps 
completely value-laden, and some time is spent assembling evidence for this 
point of view. Second I must consider the claim by Freud that religion is just 
a neurosis, and that hence, Kierkegaard’s writings, along with those of many 
others, are no more than neurotic ramblings.  
 
I look at the life of Søren Kierkegaard by focusing on a handful of key people 
and key events in his life. Three texts are considered in detail - Fear and 
Trembling, Works of Love and The Sickness Unto Death - taking from all of 
these evidence as I see it of narcissism. So here I am creating a new 
Kierkegaard, a new past, a new self, and one that helps us in our 
hermeneutic. This is not the scientific task of elucidating causes about 
Kierkegaard’s life, but rather the hermeneutic task of trying to make sense of 
it. Finally, I use this evidence and the schema so far assembled to look at a 
handful of key themes in Kierkegaard’s output, and discuss both how these 
can be seen as essentially narcissistic, and how we as readers must, to a 
lesser or greater degree, be affected narcissistically by them. 
 
The first foundational area is Narcissism. But in order to have a language for 
talking about this, some consideration must be given to pertinent 
developments in psychoanalytic theory over the last hundred or so years. To 
begin, then, Chapter Two looks at narcissism from a positivist and 
deterministic psychiatric point of view, using the current Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM) as a template. Diagnostic psychiatry offers few 
insights into whatever processes might be involved in any syndrome, 
concentrating instead on categorising external behaviours and symptoms. So 
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psychiatric symptomatology is useful as a means of enabling us to describe 
a narcissist in behaviouristic terms. But this is a language about symptoms 
and states. I need to be able to talk about processes, a persistent theme in 
this thesis. Freud himself developed the concept of narcissism, and so, 
second, proper attribution is given to his eponymous 1914 paper and 
surrounding derivatives. I refer briefly to Freud's insights into drive theory, 
and while drive theory is ultimately limited and limiting, it is important that 
we come to terms with a handful of key Freudian concepts useful in later 
discussions - concepts like the unconscious, the idea of repression, and the 
mechanics of drives. Third, I look at developments that began while Freud 
was still alive, and consider alternative and post-Freudian schools. The 
development of the concepts of object relations are summarised by 
considering the works of Melanie Klein and Ronald Fairbairn. This concludes 
with an operational definition of narcissism, emphasising the defence 
mechanisms that are in use in living a life as a narcissist. My working model 
of narcissism is about the extensive employment of a series of primary 
defence mechanisms or defence processes; the degree of use and relative 
distribution of these powerful processes is what really distinguishes a 
pathological or disturbed narcissist from the more benign narcissism of his 
fellow human beings. And this is the best language in which to 
conceptualise what happens in the narcissist's world, how they live their 
lives, their way of being.   
 
The second topic I must discuss, Chapter Three, is the reading process and 
the effect that psychodynamics has had upon it. The very Freudian concept 
of repression has been used by many, but Jaques Lacan in particular has 
obliged us to reconsider what we understand about the acts of authorship 
and reading and the logical conclusions we must come to about true 
authorial intentionality. The ideas of reader-response theory and the 
arguments of Stanley Fish and Norman Holland are also considered. 
However, none of this helps in the task of understanding the processes that 
are involved in reading narcissistic texts, and so I turn to a closer inspection 
of the psychodynamics of reading, considering the twin post-Freudian ideas 
of countertransference and projective identification. The stages that we 
might go through when reading a text, any text, are described, particularly 
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to show how projective identification can underpin the processes taking 
place when we read narcissistic texts. 
 
The third foundational area to be considered, in Chapter Four, is my 
methodology for examining the life and works of my chosen example of a 
narcissist, Søren Kierkegaard. How to examine his life and works? How to 
comment upon how he lived, and what he wrote, in a coherent and informed 
manner? If psychobiography is the methodology, what is it? How does it 
work? Is it an anachronism in a post-modern age? Can anything be gained 
from the psychobiographical approach? Many are suspicious of the more 
extravagant claims of psychobiography, and maintain it should have much 
more modest goals. In caricature, there are three main approaches or 
schools that comprise psychobiography. The first of these can be called, with 
not a little irony, Truths for All. This approach uses typically the Freudian-
type psychoanalytic findings based on a single monolithic theory that applies 
to all people. So everyone has oedipal issues, the strict Freudians would 
maintain, and this single theory can be used to explain hugely diverse sets 
of behaviours and lifestyles.  
 
On the other hand, Truths for One, an equally ironic appellation, wherein 
idiosyncratic explanations abound, offers one-off explanations for one 
episode of behaviour in just one person, calling on, often unsystematically, 
whatever theory can fit the situation. What ensues is a decided lack of 
consistent theory and intellectual rigour.  
 
The third approach might be called for consistency Truths for Some; this 
uses twentieth century psychological type theory to group humans beings 
into broadly exclusive types, and then seeks consistent psychological theory 
to explain both membership and exclusivity of the type. This third approach 
seems to me to have enormous theoretical benefits, since the justification for 
both the existence of a type and the criteria for membership of it are 
massively supported by more or less all schools of psychology at this time – 
psychodynamic, behavioural, cognitive and, increasingly, neuroscience.  
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But there remain issues with the avowed intent of current psychobiography 
to reveal something veridical about any part of a life. Hence my suspicion of 
the word 'truths' in any of the three approaches listed above. I argue that 
there is no such veridicality available to us in retrospect, and we can find in 
a life just whatever we are looking for. The important issue is how the 
question is phrased: rather than asking: 'for what are you looking', perhaps a 
more fruitful question will always be: 'why are you looking for something?' 
Nonetheless, even with all these caveats, I can still suggest that using the 
ideas surrounding the concept of Truths for Some as a methodological basis 
will permit me to assign Søren Kierkegaard to the psychodynamic category 
called narcissism, and then draw upon the very considerable corpus of 
knowledge that supports this category. This is not to claim access to a 
fundamental truth: this is one way of looking at a life, a view, as it were, 
through one pair of spectacles. There are other views, other approaches - 
actually, other spectacles; but by taking the trouble to work through this 
approach, by looking at the implications of Kierkegaard living his life as a 
narcissist, we arrive at some interesting and it seems to me profound 
conclusions. 
 
On that point, Chapter Five, I must also properly introduce my hero. What is 
interesting is to consider the reception of Kierkegaard over the last hundred 
and fifty years. For the first century or so of these, there was a distinct 
medicalistion of the man, almost a determination to view him as 
psychologically different (for many), mentally ill (for some). I review the 
literature to gain support for this aspect of our perception of Kierkegaard, 
and then consider how he has been viewed in more recent times – whether 
as a writer, a philosopher or a theologian. What seems to be important is 
that no matter how we view him, our understanding of his ideas will be 
enhanced by considering the effect his narcissism has on ours. 
 
At this point I refer the reader to Appendix II, which discusses the 
relationship between psychoanalysis and God. This is not merely indulgent: 
classical theory has harsh things to say about religion, and it is proper to 
have a balanced view. Just as a case can be made that religion is a 
consequence of psychodynamics, a similar case can be made that 
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psychodynamics is a consequence of religion, that there is no absolute basis 
for making one the narrative and the other the meta-narrative. But much 
more interestingly, Donald Winnicott’s writings on the idea of the 
intermediate space bring a new set of concepts and a language to talk about 
religious experience and religious processes. Rather than negating the 
concept of religion, psychoanalysis has added enormously to our ability to 
think and speak about it. 
 
And I also refer the reader at this point to Appendix III, to discuss the 
particular language used in this thesis, the language of psychopathology. Its 
use is so pervasive: presentation of many of the great ideas necessarily 
discussed cannot be done without repairing to the historical language of 
mental illness or psychological deviation. This, in our time, has become a 
troubling issue, reflected in both the changes in the basis of psychiatry, as 
well as the very significant changes in meta-theory in psychoanalysis that 
have taken place. I use my own concept of mental illness as unwanted 
behaviour to try to escape the value-laden language of traditional psychiatry. 
 
In the following four chapters, evidence is sought for narcissism in 
Kierkegaard’s life and works. Given the enormous corpus of what he wrote, 
and the truly vast secondary literature on that corpus, this must be a very 
careful consideration. This part is not an essay on philosophy, or theology; 
neither is it a biography, nor a critical review of his writing. It is a 
psychodynamically-based consideration of his life and works, with a view to 
demonstrating that he was subject to one particular syndrome, and the 
corpus is viewed only in that light. But even having said that, I can do no 
more than select certain examples of his work to illustrate what is hopefully 
an increasingly reliable and plausible analysis. In Chapter Six, I concentrate 
on eight aspects of his life and relationships: with Mother and Father, 
Childhood and Youth, and with Regine; I discuss his sexuality, the 
implications of the Corsair Affair, and his relationship with the ordinary 
man. 
 
The next three chapters look at three texts. Fear and Trembling is the subject 
of Chapter Seven. Kierkegaard predicted it would be the book by which he 
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would be best remembered, and that prediction has surely come true. It is a 
rattling good book, repaying multiple reads. It is also, I argue, supremely 
narcissistic. Kierkegaard, through de Silento, is at great pains to point out 
not just the moral conflict facing Abraham, but the teleological issue: Isaac 
is the seed from which Israel shall grow. It is not only about a father 
murdering his son; there is a huge political-religious-cultural imperative 
also. The Aqedah is really a monumental existential dilemma. This dilemma 
is narcissistic on a huge scale. Fear and Trembling can be read on a 
multitude of levels. The secondary industry, to quote Kirmmse 18, shows no 
sign of abating, with three more expository texts arriving within the last 
decade. But whatever else one sees in the book, by ignoring completely the 
narcissism so very present one would lose much of the interest, richness 
and humanity present in the text. 
 
Second, I talk in Chapter Eight about Works of Love. This is a difficult text, 
and even the supporters have to pause to admit there are failings. For me, 
the common charges that it is acosmic and asocial are difficult to dislodge. 
There has been substantial analysis on this significant text of theological 
ethics, and I suspect this is down to the need to rationalise the essentially 
unpalatable nature of Kierkegaard's recommendations. It is relatively easy to 
make sense of what he says within the text, to demonstrate the internal 
consistency. But applying his rubric seems, for our time and place at least, 
to be very difficult. What Kierkegaard asks seems neither reasonable nor real 
- it does not strike a chord with the modern psyche. Why? Because this is a 
much more punishing and punitive text than is usually admitted. It is a text 
that signally fails to come to terms with sexuality, indeed with emotion in 
general. It is a text about intimate relations but written from the point of 
view of pure ratiocination. This is a text of late narcissism, when life has 
failed to supply all that the narcissist demands, and when depression, not 
uncommonly, has set in. Rather than being an ethic about how we should 
love each other, this, I feel, is Kierkegaard telling us how the world should 
love him. 
 
                                                
18 Kirmmse (1996) .  
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Third, in Chapter Nine, I talk about The Sickness Unto Death. This is a 
psychological text beyond doubt, but not the kind of psychology we became 
used to in the twentieth century. Kierkegaard gives us a series of stages 
through which, he declares, the normal human being can pass. The problem 
for the modern student of psychology is that Kierkegaard’s stages are no 
more than ideographic descriptions - they are a set of, it would seem, 
arbitrary stages with no real sense of how they are serially structured 
psychologically. That is, there is no underlying psychological theory; rather 
we have a set of states of mind that Kierkegaard relates to the subject’s 
understanding of their relationship to God. And this leads us to the great 
problem with Kierkegaard's psychology. Implicit in all that he says, in this 
and much of his other writing, is the idea of the self coming to know itself. 
His analysis of what it is to be a self hangs on the idea that one can truly 
know exactly whom one is - the self knowing the self. But twentieth century 
psychology has suggested that this particular piece of knowledge is 
particularly hard to come by, and worse, very difficult to define. What is the 
true self? How is it different from an untrue or false self? How many selves 
are there? We are much more suspicious indeed of the idea of the single, 
true self, amenable and available to inspection. Current psychological 
thinking in particular, and much post-modern thinking in general, has it 
that selves are multiple - we may speak as a child, as a parent, as a sibling - 
and selves are, if we believe Freud at least, exceedingly difficult to get to 
know. We are masters not of self-perception but of self-delusion, and what 
the twentieth century explained to us were the processes and mechanisms 
that show why Kierkegaard’s sequencing, while it may be fascinating, 
profound even, is ultimately unsound, unsystematic and unhelpful.  
 
Chapter Ten is about what conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. 
There is much to be gained from identifying in the adult Kierkegaard some 
aspects of narcissism, and many of the episodes of his life, apparently 
baffling, and often dismissed or barely commented upon in much of the 
secondary literature, become much more comprehensible if narcissism is 
brought into the reader’s thinking.  
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There was in fact a huge contradiction in Kierkegaard’s life: the very 
authenticity he called upon in others was essentially lacking in his own life. 
In one sense much of his writing was a lifelong compensation for his own 
deeply felt shortcomings. I discuss a handful of key themes from this life and 
his works to show how Kierkegaard’s own narcissism informs our own, and 
hence cements the interdependence of the writer and the reader. 
 
 
In summary, this thesis is about the effects of reading texts written by 
narcissistic authors, and one author in particular. It suggests a praxis for 
reading narcissistic texts. Søren Kierkegaard can be considered eminently 
narcissistic in the sense that I define it, and that his texts have special effect 
upon his readers. For most, this effect may be benign though not 
insignificant. For some, it colours their view of the intellectual component of 
what Kierkegaard is trying to say. There has been much secondary 
commentary of the Kierkegaardian canon, almost without exception about 
the logic and reason of what the author says. This thesis is about the 
emotion generated within us by Kierkegaard, and asks questions about the 
effect of that emotion upon our interpretation the author’s meaning. As 
such, the thesis is framed by the context between emotion and cognition; it 
is situated firmly within the psychoanalytic diaspora; I use the language and 
constructs of psychodynamics to make my arguments. All of this, I 
acknowledge, is of our time, and subject to modification and possible eclipse. 
But it offers a coherent and consistent means of talking about Søren 
Kierkegaard.  
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2 The Concept of Narcissism 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The first concept to be unpacked is that called narcissism; for if this thesis is 
about reading narcissistic texts, then we must be clear what being 
narcissistic entails, what being narcissistic is. So this is a chapter of 
explanation, of defining and agreeing a common language with which to 
speak of Kierkegaard’s narcissism. Hence this chapter is not about 
Kierkegaard, but about narcissism. Kierkegaard’s narcissism is discussed at 
length in Chapters Six through Ten. 
 
What I want to achieve in this section is twofold. First, we need a shared 
model of what narcissism is in the sense of how it could be recognised. The 
psychiatric model, for all its shortcomings, does give us a crisp 
symptomatology - if we meet a person with certain characteristics, we can 
reasonably call them narcissistic; that is, we have a label for the state they 
might be in. But if we can recognise narcissism in an individual, how and 
why is it in them, part of them? Whence did it come? What happens for the 
narcissist? How did their state arise and how is it prosecuted? Why does it 
not go away, ameliorate? For this we need psychodynamic concepts and 
language; we need these to understand the processes involved in narcissism 
so that we can arrive at a working model of both the genesis and 
permanence of the narcissistic state, through understanding the key 
processes that permit its continuing existence. 
 
Obviously, I will be using a particular language to talk about a set of 
hypothesised processes. None of the processes are 'real' of course, and the 
language is arbitrary. No one suggests, for example, that the anti-libidinal 
ego 19 is a location within the hemispheres of the human brain: it is, 
manifestly, a construct. Likewise the process of repression. But if the aim of 
hermeneutics is to give meaning to our selves and our situation, then while 
neither the concepts I use nor their language have any claim to permanence 
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or ubiquity, they do provide a useful way of conceptualising and talking. 
Metaphor has a long history in medicine in general and psychiatry in 
particular, and the metaphorical nature of mental illness, including 
narcissism, is discussed below in Appendix III.  
 
So first, a general introduction. Regrettably, narcissism is both a lay concept 
and a technical term. Actually it is two technical terms, one from psychiatry 
and one from psychodynamic psychology. None of the three meanings really 
coincide, and there is a particular difference between the lay meaning of 
someone who loves themselves to the exclusion of others, and the 
psychodynamic meaning of someone who was not loved, and who tries 
forever to make up for this loss through presenting a false self to the world.  
 
It might therefore be interesting to preface this analysis of the concept of 
narcissism with a consideration of the derivation of the actual term. All three 
versions of the term presumably take their name from a Greek myth, from 
the story of someone who fell in love with his own image. 20 The story is 
worth retelling, if only to contrast the original ideas and implications of the 
myth with the distortions that have come about over the last century. 
 
The nymph Echo, a beautiful creature, was tasked with distracting Hera 
while her partner, Zeus, spent time in search of alternative pleasures. Echo 
fell in love with the equally beautiful creature Narcissus, but alas the 
interest and affection were not returned. As a result of this neglect and 
disinterest, Echo the nymph simply pined away to nothing, until only her 
voice was left. Nemesis, enraged, punished Narcissus by forcing him to stare 
at his own image in a fountain lake. Gradually, Narcissus become so 
enamoured and obsessed with his own image that he also pined and faded 
away until nothing was left of him except a small flower, one that bears his 
name today. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
19 To be explained below. 
20 see Melville (1986) for the source and a discussion.  
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The lay use of the term, clearly derived from this tale, is quite different from 
its clinical use. Whereas in ordinary language we anecdotally think of the 
narcissist as someone forever admiring themselves in mirrors, windows, or 
any other reflection, the clinical use of the term has it that narcissists are 
not in love with themselves at all, but are continuously portraying an image 
that they believe will be loved, to make up for the love they never received. 
They love themselves, not because, as in the lay understanding, they believe 
themselves to be worthy of excessive love and admiration, but exactly 
because at some level they know they are not. They were not loved, and so 
love themselves, excessively, to make amends. Of course all of this is carried 
out at some unconscious level. As a result, their own self, their true self, is 
marginalised as they present instead whatever they feel will evoke the most 
response, the most attention, the most narcissistic supply of affection, love, 
and validation. So the narcissist’s true self is effectively paralysed, and life is 
lived in order to maintain, and often at huge psychological cost, the images 
and the reflections that generate the most positive emotions. When this 
process fails, when the image is not noticed, admired or loved, then the 
narcissist’s world falls apart, and he responds with unrealistic rage and fury 
at the failure of others to respond to this carefully erected image. But 
because of failures in early development, what the narcissist considers to be 
an attractive presentation of the self may well be nothing of the sort, which 
is why narcissists can be such difficult people to be with or to help. Their 
partner has the difficult task of living with what is often a very unlikeable 
person, while having to live with rage and outrage that follows when the love 
is not perceived as complete. 
 
I want to begin by considering, but then essentially dismissing, the 
psychiatric notion of narcissism. The psychiatric notion is still important, 
however, because psychiatry has taken some of the elements of this myth 
and generated a syndrome, the definition of a specific mental illness 
actually, which has become a powerful part of psychiatric taxonomy over the 
last few decades. After that, I turn to psychodynamics, rushing with 
indecent haste through basic Freudian Drive Theory, then considering the 
arrival of Object Relations theory through two writers - Melanie Klein and 
Ronald Fairbairn. I would like to introduce Mrs Klein's three great ideas that 
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help make sense of narcissism - the very idea of an object, the notion of 
splitting, and the fecund concept of projective identification. From Dr 
Fairbairn, I try to emphasise his rejection of drives, and embrace his 
tripartite model of psychopathology that helps explain the compulsion of 
unwanted behaviour. With some understanding of processes of narcissism 
thus gained I offer an operational definition of narcissism. This draws upon 
the idea of the defence mechanism, and shows the palette of defences the 
narcissist uses, as well as the disharmonious results they can have. By this 
time, we will able to talk about why an individual becomes narcissistic, its 
psychogenesis, and also why an individual continues to behave in the way 
they do, what these writers would all call its psychopathology. 
 
There is one final preface. In our time we struggle with the medicalisation of 
mind, with concepts like mental illness and deviation, and see in such 
terminology the effects of time, place, history and culture. This is a difficult 
and profound topic, and one I address below in Appendix III. But for now, in 
summarising the great writers on narcissism, I have to use both their 
language and their world-view. Most of this theory was devised in the early 
twentieth century, when the medical model in psychiatry was at its apogee. 
So all writers of that period speak of psychopathology; the whole discipline is 
based on a comparison between the normal and the abnormal in matters of 
the mind. The allocation of people to one or the other of these categories is, 
we now see, largely a value-laden process, value-laden in a sense 
unimaginable to Sigmund Freud or his immediate successors. I argue below 
that this is exactly what happened to Søren Kierkegaard during his early 
reception. Discussed below in Appendix III are ideas that deconstruct 
psychiatric languages, ideas from Foucault and others. For now, I ask the 
reader to bear with me as I explain early twentieth century concepts using 
the language of the time. 
 
2.2 The Current Psychiatric View 
 
Psychiatry, since the 1960s, has become obsessed with diagnosis rather 
than amelioration, and has given over to individual schools, and the 
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pharmaceutical companies, any discussion of methods of treatment. 21 This 
is nowhere more apparent in modern clinical psychiatry than in the fourth 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, or DSM-IV 22, which is 
probably the basis of all psychiatric diagnosis in the US, if not the UK. For 
every psychiatric condition, the Manual contains a set of descriptors of how 
a person with the syndrome might behave or think or feel. Nowhere is there 
any attempt to consider the causes of the symptoms, or indeed how they 
might be treated. Usually multiple descriptions are proposed; exhibiting a 
subset is sufficient for a positive diagnosis. There is no condition called 
Narcissism, but there is one called Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD), 
and, according to DSM-IV, a person exhibiting NPD shows: 
A pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behaviour), need for 
admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning in early adulthood and 
present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the 
following: 
 
a) Has a grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates 
achievements and talents, expects to be recognised as superior 
without commensurate achievements) 
b) Is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, 
beauty or ideal love 
c) Believes that he or she is special and unique and can only be 
understood by, or should associate with other special or high-status 
people (or institutions) 
d) Requires excessive admiration 
                                                
21 The reasons for this are doubtless many, but one particular event stands out in 
every history of Psychiatry, and that is the paper by Daniel Rosenhan in 1973. 
Rosenham and some of his colleagues wanted to test the accuracy and validity of 
psychiatric diagnosis at that time. So they presented themselves to psychiatric 
hospitals claiming to hear voices in their head. They were admitted, and from the 
moment of admission, told only the truth, never again referring to the voices, and 
changing only their names and professions. They were diagnosed, typically, as 
schizophrenic. When in due course they came clean about what they were doing, 
they were simply not believed, and could not gain release from the institution. 
Eventually the only way for them to be released was to agree with the psychiatrists 
that they were mentally ill, understand the criteria for getting well again, and live up 
the expectations of their captors. The publication of this paper shocked both US 
psychiatry and much of US medicine, and brought about the objectivisation of 
psychiatry, reducing it to ticks in boxes, as evidenced in DSM-IV. See Rosenham 
(1973).  
22 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual remains the premier diagnostic manual in 
the US. It is strictly a classification manual, and makes no pretence at analytic 
methods or explanations. There have been previous incarnations, and we are 
currently up to version IV, with a text revision (TR) the latest offering. DSM-V is 
actively under preparation. The manual lists a very large compendium of disorders, 
over 400, grouped by type. Our interest is in Personality Disorders, of which eleven 
are listed, and in particular number 301.82 – Narcissistic Personality Disorder. 
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e) Has a sense of entitlement i.e. unreasonable expectation of especially 
favourable treatment or automatic compliance with his or her 
expectations 
f) Is interpersonally exploitative i.e. takes advantage of others to achieve 
his or her own ends 
g) Lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognise or identify with the feelings 
and needs of others 
h) Is often envious of others, or believes that others are envious of him or 
her 
i) Shows arrogant, haughty behaviours or attitudes 
 
 
The same source also tells us a great deal about the incidence of the 
syndrome: most narcissists are men - about 75% - and it is very frequently 
linked to co-morbid diagnoses of substance abuse and impulsive or reckless 
behaviour. About 0.7% of the population in the Western world are thought to 
suffer from NPD, but it seems barely to be recognised in the developing 
world. The World Health Organisation ICD-10 did not include NPD in its 
1990 revision. 
 
To put some phenomenological flesh on these medical bones, attached is a 
single case study in summarised form in Appendix I. 
 
But there is clearly a fundamental issue with this psychiatric approach. 
Exactly because DSM-IV tries to be independent of any particular school of 
theory, it simply offers a series of clinical indicators against which to match 
presenting symptoms, in order to arrive at a diagnosis. This symptom-
matching approach is generally more helpful and accurate with physical 
illness, and at its best where there is to be found the minimum number of 
intervening variables between the cause and the symptom. So a bacterial 
infection is ideal – the symptoms are unequivocal and immediate, and the 
pathways between the infecting agent and affected organs are simple and 
few. Psychosomatic illnesses are less ideal: it is difficult to be sure of the 
pathways between a stressor and, say, an asthmatic attack. In psychiatry, 
the problem is magnified. It is no secret that much discontent has emerged 
with the whole DSM-IV approach; even its devoted admirers admit that 
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diagnostic accuracy may be more consistent, but at the cost of a conceptual 
understanding of what is actually wrong with the patient 23.  
 
Relating to this thesis, the DSM-IV description of the narcissistic personality 
appears two-dimensional, and it lacks explanatory power of any kind.  
If we recall the phrase from one of the Braggs: ‘‘Science is either physics or 
stamp collecting’’ 24, it must be admitted that something is clearly missing 
from DSM, that it has a definite air of philately about it. That something, 
from the point of view of this thesis, is psychodynamics in general, and 
Object Relations theory in particular. Narcissistic Personality Disorder, one 
of the categories of DSM-IV, is just that, a simple category, devised and 
presented with little reference to the processes that constitute it as a 
constellation of symptoms. Perhaps understanding and applying the 
processes involved in narcissism will provide a much richer method of 
attempting to comprehend what motivated and inhibited Kierkegaard. 
Psychoanalytic theory, and object relations theory in particular, is wholly 
concerned with processes, and with those structures that support the 
processes. So I now turn, it must be said out of frustration with this 
nosology, to a very different approach indeed. 25 
 
 
2.3 Preface to an Object Relations View of Narcissism  
 
Here I want to derive and consider the psychoanalytic concept of narcissism. 
This is a term for a set of processes, and narcissism thus construed need not 
                                                
23 See Morey and Jones, Ch 15 in Ronningstam’s Disorders of Narcissism. This is 
also a common theme throughout Nancy McWilliams’s Psychoanalytic Diagnosis. 
(Ronningstam (2000), McWilliams (1994)). The whole issue is discussed at some 
length below. 
24 Ascribed to both Sir Lawrence (the father) and Sir William (the son). It is uncertain 
who first said it. Uniquely as father and son, they both won Nobel prizes in physics. 
25 The situation is considerably worse than this summary suggests, since narcissism 
has become a major focus for personality disorder investigation. The DSM-IV 
classification seems to many to be absurdly simple-minded, since there are generally 
agreed now to be at least three versions of the narcissistic personality: Arrogant, Shy 
and Psychopathic. Each of these exhibits behaviours based on narcissistic 
antecedents, but which are, externally, very different. For a detailed discussion and 
summary, see Ronningstam (2005) especially Chapters 2 and 3.  
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be seen as any kind of disease or pathology, nor even as a necessary human 
fault or failing. It is a way of being in the world; not always, it must be said, 
the easiest, or most endearing or most effective. I begin 26 with an 
introduction to Sigmund Freud’s ideas and rapidly move to his thoughts on 
narcissism. Freud was a drive theorist, but this thesis contends that 
narcissism is only understandable through the relationships we have with 
representations of other people, that is, through object relations 27. To 
Melanie Klein goes the accolade of being the innovator of this kind of process 
thinking, and I follow the development of her thought. Ronald Fairbairn, in 
contrast, is something of an overlooked genius, but one who provided 
superbly theoretically innovative and therapeutically useful concepts, and I 
                                                
26 This section is concerned with the derivation of the psychoanalytic concept of 
narcissism. Psychoanalysis has evolved for itself a considerable private language, 
and some of this can appear impenetrable at first.  Several texts can help 
understanding.  
By far the most accessible is Charles Rycroft’s A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis 
(Rycroft (1972)). Witty, sometimes irreverent, but always helpful, this is an excellent 
start.  
Stephen Mitchell and Margaret Black have written a remarkably concise yet 
adequately detailed summary of a century of psychoanalytic thinking in their Freud 
and Beyond (Mitchell and Black (1995)). Sometimes the pace is a little too 
breakneck, but one certainly gets enough of a flavour of what Freud and the post-
Freudians are all about.  
A more serious text is from Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The 
Language of Psychoanalysis. This is essentially a dictionary of terms and their 
meaning, written in French in 1967 and translated into English in 1973 (Laplanche 
and Pontalis (1988)).  
Apparently forbidding, but in fact immensely explanatory and useful, is Bob 
Hinshelwood’s A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought (Hinshelwood 1989)). This explains 
not only every aspect of Kleinian thinking but also compares and contrasts them 
with Freudian thought, by way of definition, example and commentary.  
At the end of the day, the only way to come to terms with any new language, of 
course, is to use it on a daily basis, which is exactly what practicing 
psychotherapists do. Without this frequent rehearsal, the casual or novice reader 
may find a need for flash cards or a summary. 
27 Object Relations theory is unquestionably a large topic, but there are a few 
introductory guides through the concepts and terminology. Michael St Clair’s Object 
Relations and Self Psychology is undoubtedly a brief introduction, but perhaps too 
superficial to be of much value (St Clair (2000)).  
Lavina Gomez has written a somewhat larger text, but again there is often but a 
surface explanation of the major ideas (Gomez (1997)).  
Judith Hughes ‘Reshaping the Psychoanalytic Domain’ is a worthwhile, detailed, 
arresting and authoritative summary of three major thinkers (Hughes (1990)).  
The standard text, however, remains that from Jay Greenberg and Stephen Mitchell: 
Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory (Greenberg and Mitchell (1983)). However, 
do not take everything in this exceedingly well regarded text as gospel. For a truly 
questioning but apparently valid counter-view, the reader is urged to consider 
Gregorio Kohon’s paper in Free Associations: Objects Are Not People 
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give due space to this Scottish iconoclast. There are very many other authors 
who have contributed in a fundamental way to our understanding of the 
processes involved in narcissism - Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut are the 
two most obvious. I will draw upon to their conceptual additions en passant. 
The most glaring omission is that of Donald Woods Winnicott. He is such a 
pervasive thinker and his ideas are used at several points during this thesis. 
There is also a group of lesser theoreticians who have studied some of the 
other aspects of narcissism - self-destructiveness, shame and humiliation, 
parental aggrandisement - aspects to be considered when applying the 
concept of narcissism to Søren Kierkegaard’s life and work. 
 
 
2.4 Origins of the Psychoanalytic Idea of Narcissism 
 
In the voluminous literature on narcissism, there are probably only 
two facts upon which everyone agrees: first, the concept of narcissism 
is one of the most important contributions to psychoanalysis; second, 
that it is one of the most confusing. 28 
 
The term was first used in a psychological sense by Havelock Ellis in an 
1898 monograph on Autoeroticism. Paul Nacke also employed the term to 
describe a sexual perversion. It was Johannes Sadger who brought it into 
common psychoanalytic parlance initially on the psychoanalysis of a 
homosexual in 1908. Otto Rank wrote a paper in 1911, probably the first 
truly psychoanalytic paper; in this he linked an essentially sexual or sensual 
process with psychic phenomena that manifestly were not either of these. By 
1911, Freud had written a note on the genetic aspects of narcissism, and in 
his 1913 book, Totem and Taboo 29, linked narcissism with a series of other 
overt behaviours. Ernest Jones later wrote perhaps the first account of 
narcissistic character traits, and Karl Abraham first described the resistance 
to transference that seems to characterise such patients 30. 
 
                                                
28 Pulver (1970) p 319. 
29 Freud, SE XIII. 
30 See the introduction to Freud’s 1914 paper in SE XI for a summary of the pre-
history of the concept. 
  
 
Page 34 
 
 
In terms of this thesis, the great paper, the starting point, was Freud’s ‘On 
Narcissism’, published in 1914. This highly compressed and conceptually 
complex paper is really about how object libido31 can develop out of ego 
libido32, how one changes from investing only in the self to investing in 
others. The paper also gives the frequently quoted four elements or 
presentations of narcissism: first, as a form of sexual perversion, as well as 
the basis for all sexual perversions; second, as a stage in libidinal 
development; third, as a kind of object choice, representing what the person 
would like to have been or would like to be; and fourth, relating to self-
esteem.  
 
Freud modified his views continually; the 1915 paper ‘Instincts and their 
Vicissitudes’ 33 speaks of the move from narcissism to object love, and this is 
a significant shift in theory. But by 1923, Freud produced his structural 
model in ‘The Ego and the Id’ 34, permitting a description of narcissism in a 
wholly new language – narcissism was the containment of all libido in the id. 
 
This basic drive model - with its concern for the intra-psychic and oblivion to 
the outside world - became increasingly unsatisfactory during Freud's later 
life. Freud never really moved beyond a drive model; he added aggression to 
libido, and tinkered with a death instinct right up to the very end of his life. 
He acknowledged that a drive theory might be an incomplete theory, but this 
was really no more than what Greenberg and Mitchell call a ‘strategy of 
accommodation’. 35 
 
Essentially Freud was a biologist, a neurologist. He began famously with his 
scientific project, and this was the infrastructure around which he built the 
early theories. While he became aware of the concept of the internal object, it 
was a deus ex machina concept, one that he never really developed. But 
despite these limitations, Freud gave us, for the first time, a means of 
                                                
31 libido invested a representation of another person or thing. 
32 libido invested in the self. 
33 Freud SE XIV p 109. 
34 Freud SE XIX. 
35 Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) Ch 3.  
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logically explaining some aspects of mental behaviour using an internally 
consistent and economical theory.  
 
 
2.5 Melanie Klein 
 
Although Freud remained true to the drive model essentially throughout his 
life, in his writings he eventually admitted the idea of ‘object’ 36 as it came to 
be used in object relations theory. Much of the impetus for this maturation 
of ideas came from his contemplations about narcissism. Eventually Freud 
acknowledged that an object can affect psychic structure, something that 
hitherto only drives could accomplish. The idea that objects have a 
deterministic effect was an important turning point, and one to be built 
upon by all the theorists considered in this thesis. None, however, should be 
given more credit for radicalism than Melanie Klein. 37 
                                                
36 The idea of an 'object' is not particularly devious, and is not at all removed from 
everyday life. Perhaps an example from Greenberg and Mitchell will make the point. 
A patient of theirs reported that his niece and her boyfriend were to visit him for the 
holidays. In preparation for the visit, he had been polishing his lamps, wiping 
fingerprints off the walls, and in general, preparing for the onslaught of what might 
be thought to be intensely critical, parental intruders. His mood, as he described the 
preparation, matches the story; he is apprehensive, timid, and embarrassed by the 
living conditions his guests will observe. In the next session, following the holiday, 
he says that the visit went surprisingly well, except that the 'kids' who stayed with 
him were 'bums' and 'slobs', wanting only to lie around in bed all day, revelling in 
the freedom to do this away from their parents. His affect once again matches the 
situation as he describes it. He is haughty and contemptuous, condescending and 
judgmental (Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) p 10). 
What is striking about this very ordinary example is how distant the reality of the 
visitors is from the version that the patient carried round in his head: before the 
holiday, the visitors were assigned the persona of parent; and afterward very much 
the persona of child. His perception of the same, unchanging people was determined 
to a very large extent by matters nothing whatsoever to do with the visitors, but 
instead by factors leftover from some early life experiences. So the visitors were 
objects - initially parental, and good, latterly children and not really so good. There 
was, as the authors observe, only a tangential relationship between the reality of the 
visitors and the model or template that the patient has of them. So it is for us all, 
and object relations theory explores how this splitting into versions of reality comes 
about, from whence objects come, and what we can do about them when the objects 
engender profound unhappiness in everyday life. 
37
 Reading Klein is an adventure, and repays the effort. Her complete works are 
available in four volumes from the Hogarth Press (Klein (1975)). An excellent 
introduction is available from one of her students, Hanna Segal (Segal (1989)).  
A collection of the most important papers can be found in Envy and Gratitude (Klein 
(1997)). The introductory texts referred to above all contain substantial chapters on 
the author. 
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There are three issues raised by Klein that are of very great importance to 
any consideration of narcissism. The first is the vexed question about where 
objects come from. The second is about the process of splitting, and the 
third is the process of projective identification. These will be considered in 
turn. 
 
First is the matter of objects and their origins. Klein really revolutionised 
thinking through her analysis of children, arriving at the conclusion that the 
child’s earliest reality is ‘wholly phantastic’ 38. By this she means that 
children possess innate object images, and that only later are these 
matched, as it were, with reality. This in turn begs the question of where 
these innate images come from. In contrast to Freud’s formulations, where 
drives are things in themselves, having no initial attachment to anything, for 
Klein, there is a clear implication that drives possess, a priori, some kind of 
an innate image or representation of what it is they seek. In her 1932 text, 39 
she summarised the early phase of her thinking from the days in Budapest, 
which emphasised, like Freud, the pursuit of sexual pleasure and the drive 
for knowledge. She argued for an extensive array of memory images present 
from birth, coming into existence through some unspecified process of 
presumably phylogenetic inheritance. So the earliest object relations of the 
neonate are with representations of body parts - faeces, penises, breasts, the 
womb - as well as aggressive mechanisms – arson and poisoning for 
example. The relations with these objects come into being without the child 
having any knowledge of the objects or processes in reality. The drives of the 
young child are thus towards these internal representations, and only later 
are they matched with reality. Strictly speaking these are phantasised 
objects, and not true objects. 
 
Klein used the term paranoid-schizoid position to reflect the central concerns 
of this stage of life, as the child splits objects into their good and bad parts 
                                                
38 ‘Phantasy’ is not the same as ‘fantasy’ in Kleinian thinking; the essential 
difference is that phantasies are deep, primal, unconscious, not under any kind of 
conscious control. Fantasies, on the other hand, carry much of the significance of 
the everyday term – wishes, dreams, ideas I can conjure up or end at will. 
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or objects, in attempt to ward off the dangers of bad objects, both internal 
and external, by keeping images of them separated and isolated from the self 
and the good objects. The child adopts a strategy that enables it to control 
and master persecutory anxiety situations, caused by the splitting into good 
and bad objects. So splitting, a concept that Klein perhaps borrowed from 
Fairbairn, is linked with how the early ego deals with aggression. Both the 
object, and the affect or mood that accompanies the object, are split, so that 
good and bad objects can be maintained in different spheres, as it were. 
Good objects - distorted internal presentations of external things or process - 
are completely introjected and taken into the ego to become part of the self, 
fused with the self. Bad objects - distorted internal representations of 
negatively perceived external things - are denied entry into the self and 
projected outwards. At its worst, with severe aggression, there are multiple 
bad objects that themselves can be split into part bad objects that are 
projected outwards, giving rise to a plethora of persecutors.  
 
Later in her thinking, Klein emphasises more holistic issues of the person. 
This phase resulted in the description of the depressive position. Somewhere 
around six months, the child realises that there is in fact only one mother. 
The beloved person is also the one destroyed in bouts of indescribable rage 
during frustration and anxiety. The child now wants to make reparations, to 
restore what has been destroyed. This is the depressive position exactly 
because the ego doubts its ability to achieve this goal. 40 But crucially, the 
object is no longer simply a vehicle for the gratification of drives – positive or 
negative – but rather a genuine ‘other’ with whom the child maintains 
intense relations. 
 
So we can see three different systems at work in Klein’s overall model of both 
development and psychopathology. Her first phase is concerned with sexual 
pleasure and a search for knowledge about especially the child’s mother’s 
body. In the second, the terrifying persecutory world is encountered and 
                                                                                                                                       
39 Klein (1932). 
40 Her analysis of the twin positions of paranoid-schizoid and depressive is very 
important for all of psychotherapeutics: on this reading, every psychodynamic 
encounter is an attempt to shift from the former to the latter. 
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mastered through splitting the confusing baffling objects into good and bad 
components. In the third phase, object relations proper come into being, as 
the child concerns herself with the whole object and expresses concerns 
about what she has done to that object. The object, by this stage, is more 
than a simple a focus for a drive: it has become something significant in the 
life of the child, about which the child genuinely cares, one way or another.  
 
 
2.6 Ronald Fairburn 
 
Klein was paradoxical in that for much of her working life she was unsure 
about distancing herself from mainstream Freudian theory. As has often 
been noted, she used Freudian language, but not always in a Freudian way. 
It was Fairbairn alone who had the courage to break with the drive model, 
and it must be said that Fairbairn informed some considerable part of 
Klein’s later thinking. 
 
First, last, and foremost, Fairbairn 41 was against drive theory. He viewed 
much of the Freudian model as simply anachronistic. It was devised at a 
time and in a place – Germany at the turn of the 19th century – when 
certain models or paradigms held sway in the natural sciences. From his 
earliest writings, and based on clinical experience, Fairbairn rejects libido 
theory as pleasure seeking. Libido in his view is object-seeking. Objects are 
not added on but are built into libidinal energy. So libido is about objects; 
libido seeks object. 42 
 
He was undoubtedly influenced by Klein’s writings, which he read in the 
1930s, and he accepted Klein’s concept of positions, questioned with her the 
explanatory power of libido, and saw that relations with internal objects had 
                                                
41 Jock Sutherland’s definitive biography is an excellent read: sympathetic, 
challenging, exegetic, engaging (Sutherland (1989)). 
42 Fairbairn wrote papers rather than textbooks, and these can readily be divided 
into three groups - Clinical Papers, his development of Object Relations Theory, and 
a Miscellaneous. Most of the important papers have been collected and issued by the 
Tavistock as Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, originally in 1953 and later in 
1994 (Fairbairn (1994)).  Most of his thinking can be found in this one volume.  
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greater explanatory powers. But Klein had not been radical enough for 
Fairbairn. In particular, Freud’s libido had become discredited; libido for 
Fairbairn was no more than an object seeking principle. Famously, he asked 
the simple question: ‘Why did the baby suck the thumb?’ Not: ‘Why did it 
suck anything’, but ‘Why the thumb?’ The answer was obvious. In contrast to 
Freud, who thought of it as a need for continued oral sexual satisfaction, a 
need that had become detached from the process of feeding, Fairbairn saw 
that it was because there was no breast to suck. 
Even the baby must have the libidinal object; and, if he is deprived of 
the natural object (the breast), he is driven to provide an object for 
himself. 43 
 
In this process, Fairbairn has also interrelated the ideas of energy and 
structure. Again, this reverses Freud’s 19th century ideas of the separation of 
structure and energy, and takes a very much more twentieth century view of 
their essential interrelation. 
 
The reversal and dismantling continues. Human adult behaviour is based on 
a drive for relationships with others, not on a set of aimless drives seeking 
pleasure or tension reduction. So psychopathology (as Fairbairn very 
definitely described it) is very much about issues over failures in relating to 
objects, rather than conflicting unconscious conflicts about pleasure-seeking 
impulses. 
 
In normal, non-pathological development, Fairbairn sees the goal of 
emotional maturation to be the achievement of mature independence. 
Infants live with real parents but also with internalised objects based on 
primary identification - the merger with the mother. The compensatory 
internal objects make amends for the shortcoming in the real parent. So 
maturity involves both a relinquishing of dependence on his real parents 
alongside an abandoning of his compensatory internal objects.  When these 
internal objects are released, the splitting of the ego is overcome and 
integrity restored. Hence the central issue of all psychopathology for 
Fairbairn is the conflict between the need for emotional independence and 
                                                
43 Fairbairn (1994) p 33. 
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adult relationships on one hand, and the fear of abandoning infantile ties 
and dependences upon internal objects, for fear of losing contact of any 
kind. 44 
 
The link between ego and object is now this: to be meaningful, an object 
must have some ego attached to it. The libidinal ego is that part of the 
child’s original ego that has not given up its unsatisfied longings for 
dependence upon its mother. Throughout life, it remains bound up with the 
exciting object, forever waiting for potential contact with the mother-as-
object; it remains bound to hoped-for events, promises, tantalising 
situations – all events that never happened. The libidinal ego longs for union 
with the exciting object, as an internal object relation, because the longing 
for real gratification from the real mother became too painful, and was 
internalised. 
 
The anti-libidinal ego by contrast, is the place for all the negative feelings 
that follow from the frustration of libidinal longing. The anti-libidinal ego is 
attached to the rejecting object, the depriving and withholding internal 
object of mother. So the anti-libidinal ego hates the libidinal ego because it 
identifies with the exciting object – the potential mother. It also attacks the 
exciting object for its false promises, and the libidinal ego for its false hopes 
                                                
44 It is in his work on Endopsychic structures that Fairbairn has given a richer and 
more complex model of model of human development, and with considerable 
psychotherapeutic implications. 
Psychic structures and the development of the ego stem from the differing kinds of 
relationships that a child can have with its mother. Basically, Fairbairn posits both 
gratifying and ungratifying components in this relationship. The ungratifying aspect 
can also be subdivided into simple and blunt rejection, and rejection following hope 
or expectation. So Fairbairn speaks of a gratifying mother, an enticing mother and a 
rejecting mother. The single real mother, who is all of these things, is internalised 
and separated out into the ideal object, the exciting object and the rejecting object. 
Now, and crucially, as each of these is internalised, a part of the healthy ego or self 
is broken off and bound up in an internal object relationship with the object.44 So 
Fairbairn proposed three aspects of the internal ego: first is the Libidinal Ego, bound 
with the enticing object, constantly promising relatedness; second is the Anti-
libidinal Ego, bound to the rejecting internal object, constantly hostile to the idea of 
relatedness; and third is the Central Ego, bound to the ideal object of a loving 
mother, carrying with it comfort and gratification. This central ego, essentially still 
healthy, is also available for future mature object relations with real people in the 
future. 
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and devotion. These internal attacks are the basis of much of the self-
punitive aspect of psychopathology. 
 
This schema permits a more careful analysis of the idea of psychopathology. 
The degree of pathology can now be seen as the extent to which healthy ego 
has been bound up with internal objects as libidinal or anti-libidinal ego. 
How much healthy real ego is left over is the key to mature emotional life. 45  
 
The economy and explanatory power of this model is no more evident than in 
the understanding of repetition in psychopathology. Any contact with deeply 
distressed mentally ill patients will convince of the extent to which pain, 
suffering and defeat are absolutely built into the patient’s life. But why? 
According to classical theory, man seeks pleasure and avoids pain.  
 
Fairbairn helps us see that the child’s essential striving is for contact, not 
pleasure. If the parent offers pleasurable exchanges, then that relationship 
will be pleasurable. But if the experience is of rejection, hurt and 
disapproval, the child will not simply ignore that parent and move on to 
something that is pleasurable. The child needs the parent, and must 
internalise those painful aspects of the relationship. This continuing 
attachment of the libidinal ego to the exciting object means that the child 
constantly hopes for a more fulfilling, satisfying relationship. The more 
devoid the actual real world exchange, the greater the hope and hence the 
power of the internalised parent. The child cannot let go of this attachment, 
exactly because of the childhood fear that there will be no attachment left, a 
fear of total isolation, of annihilation. 
 
It is the experience of these internal objects and the projection of them onto 
the outside world that produces pathological suffering, especially repetitive 
suffering. Objects of love are selected exactly because they are withholders of 
love, or deny love, so as to personify the original exciting object, which 
promised but never delivered or fulfilled. So failure in relationships is 
managed repeatedly in order to continue the longing and the need of the 
                                                
45 See his Synopsis, Chapter VII of Fairbairn (1994). 
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libidinal ego for the fulfilment of the promise of the exciting object. Darker 
emotions – the terror, depression and pointlessness of life - represent the 
ego’s identifications with bad aspects of the parents which could not be 
handled in real exchanges, and which were split off and subsequently 
internalised. All of psychopathological behaviour is repetitive because of 
these long-standing and immutable loyalties to early significant carers and 
other people. Living with and re-creating these ties throughout adult life is 
the place from where such self-defeating pathology comes.  
 
 
2.7 An Operational Definition of Narcissism 
 
Now it should be possible to summarise these ideas into a working 
hypothesis, an operational definition of narcissism. 
 
From a process perspective, what all the critical and innovative thinkers so 
far discussed have uncovered, serially but essentially jointly, is a group of 
primitive psychological processes, what are usually called defence 
mechanisms. A defence mechanism is nothing more than what its name 
suggests – a means by which the self can avoid annihilation (in the worst 
case) 46. Traditionally these mechanisms are divided into primary or 
primitive and secondary defences. Using Freud’s original terminology, the 
primary defence mechanisms are linked to the primary process, technically 
to the Id; whereas secondary defence mechanisms are linked much more to 
the secondary process, to matters of the Ego. To put the distinction another 
way, primary defences are those concerned with the boundary between the 
self and the world, whereas secondary defences are concerned with intra-
psychic phenomena, such as issues between the ego and the superego.  
Primary defences include such categories as denial, splitting and projective 
identification; secondary defences are about processes such as repression, 
rationalisation, displacement, reaction formation, acting out and so on. 
Primitive defences are few in number, but have terrible power; most people 
suffering from psychotic episodes use primary defences to make sense of 
                                                
46 see McWilliams (1994) Ch 5 for a discussion. 
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their world, thereby making themselves incomprehensible to others. 
Secondary defences are multifarious and altogether more benign. Primary 
defences are most commonly found in the psychoses; secondary defences in 
the neuroses. There are traditionally 47 thought to be six primary defence 
processes: primitive withdrawal, denial, omnipotence, idealisation, projective 
identification, and splitting, and consideration of these will be central to an 
object relations view of how Kierkegaard lived his life and wrote as he did. 
But these are no more than constructs; they are not in any sense 'real' 
processes. They are convenient terms for speaking about the consistent ways 
people have of dealing with their life. 
 
Withdrawal is the classic schizoid defence. By pretending something is not 
there, I do not have to interact with it. ‘People who withdraw into their own 
mind try the patience of those who love them by their resistance to engaging 
on a feeling level.’ 48  However, withdrawal from the world need not entail 
distortion, so that those using withdrawal as a defence may still have an 
accurate perception of the world, and may still be very sensitive to what is 
happening to others, even if they do not engage themselves. Withdrawal 
stems directly from Freud’s original model of the unconscious and 
repression. Withdrawal in all its forms is about avoidance, of the world, of 
external objects, of unmanageable internal objects. 
 
Technically speaking, Denial is much more than everyday denial - the ‘this 
can’t be happening to me’ sensation. Pathologically it is used in the face of all 
common sense, in the face of all evidence. Whereas in normal life it is a 
common way of coping with the world, pretending that something is not 
going on even though the ‘observing ego’ knows it is, in pathology the denial 
in complete: the object is removed from all conscious life. The denial extends 
to self-awareness, with patients denying their behaviour as abnormal – there 
is no ‘observing ego’. At the extreme this is incomprehensible. 
 
                                                
47 Ibid. 
48 ibid p 100. 
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Omnipotence was hinted at by Klein and others but fully developed by both 
Kernberg 49 and Kohut 50, although in somewhat different ways. Again, there 
is a spectrum from the everyday use of omnipotence – exerting one’s will, 
getting one’s way – through to deep psychopathology. The omnipotence of 
Kernberg in particular, with its consequential rage when the omnipotence is 
frustrated, is a cornerstone of narcissistic processing.  
 
Idealisation, Kohut’s idealised imago 51, begins as a necessary defence 
against a world a child may find overwhelmingly threatening. Some kind of 
idealisation is a part of normal mature love, but the continuing use of this 
defence is pathological. The setting up of an external omnipotent, omniscient 
and omnibenevolent other can act as a means of ignoring the imperfections 
in oneself, and through simple identification or fusion, there comes about 
complete denial. 
 
Projective Identification is an initially difficult concept, as many have 
commented. 52 It will be discussed in more detail below. Patrick Casement, 
who offers the most sensitive and educative explanation, defines projective 
identification as ‘a form of affective communication’, where he uses the word 
‘affect’ to refer to emotion, mood, feeling: 
When projective identification is used as form of affective 
communication, the projector has a need (usually unconscious) to 
make another person aware of what is being communicated and to be 
responded to. This affective identification can then be thought of as 
being brought about projectively by the projector and introjectively by 
the recipient. 53 
 
Melanie Klein first used this concept in a coherent way, and it has since 
become fundamental in much recent psychoanalytic theory. 54 
 
And finally to Splitting, which we can define as a person expressing one 
ambivalent attitude while regarding its opposite as completely disconnected. 
                                                
49 Kernberg (1976). 
50 Kohut (1971). 
51 Kohut (1978). 
52 See Ch 4 of Patrick Casement’s On Learning from the Patient (Casement (1985)).  
53 Casement (1985) p 81. 
54 See James Grotstein’s Splitting and Projective Identification (Grotstein (1995)). 
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The concept obviously derives from Melanie Klein, although we owe 
Fairbairn the credit for explaining the mechanisms it uses. Splitting is a 
fundamental process, almost a defining process, for any narcissistic person. 
 
So how are we to use these concepts in our understanding of the 
psychoanalytic process of narcissism? Narcissism, from this perspective, and 
in the most general psychoanalytic terms, can be defined as a way of being 
for people for whom the continuity of a sense of the self, and the esteem 
attached to it, are fundamentally problematic, and these defence 
mechanisms are the means by which the problems come about and are 
maintained. Object relations theory, as it has been summarised, explains 
how these defence mechanisms engender narcissism. 
 
This thesis makes a distinction between the resolved narcissist and the 
unresolved narcissist. Clearly these two terms are shorthand terms: there is 
no such thing as either. We all retain some narcissism, however magnificent 
our parents were in their task; and despite whatever profound damage our 
parenting may inflict upon us, we all can have lucid moments when our 
observing ego is able to reflect on the motives for our behaviour. There is a 
vast typology of the variations in narcissism, 55 a consideration of which will 
add little to this thesis; inventing more labels for states seems pointless 
when we can much more meaningfully explore the underlying processes that 
define these states. 
 
The typical origin of narcissism can be summarised by invoking the 
narcissistic carer (usually, it seems, mother), herself damaged, unempathic, 
using the child to fulfil his or her own unsatisfied needs for praise, 
admiration, recognition and achievement. The child thus has problems at 
the separation or individuation stage, separating from the carer. This leads 
to a sometimes severe lack of internalisation of self-esteem, and hence a 
dependency upon external sources of gratification and loving. This in turn 
results in a highly vulnerable ego, one which defends itself through 
                                                
55 See Ronningstam (2005). 
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narcissistic defences, outlined above, all of them aimed at creating the 
internal illusion of self-sufficiency.  
 
Current conceptions of narcissism include many subdivisions and types. So 
that there is also an inverted narcissism: for every vain and grandiose 
narcissist, there is within a self-conscious, shamed child, just as in every 
depressed and self-condemning narcissist there resides an omnipotent and 
grandiose version of how they could be. Although there is a real paucity of 
data on the genetics of narcissism, the concept of ‘narcissistic extension’ - 
the use of other people to prop up the self-esteem in the self 56 - ensures that 
there are social and behavioural ways in which narcissism can be 
perpetuated, even if genetic evidence is missing.  
 
We could also encounter the process of the family exploiting the talents of 
one member for their own ends, such that a narcissistic person may well 
have been very important to their parent, but only because of the role they 
performed for that parent, not because of who they actually were. What was 
important was their function, not their self. 
 
We can also see that shame and envy are two of the most pressing drives 
within narcissists – shame at their perception of how the world sees them for 
their shortcomings (their failure to live up to their omnipotence), and envy at 
those they perceive as possessing omnipotence or who lack the deficiencies 
the narcissist very readily feels they posses. Although half a century apart, 
Klein and Morrison 57 show the relatedness of these two concepts. 
 
Narcissists are driven by grandiosity, as Kernberg 58 in particular has 
described, that may be felt internally or projected. So they set up unreal 
goals, and either convince themselves that they have attained them (and so 
feed the grandiose self), or accept their miserable failure, denying human 
fallibility, retreating into a depressive position. 
 
                                                
56 see Alice Miller (1987).  
57 Morrison (1989). 
58 Kernberg (2004). 
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They have very poor relations with other people, and use them exploitatively. 
They judge, idealise, and seem to be without care in their dealings with 
others. This inability to relate to others can lead to the concomitant inability 
to express either remorse or gratitude. Above all, real intimacy escapes 
them. Kohut 59 has given us the concept of the selfobject, an object used in 
the service of the self, with all the demeaning and depersonalising 
implications that follow. So there is a diminished, even absent ability to love: 
all energy is spent on maintaining selfobjects, and on feeding their 
narcissism. ‘Their need for others is deep, but their love for them is shallow’.60  
 
Further, one of the most common clinical presentations is one of constant 
evaluation, whether positive or negative. So some develop narcissism 
because of a constant childhood background of criticism, of failing to be 
good enough, while others, as Rothstein 61 has pointed out, are perpetually 
over-valued, equally damaging to a realistic sense of self-esteem. 
 
The narcissistic personality, therefore, has a peculiar sense of the self:  
a vague falseness, shame, envy, emptiness or incompleteness, 
ugliness, and inferiority, or their compensatory counterparts: self-
righteousness, pride, contempt, defensive self-sufficiency, vanity and 
superiority. 62 
 
And in one sentence, if there is just one characteristic that summarises the 
narcissistic personality, it is that they feel subjectively empty: they appear 
with a grandiosity that defensively covers an emptiness of self, an absence of 
attainable ambitions, and of meaningful affirming personal relationships. 
Actually, Kierkegaard himself put it quite well: 
‘So I went out into life, initiated into every possible enjoyment of life 
yet never actually enjoying it, but instead, and this was my pleasure 
related to the pain of my depression, striving to produce the 
appearance that I was enjoying it…. That is, I had to become and did 
become an observer….but I was not living.’ 63 
 
                                                
59 Kohut (1971, 1977). 
60 McWilliams (1994) p 175. 
61 Rothstein (1984). 
62 McWilliams (1994) p 177. 
63 Point of View KW XXII p 82. 
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This, for me, summarises the life that Kierkegaard lived. Later Chapters look 
for evidence for this statement when considering his life and three of this 
works. But the next task is to unpack my second key concept, about the 
process of reading, and how psychoanalysis has helped change our views of 
what happens when we read a text. 
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3 Reading and Psychoanalysis 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
1st Spectator: What did he say? 
2nd Spectator: I think it was ‘blessed are the cheese makers’. 
1st Spectator: What’s so special about cheese makers? 
3rd Spectator: Well, obviously, it’s not meant to be taken 
literally. It refers to any manufacturer of dairy 
products. 64 
 
Effortlessly, Monty Python illustrates the central issues of hermeneutics: 
what does a text say, and what does a text mean. In this thesis I am 
engaging with both of these ideas, by asking what happens when we read 
narcissistic texts, particularly those by Søren Kierkegaard. This is a vast 
area, and nothing will be achieved by contemplating the entire discipline. So 
my analysis comes in two halves. First in this chapter, I consider the death 
of the author from a classical Freudian point of view, and later, review 
his/her resurrection through post-Freudian theory. Three topics must be 
discussed, germane to my ideas on reading. First is the demise of the 
authorial model, linked to Lacan’s ideas on repression (which from the 
perspective of this thesis are sufficient to deny any authorial intent). Second 
is the idea and limitations of the Reader-Response model. Having cleared the 
ground, some time is spent, third, on the actual process of reading as I see 
it, using the twin processes of countertransference and projective 
identification. This Chapter concludes with a discussion of what it means to 
speak of a narcissistic text. 
 
 
3.2 The Eclipse of the Author 
 
We can caricature theories of reading as those that concern themselves with 
the author, those that concern themselves with the text, and those that 
concern themselves with the reader. Author-centred criticism has held sway 
                                                
64 From The Life of Brian. Columbia Pictures, 1979 (Jones (1979)). 
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throughout much of recorded history, and there is every reason to find this 
attitude plausible. The idea, the point about reading a text, is to understand 
what the author meant when he or she wrote that text. In order to do this 
properly then, one would study a variety of disciplines to aid that 
understanding - philology, obviously, the biography and bibliography of the 
author, obviously - to attempt to know the world in which the text had been 
written. One  would learn about techniques for establishing the authenticity 
and provenance of any text; one would study the derivation of the target 
language itself. 
 
The working hypothesis of this era was what has been called the Conduit 
Model. 65 There was such a thing as a meaning, and a word was wrapped 
around this meaning like a protective coating. The word, containing the 
meaning, was sent through the ether as part of a text or a spoken sentence. 
The hearer simply unwrapped the word to reveal the original meaning, and 
communication was said to be complete. So the writer takes something from 
his inner psychological self and puts it into the wrapper, the word. This is 
then received and the same inner psychology taken from the outer word. On 
this model, that is how communication occurs. ‘You put intention in at one 
end and get meaning out at the other...’ 66 
 
The reader thus is essentially passive; things happen whether the reader 
wants them to or not: one's response is dictated by the author. This model 
also assumes a parallel lexicon or dictionary in both the author and the 
reader or hearer. Prima facie, there is no problem with this: one assumes 
that we all use words in much the same way. Different cultures, even 
different languages, can be understood using this model if only one tries 
hard enough – obtaining an authentic 1830s Danish to English dictionary, 
together with a broad historical understanding of life in Copenhagen about 
that time should be enough to enable one to understand precisely what 
Kierkegaard meant. 
 
                                                
65 Reddy (1979).  
66 Holland (1992) p 115.  
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This author-centred approach, and a genuine belief that one could truly 
approach the mind and mentality of an author, gave rise to a very literal 
approach to literary criticism and hermeneutics. It forms the basis of the 
hermeneutics of Chladenius:  
There should be no difference between fully understanding a speech 
or writing and understanding the person who is speaking or writing. 
For they too have the same rule to consider as the reader and the 
listener. Thus the speaker or writer can be thinking of the same thing 
as the reader or listener when he uses certain words. 67 
or 
A speech or written work is completely understandable if it is 
constructed so that one can fully understand the intentions of the 
author according to psychological rules… 68 
 
and is not absent in early Schleiermacher: 
Just as every act of speaking is related to both the totality of the 
language and the totality of the speaker’s thoughts, so to understand 
a speech always involves two moments: to understand what is said in 
the context of the language with its possibilities, and to understand it 
as a fact in the thinking of the speaker. 69 
 
And such an approach is not completely dead. A recent prominent US 
literary critic, E D Hirsch, says: 
I argued that, in academic criticism, the significance and use of a text 
ought to be rooted in its fixed meaning, since otherwise criticism 
would lack a stable object of enquiry and would merely float on tides 
of preference. 70 
 
Much early Kierkegaardian scholarship was carried out with exactly Hirsch’s 
maxim in mind: the search was to find the authorial intent of Kierkegaard. 
Now, and certainly in the latter part of the twentieth century, the attraction 
of Kierkegaard is that he represents a very early example of an author who 
sets out to avoid exactly that kind of simple model of a text. It is now a quite 
plausible notion that even for Kierkegaard himself there was not a single or 
fixed meaning. In general, authorial intent has anyway become increasingly 
suspect, and the text has taken on a life of its own. In hermeneutics, this is 
                                                
67 Chladenius J. M. from his Introduction to the Interpretation of Correct Interpretation 
of Reasonable Discourses and Writings. *156. Quoted in Mueller-Vollmer (1994) p 
56. 
68 ibid p 157.  
69 Schleiermacher, F.D.E. quoted in Mueller-Vollmer (1994) p 74. 
70 Hirsch (1984) 
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echoed in the ideas particularly of the later Schleiermacher and Dilthey. In 
the twentieth century, Heidegger and Gadamer more or less completed the 
process of isolating the author from the text and reader. And Barthes and 
Foucault in their own ways each proclaimed the death of the author. For 
Barthes: 
I read the text. This statement, consonant with the genius of the 
language (subject, verb, complement) is not always true….I do not 
make the text undergo a predicative operations called reading, 
consequent upon its being, and I is not an innocent subject, anterior 
to the text, which will deal subsequently with the text as it would an 
object to dismantle or a site to occupy. This ‘I’ which approaches the 
text is already itself a plurality of other texts, of infinite codes, or more 
precisely, codes whose origin is lost. 71 
 
Hence the vast majority of students of texts have moved beyond attempting 
to understand authorial intent - this is such a troubled and troubling 
process that little can be gained from it. As an adjunct, it remains useful, 
but in terms of pure theory of reading, most would consider it a dead end; 
twentieth-century hermeneutics has shown the impossibility of entering the 
mind of an author of another age.  
 
But, actually, why? What are the mechanisms that underpin this assertion? 
Why cannot we enter another mind? Why is our conscious interpretation of a 
text so suspect? How is it, in Barthes’ language, that the ‘I’ approaching a 
text is already a plurality of other texts? To discuss the idea that the text has 
its own life, as it were, I turn to the ideas of Jacques Lacan 72. The reason 
why Lacan is nearest to the spirit of this thesis is his understanding and use 
of Freud’s concept of Repression, and his further use of Displacement and 
Condensation as methods by which repressed meaning changes, producing 
the never-ending chain of signifiers. Up until his presentation of the process, 
while other individuals may have alluded to how repressed signification 
operated, there was no clear statement. (For anti-Lacanians, the theory 
                                                
71 Barthes (1970) 16-17.  
72 This notoriously difficult to approach author is well served by introductory texts. 
Malcolm Bowie’s general introduction is rewarding on every level (Bowie 1991). For a 
faster-paced summary, and an emphasis on the person, Stuart Schneiderman 
provides an immensely engaging study (Schneiderman (1983)). For an 
understanding of the clinical insights that the Lacanian psychoanalytic process 
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relies completely on Freudian ideas, and is little more than a packaging of 
seventy year-old concepts. But, as is so often true, the repackaging makes 
all the difference.) Clearly there are very many other approaches to textual 
independence, but Lacan’s ideas seem to deal with critical issues about 
reading. Note that Lacan was a clinician as a well as a theoretician, and his 
language (and hence mine in this short exposition) is that of the normal and 
the abnormal, the pathology and the symptom.   
 
It was one of Freud’s early patients, Anna O (actually Bertha von 
Pappenheim), who coined the phrase ‘the talking cure’, referring to how 
amelioration of physical symptoms (in her case hysterical) came about 
through language alone. Lacan was to rephrase this later: 
Whether it sees itself as an instrument of healing, of formation, or of 
exploration in depth, psychoanalysis has only a single medium, the 
patient’s speech. 73 
 
For Lacan, it is not just that the symptom is brought out of the unconscious 
to the conscious; it is that it is made word.  
 
In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud had at some great length discussed 
the difference between the manifest dream text and the latent dream 
thoughts. The manifest dream text is the summary of the dreaming process 
that the subject assembles on waking; the latent dream thoughts are those 
underlying the dream, never allowed into consciousness. Lacan’s insight was 
that the dream content, what we report on waking, is a transcript of the 
dream thoughts, but, crucially, presented in language. 
 
Lacan refers to Freud’s twin concepts of displacement and condensation 
frequently. Definitions are helpful. Displacement is: 
the fact that an idea’s emphasis, interest or intensity is liable to be 
detached from it and to pass on to other ideas, which were originally 
of little intensity but which are related to the first idea by a chain of 
associations. This phenomenon, though particularly noticeable in the 
analysis of dreams, is also to be observed in the formation of 
                                                                                                                                       
provides, Bruce Fink has provided an excellent text (Fink 1997). However, by far the 
best study, although twenty years old, is that from Ellie Ragland-Sullivan (1986).  
73 Lacan, Ecrits 247/40 (Lacan (1966).  
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psychoneurotic symptoms, and in a general way, in every 
unconscious formation. 74 
 
Whereas in Condensation: 
a sole idea represents several associative chains at whose point of 
intersection it is located. From the economic point of view what 
happens is that this idea is cathected by the sum of those energies 
which are concentrated upon it by virtue of the fact that they are 
attached to these different chains. 75 
 
Condensation is the process of dialectically incorporating elements of the 
dream thought so to present to the internal censor (the precursor of the 
super-ego) the manifest dream that will be allowed into consciousness. 
Condensation is literally that - the taking of a myriad links between 
signifiers, and reducing, incorporating, altering, exaggerating, diminishing 
them into a dream story that can be told in a few lines or sentences. This is 
the seduction of first reading the Freudian theory of interpretation: a short 
dream is drawn out at length – endlessly it would seem – by Freud to show 
the underlying connections, the displacements that have taken place to 
produce the dream. The dream, as Freud said, is over-determined, endlessly 
so, possessing a myriad of connections with other elements in the thoughts 
of the dream: 
The dream-thoughts and the dream-contents are presented to us like 
two versions of the same subject matter in two different languages. 76 
 
Displacement, on the other hand, involves the transfer of psychic energy 
from one thing to another. Displacement invests an innocent and apparently 
unrelated idea or impulse with all the energy of the repressed wish. In so 
doing, the original idea, the original signifier, may be lost, and all we have 
(Lacan's insight) is a chain of signifiers, with no anchoring point. 
 
We can thus say that dream work proceeds by finding elements that are 
acceptable to the censor and which can consequently be put in the place of 
the ones that are unacceptable. The pressure of pre-conscious surveillance 
obliges the unconscious to resort to circuitous representation, to find 
                                                
74 Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) p 121. See also Freud SE I p 350, 366ff. 
75 Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) p 82. See also Freud SE IV pp 293-295. 
76 Freud, SE IV p 277. 
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signifiers capable of concealing or disguising their signifieds, while at the 
same time speaking for them. Thus the dream is a product of an interaction 
between both the primary and secondary processes, what Freud called a 
compromise, fulfilling to some extent the wishes of both. 
 
Condensation and displacement are thus agents of distortion and disguise. 
They reformulate the repressed wish (or wishes) in such a way as to be 
acceptable to the psychic censor: 
The conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing 
plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the 
unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone. 77 
 
That is, a 'thing' presentation could not attain consciousness without being 
bound onto a 'word' presentation. This binding helps to explain the 
difference in volume and depth and intensity between the dream thought 
and the dream content. The richness of the unconscious language is 
strapped by the poverty of the conscious language. 
The dream is, as it were, differently centred from the dream thoughts 
- its content has different elements as its central point. 78 
 
Coming directly from Freud, this idea of 'de-centring' has been used by 
Lacan in his theory of language and the unconscious.  
 
Saussure differentiated between the concept and the acoustic image that 
became partnered with that concept. He equated the concept with the 
signified and the acoustic image with the signifier. 79 Whereas Saussure gave 
priority to the signified over the signifier, Lacan reverses this, and 
diagrammatically sets out the signifier as partitioned from the signified by a 
bar: this bar represents repression. Rather than the signifier in some sense 
representing the function of the signified, for Lacan, signifiers are all we 
have. Lacan's use of the bar, to mark a barrier between signifieds and 
signifiers, is critical. Without repression, language would operate exactly as 
the linguists say it should; but repression causes metaphoric use; it causes, 
as Lacan puts it, a rent, or tear or snag in the fabric of language. Thus we 
                                                
77 Freud, SE XIV p 201. 
78 Freud, SE IV p 305. 
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have two parallel chains of associations - the conscious known signifiers, 
and the unconscious, and unknowable signifieds. Each sparks along 
independently.  
 
Using this model 80, we can see how the integrity of the author is 
compromised. What the author means by a word is a function not only, or 
even mainly of his or her conscious intent, but of his chains of signifiers 
which in turn arise from his or her unconscious chains of unknowable 
signifieds. However hard the author tries to find the right word for a clear 
concept, repression will have its way, and the text will result from sliding 
signifiers. Thus, language speaks man or woman. And thus the text has 
reached a stage of having independence from its author, for it is not a single, 
one-to-one matching of concept to word or sound. Because of displacement, 
there is huge indeterminacy, over which the author has no control. So 
neither the reader nor the text now have a fixed determinacy, and any 
reading of the text depends upon the same processes of displacement and 
condensation in the reader. The likelihood of authorial intent ever being 
truly divined by a reader is thus doubly unlikely. 
 
However, none of this means that we must abandon investigation into what 
the author intended unconsciously. We may have to agree that we cannot 
ever arrive at a single truth, a unitary explanation, a unique causal chain. 
But just as Freud unravelled dreams, so we can unravel what might have 
been dominant in the motive for a text; whereas Freud found a meaning for a 
dream that made sense both for the analyst and the analysand, so we can 
find mechanisms of authorship that chime and resonate with what we know 
of Kierkegaard the author, and ourselves his reader.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
79 de Saussure (1986). 
80 see The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud in Sheridan 
(1977).  
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3.3 Understanding the Response of Reader  
 
Barthes, Derrida, Eco, Lacan, Iser and Fish all encompass some kind of 
acceptance of the importance of the role of the reader in understanding 
texts, and I want here to consider as an example of this approach the 
Reception Theory model of Stanley Fish, whose Reader-Response theory 
effectively denies the relevance of the author and the text. 
 
For Fish, there are only communities of readers, who have in common a set 
of canons, or ways of being in the world; and depending on which way of 
being is operating, a text will be read in one way rather than another. These 
ways of being are barely within our control. Depending where we are in the 
world will determine how we read a text, and neither the author, nor indeed 
the text, has much to do with it. 
 
The work of Fish is widely seen as a reaction to the New Critical school, 81 
which held that there was objectivity in a text. This objectivity is denied by 
Fish: there is no meaning independent of interpretative strategies by 
individuals. Meaning, in other words, does not exist ‘out there’, but is a 
product of the reader, or to be more exact, a community of readers. For Fish, 
the meaning of a text is what it does to its reader.  
 
At the extreme then, Fish might have to acknowledge the similarity between 
reading a text and interpreting a Rorschach ink-blot: there are interpretive 
communities in each case. 82 He can say all of this because of his view that 
we are always culturally and historically isolated, that we can never access 
previous cultures and therefore previous authorial intentions. Instead we 
have a total disjunction between the author and the reader/interpreter. 
                                                
81 In New Critical Theory, two essays by prominent Yale professors in the 1950s 
underlined the separation of text from either author or reader. Wimsatt and 
Beardsley argued, with immense influence, that neither the working of the mind of 
the author of a text (the Intentional Fallacy) nor the workings of the mind of the 
reader (the Affective Fallacy) should have any bearing on the meaning, value or 
worth of a text (in their case particularly poetry).  
82 For a discussion, see Scholes (1985) Ch 9, especially pp 149-154.  
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Speaking of a dialogue with a critic with whom he profoundly disagreed, Fish 
says: 
If what follows is communication or understanding, it will not be 
because he and I share a language, in the sense of knowing the 
meaning of individual words and the rules for combining them, but 
because a way of thinking, a form of life, shares us, and implicates us 
in a world of already-in-place objects, purposes, goals, procedures, 
values, and so on. 83 
 
...their interpretive practices are not free, but what constrains them 
are the understood practices and assumptions of the institution and 
not the rules and fixed meanings of a language system. 84 
 
But he rejects the charge of relativism, that any reading is possible and 
there is no basis for distinguishing them:  
The point is that there is never a moment when one believes nothing, 
when consciousness is innocent of any and all categories of thought, 
and whatever categories of thought are operative at a given moment 
will serve as an undoubted ground. 85  
 
This idea, that there is never a moment when one believes nothing, is at the 
heart of any psychoanalytic approach to reading. We bring endless baggage 
with us, our repressed unconscious, and sorting out this baggage is part of 
the process of reading that I want to consider below. This baggage, and our 
response to it, lies at the heart of projective identification and 
countertransference.  
 
However, Fish appears to be incomplete: he, too describes states but not 
processes, that there are communities but not how or why. His colleague, 
Norman Holland, on the other hand has produced a more detailed model, 
with implication for process. Holland, building on Fish, suggests a three-
tiered hierarchical model. 86  
 
                                                
83 Fish (1980) p 303. 
84 Fish (1980) p 306. 
85 Fish (1980) pp 319-20. 
86 Norman Holland, along with Stanley Fish and Wolfgang Iser, were known at Yale 
in the 1970s as ‘The Holy Family’. Holland is a prolific writer. Holland, especially in 
his early writing, was heavily influenced by David Bleich. See Bleich (1978).  
Holland’s key texts are Holland (1985) and Holland (1975). A more polemical version 
of his thought can be found in Holland (1992).  
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At the lowest level are the neurophysiological invariates - processes that are 
a consequence of how the brain is wired, how it works; these are 
independent of culture or, he would argue, history. If we are human, then we 
share these invariates. One up from here are cultural invariates, 
interpretations that are not hard-wired, but to which, at any given time and 
in any given culture, most members would subscribe. So these are culturally 
invariant elements of interpretation, or codes. Every member of a culture 
would interpret a signifier in the same way, would invoke the same code. 
Above that, Holland’s top level, are the communities, probably equivalent to 
Fish’s use of the term. One community will interpret a text in the one way; 
different communities will interpret the same text in different, but consistent 
ways, each way being an example of a 'canon' in Holland's terminology. 
Holland gives examples 87.  
 
His point is that some aspects of reading, presumably the very act of 'seeing' 
the letter 'a' for example, depends on neurophysiological invariants. 88 But 
making sense of words is at best determined by the culture within which I 
reside, and will entail both codes and canons. Interpretive communities will 
not differ at the physiological level, but may at the level of code and certainly 
will at the level of canon. 
 
                                                
87 See Holland (1992) Chapter 7. Working from the bottom up, in terms of invariant 
neurophysiology, he recalls the pioneering work of identifying individual neurones 
that respond to edge, to contour, to movement. The famous early work on the Visual 
Cliff indicates how primitive these neuronal structures are, and how invariant they 
are throughout all civilisations, indeed, it would seem, throughout most mammals. 
Codes, by contrast are cultural; they differ between cultures but not within them. 
They refer to culturally agreed ways of recognition. So in the UK, most people would 
recognise a red outline triangle on a road sign as implying some kind of prohibition; 
in US culture the corresponding shape is an octagon. In Scotland it is agreed that 
the Saltire is the Scottish national flag, although in other cultures (eg naval flag 
signalling) the same signifier means something else. 
Above these invariates are canons. These are invoked by sub-groups within a 
culture. So deciding whether a wine is medium dry or medium sweet can be, 
literally, a matter of taste. Arguing that a dominant seventh should be followed by a 
tonic resolution would be common sense for a classical musician, but not 
necessarily for a jazz musician. 
88 The likes of Chomsky would have it that it goes far beyond recognition of letters to 
recognition of elements of sentences, something he claims is uniform throughout all 
languages. See Chomsky (1986).  
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But in a sense none of this really helps: the problem with Holland, and 
hence with Fish, is that they are still both concerned with state rather than 
process. Holland, to be sure, fleshes out Fish’s high level ideas, but still fails 
to approach the critical question: why are there different codes and canons? 
Why do I belong to this sub-culture rather than any other? What has 
happened to make me apparently choose to be part of one interpretive 
culture rather than another? Holland simply moves the question out by one 
degree, without giving any more of an answer than Fish. This is the real 
issue: why, within the same general human community, does a sub-set, a 
faction, a ginger group appear? Why are there sub-groups at all? Why do any 
of us, brought up in essentially the same community, read a text differently? 
The answer, I believe, au fond is psychological, and indeed can best be 
expressed in the language of psychodynamics. In the final analysis, 
communities of readers are formed to a significant extent on the 
psychodynamic processes that happen when readers read. The community 
of readers that finds Works of Love offensive share some psychodynamics, 
whereas those that find it beautiful and revelatory share a different set of 
psychodynamics. These two communities (in Fish’s language) can be 
thought of as two different types (in the language of psychology and 
psychopathology). Of course there is no simple dichotomy: there are endless 
shades of interpretation in the middle. But if I emphasise the bipolar 
extremes to make my argument, I would argue that the extreme types to 
which they belong might be called resolved and unresolved narcissists, and 
the extent of the different readings is based on the extent to which the 
normal narcissistic processes have or have not been contained, managed 
and resolved. So this is about more than being a member of an overt 
community, sharing visible and external codes and canons. This is much 
more private, much more internal, much more psychodynamic. The 
psychodynamic type called narcissist has many sub-divisions – it exists as a 
distribution of some sort. But at the extremes, there are those for whom 
narcissism has essentially been managed, and those for whom it has not. 
These subdivisions co-exist within communities, and their differences may 
or may not be overt in day-to-day living; but they certainly become apparent 
upon reading certain kinds of text, narcissistic texts. 
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But even after all of this, I am still left with the problem of the mechanisms 
that permit these different psychodynamic responses. Lacan has given us a 
potentially nihilistic model for the reading process. Fish and Holland could 
be criticised for stopping their explanation just when it becomes interesting – 
why are there different communities? I must therefore address the detail of 
the process, the 'how' of why different interpretative communities come into 
being, actually the mechanisms of reading narcissistic texts. 
 
 
3.4 The Psychodynamics of Reading Narcissistic Texts 
 
 
This section considers what happens when we read any text, but particularly 
what happens when we read what I will define as narcissistic texts. And I 
want to go through the physical act of reading using as a template the 
processes known as Countertransference and Projective Identification. These 
are first introduced; then, following recent convention, it is suggested that 
they can be seen as two sides of the same coin. I then look in some detail at 
the psychodynamics of the act of reading, and suggest how we might 
recognise the projective identification taking place. This section is concerned 
with general principles, and I save until the final chapter discussion of what 
happens when we read the particular texts of Søren Kierkegaard. 
 
Going along with current practice, it is suggested it makes sense to use 
countertransference as something of an all-embracing concept, a catch-all, 
for the entire response that might be felt by the analyst in the therapeutic 
process with the patient. Empathy, congruence, simple identification would 
all be present. Empathy is about putting oneself in a mode or state of mind 
where the words and emotions of the patient make sense, can be 
understood, can be responded to. Congruence would be about trying to 
understand the place in the world, the world-view, the outlook of the patient, 
without specifically focussing on any particular issue. Simple identification 
might be about being reminded of an event in one’s own life that mirrors 
that in the patient - the death of a pet, moving home, whatever. So the single 
concept of countertransference is capable of logical, systematic and 
  
 
Page 62 
 
 
sequential subdivisions. 89 Countertransference is thus defined as the 
therapist’s total response to the patient, including both conscious and 
unconscious elements: 
The totalist view of countertransference requires the therapist to 
direct… his evenly suspended attention not only to the patient but 
also to the full range of his own thoughts and feelings, even if such 
thoughts and feelings at first blush seem irrelevant, inappropriate, or 
unacceptable. The therapist is encouraged to treat all thoughts and 
feelings as potentially important sources of information about the 
interaction with the patient…. The therapist strives to appreciate the 
ways in which he is being acted upon by the patient. 90 
 
Paramount among these responses is Projective Identification. It is 
customary to begin any exposition of Projective Identification with Melanie 
Klein’s original definition, and so I shall not disappoint. In 1946, she wrote: 
Much of the hatred against parts of the self is now directed towards 
the mother. This leads to a particular form of identification which 
establishes the prototype of an aggressive object-relation. I suggest for 
these processes the term “projective identification” 91 
 
Some time later, Hanna Segal gave a more rounded summary of what 
projective identification entailed: 
In projective identification parts of the self and internal objects are 
split off and projected into the external object, which then becomes 
possessed by, controlled, and identified with the projected parts. 
Projective identification has manifold aims: it may be directed towards 
the ideal object to avoid separation, or it may be directed towards the 
bad object to gain control of some source of danger. Various parts of 
the self may be projected, with various aims: bad parts of the self may 
be projected in order to get rid of them as well as to attack and 
destroy the object, good parts may be projected to avoid separation or 
to keep them safe from bad things inside or to improve the external 
object through a kind of primitive projective reparation. 92 
 
Projective identification has come to be a psychological process that fulfils 
several functions: it is a type of defence, a mode of communication, a 
primitive form of object relations, and pathway for psychological change.  
 
                                                
89 Tansey and Burke (1989). See Ch 3 for a discussion of terms. 
90 ibid p 41. 
91 Klein (1946) p 102.  
92 Segal (1973).  
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It begins as a primitive, and perhaps the only, means of communication 
open to the neonate. The infant is faced with an extremely confusing and 
complicated barrage of stimuli, many of which are utterly frightening. What 
kind of defence is available to the child? With, in Winnicott’s phrase, the 
help of the good enough mother, the baby can organise his experiences into 
dangerous, painful and frightening experiences, as opposed to comforting, 
soothing and calming ones. Supporting this kind of internal organising, 
Klein hypothesised that the infant can use fantasies about ridding himself of 
aspects of himself  (projection) and taking into himself aspects of others 
(introjection). This helps the process of separation. So projective 
identification begins as a means of keeping what is good at a safe distance 
from what is dangerous. Aspects of the infant can, in fantasy, be deposited 
in another person. 
 
Projective identification is also a means by which the child can make his 
mother feel what he is feeling. The infant cannot verbalise these feelings, and 
so must induce feelings into his mother. It is further a means of beginning 
true object relations, and shares something with Winnicott’s idea of the 
intermediate object: projective identification is a transitional form of object 
relations that lies between the stage of what we might call the subjective 
object and true object relatedness. 
 
Finally it is a means of psychological growth. It was mainly through Bion’s 
concepts of the container and the contained that the fourth function of 
projective identification gained credibility. As Bion put it: 
One of the consequences of this process is that, by projecting the bad 
parts (including phantasies and bad feelings|) into the good breast, 
(an understanding object) the infant will be able - insofar as his 
development allows – to reintroject the same parts in a more tolerable 
form once they have been modified by the reverie or thoughts of the 
object. 93 
 
In other words, the wholly unmanageable object is projected out, introjected 
and contained by, in this instance mother. The ‘other’, the ‘container’, takes 
in the projection, contains and processes it, and then again releases it in a 
                                                
93 Grinberg et al (1977) p 29.  
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modified and altogether more benign state. Thus the individual, infant or 
adult, can see that these hitherto wholly bad and fearful objects may not be 
so bad after all. And hence psychological growth. 
 
The concept has undergone much change since Klein’s initial introduction, 
but remains, in the UK at least, a cornerstone of theoretical understanding 
and clinical practice. The essence, though, has changed little: the analysand 
puts some part of himself into the therapeutic space, and this is then 
accepted by the analyst. The thus projected parts are usually bad parts of 
the self, something to be got rid of; and the analyst may be surprised at the 
intensity of what he introjects or allows in. Once the introject has been 
managed and contained by the analyst, it can be discussed, interpreted, 
reflected on by the analyst, and thereby reintrojected in a safer, less 
dangerous form. So these are the three steps of projective identification: 
initial projection by the analysand, introjection and containment by the 
analyst, and subsequent re-projection and re-introjection of the modified 
part object by the analysand. 
 
In the case of the living analysand, this is a straightforward process. When 
dealing with a text, it is more difficult, in that there is no third step. That is, 
the text can as it were project bad parts of the author; the reader can 
introject these parts; but, save putting the book momentarily to one side and 
having an imaginary conversation with the author, it is not otherwise 
possible to require the author to reintroject the contained and modified 
projection.  
 
Actually, I suggest, we do have short or momentary imaginary conversations 
with the author. We do pause, perhaps scratch our head, and comment 
under our breath that the author just doesn’t understand something, or that 
he is mistaken, or presumptuous, or deluded or whatever. Often - usually - 
these are on technical points, points of logic, points of understanding. They 
are rational responses to what we are reading. But beyond the conversations 
of which we are aware, there is still a process that deals with issues about 
which we have only disturbed feelings, not points of logic, rather issues of 
emotion, self and being, matters not easily couched in language. So our 
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response to these engendered feelings tends not to be language based, but 
the effect on the reader can be at least as powerful as points of logic. All of 
this accords with common language and experience. When we speak of a 
text, we use two languages. One will be formal, critical, will compare this 
text to peer texts, to other foundational texts, and will comment on its 
internal logic. But another kind of response speaks of our being disturbed, 
or moved, or touched, without an adequate basis for explanation. We speak 
of a very powerful book. Books can be memorable, and almost certainly not 
because of their internal logic. Texts are powerful because they speak to our 
emotions; and while empathy and simple identification play their part, the 
process by which they largely do this, I am suggesting, can best be described 
by the concept of projective identification. The author puts something of 
themselves into the text, something bad or something good; we read the text 
and accept and internalise the output from the author. This is a qualitatively 
different process from intellectually grasping or rejecting the cognitive 
content or import of the text. 
 
 
3.5 Projective Identification in Reading 
 
 
Let me now analyse the process of reading to show how Projective 
Identification might occur and how we respond to it. 94 There are, on this 
model, three phases, and in the process of reading they parallel the 
processes encountered with a living patient or analysand. The first, the 
reception phase, is about how the analyst can be receptive to any signals 
from the patient that may induce countertransference; the second phase, 
called internal processing, is concerned with how the analyst understands 
the meaning of the transference induced within him; and the third phase is 
about how the analyst communicates back to the patient, and what the 
transference has meant for the analyst and patient. Within these three 
phases, there is a series of sub-phases, which from a clinical point of view 
are extremely helpful in identifying processes. They can also seem overly 
                                                
94 This follows the strategy outlined by Tansey and Burke. Tansey and Burke (1989) 
Chs 5-7. 
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analytical, since the whole process of a projective identification and a 
response to it can be a fleeting moment of revelation, and the idea that such 
a process is ponderously subjected to time limited computation is obviously 
nonsense. So this is a theoretical schema, but one which I think is 
exceptionally helpful in helping us understand what happens when we read 
narcissistic texts. 
 
Using this schema, let me describe one model of what happens when we 
read a text. I am not here suggesting that this is how we should read texts, 
or that this is the only way to read any text, nor Kierkegaard in particular. 
But I am suggesting that some part of the process described below can 
happen for some readers of Kierkegaard’s text, and I am particularly 
suggesting that these processes are much more likely to happen for those 
called unresolved narcissists. But before starting this, there is one particular 
issue that must be addressed: who is the analyst and who the analysand? Is 
Kierkegaard projecting onto us, or are we projecting onto Kierkegaard? The 
answer is clearly going to be that some of each is taking place. But the 
general assumption is that we receive communications from Kierkegaard – 
we read his texts, and in that sense he is the analyand and we the analyst. 
We have to try to interpret the overt and covert messages he is sending us, 
and reflect on the internal changes that occur within us as we read these 
complex texts and ‘hear’, consciously or through his and our unconscious, 
his message. (It must be said that there is an alternative view, that of 
Kierkegaard as the dangerous writer. For some, he is so overwhelming, so 
capable of taking over our judgements and thoughts as to make the act of 
reading more like an act of submission, whereby all his ideas are consciously 
accepted, leaving behind a whirlpool of unconscious resentment and 
emotion that has to be worked out in due course. I am presuming that this 
is not the primary process for the modern reader of Kierkegaard, although 
some of this may be present for all of us.) 
 
The first phase of reading Kierkegaard is the reception phase, when we settle 
down in a quiet room, decide how much of which text we intend to read in 
the time available, and conscientiously begin at the beginning and continue 
through until it is time to stop. Alas, reading rarely happens like that.  
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Spence 95 has pointed out the sheer difficulty of listening to a real patient, 
and by extension of reading a real text. One is consumed with so much trivia 
that continues to intrude onto consciousness - how the day is going, the seat 
upon which one sits, whether one’s glasses are comfortable, the noisy 
interruption of the outside world. But above all, we have previous responses 
to having met Kierkegaard before. We never come to Kierkegaard without 
preconceptions, as I will show in later chapters - he is forever the 
melancholy Dane in our pre-conscious. What is called for when reading such 
texts is a freely hovering attention, attention directed towards both what the 
text is saying, and how we respond to it. Such a situation is difficult to 
attain, but without it, we run the risk of ignoring responses within ourselves 
that give clues to what Kierkegaard is trying to communicate. To paraphrase 
Sandler, we are aiming for ‘free-floating attention’ which allows all sort of 
thoughts, day-dreams and associations to enter consciousness while at the 
same listening to and observing the text. 96 Thus, Sandler is suggesting, the 
focus of attention should be a compromise between reflecting on the reader’s 
own wishes and desires, and the desires and emotions stirred up by the text. 
 
Straight away this leads to the concept of the therapeutic alliance or frame, 
a concept taken for granted in the psychoanalytic literature, but rarely 
explored in theories of reading 97. It is important, when reading an author 
such as Kierkegaard, to keep faith with his writings as it were, to make a 
promise to oneself to try to understand what it is the author is attempting to 
tell the reader. If one begins the text with a cynical or thoroughly 
disapproving attitude, then little of what Kierkegaard has to say will come 
across. So, for example, even though one may find, early on in Works of 
Love, many of Kierkegaard’s attitudes to be troubling, even repulsive, one 
must as it were keep faith that there is something important here to be 
understood. Of course one is permitted to give up and discard the book! But 
I am suggesting that narcissistic readers of Kierkegaard’s text do not, exactly 
for narcissistic reasons. 
                                                
95 Spence (1982) especially Ch VI. 
96 Sandler (1976) p 44.  
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It is important, if we are to be true to our emotions, to be receptive to 
Kierkegaard as we read him and to be aware of how the incidents of day-to-
day living can affect our attention, and distort our perceptions. But that is 
just a preamble. At some point or other, on this theoretical basis, we 
experience an emotional response to reading Kierkegaard. It may be one of 
admiration at his style, frustration at his circumlocutions, a genuine 
attraction to an idea, or a repugnance to an attitude. We must retain an 
openness to being emotionally influenced by Kierkegaard, and not succumb 
to too early a shutting down of any emotional responses coupled with a 
rationalisation of how we feel about him. We must be open in this way 
because of our need to be receptive to the unconscious messages, the 
unworded ideas, that Kierkegaard is putting across, to the induction of 
projective identification. If we fail to be open, we fail to allow the introject to 
come into us. If we are open, then we can well experience what Balint calls 
‘therapeutic regression’ . 98 
 
If, then, we remain open to Kierkegaard’s effect upon us, we reach a stage 
where we can have introjected a communication that exerts a modifying 
influence upon our experience of self in our interaction with Kierkegaard: he 
has awakened something within us. Let us follow convention and call this a 
‘signal affect’. 99 The job of the reader at this point is to continue with this 
openness, and to retain the idea that he has made some kind of introjection, 
emanating from the text, and that some kind of emotional change is taking 
place. 
 
So to summarise the process of reading so far as defined by this theoretical 
stance. First, in reading empathically, the reader must be able to clear their 
mind of external stimuli and influences in order that he can properly listen 
and be attuned to the messages – conscious and unconscious - within the 
                                                                                                                                       
97 The term was actually used by Freud, and has become increasingly important as 
psychotherapy and counselling have become more widely available and accessed. 
For a recent exposition and summary of the concept, see Gray (1994).  
98 Balint (1968) p 146.  
99 This concept is discussed at length by several authors. See, for example Olinick 
(1969) or Beres and Arlow (1974).  
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text. Second, the reader must remain sensitive, susceptible even, to both 
literal and figurative, reasoned and emotional interactional pressure from 
the text, so that Kierkegaard has the opportunity to transmit all of his 
messages, those he intended to transmit as well as those he did not. And 
third, the reader must be willing to accept his emotional responses to the 
text not just as an emotional knee-jerk, but also as what we have called a 
signal affect, a stimulus attached to emotion, that is capable of analysis and 
understanding, revealing potentially valuable underlying meanings. Once 
this has been observed, and properly contained as opposed to being rejected, 
it is then possible to approach the next phase in which this multiplicity is 
processed, and sense made of it all. 
 
The second stage has been called Internal Processing. 100 The task of the 
reader here is to hold, in the sense that Bion used that term. 101 The 
introjection discussed above, and thence separate out what belongs to 
himself, and what to the patient.  A failure at this stage would be the 
inability to hold all of these thoughts and feelings, and immediately to reject 
those that belong to us as unacceptable. Since we cannot tolerate the 
emotions stirred up by the introjection, we deny them. But if we are to 
manage and investigate the emotions thus stirred, we need some kind of 
psychological distance from our immediate situation, we need to reflect on 
what it is the book is doing to us. So we have to ask ‘what am I feeling now? 
Why is this book doing this to me? And crucially, what purpose does this 
serve for the author to make me feel as I do?’  
 
There are two answers to these questions. The first derives from Fliess 102, 
and the second from Ogden. 103 Fliess emphasised the importance of being 
able to tolerate the negative emotions reading might bring about by 
emphasising the need to suspend super-ego criticism. Although couched in 
classical theory terms, this remains: exactly what the powerful text does is 
awaken unconscious criticisms, derived from early years, and internalised 
                                                
100 Tansey and Burke (1989) p 85. 
101 Bion (1959).  
102 Fliess (1942).  
103 Ogden (1979). 
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through whatever process, so that we become our own worst critic. This 
remains for us all, but is infantile, always negative, and Fliess merely 
emphasises the need to be able to recognise this and manage or contain it. 
We must be able to view ourselves, temporarily, in an unfavourable light as 
we read a powerful text. The text is not pointing up a permanent truth, 
however, just reminding us of our archaic psychological development. So 
this is not a permanent threat to self-esteem or self-awareness: it is 
temporary; it will pass. We must not throw the book down, literally or 
metaphorically at this moment. What Ogden is asking us to do is remember 
that we are the author of our own feelings, that others can engender 
unsettling feelings within us, but that ultimately we retain authorship and 
ownership. It is, in classical language, about shifting from the experiencing 
ego to the observing ego.  
 
I suggest at this point that Kierkegaard, does not want us to do this 104. His 
entire thrust is about engaging us, certainly intellectually and necessarily 
emotionally, so that we remain, while reading him, in the experiential state. 
His gives us little room to step back and reflect, observe, what is happening 
to us as we read his words. He demands an experiential response from the 
reader. The danger, thus, in reading Kierkegaard, is that we remain all too 
aware of the strong feelings he induces within us, but not aware of what 
they might mean. The experience of self that Kierkegaard induces can be 
taken too literally, and perhaps should be tempered by asking what feelings 
Kierkegaard himself is enduring that he feels the need to project them out 
onto us, his reader. As Tansey and Burke summarise it: 
This sense of inadequacy is experienced as an enduring actuality 
rather than as a temporary and induced identification signalling 
something potentially important about the patient. 105 
 
It was Greenson who first used the term 'working model' in conjunction with 
projective identification. 106 He was referring to the ‘internal replica’ of a 
                                                
104 Throughout this discussion, Kierkegaard is used as the example of reading a 
narcissistic author, simply because he is my chosen exemplar. There are doubtless 
very very many others, and much of what is suggested in this Chapter can easily be 
adapted to the works of others. 
105 Tansey and Burke (1989) p 88. 
106 Greenson (1960).  
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patient that the therapist builds up over time. It consists of the patient’s 
'physical appearance, affects, values, fantasies etc.’ 107 This is a most 
powerful idea. For it will help us understand to a much greater extent our 
own responses to reading Kierkegaard. Greenson asks that we put ourselves 
in the situation of the writer, of Kierkegaard. As he explains with a very real 
example, 108 the intention is not to put one’s self into Kierkegaard’s situation, 
but to try to imagine being Kierkegaard in Kierkegaard's situation. Patently, 
this is not easy. We are dealing with a long since dead man. But we respond 
anyway to some version of Kierkegaard when we read him; that melancholy 
Dane image just won’t go away. At this point I am asking no more than that 
we try to imagine being whatever it is that we conceive of as being Søren 
Kierkegaard, ‘our’ Søren Kierkegaard, and then imagine why he has said the 
words that are causing us such emotion. If such a process can be effected, 
much begins to become clear. We can see both how much of the emotion 
belongs to us, and how much to Kierkegaard, based upon our imperfect 
model of him.  
 
So we have two processes to manage, and in parallel, if we are to be true to, 
and able to analyse and understand our emotional responses to 
Kierkegaard’s texts. We must first try to isolate and make sense of the 
emotions that Kierkegaard generates within us when we read, recognising 
some of the negative (and positive) emotions as transient, and the need for 
careful reality testing against what remains our genuine and authentic self. 
But at the same time must try to image why the person we know as 
Kierkegaard wrote what he did and how he did, such that emotion of this 
intensity has been generated within us. Here we are truly in the hermeneutic 
circle 109. We approach a Kierkegaardian text with some understanding of 
the author. Our pre-understanding modifies our reading of the text, but our 
response to that particular text also modifies our understanding of the 
author. I will never reach the 'true' understanding of Kierkegaard, but I may 
refine an understanding that makes sense for me, his particular reader. I 
generate the past of Kierkegaard here in the present, here in the act of 
                                                
107 ibid p 421. 
108 ibid p 421. 
109 A key concept in hermeneutical theory. See Thistleton (1992) Ch VI et seq. 
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reading. But that model, conscious or not, and whether I like it or not, 
informs my every understanding of what he wrote. 
 
The third stage in projective identification is that of re-projecting the part 
object and its associated emotion back to the analysand. In our case, we 
cannot project anything back to an inanimate text, and our author is dead. 
Our options might seem limited. But this remains a valid and valuable 
ultimate process, for it completes something. The problem is with how 
conscious we allow this process to be. As was commented above, the most 
common and immediate response to any stirring of emotion by a text is a 
rational denial, coupled with a cognitive downgrading of the author. A more 
sensitive approach will permit the reader to reflect on what is going on, what 
the author has engendered, and what state of mind the author might have 
been in to put such emotion into the text, what Fliess calls a ‘taste’ of the 
author’s emotion 110. While there is no possibility of a dialogue with the 
author, there is the possibility of a spoken, though usually unspoken 
summarising of the episode just encountered. Whether in uttered or 
unuttered words, the reader can organise and verbalise the hitherto 
unspoken emotions. This typically obviates the need for a negative cognitive 
response, and permits a richer understanding of the points the author was 
trying to make, as well as allowing the reader to access more of the author 
as a person. 
 
But this is a difficult process, for there is no basis for evaluating the validity 
of the analysis and summary that the reader may come up with. The process 
is liable to take one into consideration more of one’s own emotional 
situation, disregarding that of the author. 111 Throughout, the general 
hypothesis should be that the author, in some way or other, unconsciously 
needs the reader to feel some form of what he is feeling, and that this serves 
some purpose for the author. 112 Further, it should be viewed as an effort by 
the author to communicate to the reader in a way that is potentially much 
                                                
110 Fliess (1942). 
111 Sandler (1976). 
112 Tansey and Burke (1989) p 121. 
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more effective and powerful than using words alone. 113 And remembering 
Lacan, we can conjecture that the author is doing this because some things 
cannot be said in words, that the transition from repression means that 
whatever words are used, the intended meaning is lost. 
 
So on this reading, the author is not yet quite dead (even though, in this 
instance, he actually has died). Authorial intent may be difficult to support, 
but the idea that the author can never communicate some intention through 
emotion to the reader, is, I suggest, not yet proven. Something happens, if 
we allow it to, when we read texts, and something very special happens 
when we read narcissistic texts. 
 
 
3.6 The Concept of the Narcissistic Text 
 
So far, then, we have a mechanism for understanding how the narcissistic 
author speaks to the narcissistic reader. But can a text really be 
narcissistic? At first sight surely it quite literally cannot. A text, at least in 
the sense of a printed text, or straightforward derivatives thereof, is no more 
than a series of marks on paper. It requires a reader for it to become 
intelligible. But any reader, certainly any human reader, will be subject to 
the similar laws 114 of psychodynamics as the author. 115 As Lacan describes, 
and as was discussed above, the signifieds in the unconscious of the author 
spark the signifieds in the unconscious of the reader, and the text is the 
medium through which this sparking occurs. The essence is Lacanian: the 
narcissistic author, driven through his signifieds, puts signifiers down on 
paper, and upon the act of being read, these signifiers stimulate similar 
chains of signifieds in the repressed of the reader.  Lacan has shown how 
these marks contain meaning from the author, but not necessarily any 
meaning the author intended. We cannot be sure what these signifieds are, 
for they remain unspoken, unworded. The passage from unconscious 
concept to conscious word changes the signifieds forever, and it must 
                                                
113 See Grotstein (1995) and Ogden (1979). 
114 actually, of course they are constructs. 
115 This is a fundamental assumption of all of psychodynamic theory. 
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remove purposeful meaning. On Lacan’s view, we are left, worse case, with a 
set of signifiers which neither the author nor the reader can manage or 
decode or manipulate in any conscious way. Texts read us.  
 
Writing is undoubtedly about projection. The author projects onto his texts 
issues about his own life. Events, people, motives, themes from a life become 
presented in the text. This need not be other than a healthy process, even 
healthily narcissistic. Writing is undoubtedly for many writers a narcissistic 
crutch; it is a verbal artificial prop for the self. In this sense, writing always 
courts another; it always wants to be read; it is, if you like, a means of 
augmenting an anxiously depleted self by the supplement of the word. 
Writing produces for the author a recognition that mitigates against 
everyday narcissistic fears. 
 
But desire needs an other, and there is a corollary, and that is the reader. As 
readers we also project onto a text. Innocently, we project our lives, our 
significant characters, our motives and our themes onto the apparently 
already populated text; we appropriate the text to act as a narrative for our 
lives. And there is narcissism here too; we gain esteem and self-recognition 
by being part of the author’s plot, modified to accommodate our own life and 
issues.  
 
Hence we have an interesting reciprocity. The author desires power through 
the projected engagement of the reader, while the reader gains power from 
the projecting onto the text. All this is commonplace 116, and all this is 
benign. But truly narcissistic authors, and their reading counterparts, take 
this process to extremes. This is all a matter of degree, but whereas 
narcissistically content authors use projection as their main mechanism in 
writing, narcissistically damaged authors use projective identification. Again 
the distinction between these two processes can be blurred, but in essence 
true narcissistic writers use their texts in order to project ideas, emotions, 
and partial objects which need to be removed from the self. Usually these are 
negative emotions; sometimes not. But there is a need, a real 
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psychodynamic urgency for this more pathological projection to take place, 
exactly because such internal wishes and emotions threaten the self. 
Projection in this instance is not just an authorial option, an intellectual 
amusement, a nicety, a felicitous turn of phrase, but a desperate, sometimes 
a raging need to be rid of internal excruciatingly persecutory objects and 
their attendant affect. And the narcissistically damaged author must locate 
these projected objects into another, who must assume ownership and 
thereby responsibility. This is what our narcissistically damaged reader 
does: the very ideas that torment the author torment his reader, and these 
ideas are accepted: the reader identifies with the projection and takes them 
onboard as his own. So the narcissistic way of being of the author directly 
awakens the narcissistic way of being of the reader. This is not projection: in 
the benign situation, the reader more or less chooses which parts of his life 
to project onto the characters or situations in the novel. In the case of the 
damaged narcissist, the intention, if not the result, is that such an option is 
managed by the author. 
 
Narcissistic authors engender much more closely defined emotions in their 
readers. We know from psychiatry the overt behaviours, the symptomatology 
of the narcissist: seeking admiration, expecting undeserved respect, feeling 
and acting special and so on. And we know from the descriptions of primary 
defence mechanisms what might be going on in the narcissistic to engender 
the behaviours and states. Hence when a narcissist speaks unto a 
narcissist, we have more than random interactions. The emotions, the 
primary defences of the one speak directly to the emotions, the primary 
defences of the other, and we can see how projective identification in 
particular would be the process by which this transfer takes place.  
 
So to call a text narcissistic is a shorthand term for a complex process. A 
narcissistic text contains canons, in Holland’s language, that are shared by 
other narcissists. And these are based not upon common cultural sharing of 
road signs, or wine or naval flags, but on much more private and 
idiosyncratic events from childhood. The terrible insult acted upon the infant 
                                                                                                                                       
116 For discussions, see for example Berman (1990); Layton and Schapiro (1986); 
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self that developed into our author has in some sense also been acted upon 
his reader, upon us, albeit to a lesser or greater extent. The detail of that 
insult must vary from person to person; these early processes are and must 
be unique: psychoanalysis is based on such a tenet. But there would seem 
to be enough commonality that we can speak of unresolved or resolved 
narcissists 117, that even though the detail may be remarkably different, the 
processes used in response to the insult, and hence the behaviours and 
states that result, are similar. And hence there is indeed a community of 
readers. A narcissistic text thus contains both evidence of the insult carried 
out, and the processes used in response to it. When meeting this evidence, 
the narcissistic reader cannot be other than affected. The text is the medium 
for this process. The text transmits the narcissism. 118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Alcorn (1994).  
117 See the discussion on narcissism in Ch Two above. 
118 An analogy may be made with current electronic digital recording of texts. Up 
until one hundred years ago, a text had to be represented as some kind of marks on 
a medium, available for immediate visual inspection with no intermediary. (I 
appreciate the existence of the oral tradition, but that does not affect this argument.) 
Electronic recording however added several degrees of complexity. Take any of the 
currently miniature devices – say the stick. It is easy to load the entire Bible into 
such a tiny device. Does it then ‘contain’ the Bible? To answer this we have to 
consider Information Theory, first described by Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver  
over fifty years ago. They suggest that any act of communication involves seven 
elements: a source, an encoder, a transmitter, a channel, a receiver, a decoder and a 
recipient.  So to write the Bible onto a stick, we need all seven elements to be right; 
and to ‘read’ the Bible from the stick, similarly we need the exact parallel 
technology. Without it we would never know what the stick contained. With it, all 
becomes obvious. There is a similar situation with narcissistically encoded texts. 
The narcissistic author encodes and encrypts his messages (not necessarily 
consciously), but unless the receiver, decoder and recipient (all constructs within a 
single person) are similarly tuned, there will be a failure of communication – the 
narcissistic message may not be heard. (Shannon and Weaver (1947)). 
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4 The Idea of Psychobiography 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The world loves to blacken the radiant and drag the sublime into the 
dust. 119 
 
There is a problem with organising any review of psychobiography, since it 
assumes large parts of personality theory, as well as taking a view on 
theories of history: there is no likelihood of considering either of these in this 
chapter (other than on an ‘as-needed’ basis). For a review of attempts to 
organise psychobiography theory, see a recent summary by William Runyan 
in Hogan’s reference text Handbook of Personality Psychology. 120 
 
In reality, psychobiography is little different from much modern biography. It 
is a rare contemporary biography that refrains from making some enquiry 
into the motives of principal actors, from trying to link early life events with 
later life decisions, or from seeking to identify consistencies and similarities 
in the way a life is lived or challenges dealt with. 121  
 
So the difference between common-place biography and psychobiography is 
probably more a matter of degree. Whereas most biographies make use of 
some – often unstructured – psychological theorising and psychological 
ideas, the psychobiographer is really concerned with the use of psychological 
ideas as a primary tool in writing about the subject. Hence in 
psychobiography there is always substantial use of psychological theory and 
research. Whereas a biographer will consider a whole life, and attempt a 
rounded summary of how a life was lived, the psychobiographer by contrast 
might be much more concerned with specific events or episodes, not always 
attempting to relate these to the whole life. 122 
 
                                                
119 From a poem by Schiller, ‘Das Madchen von Orleans’, quoted by Freud at the 
start of his Leonardo paper, SE XI p 63. 
120 Hogan (1997) Ch 2. 
121 W T Schultz - Personal Communication. See his Handbook of Psychobiography 
Schultz (2005) Ch 1.   
122 ibid Ch 1. 
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Runyan gives a measured definition of psychobiography: 
 
The explicit use of systematic or formal psychology in biography.  
 
Three aspects of the definition should be noted. First, the field is 
defined by the use of psychology, which may or may not be 
psychoanalytic. Second, the use must be explicit or visible, in order to 
distinguish psychobiography from all those biographies which make 
implicit use of commonsense psychology. Third, the definition refers 
not to the application of personality theory but to the use of 
psychology, which is intended to include within psychobiography 
those works drawing upon the full range of resources from the field of 
psychology, including psychological concepts, data, methods, as well 
as theory from developmental, social and personality psychology.123 
 
For the sake of completeness, mention should be made of psychohistory, 
which refers to the application of psychological theory to historical events; it 
is sometimes called the science of historical motivation. It is the 
understanding of history though the motives of individual personalities. 
Psychobiography is more the attempt to understand life through 
understanding the motives of individual personalities.124 
 
Probably the very first psychobiography was therefore by Sigmund Freud: 
his original treatise on the life and motivation of Leonardo da Vinci 125. 
Following this initial attempt, there was a flurry of similar psychobiographies 
– Shakespeare, Richard Wagner, Socrates, among others. 126 This outpouring 
continued throughout the early half of the twentieth century, with writers 
and politicians being the favourite victims – Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Moliere, 
Goethe, Nietzsche from the former camp, and Caesar, Lincoln, Napoleon, 
and Alexander the Great from the latter. Much of this corpus was of very 
uneven quality, with many ‘psychoanalytic’ studies being carried out by 
writers with little or no psychoanalytic training. Some notable products 
appeared around the mid-century, and the entire area has become extremely 
popular, at least in terms of output, in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century. For a recent survey of the oeuvre, see Runyan’s summary.127 
                                                
123 Runyan (1984) p 202. 
124 ibid Ch 1. 
125 Freud SE XI. 
126 many of which are summarised in Dooley’s paper (Dooley (1916)). 
127 in Hogan (1997) Ch 2. 
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This thesis must have its own view on what psychobiography is about, its 
purpose, as well as exploring how it goes about its business, its method. 
Defining the goal of any discipline linked to psychology is difficult, but Levy 
suggests: 
The primary goal of psychology is the development of generalisations 
of ever increasing scope, so that greater and greater varieties of 
phenomena may be explained by them, larger and larger numbers of 
questions answered by them, and broader and broader reaching 
predictions and decisions based on them. 128 
 
There is also an epigram from Kluckholm:  
Every man is in certain respects a) like all other men, (b) like some 
other men, (c) like no other man. 129 
 
So merging these, I can suggest, with Runyan 130, that the goals of 
personality psychology are three-fold: to discover what is true of all human 
beings; what is true of groups of human beings; and what is true of 
particular human beings. Psychobiography uses these three sorts of truths 
in its search for meaningful analyses of its heroes and heroines. This of 
course is psychological truth, or truth used in a psychological sense. Such a 
usage of the word does not stand up well to any kind of post-modern 
inspection, but we are in the world of the psychobiographers, and I shall 
stick with their usage. This is, at best, an ironic use of the term 'truth'. 
 
What is true for all human beings is an arena not much inhabited by 
psychologists. The realisation of the importance of nurture and culture in 
individual development led to psychologists making decreasingly broad 
pronouncements during the latter half of the twentieth century.  
Pronouncements about developmental or cognitive psychology are frequently 
surrounded by caveats pointing out that the process under consideration 
may not be universal. 
 
An exception to the abstinence of psychologists declaring truths for all 
people, perhaps typically, was Sigmund Freud, and it was one of the major 
                                                
128 Levy (1970) p 53. 
129 In Kluckholm (1953).  
  
 
Page 80 
 
 
articles of faith for him that he was writing a science of the mind that truly 
applied to everyman. 131 Few would agree that psychoanalysis has achieved 
that status, and his later writings admitted increasingly to the difficulties in 
this project. But his 1910 ‘Leonardo’ monograph is an excellent example of 
psychobiography through universal truths. Freud develops, on the hoof as it 
were, new aspects of psychoanalytic theory to explain processes in 
Leonardo’s life, aspects that are nevertheless presented as being applicable 
to all of humankind. But let us note his method: the basis for these 
universal truths is clinical information gained as a practitioner of 
psychoanalysis. And the continuing practice of psychoanalysis provides the 
evidence for the validity of these universal truths. It is easy to see why the 
anti-psychoanalytic movement complained about this inherently circular 
process. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum lies Truths for One. This approach or school 
is characteristic of a large amount of recent psychobiography, which 
concerns itself with as many determinants of specific behaviour during a life 
as it can, but typically emphasises idiosyncratic events, and uses the 
idiographic method. 132 This is not to the exclusion of all others, but in 
essence, the idiographic approach entails a careful analysis of the 
interaction between the person and the life events that surround them often 
on a piecemeal basis: the primary intention is to make sense of a part of a 
life, effectively on a stimulus-response basis. The hero of the 
psychobiography behaved (or spoke, acted, thought) in a certain way 
essentially because of a psychological precursor. Such an approach is highly 
attractive, but lays itself open to charges of superficiality as well as a lack of 
proper rigour: if we concede the ideas of a more or less permanent sense of 
self, then should not episodes be considered within this continuous self?  
 
The middle approach of psychobiography - truths that apply to some – is a 
much more sober approach. Perhaps the majority of experimental work and 
the subsequent theory in psychology for the last century has been about 
                                                                                                                                       
130 Runyan (1984) p 7. 
131 See for example his ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’ SE I p 281. 
132 Runyan, ibid Ch 9. 
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finding differences between groups, in some sense or other. The 
underpinning methodology is important, and I will explore this in more detail 
later in this chapter. But for now let us note the basis of the approach. 
Truths for All can be criticised for being too blunt an instrument; Truths for 
One can be wonderfully illuminating, but intensely inefficient in that 
enormous amounts of time must be spent uncovering truths that, ostensibly 
at least, have absolutely no application to anybody else. But I am trying in 
this thesis to point out that there is a group of people whom I shall call 
narcissists, and that the way of being in the world of any one narcissist will 
be echoed to a greater or lesser extent in the life of any other. Truths for 
Some offers that ideal middle, as long as we can be sure that the ‘some’ in 
question truly share things in common, and that truths can be generalised 
from small sample to entire subsets of populations.  
 
The history of Truths for Some in psychology is more or less equal to the 
history of the theory of types in psychological theory, which has progressed 
through three eras: simple labelling, reflecting not much more than a 
phrenological approach to differences; factor or trait theory, which spent 
much of the last century arguing as much about form as about content; and 
the process approach, evidenced by the arrival of cognitive psychology in the 
mid-century on one hand, and forming the basis of much post-Freudian 
psychodynamics on the other. Just as psychological types have become 
commonplace in the psychology of everyday life, so too in psychopathology, 
psychological types have been devised and developed. Thus we have the 
Schizoid personality, the Paranoid personality, the Narcissistic personality: 
each has a distinct way of being, and each a distinct psychopathology. 
 
These three approaches -Truths for All, Truths for Some and Truths for One - 
can be viewed as paradigms of how psychobiography has been carried out 
over the last century. Manifestly, they are not mutually exclusive, and 
although Freud may have steadfastly translated any idiosyncratic event that 
befell poor Leonardo into a process that he felt applied to all of humankind 
since the beginning of time, few would dream of such temerity at this point 
in the history of the subject. Any means at all - pure theory, sub-theory 
based on groups or types, and idiosyncratic life events as precursors - all are 
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nowadays called into play to explain, to make sense, of either a partial or a 
full life. 
 
 
4.2 Objections to Psychobiography 
 
Attacks on the psychobiographical method began as early as 1924 133, and 
reached something of a crescendo during the anti-psychoanalytic movement 
on the 1950s and 60s. Writers such as Hans Eysenck 134 criticised the entire 
integrity of psychoanalysis as both a theoretical model and a therapeutic 
method, while Karl Popper 135 conducted his own attack based on the lack of 
scientific rigour involved in psychoanalysis and its inability to entertain 
refutation. This writing necessarily spilled over into evaluations of 
psychobiographies, since, then as now, the underpinning psychological 
process model of choice was the psychoanalytic method. (It should be 
mentioned that there are other underlying theories that can be used as the 
basis for psychobiography; in practice, it would seem that biography as an 
analysis and understanding of the effects of past life on present actions 
usually utilises some psychodynamic method as underpinning theory.) 
 
Consider, then, the standard set of criticisms of psychobiographies that use 
the psychoanalytic method. Erik Erikson, author of a highly respected 
substantial psychobiography on the young Martin Luther 136 was anxious 
about the process. His Daedalus essay of 1968 137 most clearly indicates his 
preoccupations. His key concern is the need for self-awareness and 
disciplined subjectivity, alluding to a prior self-analysis as a pre-condition of 
undertaking any psychobiography 138. He cautions psycho-historians not to: 
immerse themselves in the very disguises, rationalisations, and 
idealisations of the historical process from which it should be their 
business to separate themselves. 139 
                                                
133 Whilbey The Indiscretions of Biography (1924). 
134 See as just one example of a large and vituperous outpouring: What is wrong 
with psychoanalysis in his Uses and Abuses of Psychology (Eysenck (1962)). 
135 His most quoted text is Conjectures and Refutations, Popper (1963). 
136 Erikson (1958). 
137 Erikson (1968). 
138 Erikson (1958) p 20. 
139 Erikson (1968) p 709. 
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Criticisms of a more strident nature abound; perhaps none is more direct 
than Stannard’s 1980 critique: 
from the earliest endeavours to write psychohistory to those of the 
present, individual writings of would-be psycho-historians have 
consistently been characterised by a cavalier attitude toward fact, a 
contorted attitude toward logic, an irresponsible attitude toward 
theory validation, and a myopic attitude toward cultural differences 
and anachronism. 140 
 
Moving beyond the hyperbole, there are clearly issues to be addressed; prime 
among these is the use of inadequate evidence: 
The psychohistorian who wishes to use psychological materials in an 
effort to gain a deeper understanding of a historical figure, or in the 
reconstruction of historical events, is, however, confronted with major 
problems of evidence. In conducting a psychoanalysis, the investigator 
has only to wait, and he is likely, through the process of free 
association, interpretation and working through, to obtain systematic 
data concerning his patient’s past history, motivations, conflicts and 
ego strengths. To be sure, resistance and the ego defences distort, but 
this very distortion can then be the subject of further analysis and 
validation. When we try to apply these psychological methods to a 
historical figure, we have no such cooperation and no analogous 
systematic way to obtain information. 141 
 
Stone put it more bluntly: 
Freudian psychology has not been much use to the historian, who is 
usually unable to penetrate the bedroom, the bathroom or the 
nursery. If Freud is right, and if these are the places where the action 
is, there is not much the historian can do about it. 142 
 
It would be foolish to pretend there is no substance to these complaints. 
Anyone who has been anywhere near to the clinical psychotherapeutic 
situation, whether looking up from the couch or down at it, cannot deny the 
importance of the existence, and of the presence, of the other in the process. 
It is exactly in this encounter that so much of the exploration of analysis 
takes place. It is in encounter that the apparent serendipity and creativity of 
the therapeutic process can happen. And it is in encounter that truth is 
shown to be lies, and lies to be the truth. No amount of effort of empathy 
and congruence can make up for this existential process. This is because it 
                                                
140 Stannard (1980) p147. 
141 Mack (1971) p 153. 
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is ‘the talking cure’. Freud’s basic insight was that when allowed to free 
associate, people eventually stopped. And this stopping was, he postulated, 
due to something or someone stopping them. Exactly at this moment, and 
not before, the interesting things began to happen: the patient has 
encountered an other through the presence of the analyst. And learning new 
truths about this other is the journey that is psychoanalysis.  
 
But manifestly this method of discovery is impossible for the psycho-
biographer. Any inference lacks response, lacks denial, lacks resistance, 
indeed lacks the very stuff of psychodynamic encounter. We are also in 
danger of ignoring most of the challenges of the last century that warn us of 
the peril of attempting exactly this sort of psychological reconstruction. 
Around 1819, Schleiermacher 143 was able to suggest there are just two 
things needed to understand the writing of a previous author: an 
appreciation of what was actually meant by the words the author used (the 
subject of philology), and an appreciation of what was going on inside the 
author’s head (the subject of psychology). Subsequent to these optimistic 
prescriptions, there has come into being a whole set of barriers to both of 
these precursors, especially the latter. The entire hermeneutic movement 
has manoeuvred itself into a position whereby comprehension would appear 
to be at best arbitrary. Nietzsche, the phenomenologists, Gadamer, and 
especially Derrida, have challenged the place of ratiocination in the 
understanding of verbal or literary intention. But perhaps the biggest 
challenge came from Sigmund Freud himself. It was he, almost at the same 
time as writing about Leonardo, who showed us the treachery that is motive 
reported through language.  Through postulating his twin fundamental 
processes of condensation and displacement 144, Freud demonstrated 
mechanisms whereby the authors themselves may literally not know why 
they write as they do. Derrida and Lacan, especially, have seized upon this 
idea. 145   
                                                                                                                                       
142 Stone (1981) p 53. 
143 quoted in Mueller-Vollmer (1994) Ch 2. 
144 These are the two particular concepts that emerged while he was writing The 
Interpretation of Dreams. They were defined and discussed above.                                                                                                               
145 see Mark Krupnick’s Introduction in his Displacement: Derrida and After 
(Krupnick (1983)). 
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There is also a major issue with reconstruction. Many, including Erikson, 
have made the mistake of reconstructing childhood events from adult 
behaviours, and then positing them as given. 146 This is a most common 
error, carried out often to surprising degree. The prize must go to Bishop 
Agnellus of Revena, who wrote a ninth century biography of his 
predecessors: 
In order that there might not be a break in the series, I have 
sometimes composed the life myself, with the help of God and the 
prayers of the brethren. 147 
 
The complaint of reductionism is also common, in that psychobiographers 
emphasise often pathological psychoanalytic processes and ignore anything 
at all to do with the society in which the subject lived, or indeed their 
creativity. As Meyer puts it, many works are guilty of:  
emphasising the basic concern with abnormality leading to the 
conclusion that what psychoanalysis has to offer to an understanding 
of the lives of great men consisted mainly in a documentation and 
explication of their foibles and follies. 148 
 
 
4.3 Discussion 
 
How then to respond to such trenchant criticism? My own view is that there 
is no real answer to their key claim, that psychobiography is an inexact 
science. When investigating an other, there is no right answer, no single 
psychological cause of any behaviour. We need to rid ourselves of this need 
to reduce ambiguity, and to rid ourselves of the persistent if naive idea of 
some psychical veridical camera that has recorded all we have thought and 
all we have done. We have no access to any such permanent accurate 
record, and we should cease pretending that we do; even if it were there, it is 
not amenable to access by psychoanalysis or any other method. The 
uncertainty, the ambiguity is complete. Pasts are not recreated, but created 
de novo; and pasts serve whatever purpose we choose. 
 
                                                
146 see Erikson (1958). 
147 Clifford (1962) p x. 
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But psychobiography still has a purpose, although it is more arbitrary than 
its staunch proponents might claim. It is a tool to help generate a view, a 
model, an optional re-presentation of a self. No psychobiography can claim 
ultimate accuracy, authenticity or genuine validity. So all psychobiography 
can do is inform a narrative, help tell a story, offer support to one 
hermeneutic out of many. In short, psychobiography is indeed concerned not 
with elucidating causes about a life, but with making sense of a life. 
 
But even accepting all of that, the frustration of the Truths for All approach 
is that a very few ideas - the oedipal issue, stages of sexual development - 
are used as the sole explanation of hugely disparate behaviours in every 
person that has ever lived. Such a scope necessarily suggests that 
generating antecedents from such a few principles lacks plausibility and 
validity - I just do not believe that Kierkegaard's life and works can be 
explained in exactly the same way as the life of any other Danish writer of 
the same period. If there are psychological antecedents in common between 
two people, they are so general as to be meaningless.  
 
And I cannot go with the idea of viewing Kierkegaard's life as a serial 
sequence of events, each capable of its own explanation but with no 
underlying theme or reference. In that Kierkegaard was so clearly concerned 
with the idea of unitary self, urging us to become 'one thing', it surely 
behoves us to look for some unity in his life. 
 
Notwithstanding the criticisms against truths for all and truths for one, 
there is value in the third way, the middle road, that concerns itself much 
more with processes than with descriptions, and that genuinely helps us 
understand the 'how' as much as the 'why' inherent in any analysis of 
motive. 'Truths for Some' gains support from much of recent personality 
theory and the general psychological theory of types. By assigning a person 
to a type, we can access a body of theory that categorises that type, thus 
ensuring genuine membership and true exclusivity, as well as helping to 
explain why they are of that type. And we can further access a body of 
                                                                                                                                       
148 Meyer (1972) p 373. 
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theory about the mechanisms that underpin the peculiarity of that type, 
thus helping to explain the how of that type's behaviour. All of this assumes 
basic type theory in psychopathology, as well as an understanding of defence 
mechanisms that all the schools of psychodynamics accept. 
  
 
4.4 Truths for Some 
 
The methodology is deceptively simple: devise or otherwise obtain a logically 
supportable series of ways of being in the world; let each of these be called a 
Type. Then assign the individual in question, the hero of the 
psychobiography, to the appropriate type, and then use the in extant theory 
surrounding that type to give a consistent explanation for how a life was 
lived. There are still caveats: this is not to claim the only explanation, or the 
‘correct’ explanation. But it can offer a consistent basis for discovering a new 
version of a life. Clearly, from the preceding sections, I propose to place 
Søren Kierkegaard into the category called 'narcissist'. But I must also 
explain the family of types to which narcissism belongs, and prior to that, 
the logical basis for the psychological theory of types. 
 
The early approaches to personality theory were no more than examples of 
taxonomies; but both psychology and psychopathology need taxonomies. A 
good taxonomy will permit efficient communication and efficient research, 
and will lead to the establishment of concepts capable of manipulation, 
concepts that are primarily analytical instruments for the intellectual 
mastery of empirical data. For many, a poor taxonomy is better than none at 
all. But in the final analysis, this is no more than labelling.149 And if we 
recall our basic statistics, categorisation is clearly measurement on a 
nominal scale: one category is different from any other, but there is little or 
no sense of gradation or incremental change. ‘Schizoid’ is different from 
‘Obsessive’ as ‘France’ is from ‘China’; each pair belongs to the same family, 
but beyond that there is little by way of increased understanding.  
 
                                                
149 See Frances  (1990) and  (1993) for a review of this approach. 
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Many have been very critical of this approach, claiming that dealing in states 
or categories must be replaced by a series of process models if better 
understanding is to follow. Perhaps the primary mover in this debate was 
Thomas Szasz. 150  He questioned the value of either a categorisation model 
or even a factor model for anything to do with psychopathology. Only by 
understanding processes will we appreciate how and why we can summarise 
complex behaviour into relatively simple categories. Without the underlying 
understanding of the processes, we will arrive at the potentially 
contradictory situation when several distinct categorisations can be used to 
explain the same behaviour. He pointed up examples - the replacement of 
the thing called phlogiston by the process called oxidation is just one - as 
evidence of the increased economy and power in explanation of processes 
over states. 
 
This process model can be applied to narcissism. There are generally agreed 
151 to be nine types of personality psychopathology. They are: psychopathic, 
narcissistic, schizoid, paranoid, depressive, masochistic, hysterical, 
obsessive and dissociative. And each of these types comes about because of 
the differential effects of the defence mechanisms described in the previous 
section: primitive withdrawal; denial; omnipotence; idealisation; projective 
identification; and splitting. Hence this approach enables us to describe any 
of the character types using any of the languages of the schools, but using a 
basic set of processes. Note that the names of the nine types are nothing 
more than labels. They should not be considered for reification. They could 
just as easily be letters of the alphabet or colours of the rainbow. They are a 
label for a consistent and unique constellation of use of defence 
mechanisms, consistent throughout life for any person properly assigned to 
the type, and consistent among the community that makes up that type. 
 
While these nine types are by no means mutually exclusive, it is possible to 
give quite clear descriptors of each type such that different interviewers 
meeting the same type will tend to agree on their classification or diagnosis. 
                                                
150 He wrote over 30 full texts and several hundred papers on more or less the same 
topic before his death. 
151 See McWilliams (1999). 
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So a schizoid described in drive theory processes still exhibits more or less 
the same behaviour as a schizoid viewed from an object relations viewpoint. 
And so with an obsessive, or a narcissist. We can propose our hero as 
belonging to one of these character types, and then use any of the theoretical 
models to explain or predict his behaviour. We are thus able to talk about 
truths for a group of people, in this instance those normally described as 
narcissists. Having made the proposition, we have to hand a plethora of 
process models for various aspects of his behaviour. Note that there is a 
clear possibility of refutation in the Popperian sense: a Schizoid is very 
different from an Hysterical personality, and a Narcissist very different from 
an Obsessive 152. So there is a clear opportunity, as it were, to get it wrong. If 
little or no supporting evidence, from life and work, can be found that can be 
described and explained by the appropriate processes, then the hypothesis 
must be rejected.  
 
Where this approach has benefits over and above the Truths for All approach 
is that we are not condemned to using very broad-brush theory that offers 
little by way of detailed and differentiated explanation of a life’s course. And 
compared with the Truths for One approach, neither are we obliged to find 
singular antecedents for every significant life event. By assigning a 
psychopathological personality type, we can predict that certain pathological 
responses will follow certain stimuli, and if necessary show the underlying 
processes that account for that behaviour, whether in terms of development 
or defence. 
 
 
 
                                                
152 Placed in a room together, the Schizoid would tend to withdraw, to avoid contact, 
to become internally confused. The Hysteric would do much the opposite, and 
externalise anxiety, allowing internal fears to become public. The Obsessive, 
presumably, would tidy the room.  
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5 Approaching Søren Kierkegaard 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
This Chapter discusses why I use Søren Aabye Kierkegaard as my exemplar, 
my model of what happens when we read narcissistic texts. Two immediate 
questions arise: why an exemplar at all, and why this one? 
 
The history of psychoanalysis in its most catholic sense is replete with the 
case study, the vignette, the observation that informs the development of 
theory. The language of psychoanalysis is dense, obtuse and sometimes one 
fears asymptotic to meaninglessness: hence the case study is so much more 
than just a reality check. If we agree with Peter Fonagay’s 153 description that 
psychoanalysis is the most profound exploration of human subjectivity 
consistent with systematic study, then there is a balance to be struck 
between the systematic and the subjective aspects. By using an example I 
am respecting this balance. 
 
But why Søren Kierkegaard? He offers that rare combination – a profound 
intellectual output, coupled with a high degree of personal revelation. That 
the personal revelations are dubious, incomplete, perhaps deluded and 
sometimes mendacious means that he is no different from the typical client 
coming to psychoanalysis. The challenge is to see how we can weave a 
coherent story about his life and being, just as one would with any 
analysand. The detail of his life and three of his works will be considered 
below. But the critical precursor question is: how do we come to 
Kierkegaard? How do we meet him? What are our preconceptions? In terms 
of the hermeneutic circle what Weltanschauung do we bring to the details of 
what he says and who he was? In answering this, I want first to consider his 
reception in the first hundred years following his death. Second, I want to 
consider the more recent academic appraisals of who he was and what kind 
of writer he was, differentiating between Kierkegaard the man of letters, the 
philosopher and the theologian. Finally, I give my own views on why he 
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presents such a splendid example for understanding the process of reading 
narcissistic texts. 
 
So, when we first encounter Kierkegaard, what are we meeting? Do we arrive 
tabula rasa? What happens in that first encounter? For all but the most 
naive reader, when we meet Kierkegaard for the first time he comes with an 
introduction, a preface or a synopsis that contains elements about his life, 
and elements about his psychopathology. Biographies, early and late, give 
credence to some kind of psychic difference, psychological disability or frank 
mental illness. This perception, this metaphor for how he lived his life, has 
turned into myth, and is established in our time. I want to question this 
prevalent assumption, by identifying the sources for some of our beliefs 
about the state of Kierkegaard's mental health, that is, by considering briefly 
some biographies and psychological studies of the man. It will be clear from 
Kierkegaard's reception over the last one hundred and fifty years that 
scholarship has a set of assumptions about him, and these assumptions 
amount to essentially a medicalised model. In turn, this medicalised model 
then gives us the freedom and authority to have a privileged view when 
thinking about his writings. Because, on this view, we are normal and he is 
sick, we bring a plethora of assumptions about what he wrote and how these 
writings and thoughts affect us.  
 
We meet, in short, a medicalised author, and thereby we are able to contain 
many of the difficulties his writings engender. Kierkegaard, it has been 
suggested 154, is a dangerous writer, and much effort has been expended to 
manage this danger, as the early reception shows. By medicalising 
Kierkegaard, by making him the subjective patient, we thereby become the 
more objective therapist, and hence we have a means of negating some of 
Kierkegaard’s most challenging ideas. They thus are reduced, and he also. 
But to make this case I must first race through more than a century of 
responses to Kierkegaard. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
153 Fonagay (2007) p 917. 
154  Adorno’s notoriously complex ‘Kierkegaard’ (Adorno (1989)) more than makes the 
point.  
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5.2 Kierkegaard’s Early Reception 
 
There has always been a fascination about Kierkegaard’s motives, and 
evidence for this can be seen from the very earliest reception. 155 Perhaps the 
first psychological analysis of Kierkegaard comes from one Erik Bogh (1822-
99). His chosen title (Søren Kierkegaard and the Saint Søren Cult) 156 
indicates too much about the contents. The text offers a psychological, even 
medical analysis of the motives of the man: 
Søren Kierkegaard was, as is well known, both a hypochondriac and 
an affected man 157 
(his) entire intellectual career was a confused sysiphus-battle in order 
to reflect the fervour within himself… 158 
Søren Kierkegaard was not merely a man of genius, but he was 
unfortunately a sick man as well. 159 
 
And about the Journals, which were just becoming available to the general 
reader at this time following Barfod’s editorial efforts: 
they are generally unreliable….Now they are an expression of self 
deception, and now an experiment in the deception of others. Most 
often it is both parts together.160 
 
Some have taken Bogh’s offering as an unfortunate portent of much of the 
Kierkegaard industry that was to follow.161 The chief culprit, in the eyes of 
such critics, is the writing of Georg Brandes. 
 
Brandes gave a series of lectures around Swedish Universities in 1876; the 
outcome of these was the publication of his ‘Søren Kierkegaard – A Critical 
Exposition in Outline’.162 This major text follows a biographical-psychological 
approach, evaluating the successive stages of life through which Kierkegaard 
passed. Brandes suggests 163 that two emotions drove much of Kierkegaard’s 
                                                
155 The earliest reception given to Kierkegaard’s work has been detailed by two major 
sources: Aage Henriksen’s prize winning essay of 1951 (Henriksen (1951)) and Habib 
Malik’s later compilation (Malik (1997)). 
156 Published in Copenhagen in 1870. 
157 Bogh p 6. 
158 ibid p 4. 
159 ibid p 4. 
160 ibid p 5. 
161 see Malik (1997) p 218-19. 
162 Søren Kierkegaard: En Kritisk Fremstilling I Grundrids (Copenhagen 1877). 
163 ibid p 35. 
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adult life - Pietet (in the sense of reverence, respect and veneration) coupled 
with Foragt (in the sense of contempt and scorn). But as Henrikesen points 
out in his commentary, and most interestingly from our point of view, 
reverence and contempt do not define character, but relations: 
Reverence leads him away from his ego in sincere devotion, but in his 
contempt there is a double current, a cold one directed towards the 
outside world, and a warm one flowing towards his own person. 164 
 
In fact, Brandes’ analysis is extremely penetrating, considering that it was 
written a quarter of a century before the ideas of psychoanalysis became 
popular. The author sets up a series of claims about Kierkegaard that have, 
for good or for ill, become part of our conscious and indeed unconscious 
perception of him. Thus: Kierkegaard was a product of an early gloomy 
childhood; his father forced piety upon him; his physical frailty as a child 
incurred the teasing and anger of fellow schoolmates; his natural intellect 
developed into an intense sarcasm that he used to retaliate against his 
school day persecutors; the use of indirect communication and the use of 
pseudonymous authors, stem from Kierkegaard’s fear of contempt and 
further torment were he to claim the writings as his own.  
 
It was Brandes who first isolated the trinity of life events that have served so 
many psycho-biographical essays of Kierkegaard so well: his relation with 
his father, his engagement to Regine, and the Corsair affair. In seeking 
evidence, Brandes is the first writer to interpret parts of Kierkegaard’s 
writing that were never admitted as being autobiographical to be in fact just 
that. Brandes was the first to suggest that Kierkegaard’s ‘thorn in the flesh’ 
was sexual impotence. And the aftermath of the broken engagement was the 
reason for Kierkegaard’s increasingly vociferous critique of the State, the 
Church and the Present Age.  
 
Brandes has been roundly criticised for having a rationalist-positivist 
agenda.165 Henriksen even suggests that Brandes admitted in his 1888 letter 
to Nietzsche, no less, stating that ‘his aim writing the treatise on Søren 
                                                
164 ibid p 24. 
165 see Aage Henrikesen: Methods and Results p 28-30 (Henriksen 1951) and Malik 
(1997) p251-6. 
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Kierkegaard was to free the Danish people from his influence’.166 But for all 
that, there is great insight: in a piece of remarkable psychological reasoning 
from 1877, Brandes suggests: 
There was a cleavage in his life. Before the Christian tradition and its 
ecclesiastical and poetical apostles he prostrated himself, before those 
who were outside it in their literary and political activities, he had 
only the deadliest scorn. In his reverence he waived part of his 
legitimate critical rights. To make up for this he claimed a place apart 
from the ordinary run of men in other respects. 167 
 
This is a most excellent description of the narcissistic process. 
 
For a different and more focused summary of the reception accorded to 
Kierkegaard during the first hundred years following his death, Aage 
Henriksen’s Kierkegaard Studies in Scandinavia is a valuable source. 
Published in 1951, it is a detailed analysis of the themes that drove the 
perception of Soren Kierkegaard during two remarkable half centuries.  
 
Henriksen considers, under the heading of Biological Psychology, an 
evaluation of Landmark’s ‘Interpretations of Kierkegaard’s Early History’.168 
This contains perhaps the first reference to Kierkegaard and Oedipus, with 
Landmark’s strenuous attempts to identify the Great Earthquake described 
in the journals with the awareness of the state of his relationship with his 
father. Another major work considered by Henriksen is from Hjalmar 
Helweg, one of Denmark’s most eminent psychiatrists in the first half of the 
last century. His ‘Søren Kierkegaard: Enpsykiarispsykoloisk studie’ 
(Kierkegaard: a Psychiatric-Psychological Study) was published in Danish in 
1933. It was Helweg who added theoretical weight to the common view that 
Kierkegaard suffered from endogenous manic-depressive psychosis – what 
might now be called a bi-polar syndrome. Helweg points to the family 
incidence of the syndrome, and draws extensively on the then current 
psychiatric obsession with linking Kretschmer’s body types to 
psychopathology. So, according to Helweg, Kierkegaard’s build was ‘pycnic’, 
and his nature was ‘syntonic’. But published about the same time, and in 
                                                
166 ibid p 23. 
167 Brandes (1877) p 33. 
168 Henriksen  ibid p 112. 
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the same light, was John Bjorkhem’s ‘Søren Kierkegaard I psykologisk 
belysning’ (Soren Kierkegaard in a Psychological Light).169 This is a neat 
counter-argument to Helweg, and suggests that Kierkegaard was of 
Kretschmer’s asthenic-schizothymic type 170. 
 
Mention might also be made of two texts that concentrate on Kierkegaard’s 
alleged deformity, his hunched back. R Magnussen’s 1942 text Søren 
Kierkegaard set udefra (Soren Kierkegaard viewed from without)171 makes 
much of Kierkegaard’s physical deformity. This, the author maintains, is the 
real cause of the severe melancholia that afflicted Kierkegaard. About the 
same time, Theodor Haecker wrote a short but similar text with the very 
non-politically correct title ‘Kierkegaard the Cripple’, probably in 1943, 
although it was not published until 1947 172.  
 
Helweg was unambiguous in his diagnosis that Kierkegaard suffered from a 
manic-depressive psychosis, and it is against this certainty that Ib Ostenfeld 
set out to give his own psychopathological analysis 173. Even though it was 
written at the end of the 1960s, when psychiatry was undergoing by far its 
most radical change 174, the text has a dated air about it, as well as 
presenting arguments that appeal more to common sense than anything to 
do with psychiatry. In a nutshell, Ostenfeld suggests emphatically that ‘it is 
                                                
169 Henriksen ibid p 123. 
170 The early part of the last century was awash with theories linking mental and 
physical attributes. None was more assiduous in this theory building than Ernst 
Kretschmer. His major text was translated in 1925 as Physique and Character. Odd 
as this might seem now, intense effort was dedicated to this linkage, and a vast 
taxonomy of body types came into being. A fair but unkind caricature of the ideas of 
this movement would be contained in the dictum: ‘fat people are jolly, thin people are 
miserable’. If this ever were true in the 1930s, it certainly is not true today, for 
mainly cultural and medical reasons. Not surprisingly, such an approach is now 
very much out of fashion. 
171 Henriksen (1951) p 127. 
172 Haecker (1948). 
173 Ostenfeld (1978). 
174 It is difficult for us now to recall that only fifty years ago, the armaments at the 
disposal of the average psychiatrist were minimal. For all of the first half of the 
twentieth century, the options were: electro-convulsive therapy; a handful of 
essentially inorganic compounds, such as paraldehyde, with which to stultify the 
patient; the terrifying unanaesthetised use of insulin as shock therapy; and latterly 
psycho-surgery. Otherwise, the options were restraint, always physical, and usually, 
to modern perceptions, brutal. The arrival of chlorpromazine as the first psycho-
active drug in the late 1950s was the start of a truly remarkable change. 
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impossible to find manic-depressive features in his writings’.175 
Kierekegaard’s melancholy is not identified with depressive tendencies, but 
rather is  
a complex phenomenon, partly an expression of fragility of mind not 
uncommon among members of a manic-depressive family who have 
not themselves inherited the disposition, and partly the result of 
violent influences from the environment. 176  
 
The primary and overwhelming influence on Kierkegaard’s life was, 
according to Ostenfeld, his father. It was a wish to obey his father 
throughout his life that led to the problem with the engagement, and the 
Corsair: 
His father was the only person toward whom Søren could express his 
feelings freely and openly both in life and in death.177 
 
Ostenfeld’s analysis of the later years and the crisis in Kierkegaard’s life 
revolve around the themes already expressed: the underlying irrevocable 
attachment to his father, the extreme social sensitivity, the resulting inner 
conflict, and his resulting uncertainty about his place in public life: 
All these private difficulties were his real motivations in the Church 
struggle which was only indirectly an attack on the existing church. It 
became a symbol of his personal dilemma in all these areas that he 
could no longer control….There is a straight line from his experiences 
in childhood to the uncontrolled outbursts of this final phase. 178 
 
In summary, then, I suggest we can see in the early reception a broad 
agreement that Søren Kierkegaard endured some kind of psychopathology. 
The extent, the name, and its relative impact for his life and works are given 
different degrees of importance. But essentially the early biographies make 
culturally standard assumptions: that there is a medical model of 
psychopathology, and that Søren Kierkegaard, in some sense, suffered from 
it. 
 
 
 
                                                
175 ibid p 49. 
176 ibid p 5. 
177 ibid p 11. 
178 ibid p 42. 
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5.3 Kierkegaard in the Anglo Saxon World 
 
In the 1930s, the Anglo-Saxon world was introduced to the ideas and life of 
Kierkegaard through two authors: Alexander Dru, who translated parts of 
the Diaries179 into what was to become a long-standing best seller; and 
Walter Lowrie, who translated almost everything else. Lowrie’s Kierkegaard, 
a full and detailed analysis of the man and his ideas, appeared in 1938.180  
 
Lowrie is responsible for much of our current and often unconscious 
imagery of Søren Kierkegaard. It is a commonplace to refer to him as ‘the 
melancholy Dane’. The English-speaking world owes this to Lowrie. There is 
an oft-repeated tale in the secondary literature that Danish mothers 
admonish their children ‘not to be a Søren’ 181, again a debt to Lowrie. More 
importantly, there has come about a set of biographical assumptions about 
Søren’s early life, repeated by the majority of English language biographies 
and other secondary sources, that we owe to Walter Lowrie, but about 
which, from a psychological point of view at least, there is real ambiguity.  
 
Lowrie posits many key issues, based entirely on components of 
Kierkegaard’s writings, and presented by him as in no way autobiographical, 
as actual biographical fact - the walks round the living room, 182 anecdotes 
about early school days taken from Judge William 183, the gloomy religious 
childhood and the obsession with sado-masochistic elements in Christianity 
184; and the matter of Father's rape of Ane Lund. 185 
 
The romanticisation of the Kierkegaardian story continued throughout much 
of the mid-century. In the biography by Josiah Thompson 186, we encounter 
a certainty about putative autobiographical events taken to extreme. So sure 
                                                
179 Dru (1938). 
180 Lowrie Kierkegaard (1938). 
181 although ask any modern Copenhagener, and they will probably not know what 
you are talking about. 
182 Fragments, KW VII, pp 118-125. 
183 Either/Or II, KW IV. 
184 Fragments, KW VII pp 127-8. 
185 Stages, KW XI, pp 250-252. 
186 Thomson (1973). 
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is this author of the validity of questionable inserts he is able to treat them 
in novella form: 
The boy knocks. From within a voice answers. As the boy enters the 
drawing room the old man puts down his book, shifts his spectacles, 
and turns to see what it is he wants. “Father, may I go out?” The 
shadows are already creeping up the walls of the houses across the 
square; it must be getting on towards six. “No, it’s too late,” the old 
man answers. “Dinner will be ready soon…But if you like we can take 
one of our walks in here.” He rises from the chair, lays his spectacles 
across the open book, and gently takes the child’s hand. Together 
they begin to walk up and down the drawing room. 187 
 
There is simply no way of knowing whether anything like this actually 
happened, but it makes for a wonderful yarn, and adds to the cryptic 
personality that is Søren Kierkegaard. It is a rare reader who does not want 
to believe that they are reading autobiography.  
 
James Collins’ popular and influential The Mind of Kierkegaard 188 was 
originally published in 1953. Although primarily an introduction to the 
thought of Kierkegaard, Collins begins with the traditional biographical 
discussion and analysis, all of it essentially conservative. Collins repeats 
many of the quasi-biographical anecdotes first unearthed by Lowrie and sees 
them as fact, sometimes with a little embellishment of his own.189 In that 
this text has been a primary Anglo-Saxon source for perhaps a generation of 
students wishing to come to terms with Kierkegaard, it is hardly surprising 
that the images, anecdotes and persona of the melancholy Dane are so 
firmly fixed. 
 
There have been a few demonstrably psychoanalytic investigations of the 
mind of Kierkegaard, pre-eminent of which is Sylviane Agacinski’s Aparte. 190 
For the most part, this text is a series of comments, explanations, 
amplifications, refutations, extensions, and exaggerations of Kierkegaard’s 
themes. On the issues of Kierkegaard’s melancholy, Father’s guilt and the 
absence of Mother in any of the writings, the author writes: 
                                                
187 ibid p 30. 
188
  Collins (1983). 
189 so the ‘walks around the drawing room’ story is added to: ‘Friends would be 
greeted, gossip exchanges, obstacles avoided’ etc (Collins (1983) p 5). 
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Could the mother’s rape scene represent for K’s unconsciousness the 
father’s secret? Is the son’s unconscious hearing some unspeakable 
confession in the enigmatic words of the father, something like, “I 
raped your mother”? Had this been the case, such a message could 
not have registered completely; first of all because it would have 
destroyed the son’s image of a father loved and admired like a god, 
and further because such a crime would have brought to light the 
father’s betrayal (“It wasn’t you I wanted, seduced, violated…”), and 
finally, because the son would have had to recognise the origin of his 
own birth in this scene….. This is because not only would it intersect 
with the inexpressible desires of the son regarding his mother, but 
even more importantly because it would unleash his jealousy of her, 
though not without the scene’s being able to satisfy at the same time 
the son’s desire to occupy his mother’s place in it. 191 
 
More recent biographies, particularly that from Garff, have been much less 
certain in their psychopathology, and hence much more in tune with any 
modern psychological biography. There has been a noticeable softening of 
the allocation of Kierkegaard to the ranks of the partially insane. We have in 
recent times felt the force of Derrida and others on Kierkegaard’s work. 192 
The outcome of this approach has been a recognition that it is both easy and 
profitable to play with sections and segments of the corpus in order to gain 
specific insights, and we have seen how Agacinski’s adds much to our 
perspective of both the life and the writings of Kierkegaard using such a 
post-modern approach, as the above quotation indicates. Many of the 
plethora of recent analytic papers on Kierkegaard’s titles nonetheless use 
some biographical statement or inference in support of an argument. 193 But 
none of this takes away from the unconscious perception I maintain most of 
us carry around, based very much on these early biographies and analyses. 
194  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
190 Agacinski (1988). 
191 ibid p 252. 
192 see as just one example of many, the essays in Houe and Marino (2003). 
193 The easiest place to find these ‘micro-biographies’ is in the International 
Commentary Series, eg vol 13 : The Corsair Affair (Perkins (1990)). 
194 Perhaps a telling anecdote: when I informed a neighbour of mine, a retired 
University Principal, that I intended to attempt a PhD on Kierkegaard, he replied: 
‘You have my deepest sympathy.’ 
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5.4 Current Approaches to Kierkegaard 
 
Kierkegaard is still enigmatic in our time, even if our wish to pigeon-hole 
him medically has largely dissipated. We now have problems pigeon-holing 
him intellectually. Perhaps these are two sides of the same coin, a 
continuing need to manage, to reduce.  Now, in this section, I want to make 
it clear that however one views Kierkegaard, from whatever intellectual 
discipline one comes to him, my thesis about reading him as a narcissist 
still carries force.  
 
How are we best to characterise Kierkegaard? A Philosopher? A Theologian? 
A writer, a man of letters? He was of course all of these and more, and no 
easy categorisation process works: many have tried to present a summary of 
Kierkegaard’s thought, only to find themselves shoehorning a wide-ranging 
and eclectic thinker into one or more arbitrary boxes, leaving far more out 
than they manage to get in. Perhaps the most immediately tempting 
approach of all is to view Kierkegaard as a frustrated autobiographer, who 
wants nothing more than to tell the terrible story of his own life, but is both 
too embarrassed and too intellectual to spell it all out as nothing more than 
a chronology? So we could, like Josiah Thomson discussed below, see the 
Kierkegaardian output as 'no more' than an extended biographical 
conundrum. All his insights and ideas, all of his writing, less so perhaps the 
veronymous texts, have their basis in Kierkegaard's life and his 
relationships, and our task is to solve the conundrum, to relate life events to 
works of writing. 
 
It is a truism that all individual output is in some sense nothing more than a 
response to one’s being, to one’s nature and nurture. But this 
generalisation, if not analysed further, could be facile, and would do nothing 
to explain either the complexity of methodology or of output of Kierkegaard. 
But there have been those who have followed this approach, at least around 
the middle of the last century. Such a tacit assumption I suspect informs far 
more secondary works on Kierkegaard than might be thought. The problem 
for this thesis is that such an approach is too simplistic by a long shot. 
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Many people, for example, have called off their engagement but without 
producing the kind of writing that Kierkegaard produced. So why he? This is 
an instance of the major problem with the ‘Truths for All’ school of 
psychobiography, defined and analysed above. What is missing is an 
examination of the exact mechanisms in place that, activated by say the 
breakup with Regine, helped to produce Fear and Trembling. Or Works of 
Love, mutatis mutandis. This straightforward biographical approach is now 
perceived as overly simplistic, and while an understanding of the psychology 
of any writer is helpful and sometimes essential, any psychological 
understanding can only be limited, speculative and never definitive.  
 
And in someone who is as subtle and frankly devious as Kierkegaard, we 
must guard against taking him at his own word. Taylor, for example, in 
dismissing the biographical approach, claims: 
It is simply incorrect to regard the pseudonymous works as 
fundamentally concerned with Kierkegaard’s own existence. His 
interest is rather with the existence of the reader 195 
 
Well, perhaps; but that too would be a simplistic view of a personality and 
an intention, just the kind of error of which Taylor accuses the biographers. 
I fear it is just not that easy. As has already been said, and to be developed 
further, selves are not there to be re-discovered, but to be created. The idea 
that any biographical approach can, without question, rule in or rule out a 
psychological explanation for an action or a process has become essentially 
unacceptable in this, our time. We can create many pasts, and thereby many 
selves. Ideally this creational process is best carried out with a living person, 
when conjectures can be refuted by memories and attitudes. The same 
process applied to the dead cannot give much in the way of refutation, and 
as was pointed out, we have very little independent contemporary 
information about Kierkegaard. 
 
At the simplest level, of course Kierkegaard was a writer, a critic, a man of 
letters. Littering his output are references to, and theories about, the artistic 
                                                
195 Taylor (1975) p 29. 
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and the aesthetic. We have reviews of literature 196, of plays 197, of music 198. 
We have his well-documented association with the literary and theatrical 
circles of Golden Age Denmark 199. His fascination with theatre is everywhere 
in his pseudonymous works: Either/Or, Repetition, Stages on Life’s Way – all 
have extensive descriptions of matters theatrical and a perceptive 
contemplation on the psychological processes that occur during theatre. We 
have essentially a theory of the artistic 200.  
 
We could, further, think of Kierkegaard as essentially a writer of novellas, 
whose main ideas are wrapped in a literary casement. The predominant 
supporter of such a view is Louis Mackay, and his Kierkegaard: A Kind of 
Poet 201 stands among attempts to turn this thinker into a writer. Attractive 
as the idea is, it is surely limited. The thought of treating the more obscure 
and contradictory parts of the Kierkegaardian canon as pure poetry is, it 
must be admitted, very tempting sometimes. But to view Kierkegaard as no 
more than a literary author surely does not ring true for the majority of 
readers. 
 
Kierkegaard certainly experimented with writing. He was inventive, 
demonstrably prolific, and defined a use of the Danish language that had 
hitherto been absent. He pushed language to the limit, and remained 
fascinated by what lay beyond that limit, the end of language, as it were. 202 
As part of the Golden Age, he shared with others in that circle both the 
desire to be excellent, and the rejouicement that came with a recognition that 
                                                
196 One of his earliest works was a critique of Hans Christian Anderson (From the 
Papers of One Still Living reviews, at great length, Anderson’s Only a Fiddler). 
197 for example, A Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, KW XVII. 
198 His fascination, not to say obsession, with Don Giovanni is everywhere in his 
early writings and diaries, but most obviously in Either/Or Part 1. There are well 
over one hundred references to Don Giovanni in Kierkegaard’s work. 
199 The circle of friends included the Heibergs, Sibbern and Moller among many. For 
a detailed analysis see Stewart (2003).  
200 For a very clear summation see George Pattison’s chapter in the Cambridge 
Companion to Kierkegaard. Pattison (1998). 
201 Mackay (1971).  
202 Several texts explore Kierkegaard’s view of the limitations of language. See, for 
example, Shakespeare (2001) or Hale (2002).  
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something very special was happening in Denmark at that time. 203 He mixed 
with that special set, and seemingly, at first at least, very much enjoyed it. 
He enjoyed being seen as the equal of other learned intellectuals; he enjoyed 
more being the centre of attention, of being primus inter pares with the great 
and the good of Copenhagen. His later work incorporated social theory, 
politics, theories of justice and ethics, and obviously psychology. It would 
take no effort to categorise Søren Kierkegaard as an eminent man of letters 
in the early part of the nineteenth century. However, the academy of today is 
rarely satisfied with such an old-fashioned and essentially unaccountable 
categorisation. For much of the twentieth century, the debate was about 
whether Kierkegaard was a philosopher or a theologian, and the debate has 
swung back and forth.  
 
The biggest problem with considering Kierkegaard as a philosopher seems to 
be what he himself says about both philosophy and his view of it. The issue 
is about the role, the importance, of the religious imperative in Kierkegaard’s 
self-confessed Christian commitment. His particular understanding of 
religion required him to deny that its claims were open to scrutiny by human 
understanding. So, a priori, Kierkegaard rules out reason, the basis of 
philosophy, as a means of analysing his theology. Philosophy is thus 
condemned from the beginning.  
 
But the case for Kierkegaard being a philosopher has been well 
summarised204. First, the subject and practice of philosophy is essentially a 
cumulation of philosophical thinking; like common law, there is a set of 
foundations from previous practice that guides current thinking. 
Kierkegaard is clearly part of that ‘cumulative index’, as it were. Kierkegaard 
became part of modern European philosophical thinking at a particularly 
crucial time – the mid-nineteenth century – and Kierkegaard is essentially 
part of that turbulent time. Philosophers of many colours feel obliged, sooner 
                                                
203 for a detailed discussion, see the first part of Kirmmse’s Kierkegaard in Golden 
Age Denmark (Kirmmse (1990)).  
204 see for example Pattison (2005) or Dupre (1963). 
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or later, to write what Pattison calls their ‘statutory Kierkegaardian essay’. 
205 
 
And further, Kierkegaard did indeed write texts ostensibly about philosophy. 
Amongst many, Evans has argued that Kierkegaard’s two key philosophical 
works, Fragments and Postscript, contain primarily philosophy and very good 
philosophy at that. 206 Titles can be misleading of course, and it all depends 
what you mean by philosophy. But at the very least, just as modern analytic 
philosophy after Wittgenstein is very much concerned with divining the 
proper language for any given topic of analysis, so too Kierkegaard was very 
much concerned about the demarcation of, in his terms, spheres of 
existence, and the proper language for talking about them, Fear and 
Trembling being the most spectacular case in point. If modern philosophy, 
post-Wittgenstein, has become particularly concerned with language, then 
Kierkegaard can easily claim a place in the history of ideas about language. 
It is his attempts to address us as thinkers that marks him out as a singular 
philosopher, attempting, much like the later Wittgenstein, to enable us to 
change how we think, not just to present arguments that result in different 
conclusions. In this sense, Kierkegaard can be seen as very much concerned 
with his single reader, and his meiotic method is very much aimed at 
developing and improving our thinking habits. Although, I have to add, that 
may not be the whole story: his motivation for engaging the single reader 
may well not be all he claims, or what commentators have assumed. There 
are different ways of being concerned or obsessed with that single reader, 
and this thesis maintains the engagement is in part at least narcissistic. 
 
Kierkegaard was centrally interested in the idea of the self. This has 
assumed paramount importance in recent philosophy and theology. It would 
be absurd to ignore a writer who added enormously to the millennia-old 
debate about the idea of the self and its relation to philosophical thinking. 
Pattison efficiently summarises Kierkegaard’s definition of the self’s 
responsibility in Kierkegaard’s thought: 
                                                
205 ibid p 8. 
206 Evans (1983) p 4.  
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I am who I am and as I am, and there is no parallel universe into 
which I can escape. I am infinitely responsible for the self that I am 
and there is no one else who is or can be responsible for it in the 
same way. 207 
 
While writers and artists had hinted as much for these millennia, 
Kierkegaard’s was a remarkably concise and highly innovative statement of a 
very modern view of self. 
 
But labelling Kierkegaard as a philosopher can be performed only in spite of 
his own best efforts to prevent this. The categorisation problem has 
perplexed most of those who have attempted any kind of intellectual 
biography of Kierkegaard. Alastair Hannay in particular has struggled with 
the intellectual characterisation of Kierkegaard 208. George Pattison, likewise, 
over many years has considered Kierkegaard’s disciplinary loyalty 209. 
Perhaps there is no clear answer, not least because of Kierkegaard’s very 
own statements: he dismissed most academics; he denied the value of 
philosophy; he eventually damned the Church and most of its theologians. 
 
Was Kierkegaard, then, a theologian? There is a problem of definition here, 
since the inclusion of post-modern theology would stretch the boundaries of 
what theology might be. If we take a conservative view of theology as the 
methodological interpretation of the content of Christian faith 210, then 
Kierkegaard only just fits into the category of theologian. For as Gouwens 
points out 211, he is not concerned with systematic observation and 
translation of faith's content from, as it were, one language into another. 
Kierkegaard's concern is very much more that of enabling the individual 
reader to make sense of what it is to be Christian and what is in the gospels. 
Whereas many mainstream theologians would actively work to translate, to 
make easier the understanding process, Kierkegaard steadfastly accepts the 
difficulty, even the impossibility of the gospel message, and tries to empower 
                                                
207 Pattison (2005) p 93 See also Pattison (1992) and Pattison (1998). 
208 See Hannay (2001), Hannay (1982). See also Hannay (2003).  
209 Pattison has provided several texts considering the life and works of Kierkegaard 
including Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious (1992).  
210 Tillich (1967) p 15.  
211 Gouwens (1996). 
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the single individual nevertheless to make sense of it. So Kierkegaard can 
say, without resorting to a pseudonymous author: 
The importance [of my pseudonymous literature]…… does not consist 
in making any new proposal, some unheard of discovery, or in 
founding a new party and wanting to go further, but precisely in the 
opposite, of wanting once again to read through solo, if possible in a 
more inward way, the original text of the individual human existence-
relationships, the old familiar texts handed down from the fathers.  212 
 
But this does not make Kierkegaard a theologian based on the above 
definition. Not only did he not do what my definition would have theologians 
do, he probably would have found such a translation project heretical. The 
idea, for Kierkegaard, is not to make living Christianity easier or necessarily 
more comprehensible. The idea is to enable us to engage with the eternal 
message of the gospels. 
 
So Kierkegaard is perhaps not a theologian in the sense that he is concerned 
with dogmatics, with the correct presentation of Christian belief. He is 
concerned with how the concepts of Christian belief are used, and hence 
what they mean. In this he is often linked with the later Wittgenstein, and 
there is a considerable literature on the parallels between these writers. 213 
As Kierkegaard said over and over again, his intention was to require of the 
reader a personal response to his writings, one that engendered reflection on 
the part of the reader: he was not out to increase the amount of academic 
scholarship: 
Scholarship more and more turns away from a primitive impression of 
existence…One does not love, does not have faith, does not act; but 
one knows what erotic love is, what faith is. 214 
 
A case has been made by both Pattison 215 and Gouwens 216 for seeing 
Kierkegaard as a religious writer, as a Christian author.  Evans, too, makes 
a case for seeing him as a writer and psychologist whose ideas were deeply 
informed by Christianity. 217 So such a view would not see Kierkegaard’s 
                                                
212 KW CUP p 629. 
213 See Holmer, (1978), Creegan, (1989), Bell and Hustwit (1978).  
214 KW p 250. 
215 Pattison (1999). 
216 Gouwens op cit. 
217 Evans (1990). 
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writings as novellas or literature, but as writings, technical if you like, about 
the nature of humankind and Christianity, and such a view would make 
them easier of access. I would want to agree with this view, that Kierkegaard 
is a ‘kind’ of theologian, a theological writer, one who is primarily concerned 
with the ‘how’ of Christianity, perhaps at the expense of the ‘what’. 218 Or in 
Hans Frei’s phrase, Kierkegaard is essentially concerned with the ‘logic of 
coming to belief’. 219 
 
My thesis is that whatever view one takes of Søren Kierkegaard, as writer, as 
philosopher, as theologian, any hermeneutic is incomplete without an 
understanding of his motives. His artistic critiques, his theory of artistic 
reception, his analyses of Don Giovanni, these are made more 
understandable by considering Kierkegaard’s way of being in the world, what 
I shall call his narcissism. Likewise his philosophy, his appeal to the 
individual, his recasting of truth, his version of religious ethics, these attain 
a different level of comprehension when considered in the light of his 
narcissism. And his unnerving and demanding theology, his defining of God 
as infinitely qualitatively different, and the incarnation as an offence and a 
paradox, all of these ideas can be enriched by seeing how they are 
underpinned by his narcissism. 
 
Gouwans perhaps best makes the case for this view of Kierkegaardian 
writing when he says: 
For more readers than care to admit it, there is something deeply 
opaque and troubling in strategy and spirit about Kierkegaard's 
thought, for he is a writer who calls attention to the resistances 
against primitive reading, and he can make one ashamed of one's own 
thoughts and passions…..What Kierkegaard desired - and deserves - 
above all is readers (and writers) who attempt to "think with" (and 
"against") him, to enter into the concerns and issues he raises with 
philosophical eros and passion. 220 
 
While wholeheartedly agreeing with this sentiment, the aching omission is 
the question ‘why’. Why does Kierkegaard do this to us? And in exploring the 
                                                
218 Gouwens op cit p 12. 
219 Frei (1992) p 54.  
220 Gouwens op cit p 2. 
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question and giving an answer, of course I must address the other question 
of ‘how’. 
 
In this thesis I am not concerned to add another medical diagnosis about the 
life of Kierkegaard. The implication of such a process is to give gravitas to 
the perception that we the observers can then inspect, from the outside, and 
with all the objectivity we can muster, his life and thereby his work. Rather, 
my aim is to show the dependence of the work on the life; that objectivity 
about his work is impossible, that we cannot read Kierkegaard and maintain 
this subjective/objective dichotomy. This, I argue, is not just for the reasons 
and methods that Kierkegaard himself defined and utilised. This is because 
of how we function when we read his texts: we cannot be objective, because 
reading narcissistic texts is different from reading other kinds of texts: we 
cannot avoid some kind of identification – positive or negative – with the 
author. 
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6 Narcissistic Influences in Kierkegaard's Life 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 
In the hunt for the real Kierkegaard people frequently overlook the 
fact that mystification, mummery, and fiction are constitutive features 
in Kierkegaard’s production of himself – and that this is precisely why 
these things help to reveal the “real” Kierkegaard. 221 
 
 
This section is concerned with an evaluation of the life and some of the 
works of Søren Kierkegaard, inspected and discussed with a view to 
discerning evidence of narcissism. This, Chapter 6, looks at key aspects of 
his life; the following three chapters look respectively at a particular text: 
Fear and Trembling, Works of Love and The Sickness Unto Death.  
 
In all of what follows in this section, the fundamental issue, fundamental to 
whether or not the section makes any sense at all, is what we are to take as 
indicative of narcissism, what evidence is to count in favour, and what 
against. There are several options. First, we could take the literal indicators, 
the symptoms from DSM-IV. These were enumerated above as: a grandiose 
sense of the self, fantasies of unlimited power or success, a sense of being 
special, having a need for excessive admiration, a great sense of entitlement, 
being personally exploitative, lacking in empathy, displaying great envy, and 
showing arrogant, haughty behaviour. 
 
The problem is that these behaviours can be precursors or consequences of 
any number of underlying states. As Kernberg accurately but somewhat 
unhelpfully illustrates:  
For example, social timidity, social phobia or inhibition, may 
contribute to a diagnosis of either a schizoid or an avoidant 
personality, but may in fact reflect the cautiousness of a deeply 
paranoid individual, the fear of exposure of a narcissistically 
grandiose individual, or a reaction formation against exhibitionistic 
tendencies in a hysterical individual. 222 
 
                                                
221 Garff (2005) p 101. 
222 Kernberg (2004) p 5.  
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The limitations of the DSM-IV categories were discussed above, and their 
limitations seem to me to be so great that, alone, they provide no aid to 
understanding. But as a checklist, a symptomatology, they have a 
superficial attraction, and I shall refer to these symptoms as we consider 
Kierkegaard’s life and works in some detail. 
 
A second approach would be to ignore the symptoms and think instead of 
types of narcissist. So, briefly, we could consider which of Bursten's four 
types 223 (craving, paranoid, manipulative and phallic) best fits the 
personality of Søren Kierkegaard. Or we could take Millon’s six categories 224 
(normal, unprincipled, amorous, compensatory, elitist, and fanatic) and 
repeat the process. As I have previously suggested, thinking in types is also 
useful as shorthand, but does nothing to help understand the underlying 
processes. And few individuals fit perfectly into any one of these categories. 
 
As a strategy, much better is to consider the psychodynamic processes that 
underpin narcissism. These, also, were discussed in Chapter 2, and Otto 
Kernberg provided a summary. He suggests eight primitive defence 
mechanisms are always involved: splitting, primitive idealisation, 
devaluation, projection, projective identification, denial, omnipotence, and 
omnipotent control. The problem we have here is that some of these are 
exceptionally difficult to discern without access to the living person, without, 
that is, indulging in the therapeutic hour. One can infer such defensive 
processes, but such an inference is always speculative, and manifestly lacks 
corroboration. However, understanding processes rather than states is 
always, I contend, a more profound method of coming to terms with 
motivation, and identifying these defence mechanisms is a critical part of 
understanding Kierkegaard’s narcissism. 
 
While none of these is perfect on its own, I will use all three approaches - 
looking for DSM symptoms, considering what type of narcissist Kierkegaard 
might have been, while constantly looking for evidence of these 
psychodynamic processes. Beyond that, we can also look for the existence of 
                                                
223 Bursten (1973).   
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the primary underlying instinct, the one foundational process that begets all 
kinds and shades of narcissism - rage. This, fortunately from a biographical 
point of view, is such a clear emotion, such a basic and difficult to disguise 
personal process that we should be able to spot it both in the diaries and in 
the published works. It may not always appear as rage, of course, but it 
should be possible to trace a direct path back from the observed behaviour 
to the emotion.  
 
Why rage? Because rage is the fundamental affect linked to aggression, one 
of the two drives with which psychodynamics is concerned. Affect can be 
defined as an inborn, constitutionally and genetically determined mode of 
reaction, triggered first by various physiological and bodily experiences, and 
later, by the development of object relations. 225 So rage is the affect of 
aggression: aggression shows itself as rage.  
 
The purpose of rage is to control, defeat or obviate a source of irritation or 
pain.  At the same time, rage can be seen to eliminate barriers to 
gratification, and this latter purpose is the prototype for later functions of 
rage as a means of destroying bad objects, objects that stand between the 
self and the gratification of the self. This is the primary and basic essence of 
rage. But accompanying rage are two other affects – hatred and envy. 
 
Hatred is a derivative of rage, but rather than remaining a primary process, 
it evolves through development. So in due course, the wish to destroy the 
bad object becomes instead a wish to inflict pain, to make the bad object 
suffer, so that we arrive at the sadistic aspect of narcissism. Later again, the 
wish is neither to destroy the bad object, nor to make it suffer, but to control 
that object through domination, through power over the object – this, so that 
the persecutory aspects of the object can be nullified and managed. And as 
we all know, hatred has its counterpart – revenge. The purpose of hatred is 
to effect revenge over the bad object. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
224 Millon (2000) Ch 9.  
225 see Kernberg (2004) Ch 2. 
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Envy is a more complex process, and we must look to Klein for the analysis 
of this seemingly contradictory emotion. Envy, for Klein, is the need to spoil, 
to destroy, to murder, the very object that is needed for survival and 
wellbeing. We both want, and want to negate, the object of envy. If we begin 
with the original frustration of the absent breast, this breast is viewed as 
withholding itself, as a punitive breast, as a wilful and denying object. The 
resulting rage is transformed into hatred, so that the infant wishes only to 
spoil, to murder or destroy this punishing breast. But this is also the loving 
breast, the comforting, feeding breast: this is the source of life, sustenance 
and happiness. This conflict of hating the most the thing one loves the most 
is carried on into later life 226. 
 
There is no one-to-one correspondence between rage and narcissism; it is a 
necessary condition but not a sufficient one. Other severe personality 
disorders have a component of rage about them. But there is a clear 
retrospective path from overt narcissism back to rage, and there is a 
particular constellation of rage, hatred and envy that is unique to 
narcissism. So in what follows below, I will note overt behaviours, but 
attempt to relate these back to the primary processes of rage, hatred and 
envy. As we have seen from the literature, rage is rarely evident in early 
years, or through the golden age of youth that many narcissists experience. 
But it is there, and invariably emerges as the impossibility of the narcissistic 
project becomes apparent. 
 
 
6.2 Sources of Evidence  
 
We have essentially four sources of evidence about the kind of life lived by 
Søren Kierkegaard. The first, the best, but the most minimal is the 
contemporaneous accounts. As has been pointed out 227, there are barely 
6,000 actual words from a handful of his exact contemporaries, and there 
particularly is little about his childhood or early life.  
                                                
226 And this concurs with everyday life and language. We say, of an envied object: 
‘either I have it or nobody does!’  
227 Kirmmse (1996). 
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The second set of sources is his Journals and Papers. These are tantalising. 
It seems clear to the majority of recent biographers and commentators that 
not everything in these papers can be taken as a true and faithful sentiment 
from Kierkegaard. And terrible things were done to the early source papers 
by Kierkegaard's brother and first agent, leading to an arbitrariness of much 
of the dating of Kierkegaard’s remaining papers, as well as considerable 
uncertainty about what has gone missing. 228 Fenger has given a description 
of the magnitude of the problem, which can hardly be bettered: 
Anyone willing to spend a couple of hours at the Royal Library, 
looking at Kierkegaard’s early papers, will see how hopeless it is to try 
to bring order to their ranks…. 
 
I closed my eyes and chose a packet of Kierkegaard papers…It turned 
out to be A, Package 41, Folder 2, which contains notes from the 
Journal FF with the dates September 13th 1836 to August 18th 1836, 
although enclosures 5-6, 25-26, 29-30, 38-40, 51-54, 69-70 and 97 
are missing. One finds a whole stack of identical transparent 
envelopes, each containing small slips of paper, usually with 
handwriting on both sides. On each envelope there is annotation in 
India ink as to where these pieces are located in the edition of Heiburg 
and Kuhr. It is difficult to determine how much of the work of these 
editors is owed to Barfod, including the pagination in pencil, the 
crossings-out, the pastings-over. 229  
 
Everywhere there is evidence that the diaries were actively being written 
more for posterity than as an absolutely accurate record of his day-to-day 
living and thoughts. 230  
 
The third source must be entries and commentaries in his published works, 
making a distinction between the inserted anecdotes and the works 
themselves. Large sections of some of the pseudonymous canon have been 
thought of as autobiographical. Parts of Either /Or, certainly Repetition, 
                                                
228 This is a detailed story that cannot be repeated here. See Fenger (1980), 
especially Ch 2 for a detailed exposition of just how much we do not know about 
Søren Kierkegaard. 
229 Fenger (1980) p 50-52.  
230 It would seem for the biographies that critical psychological analysis of 
Kierkegaard's motives is relatively recent. Certainly the early biographies, as was 
discussed in Chapter 3, present a benign view of the papers, taking them very much 
at face value. It is only the more recent biographies, Hannay (2001) and especially 
Garff (2005) that have attempted a systematic psychological analysis of Kierkegaard 
through his papers. 
  
 
Page 114 
 
 
whole sections of Stages on Life's Way - all of these and more have been the 
subject of intense scrutiny, and sometimes truly fabulous interpretation. 
More locally, there are many anecdotes or adumbrations that begin 
something like ‘ there was once a brilliant young man...’ or ‘there lived a 
specially gifted child…’ spread throughout his texts, usually inserted to 
make a point, as an illustrative vignette. There is simply no way of knowing 
for sure whether or not these anecdotes, seemingly casually inserted, are 
anything other than literary invention, placed there to make or emphasise a 
point, or whether they are systematically placed clues to his character, left 
for posterity to discover and debate. But it is important to have a view on the 
distinction between the entries in the Journals and those in published 
works. I want to suggest therefore that as a general rule, incidents reported 
in the Journals are essentially true, they probably did happen, there is a 
basis in real experience, or they are genuine recollections, even though they 
may have been modified by time and thought. Incidents in the published 
works on the other hand, including those intended for publication, may well 
be narcissistic fantasies, about what could or what should have happened. 
They may not be based in fact or recollection but in narcissistic desire. They 
portray the world as Kierkegaard wishes, or feared, it had been. 
 
So the walks in the drawing room would be a perfect instance of narcissistic 
fantasy. Although father would not permit the child to go out, he would 
devote his time and attention, without distraction or competition, to creating 
the world in the drawing room. The wholly good object that was father 
dedicated himself without reservation to the son, and more, was 
choreographing how the world worked just for the son. The son's most 
desired selfobject organised and manipulated the entire world for the son's 
personal use. For narcissists, it doesn't get much better. 
 
Cursing God on the Jutland heath, on the other hand, locates the badness 
of the bad object that is father quite exactly, and without the possibility of 
redemption. There was just father and God, no intervening variable, and no 
excuses. For the religiously inclined narcissist, it can't get much worse. 
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The reason for inventing the detailed description of the thing that didn't 
happen is to portray one of two things. Either it is about the kind of 
attention the young Søren wishes he had received from Father, or it is to 
demean and diminish, effectively to punish Father for his lack of persistent 
narcissistic supply towards his son. The one elevates, temporarily, Father to 
the ideal, the true source of fantasised supply; the other punishes Father for 
his inability to supply what is needed. 
. 
The fourth and weakest source is the very many biographies. Many of these 
make excellent inferences about his life, but in the final analysis they can be 
based in nothing more than the same contemporaneous accounts, the 
entries in the Diaries, Journals and Papers, and his published works: they 
are indeed no more than inferences 231. 
 
6.3 Mother 
 
In almost any theory or model of child-rearing, throughout history, the 
child’s relationship with mother has always assumed a paramount position. 
In the century since Freud began publications, this has to a significant 
extent been formalised. But in the case of Søren Kierkegaard, we have a 
double conundrum: he makes effectively no reference to his mother in any of 
his writings; and we know very little about her.  
 
Her family, another poor Jutland peasant family, it seems owned one cow 
and four sheep; her father was a convivial man, and the family all 
respectable and honourable people in their station. There were six children 
in Ane’s family, three of the girls were called Ane. As the youngest she was 
                                                
231
 We must guard against an overly saintly view of the man. Perhaps this view has 
faded, given the more realistic psychological analyses to be found in some of the 
recent biographies. But it was a recurrent approach for the middle part of the last 
century, and these perceptions take time to disappear. The essence of this ‘Søren-
Centric’ approach is that he was indeed a genius; that he was a prophet before his 
time; that those who did him wrong were later shamed by history. The trouble with 
this approach is that it is very unhelpful in making inferences about how Søren 
Kierkegaard felt at the time, or what the social dynamics, let alone his own 
psychodynamics, might have been. Kierkegaard himself may have been utterly 
  
 
Page 116 
 
 
therefore ‘little Ane’. We have almost no contemporaneous information about 
her, other than that she was in service in Copenhagen working for a Hosier 
named Janus Pallesen Thorning, a neighbour of the Royen family, before 
working as maid to Michael’s first wife. Henriette Lund’s memoirs, privately 
published originally 1880, say of Ane: 
I do not remember her at all, but she was referred to in the family as a 
kind little woman with an unpretentious and cheerful turn of mind. 
Her sons’ development was a bit over her head; their high-flying 
appeared to her worried heart to be a flight way from the level on 
which she felt comfortable, and on which she would so much 
preferred to have kept them. And she was therefore never more in her 
element than when a passing illness forced them ever so slightly back 
under her jurisdiction. She was especially gratified when she could 
get them peacefully into bed, since then she wielded her sceptre with 
delight, cosseted them and protected them like a hen her chicks. Her 
motherly inclinations also agreed with the grandchildren in the 
family. Her plump little figure had only to appear in the doorway of 
the nursery, and the cries and screams would give way to a hush; the 
rebellious young boy or girl soon fell sweetly asleep in her soft 
embrace. 232 
 
And that, really, is it. The rest is conjecture. Even this reasonably 
informative portrait is, in the majority, about Ane as grandmother, not 
mother. It is surely a commonplace of everyday family relationships, let 
alone psychodynamics, that a dearly loved, idealised grandmother can all too 
easily have been a tyrannical or damaging mother in her younger years.  
 
Those biographical studies written during what has been called the ‘blunt 
reading’ era – around the middle of the twentieth century – tend to make a 
harsh judgement on Søren’s mother. She could read a little but could not 
write, and had been through little education. She was, according to this 
approach, almost irrelevant in Søren’s life. Walter Lowrie’s 1938 biography 
suggests that mother ‘counted for little in the household’ 233 while Grimsley 
234 comments that his mother ‘played a shadowy part in his upbringing’. 
                                                                                                                                       
convinced that history would show he was a true genius long after his death. But 
there is very little evidence that other people shared that conviction at the time. 
232 Kirmmse (1996) p 152. But note Kirmmse’s caveat about Jette’s revisionist 
agenda. See p 317. 
233 Lowrie (1938) p 24. 
234 Grimsley (1973). 
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Others, Thompson 235 for example, in a biography otherwise inventive on an 
heroic scale, mentions her only simply as his mother, almost nothing more 
than a biological entity.  
 
Given the lack of information, such broadly negative conclusions are not 
unwarranted. But from a psychodynamic point of view, we cannot possibly 
let it rest at that. 
 
There are really just two linked questions to answer at this point. First, did 
Kierkegaard really never mention his mother in all his writings? And second, 
if that is the case, why not? I suggest there are three possible reasons for the 
absence of mention of mother. The first is that he did indeed mention her, 
perhaps often, but that the entries were removed either by brother Peter, or 
by editor Barfod, or by both. This would account for the complete absence of 
reference. But, reading the six thousand nine hundred and sixty nine entries 
in the Hong edition of the diaries and papers, it is impossible to believe that 
Kierkegaard would have written only neat, delineated entries entitled 
'Mother'. The idea of 'mother' would have permeated his writings; no editor, 
surely, would have been able to remove every hint, every subtle reference, 
every adumbration to her.  
 
So I suggest that the Papers are essentially representative, and we must 
assume that he chose not to write about her. The second reason for the 
omission is that one simply did not write about mother in diaries at that 
time and place, that this is a cultural omission. This is plausible, if unlikely, 
though Watkin’s 236 apologetic would support this view: Ane indeed was 
barely literate, but that was of little importance, she suggests. The primary 
role and influence of father was in the arena of intellectual discussion, of 
dialectically argumentative debate, of ratiocination. The anecdotes about 
father and the two sons engaged in endless theological or philosophical 
interchange do not make mother irrelevant: rather they define her place 
absolutely as in a different sphere - literally, the mother. There is no 
surprise for Watkin that mother is not mentioned, since the primary output 
                                                
235 Thompson (1973).  
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of Søren’s life is cognitive and intellectual; she played no part in that 
particular part of his life, and therefore she is not represented in his 
writings.  
 
But there is a third possibility. In diaries one writes about the things that 
occupy one. Presumably openly criticising one’s mother would have been a 
difficulty for Kierkegaard; but to ignore her totally approaches denial. That 
is, the complete absence or mention suggests the failure of any admitted 
relationship with her, although there clearly was one. Father, by contrast, 
was all sorts of things, and Kierkegaard could admit, deny and discuss many 
of them, certainly in his Papers. But the denial of the existence of mother 
suggests something much darker, and shame would be the obvious affect. 
We are not silent about things that make us angry, and we are not always 
silent about matters of guilt – we wish to expunge the guilt, to rationalise it. 
But shame speaks from the very centre of being – it is the most private 
emotion. It is something about which we dare not speak. 
 
So why might Kierkegaard have been ashamed of his mother? I do not know, 
and there is so little information on which to make assumptions or build a 
case. One possible reason is simply social: her lack of obvious intelligence 
compared with her husband, and indeed her sons. We are told that her hand 
had to be guided when making a signature. Is this why he denied her? Was 
he ashamed to admit his mother because of her education? 
 
Perhaps instead it involved his mother's pre-marital sexual involvement with 
his father. It is interesting that although he talks around and about his 
father's sins, he never mentions mother's role in that sinfulness. Was 
Kierkegaard deeply misogynistic, hating women exactly for their sexuality? Is 
the problem that the fault, in Kierkegaard's eyes, was not with his father for 
seducing, but with his mother for being the seducer? I suspect this is nearer 
the mark.  In terms of sexuality, male narcissists tend either to be rampant 
users and abusers of women, the phallic narcissist, or else the fearful, 
resentful denyer of female sexuality. Female sexuality calls for and demands 
                                                                                                                                       
236 Watkin (1997) pp 7-8. 
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masculine sexuality, for transgression of the self. Much of Kierkegaard’s 
relationship with Regine Olsen can be seen as a response to the very threat 
of her sexuality. His own sexual self was too poor, too fragile and much too 
limited to permit the transgressions of intimacy. How much of this was a 
transferred object, from how he viewed mother, we can never know. 
 
But of an earlier age, why then was there no mention? Before puberty, he 
must have had a loving relationship with her from all we can read; but there 
is no written mention from one whose very life was defined through his 
writing. A model for this omission could be constructed: the early 
narcissistic injury was so great that the anti-libidinal ego would not permit 
any joyful relationship with the enticing object that was mother, so that to 
engage with mother as an adult would be to risk repeating the infantile 
injury to such an extent that it was best not to engage in the first place. But 
the scant information we have about Søren clinging to his mother’s skirts 
gives the lie to anything so draconian. 
 
I can only wonder why Søren was too ashamed to speak about his mother. 
Perhaps, in the end, all of the two million words written by Kierkegaard are 
just one enormous Freudian slip: in the words of the old joke, he wrote 
about one thing, and meant a mother. 
 
 
6.4 Father and Brother 
 
About one end of father’s life, Kierkegaard observed: ‘My father was born on 
the due date.’ 237 About the other, he wrote in his Journal: 
My father died on Wednesday the 8th at 2.00 am. I so deeply desired 
that he might live a couple of years more, and I regard his death as 
the last sacrifice of his love for me, because in dying he did not depart 
from me, but he died for me, in order that something, if possible, 
might come of me. 238 
 
                                                
237 Garff (2005) p 13. 
238 JP 5335. 
  
 
Page 120 
 
 
Even though this latter entry was written only days after the death, the 
narcissistic tone is immediately apparent, and it is this tone than can be 
found throughout much of Kierkegaard’s recorded writings about his 
difficult, melancholic father. It is, actually, a remarkable statement, almost 
blasphemous. As Søren sees it, his father gave up his life in order that the 
son might make something of his. This raises all sorts of questions about the 
perceived nature of the inhibitions and impediments to Søren’s life that 
belong to Michael, and what sort of object Father really was.  
 
Beyond the birth and death of Michael Perdeson Kierkegaard, we actually 
know very little. The bald facts of familial history have been outlined; we 
know something of how an ageing son wrote of his father and his upbringing 
239, although some of this must be viewed with suspicion as being revisionist 
writing; we also have, as was mentioned above, a series of incidents related 
in the pseudonymous canon that beg biographical interpretation - the walks 
around the living room, the cursing of God on the Jutland Heath, the sight 
of the image of the crucifixion - but I have suggested we really cannot be 
sure they ever happened. Beyond some descriptions of the externals of the 
man, his dress, his demeanour, there is little else to say. He was regarded as 
a true thinker, and was admired for his reading and intellect. His poor 
background seems to have been of no consequence: all in all, he was a 
welcome member of Copenhagen’s intellectual middle class. 
 
One question is worth asking: did he suffer from depression, and was this 
depression passed on? Beyond a moody temperament, there is nothing in 
the scant contemporaneous account to suggest he did. His energy, effort, 
attention to detail, care and punctiliousness are all contra-indicators of 
clinical depression. The attribution of melancholy seems to stem mainly from 
the son, who then assigned it to himself. And anyway, the Danish word 
'tugsindighed' suggests a heaviness of mind, rather than depression 240. 
There is probably no basis for suggesting technical depression, and there is 
little point in speculating whether it was transmitted. The depression that 
                                                
239 to be discussed below, but principally in Point of View. 
240 for a discussion see McCarthy (1978) p54 et seq.  
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the son encountered, and that he describes in later life in detail, was, I 
suggest, in reaction to narcissistic failure. 
 
In terms of father’s sexuality, there is no reason to doubt the man’s love for 
his wife. Watkin suggests that the Moravians, with whom father was 
affiliated, took a particularly dim view of sex in marriage; as late as 1820, 
marriage partners were decided by the casting of lots in the community, and 
the sexual element in marriage was ‘demoted to the level of indifference’ 241: 
Michael hardly seems to have been indifferent to Ane. 
 
But in reality, the dynamics of the household seem very much more to 
involve an all-male triple - Father, Eldest Son and Youngest Son - Michael, 
Peter and Søren. Søren’s relationship with Peter, although much less 
discussed, is equally crucial to understanding Søren’s narcissism: 
Søren was confirmed on the 20th and received my watch, and I 
received father’s. 242 
 
Peter was the eldest son, and in Golden Age Denmark, then as now, he 
appears to have attributes that modern popular psychology would ascribe to 
any eldest child - conscientious, hardworking, dutiful, slightly boring. Much 
more fun, then, to be the youngest - with little sense of responsibility, and 
leaving obligation, sobriety and sensible thinking about the future to others. 
In the parlance of popular psychology, the difference is about requiring the 
eldest to grow up and take their place as an adult, contrasted with denying 
the youngest that freedom to grow up. 
 
From what evidence there is, young Søren perhaps deserves some sympathy 
in his dislike of his brother. Consider the letter written by his Headmaster, 
Professor Nielson, in September of 1830 on leaving the Borgerdydskol to 
begin University. It runs to about five hundred words. The first hundred or 
so are an introduction, possibly displaying more about the teacher’s 
erudition than anything about his pupil. But immediately the boy’s name is 
mentioned, it is linked to his father, his family and his upbringing: 
                                                
241 Watkin (1997) p 9.  
242 quoted in Kirmmse (1998) p 24.  
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From the very beginning he was steeped in his parent’s seriousness 
and in the good example of their strong sense of religious reverence, 
devotion to God, and moral responsibility.’ 
 
Shortly thereafter: 
…so that one may certainly hope that he will be his brother’s equal, 
since he is equal in talent. 
 
The remainder of the letter is essentially about the virtue of Søren’ s father: 
His father’s wisdom and goodness can be seen in all of his 
circumstance. 
 
Because his father’s home is thus such a model of industriousness, 
patience and moderation… 
 
He (father) has taught him…He has done everything to awaken the 
boy’s love for scholarly culture…. 
 
It continues to the end: 
This young man, who has been raised and educated in this manner, 
in keeping with the customs of our forebears and with the discipline 
that will promote the welfare of state – and not in the rash and 
rebellious spirit of the times – I recommend to you, learned men, in 
the highest fashion. 243 
 
From a contemporary point of view, this is a poor reference; the poverty 
clearly stems from the lack of appreciation of the individual in question: it is 
not about the child but about perceived influences upon that child. Indeed, 
who is the child? I will discuss below the ideas of Winnicott and Laing, about 
the true and false self. For now, I suggest that Søren's true self was in 
permanent danger within his family of being denied in favour of a false self, 
a self that matched up to Peter, a self that tried to come out of Peter’s 
shadow. Søren was, on this reading, an appendage to Peter, a contrast, a 
dialectic. Perhaps this has been an issue for youngest sons since time 
began: how to assert oneself against the favoured, much more worthy 
sibling, whom father, doubtless, loves best. 
 
There is some evidence from contemporary sources of fraternal rivalry, 
fraternal spite, though perhaps nothing more than might be present in many 
such relationships: 
                                                
243 all from Kirmmse (1996) pp15-18.  
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in the second form, SK’s Greek teacher was his brother, the later 
bishop. It was clear and often striking to us that he (Søren) 
deliberately made things difficult by bringing his relationship to his 
brother into the classroom situation on various occasions, and it 
seemed to us that he was teasing him. 244 
 
And the Journals and Papers contain a fair sprinkling of brotherly spats. As 
late as 1848 he wrote: ‘My brother’s petty-mindedness and envy are all my 
family has done for me.’ 245 And in the same year: 
It is dreadful to see the carelessness, indifference, and unconcern 
with which children are brought up – and yet by the age of ten every 
person is essentially what he will become. Yet almost all bear some 
damage from youth which they do not heal by their seventieth year; 
furthermore all unhappy individualities usually have a background of 
a faulty childhood.  
 
O, wretched satire upon the human race, that providence has so 
richly equipped almost every child, because it knew in advance what 
it means to have been brought up by “parents”, ie, to be messed up as 
much as is humanly possible. 246 
 
That was written when he was 37, but in reality already an old man. In the 
absence of any more contemporaneous accounts of his childhood, we must 
infer that this is Kierkegaard’s considered judgement on the childhood 
influences upon him from his mother and father. 
 
But we must return to Father. Apart from God, father claims the most 
entries in all of Kiergaraard's writing - over ten thousand appearances 247. 
Fortunately, there is an abundance of repetition in these entries, and it is 
easy to discern how Kierkegaard thought of him, particularly in later Journal 
entries. 
 
He was at once a loved father and a despised father. So what did 
Kierkegaard know of the man? For all the secrecy about his father’s alleged 
sins, the great earthquake, the tantalising hints from Solomon's dream, the 
clear allusion to inherited guilt, what did Søren really know of Michael? I 
                                                
244 From Frederik Welding’s letter, quoted in Kirmmse (1996) p 8. 
245 JP 6106 Note the Hong’s comment that by ‘family’ Søren meant Peter, the only 
surviving member' (Note 1762  JP vol 5 p 555). 
246 JP 1171. 
247 McKinnon (2001). 
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suggest that out of these thousands of entries we have an image of a man 
that fitted what Kierkegaard needed from him, rather than being any 
particularly accurate representation of what he was. He was split object, and 
the goodness of the good object knew no bounds, likewise with the bad 
object, mutatis mutandis. At best father was responsible for all that was good 
in Søren - he even died for his sake. At worst, he prevented Søren from 
engaging in the real world, in real life. One object was the source of the 
genius, the uniqueness, the glory that was Kierkegaard’s view of himself; the 
other the cause of all of Kierkegaard’s utter misery. Søren never really knew 
Michael - a not uncommon state of affairs in families – and so spent much of 
his life alternately appeasing and punishing his father, seeking but never 
finding object constancy. 
 
Two influences remained with Kierkegaard until his death: Regine and 
Father. Regine, I suggest below, became an accommodating object, and 
Kierkegaard was essentially at peace with her. But father, until the end, 
remained a conflicting influence, and the failure to resolve the conflict begat 
not only the early pseudonymous and devotional writings, but also those - 
bitter, enraged and singularly unhealthy - of his late years. 
 
 
6.5 Søren’s Childhood 
 
We are indebted to Bruce Kirmmse for his aggregation of what little exact 
evidence there is about Kierkegaard’s chilhood 248, and to Joachim Garff for 
his insights upon this modest collection 249. Here is a partial list of 
quotations from exact contemporaries, obviously written many years later. 
To begin, the source of the anecdote about his nickname – the fork:  
What would he most like to be? ‘A fork.’ Why? ‘Well, then I could 
spear anything I wanted on the dinner table’. But what if we come 
after you? ‘Then I’ll spear you’.250 
 
                                                
248 See his Encounters with Kierkegaard Ch 1 Kirmmse (1996). 
249 see Garff (2005) Ch 1. 
250 Kirmmse (1996) p 3. 
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And a revealing one-liner from Christian and Thomas Svendson, 
contemporaries of Søren: 
As usual, Søren sat in a corner and sulked. 251 
 
And 
Søren was a rather ill-tempered child. He was not well liked by his 
cousins… He was not without a certain teasing mischievousness…. 
Søren’s classmates resented his clever dialectical argumentation with 
which he triumphed over everyone… consequently one day, when 
school was over, Søren was forced up onto a table, where two of his 
class mates held him by the arms, two by the legs, and the rest gave 
his behind a vigorous working over with rulers, book-straps etc. 252 
 
Or Leibeberg’s 
he was a quiet, peaceable, industrious boy who drew little attention to 
himself. 253 
 
But more serious information comes from a letter by Frederik Welding, 
written in 1869.254 A substantial quotation is given below: 
there were surely only a very few class mates who understood 
Kierkegaard or came to be on close terms with him in the way typical 
of others of that age. S.K did not reveal his character in the way that 
boys and young people of school age usually do. He went his own way, 
almost self-contained, never spoke of his home, and neither brought 
class mates home with him nor visited them in their homes. To the 
rest of us, who knew and lived a genuinely more boyish life, SK was a 
stranger and an object of pity. 
 
We all viewed SK as someone whose house was shrouded in 
mysterious shadows of strictness and eccentricity. SK’s schooldays 
passed quietly and, it seemed, without joy. He worked more out of fear 
and compulsion than out of desire or any happy industriousness. 
 
Grades were important to him.  
 
As far as I can remember, he was not friends with any other of the 
boys….In most of his contacts with us he showed that he was so 
foreign to our interests that we quickly broke off contact with him., 
and he often displayed a superior and teasing attitude…He could 
never keep from teasing others with nicknames he had heard, with 
laughter and with funny faces even though it often earned him a 
beating. I do not recall that his language was ever genuinely witty or 
                                                
251 ibid p 3. 
252 ibid p 4-5. 
253 ibid p 6. 
254 ibid p 6-9. The veracity of this letter is attested to by another contemporary who 
read it, Edvard J Anger. Anger also confirms that SK ‘was a tease, and his ‘foul 
mouth’ cost him many bloody noses.’ 
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cutting, but it was annoying and provocative, and he was aware that 
it had this effect even though he was often the one who paid for it. 
 
These outbursts of passion for teasing seemed to be absolutely 
unconnected with the rest of his otherwise silent and unspeaking 
existence among us. During these outbursts, his most remarkable 
talent was the ability to make his target appear ridiculous, and it was 
especially the big tall and powerfully built boys whom he chose as the 
objects of his derision…. And thus he became even stranger and 
isolated from the rest of us.  
 
When I look back on things, it seems to me that, in general, as a boy 
SK usually had a good eye for people’s weak points. 
 
After I left University, SK visited me frequently in the summer at 
Frederiksborg. On these trips he found it amusing to encourage his 
peasant travelling companion to reveal his innermost thoughts. He 
mentioned this once in a remark to me: ‘Peasants and children are 
the only reasonable human beings with whom it is relaxing to spend 
time’. 
 
There is another attribute of the schoolboy Søren that several 
contemporaries attest to; typical is Peter Lind’s letter:255 
 
When it was time for him to give recitations which he was to have 
learned by heart, he was unusually talented in reading with his book 
concealed under his desk, without attracting the attention of his 
teachers…. No one knew anything about his unusual talents. We did 
not have the least suspicion that he would one day come forth as a 
great opponent of his times…. 
 
The teachers acknowledged that SK was unusually gifted, but were 
not always satisfied with him. 
 
The same sentiment comes from H. P. Holst’s letter: 
I was his classmate for many years…In his boyhood years, SK was not 
the object of great expectations. I don’t think he was even seen as 
especially bright. 256 
 
Similar points are made by Edvard Anger and Frederik Welding 257. Perhaps 
the school report puts it best: 
A good mind, open to everything that requires first-rate attention, but 
for a long time he was very childish and quite lacking in seriousness. 
He had a desire for freedom and independence, which was expressed 
in his behaviour in the form of a good-natured, sometimes amusing 
                                                
255 ibid p 11. 
256 ibid p 13. 
257 ibid pp 6-9. 
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lack of constraint, which prevented him from getting involved with 
anything or from showing any great interest in things that would keep 
him from being able to withdraw into himself again. His 
irresponsibility rarely permitted him to bring his good intentions to 
fruition or to pursue a definite goal in a sustained manner. 258 
 
What can we make of all this? Garff sums it up through a paired series of 
adjectives: 
quiet, strange, joyless, cowed, withdrawn, thin, pale…contradicted 
but also psychologically supported by….terms such as teasing, witty, 
impudent, irritating, and provocative. 259 
 
There is no picture of a happy-go-lucky, popular, endearing child. There is 
little that indicates future greatness. There is something to suggest an 
aggression, however. The small, thin boy picks verbal fights with others, to 
his own detriment. Why would he pick such a fight? What was the purpose 
of the teasing?  
 
We simply cannot know the events, the mood, the Weltanschuaang that 
pervaded No 2 Nytorv. There is a quite tantalising, yet probably suspect, 
much later description of how Father’s melancholy and religiosity hung 
around the home and its inhabitants: 
From childhood on I have been in the grip on an enormous 
depression... My only joy from almost as far back as I can remember 
was that no one could discover how unhappy I felt. As a child I was 
rigorously and earnestly brought up in Christianity, insanely brought 
up humanely speaking – already in earliest childhood I had 
overstrained myself under the impression that the depressed old man, 
who had laid it upon me, was himself sinking under… 260 
 
What might be inferred from this is the guilt the child felt about the father. 
The child felt responsible for the well being, for the very life of the father. If 
we agree, with Fairbairn, that the loss of the relationship with the carer is 
the most annihilating fear of the child, then what Søren felt was laid upon 
him was not just Christianity, but the total responsibility of keeping a 
sinking father from sinking completely. So the wholly good object became 
compounded with the imminent fear of its literal disappearance. No wonder, 
                                                
258 A school report written in 1830 when Soren KIerkegaard was 17, by Professor M 
Nielsen. Quoted in ibid p 14. 
259 Garff (2005) p 20. 
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then we have the joyless, cowed, withdrawn child. The very thing that 
provided love and nurture, the good internal object that was father, would 
only remain loving and nurturing, indeed would only remain at all, if the 
child took the burden that father was carrying. Rather than being son to the 
father, Søren was also obliged to act as father, as carer. On this reading, 
Søren’s was a desperate situation, desperate for any child; in this sense, the 
childhood of Søren Kierkegaard was appalling. 
 
For every good object there is a bad one; in this case, not only was the bad 
father punishing, uncaring and diminishing, it also demanded some 
nurturing and succour. For if Søren didn’t provide this, father would cease 
to be. While the wish with bad objects is to punish, to seek revenge, to 
murder, the additional guilt makes for unusually complicated object 
relations. Father was therefore split into a wholly good object, that Søren 
owned, and that he sought to please; the wholly bad internal object that was 
Father, unacceptable in consciousness at that time, was projected out into 
the world, and onto his fellows. The fact that Søren's aggressive behaviour to 
his peers resulted in aggression back towards him just confirmed the 
accuracy of his projections: his victims were persecutors, justifiably bad 
objects.  
 
So we see a lonely child, a stranger, driven to academic success rather than 
enjoying it. This sense of being driven was to permeate all of Kierkegaard’s 
adult life. But what is missing from this small amount of recollected 
evidence is anything to do with his home life, his relationship with his 
mother or siblings, anything about what motivated him. All we can see is a 
troubled, indeed angry small boy, using his aggressive verbal skills to 
maintain his sense of self, along with his place in a world. But early 
aggression generally does not bode well for later peace of mind.    
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
260 Point of View, KW XXII p 79. 
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6.6 The Young Man 
 
Søren Kierkegaard left Copenhagen on June 17th 1838 to travel and stay, 
still courtesy of his father’s loans, in the fishing village of Gilleleje, at the 
north of the island of Zealand. The journal entries from that time have a 
particular importance for the Kierkegaardian myth, and they stand as a 
cornerstone in the Kierkegaardian hagiography. They are often quoted as the 
start of Kierkegaard’s lifetime output, 261 and contain the famous basic 
question that allegedly was to inform and drive his thinking and writing 
throughout his life:  
..the crucial thing is to find the truth which is true for me, to find the 
idea for which I am to live and die. 262 
 
The above-quoted phrase occurs as a diary entry from this two-month tour. 
It was allegedly written on 1st August 1835 of the same year, and later 
transcribed into the journals 263. 
 
The problem with the famous entry is that it is too easy to alight on the 
striking, memorable, challenging question, without paying any attention to 
the solution to the challenge that Kierkegaard suggests for himself. What he 
does suggest is a wholly negative solution, about what he should not do. And 
from an object relations point of view, it is disastrous advice that he gives: 
But in order to find that idea, or - to put it more correctly – to find 
myself, it does no good to plunge still farther in the world. That was 
just what I did before. 264 
 
                                                
261 For example, Lowrie, in his Kierkegaard, suggests: ‘the journal of this 
tour…contains the fullest and most perspicuous account of his state of mind that he 
ever wrote in his youth’. Lowrie (1942) p 81. Similar sentiments are expressed by 
virtually every biographer. 
262 JP 5100. 
263 There are questions about whether this was really a letter, or part of a work of 
fiction Kierkegaard was contemplating. The remainder of the Gilleleje entries 
undoubtedly have a novella aspect to them, and there are inconsistencies in timings 
and locations, making them perhaps less than wholly accurate diary entries. And in 
the earlier Lund letter, it is not entirely clear that this was truly a letter written to be 
sent; there is the notation ‘nonnulla desunt’ - ‘a good part missing’ - an odd thing to 
say in a letter. Fenger suggests that these pages were in fact written in Copenhagen 
a year later.  See Fenger (1980) p 96.  
264 JP 5100. 
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So studying law, though tempting, is dismissed. So is being an actor, 
although he speaks with some feeling: ‘so that by putting myself in another’s 
role I could, so to speak, find a substitute for my own life.’ 265 (This is 
interesting: Kierkegaard was to have a lifelong fascination with the theatre, 
both formally, in terms of his identification with the process of acting 266 and 
observing acting, and in an informal sense, in that he was very much an 
actor, thwarted or otherwise. 267)  
 
But the issue here is a denial of the value of entering the real world, of 
forming adult internal objects that possess constancy. Finding oneself, the 
object relations school would contend, is about coming to the realisation 
that splitting real objects into unreal, internal opposing objects is not a valid 
way to lead a life. The two internal objects are representations of a constant 
real external object, and we must strive to meet the reality of the world as 
much as we can. Kierkegaard, it seems to me, has already decided that he, if 
not humankind, cannot stand too much reality. The remainder of the 
Journal entry is written on the assumption that his chosen path will lead to 
enlightenment about the self: 
One must first learn to know himself before knowing anything else. 
Not until a man has inwardly understood himself and then sees the 
course he is to take does his life gain peace and meaning; only then is 
he free of that irksome, sinister travelling companion, - that irony of 
life. 268 
 
Of course, the two-fold process Kierkegaard here suggests - self-
understanding followed by engagement with life - misses the point that is 
object relations theory. Self-understanding is engagement with life, the 
proper engagement with constant objects. One cannot achieve any real 
degree of self-awareness without testing and modifying the faulty internal 
objects that are the inheritance of childhood for us all.  
 
                                                
265 Ibid. 
266 see Repetition, KW VI p 154 et seq for a revealing insight into how the theatrical 
process appealed to this putative narcissist. 
267 This will be discussed inter alia, but for example, Kierkegaard suggests that 
many if not most of his books be read aloud. His desk (now in the Municipal 
Museum in Copenhagen), a high, standing desk, gives some impression of the 
maestro standing before an audience.  
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This diary entry can either be seen as the passionate outpourings of a 
passionate young man, or as an invention, a planned novella, and in that 
sense something that taps quite nicely into the author’s unconscious. In 
either case, we have from Kierkegaard a resolution to close the door on 
engagement with the world, and retreat to the interior, as if this would truly 
help the self to define the self. So far from being a defining statement about 
Kierkegaard’s existentialism, on this reading it is the first defining statement 
about his narcissism. 
 
But these early adult years of Kierkegaard, around 1836, were in general 
typical golden years for any narcissist. He was of independent means (his 
father simply paid his bills); there was no pressure on him to complete his 
degree; he entered into the intellectual set of Copenhagen and found some 
considerable narcissistic support therein. His involvement with the likes of 
J. L. Hieberg and Poul Martin Moller were sources of considerable 
narcissistic joy. But in and among the joy would be the beginnings of the 
failure of this supply. 269 Nonetheless, Kierkegaard succeeded in gaining 
admission to the ‘charmed circle’ of Copenhagen intelligentsia centring on 
the Heiberg family. But even here, we can see the narcissist’s problem. Any 
given source of supply eventually is no longer sufficient. So it was with the 
Heiberg group. Being admitted was initially gratifying, but this soon palled. 
And even though he might be master of wit at a meeting, this was eventually 
not sufficient to maintain the mirror of unconditional and incomparable 
praise – he still had to share the platform with others in the circle. We see 
this in the oft-quoted but rarely commented upon diary entry: 
I have just come from a gathering where I was the life and soul of the 
party; witticisms flowed out of my mouth; everybody laughed, admired 
me – but I left, yes, the dash ought to be as long as the radii of the 
earth’s orbit --------------- and wanted to shoot myself. 270 
 
                                                                                                                                       
268 JP 5100. 
269 see Garff (2005) p 67 for a discussion of an attack on the young Kierkegaard. 
270 JP 5141. But note that at least one commentator (Emanuel Hirsch) views this, 
along with a great deal written about the same time, not as autobiographical but as 
part of a series of pseudonymous letters (see JP Vol 5 note 245). I would apply the 
same logic as suggested above: either this is truly autobiographical or it represents a 
fiction which itself has access to K’s unconscious. Either way, I see this an evidence 
of narcissism. 
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This is usually taken as evidence of Kierkegaard’s incipient or permanent 
depression. I disagree. There is virtually no evidence of clinical depression to 
be found anywhere in the diaries and papers. None of the symptoms either 
as presented in DSM-IV 271 or as described in common experience apply: he 
rarely suffered from debilitating apathy; he very much cared about his own 
appearance and well-being; he almost never seems to have been lacking in 
energy for his writings. (And as discussed above, it is a moot point whether 
father was any more a depressive than the son.) But in the case of this son, 
neither depression nor melancholia fit the bill. We are seeing the other side 
of a narcissist, one whose supply is failing. The overt emotion is rage, and 
the covert emotion is shame. Why would a narcissist want to shoot himself 
after such a successful evening? No matter how much praise and reward 
there had been, he knew he would always need more, and saw the 
impossibility of his position. Narcissistic supply has to be endless, unlimited, 
and of course no real person can supply that. In other language, the anti-
libidinal ego, formed through the failure of early object relations, begins 
again its inexorable task of doubting the worth of the exciting object. ‘You 
are not worth all that praise’ runs its mantra. The introjected bad object from 
the early splitting comes out of repression, into consciousness, and repeats 
the truth from so long ago: ‘sooner or later they will cease to love and admire 
you’. It was true for the child; and since, as Freud says, time means nothing 
to the Id, it is just as true and potent for the man. At the very moment of 
newly discovered joy, the narcissist is simultaneously reduced.  
 
 
 
6.7 Regine Olsen 
 
 
This is ground over which many have picked, and there is a daunting 
amount of reading for anyone wishing to say anything original about Søren’s 
love affair with Regine. We have Kierkegaard's contemporaneous accounts 
                                                
271 DSM-IV defines depression as involving: sleep and appetite disturbances, lack of 
energy, poor self esteem, difficulty concentrating or making decisions, hopelessness 
(DSM IV, pp 339-345). 
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272, and we have some autobiographical notes recorded by a possibly 
geriatric Regine 273. There has recently come to light her alleged diary 274, 
although this is widely regarded as fraudulent. We even have a novel about 
their relationship 275. But above all, we have interminable speculation from 
the biographers and virtually every secondary commentator. 
Understandably, perhaps: this is, after all, much too delicious an 
opportunity to miss. For an author whose life is manifestly intermingled with 
his writings, it would be sinful not to relate his star-struck romance to his 
literary output. 
 
We know from the Regine’s memoir roughly when they met 276; we know only 
a little about Counsellor Olsen’s daughter 277. We have what appear to be 
frank representations of the emotions that Kierkegaard felt for the young 
lady 278. We have a set of letters, not perhaps typical love letters, but letters 
that display the wax and wane of an infatuation 279. And we have evidence in 
later writings of an insistent mind-set that keeps referring to their affair, 
long after Miss Olsen became Mrs Schlegel 280. 
 
There is no point in rehearsing the biography or retelling the chronology. 
Much of it is speculation, for both Kierkegaard and his executors seem to 
have wanted to keep some truths from posterity. There are perhaps just 
three fundamental questions that concern this thesis. Why did Kierkegaard 
become engaged to the young Regine? Why did the engagement terminate? 
                                                
272 The Journals and Papers, especially the autobiographical volumes in the Hong 
set, and Kierkegaard's Letters (volume 24 of the Hong set) are the obvious source, 
although many of his pseudonymous works have allusions to a relationship much 
like his own. The Seducer's Diary, for instance, seems to contain far too much 
information to be dismissed as pure invention, or of no relevance to Kierkegaard's 
own psyche. 
273 See Kirmmse (1996) Ch 3. 
274 Regine Olsens Dagbog, (Regine Olsen's Diary), Hobjerg, Denmark: Hovedland 
Press, 2001. (Not referenced). 
275 Anderson (1974).  
276 See Kirmmse (1996) p 34. 
277 Garff (2005) pp 176 et seq. 
278 These are scattered throughout the Journals after their first meeting. The early 
insights follow from JP 5477. 
279 See Letters and Documents, KW XXV pp 61-88. 
280 References are scattered liberally. See, for example, Point of View, as well as a 
dozen Journal entries between JP 6132 and JP 6476, and especially the octave of 
entries to JP 6488. 
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And why did he retain his obsession with her for much of the rest of his life? 
The answers can be summarised quite quickly: Søren Kierkegaard was not 
ready for marriage, or anything like it. Leaving aside for now the matter of 
his sexuality and their sexual relations 281, object relations theory would 
contend that he had almost no knowledge of the real person that was 
Regine. He had in his consciousness an idealised object before the proposal 
282, and a very much less than ideal object immediately afterwards 283. As 
time and distance affected the possibility of any kind of object constancy, 
Kierkegaard once again allowed the idealised object to resurface and 
predominate, so that he could write at the end of his life, speaking both of 
his father and Regine: 
the two people whom I love most, to whom I owe whatever I have 
become as an author; an old man – the errors of melancholy love; a 
very young girl, almost a mere child – the lovable tears of her 
misunderstanding. 284 
 
 
6.7.1 The Infatuation 
 
When Kierkegaard met Regine he was of marrying age. But, truth be told, he 
never should have married. Søren Kierkegaard should have remained single, 
with a housekeeper and a secretary: a confirmed bachelor, and none the 
worse for that. He could have enjoyed the occasional dalliance, the ladies of 
the night near to Tivoli if he wished, perhaps even an affair. But marriage 
was not for him, and all the evidence is that he knew it. So why did he 
propose marriage? There are but two answers: social or family pressure, and 
faulty object relations. The former we can discount, for there is nowhere 
even the most indirect allusion to any obligation upon him.  
At this time in his life, his father had died, as had his mother; most of his 
siblings, too, had died. His first infatuation was in fact with Bolette Rordam, 
                                                
281 discussed below in Section 6.9 'Kierkegaard's Sexuality'. 
282 See JP 6472: ‘Even before my father died my mind was made up about her’. At 
this stage Kierkegaard knew almost nothing about her. See Fenger (1980) Ch 6 and 
Garff (2005) p 177. 
283 '..the next day I saw that I had made a mistake. Penitent that I was, my vita ante 
acta, my melancholy – that was sufficient. I suffered indescribably during that time’ 
JP 6472. 
284 Garff ibid p 191. 
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and his early diary entry, a mixture of ecstasy and frank panic 285, refers to 
her, not Regine, something Kierkegaard tried unsuccessfully to hide in his 
Journals. When it came to Regine, Kierkegaard fell in love, not with this 
beautiful and charming young woman, but with something else. The most 
important object relations issue that stands out from the diary pages is the 
extent to which Kierkegaard never knew the person that was Regine Olsen. If 
ever there was a selfobject, here it was. She was an invention of his 
imagination, and he never enabled himself to know her. He fell in love with, 
and proposed to, an ideal good object, one that would bring him eternal 
happiness, amend the narcissistic injuries he had suffered, and would give 
him the praise, regard, admiration and narcissistic succour he craved. None 
of this was either understood or mentioned by him, but it was assumed – 
that was the reason for his infatuation. This is not to deny any erotic 
attraction, for the detail of The Seducer’s Diary indicates something of what 
he might have been feeling 286. But Kierkegaard immediately made the poor 
child into something he needed, without in any sense allowing himself to 
know and understand the person. Prior to the engagement, Regine was 
without flaw or fault, and this unreal object would exist in his life to serve 
him in his needs and save him from his frailties. All the criticisms and 
failures in life, the rebuttals, the hurt, the cutting remarks, the inabilities to 
see his greatness and brilliance, all these would be obviated by this 
pubescent child. She would make up for all of life’s failures, including 
whatever initial failures of loving and caring there might have been. Regine 
was wholly good, wholly bountiful, without criticism or denial. She was the 
original good breast.  
 
And of course she was nothing of the sort. She was a healthy, intelligent, 
sexual young woman who wished from her relationship with her suitor what 
any similar person would wish – a mixture of the erotic, the intellectual, 
passion mixed with caring and respect. But there had to be a mixture.  
 
Sadly, Kierkegaard could only provide some of these requirements. 
Kierkegaard's was a world of the interior, whether or not he wished to admit 
                                                
285 see JP 5219 and 5220. 
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it, and there was little else to commend him. As I discuss below 287, 
narcissists have extreme issues with intimate sexual relationships, not least 
because sexual intimacy demands a fusion of the self with the other. When 
the self is chronically fragile, such a fusion is threatening to the point of 
annihilation. Beyond sexuality, it is extremely difficult for narcissists to cope 
with criticism. Kierkegaard’s reactions to poor reviews of his works rapidly 
turned to rage. Regine Olsen, as a real person, was never going to permit her 
beau to imagine himself without flaw or failing, just as she knew her own 
irritations and lacunae. But up to the moment of the engagement, for 
Kierkegaard the libidinal ego was in the ascendancy. That part of the original 
ego that stayed with hoped-for primary fusion, that craved the denied 
original bliss, sought it in Regine. Here, at last, was the chance of regaining 
what had been denied all his life. His infatuation was not for this living 
person, but for some hoped for return to a lost state of perfect happiness. 
And it was not to be. 
 
 
 
6.7.2 The End of the Engagement 
 
 
Kierkegaard describes the proposal with some clarity and candour. 288 
But the day after proposing he knew something was wrong. Now, Søren 
Kierkegaard was not the first young man to wake up with dreadful 
misgivings the morning after proposing matrimony. But what matters in 
such a situation is what you do next. For many there is a period of 
rationalisation or denial, and Kierkegaard certainly went through that. His 
later recollection tells in some detail how he suffered 289. But the overnight 
conversion from the good object to the bad object is a classic case of split 
objects, of a false self being brought to heel by a terrified true self, and of a 
persecuting anti-libidinal ego asserting itself. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
286 see, for example, Either/Or I KW III p 411. 
287 See Chapter 8 on Works of Love. 
288 JP 6472. Note that this is a late recollection. This entire long entry, the basis of 
much biographical information about Kierkegaard and Regine, seems much too 
clinical an account of his early relationship, written perhaps with posterity rather 
than veritas in mind.  
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His immediate narcissistic task was to distance himself from her, so that 
despite protestations of love, he could gradually return to his previous 
existence, safe from the threats of intimacy, sharing and self-revelation. 
First, anything erotic was banned; as he was later to write: 
The greatest possible misunderstanding between man and man about 
the religious life occurs between a man and a woman when the man 
wants to impart religion to her, all the blessedness implicit in being 
before God, and then he becomes the object of her romantic love. 290 
 
Being the object of anybody’s romantic love was fine in the abstract – 
narcissistic supply at its best. But when that love laid claims on the 
narcissistic self, when it cannot be controlled but demands a portion of the 
self, then it becomes intolerable. Suggestions of this inability to tolerate are 
there in his first letter after the engagement, dated by some as September 
23rd 1840. This is the one with the drawing of the man on the bridge looking 
through a telescope. He writes that: 
..the spyglass itself has a unique characteristic…so that…one sees 
something quite different from what is seen by all the other people 
about one..  Only in the proper hands and for the proper eye it is a 
divine telegraph; for everybody else it is a useless contrivance. 291 
 
This, I suggest, is the narcissist reasserting himself after the crisis of the 
engagement. Only the right person can use this spyglass: the right person 
can see things no other can. Kierkegaard is at one end of the spyglass, but 
he already knows that Regine is not at the other. So soon after proposing 
marriage, he cannot even look at the real, the true person that is Regine, let 
alone contemplate any kind of intimacy. 
 
Slowly, over the months, the Wednesday letters become more and more 
strained, increasingly irrelevant to their supposed state of love. There is no 
mention of the importance of the other, their endless fascination, the loving 
retelling of shared moments. They take on an uncomfortable tone of 
preaching and remonstration, probity and rectitude 292. Regine, it seems was 
blind to this, remaining deeply in love with him, and oblivious to his 
                                                                                                                                       
289 JP 6742. 
290 JP 1370. 
291 JP 5478. 
292 Kierkegaard regularly read Mynster’s sermons to her. See Garff (2005) p 183. 
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distancing and his inner turmoil and fear. When the end of the engagement 
came, she was shocked, completely surprised, distraught. But Kierkegaard 
had been planning this escape for over a year.  
So we parted… I spent the night crying in my bed. But in the daytime 
I was my usual self, more flippant and witty than even necessary. 293 
 
Even here, in extremis, he cannot resist the narcissist's riposte. 
 
 
6.7.3 The Legacy 
 
 
In one sense, the engagement as it had been for Kierkegaard never ended. 
His infatuation with this unreal object continued for the rest of his life. The 
fact that his fiancée married another, and that attempts to make contact 
with her in later life were rebuffed, meant relatively little. Kierkegaard was in 
fantasy. Instead of having to contend with a very unreliable and potentially 
impossible real woman, he instead contentedly concerned himself with an 
ever perfect and totally manageable imaginary one. Once or twice, reality 
burst in, and the libidinal ego was, again, momentarily hooked. But with 
time, this all passed, it all healed, and he could leave to posterity a 
wonderful story of true but blighted love, a tale of undying but unfulfilled 
passion, to match those of the great loves of all time - Abelard and Heloise, 
even Romeo and Juliet. All this, from an object relations point of view, is 
sadly a long way away from the truth. 
 
After the end of the engagement he went to Berlin - 'fled' is a favourite word 
of biographers. Between there and Copenhagen he wrote Either/Or. 
Traditionally viewed, this is a tale to convince Copenhageners that he was a 
scoundrel and that Regine was better off with out him. And further, Regine 
herself was to read into the various components of this text the message that 
he really had loved her, but that he could not go through with marriage 
since he was destined for higher things, that he was in some sense already 
spoken for, that she must sacrifice her own happiness just as he sacrificed 
his. These were things she would immediately understand and appreciate. I 
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would rather suggest that this text was a narcissistic response, designed 
above all to show off his brilliance, to deny the injury from the engagement, 
and to restore his narcissistic self-esteem. It is not by chance that we first 
meet the pseudonymous authors - several of them 294. Nor is it by chance 
that Kierkegaard reveals something of his own sexuality in the detail of The 
Seducer's Diary 295. And Judge William’s wholly unconvincing defence of the 
state of marriage 296 is, perhaps unconsciously, as ironic as anything written 
by Kierkegaard. No, this was not for Regine, or even Copenhagen. This was 
to show the world that a star was in the ascendancy, that the petty 
requirements of the social do not apply to all, and that if you are special 
enough, you can rise above it all. No wonder he was desperately concerned 
about the reviews. 
 
Reality did burst in. As a single instance of his lack of empathy, consider his 
disastrous misinterpretation of the nod from Regine during Bishop Mynster’s 
sermon in the Frue Kirke on Easter Sunday, 1843. Kierkegaard's was a 
human response to an estranged lover - she whom one had loved might still 
have feelings. And in many ways doubtless she did. But the diary entries 
around this time are again a mixture of delight and panic:  
At vespers on Easter Sunday… she nodded to me. I do not know if it 
was pleadingly or forgivingly, but in any case very affectionately. I had 
sat down in a place apart, but she had discovered it. Now a year and a 
half of suffering and all the enormous pains I took are wasted; she 
does not believe I was a deceiver, she has faith in me…. The higher we 
go the more dreadful it is. And yet I cannot live solely for her, cannot 
expose myself to the contempt of men in order to lose my honour.  297 
 
At this point a page is torn for the Journal (always a suspicious sign in any 
diary). Then he continues: 
I have done everything in order that she may not suspect that she 
perhaps bears a little of the guilt herself….I ran her aground – she 
deserved it, that is my honest opinion…298 
                                                
294 Apart from A and the Young Man, Johannes the Seducer and Judge William, we 
have B and Victor Eremita. See Chapter Ten below for a discussion of the 
narcissistic role of pseudonyms. 
295 to be discussed immediately below. 
296 Garff (2005) summarises the criticisms and his responses. The Hong's 
Introduction to Either/Or is also enlightening. 
297 JP 5653. 
298 Ibid. 
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All this from a nod. We see the ambivalence: Kierkegaard both desires and 
dreads the re-emergence of the real woman demanding real involvement. For 
Kierkegaard, this wordless, emotionless nod was an instance of the abiding 
libidinal ego, always looking for the impossible and perfect fulfilment, 
catching him off guard, and re-kindling primal hopes. For Kierkegaard, the 
anonymous, uncued, ungrounded nod was all he needed for a vast set of 
emotions - positive and negative - to come into consciousness and into play. 
For Regine, in all probability, the nod was no more than an instance of, well, 
nodding. 
 
Months after this Regine married, causing much heartache in the final 
writing of Repetition. But once she was safely out of reach, Kierkegaard could 
play the narcissist's game of relating to an internally ideal but externally 
unattainable object. The absence of reality in such narcissistic fantasies 
permits an endless supply of succour and supply. From time to time, the 
supply seems sterile, as indeed it is, and at such times narcissists will make 
attempts to make contact with the object of their unreal affection. And we 
see this more than once.  
 
On the 25th June 1849, Regine’s father died. This seems to have set in train 
a considerable amount of retrospective analysis and justification. He wrote: 
Counsellor Olsen is dead. This will certainly lead her to think in a 
special way of her relationship to me. 299 
 
Note the lack of concern here for how she might be thinking about the loss of 
her father; instead we have the typically narcissistic reorientation of the 
external event to within the self. There follows, in the Journals, a series of 
entries concentrating on what happened with Regine. There is much detailed 
and retrospective analysis, even to the point of dividing the course of the 
relationship into five clinical phases 300. But throughout these twenty or so 
entries, there is a constant tension between allocating the blame to himself 
and to Regine. And throughout, placing blame upon himself is 
narcissistically done. So Regine is elevated then demeaned, praised then 
cursed; she is innocent, yet she carries a burden of responsibility:  
                                                
299 JP 6453. 
  
 
Page 141 
 
 
..she has suffered for my sake. 301 
She forgets that two months prior to the decisive break she received a 
disengagement letter worded as humbly as possible for me… 302 
 
She does bear a great responsibility. 303  
I should and must have my freedom…she herself ought to have 
understood this a little and made my situation a bit easier… Alas, but 
she was so young, and she was so lovingly devoted to me.. 304 
 
Basically she had taken possession of me with her tears. 305 
My basic guilt is to have swept her along.  306 
Yes, but she also has a great responsibility toward me because of her 
misuse of pious entreaties. 307  
 
Among all these are insights that almost certainly were not present while the 
relationship was taking its course. 
but I am continually afraid of her passion. 308 
 
but however much I loved her, it seems I continually wanted to 
conceal from myself how much she actually affected me, which really 
does not seem appropriate to erotic love.  309 
 
Suppose I had married her. Let us assume it. What then? In the 
course of half a year or less she would have been unhinged. 310   
 
And he continues with the narcissistic illusion that her marriage is fragile, 
and that he has only, as it were, to click his fingers for her old passion for 
him to return. He was convinced she could not resist his charms: 
 A marriage will not bind her if her passion is kindled again. 311 
 
..if she finds out that I was motivated in the past by considerations of 
religion and suffering, I run the risk of her suddenly yielding to 
despair over her marriage.  312  
                                                                                                                                       
300 JP 6482. 
301 JP 6470. 
302 JP 6472. 
303 JP 6740. 
304 JP 6479. 
305 JP 6476. 
306 JP 6482. 
307 JP 6544. 
308 JP 6454. 
309 JP 6470. 
310 JP 6488. 
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And he projects his own fantasies onto her: ‘ ..the achievement of historical 
fame which is sure to be hers.’ 313 And: 
My life will unconditionally accent her life, my literary work is to be 
regarded as a monument to her honour and praise. I take her along 
into history. 
 
The whole tone is unreal; he presumes he is still at the centre of her 
thoughts and desire. There are many repetitive recitatives, thought 
experiments as it were, about hypothetical interactions between them.314  
But always there is the presumption of a continuing loving devotion, 
complete devotion on Regine’s part. And much self-justification on his: 
 Certainly getting my freedom was also the only suitable thing for her. 
315  
 
But the marriage vow obligates me to be completely open, convicts me 
if I do not do so, demands that I lead her into my deepest inner self; 
well, at that moment the relationship will be an absurdity, and she 
will be completely wasted on me. 316  
 
Throughout, he retained the most fabulous view of himself:  
she wholeheartedly would put up with everything and still thank me 
all her life for the greatest of blessings, her relationship to me. 317 
 
He never wanted her to forget him; his actions he always believed were of the 
highest and special. 
To trot alongside a girl whose love I truly did not reject but was force 
to make it seem as if I, humanly speaking, rejected it: yes, this is the 
task for me. 318 
 
So in the end, he wrote to Regine via Schlegel on 19th November 1849. The 
letter was returned. This permitted, after yet more introspection, what no 
doubt seemed at the time a genuine closure: 
But now the affair is really ended. And never have I felt so light and 
happy and free about this matter, so totally myself again, as just now 
                                                
313 ibid. 
314 Entry 6488 has that telltale mark of perhaps too much self-revelation, the page 
torn form the journal. 
315 JP 6480. 
316 Ibid. 
317 JP 6488. 
318 Ibid. 
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after making this sacrificial step! For now I understand I have God’s 
consent to let her go and to take care of myself, complying only with her 
last plea: ‘to think of her sometimes,” in this way keeping her for 
history and eternity. 319 (Kierkegaard’s emphasis). 
 
At the same time he gives us the perfect fantasised summary of the whole 
relationship: 
If the period of writing aesthetic literature were not long past, or if a 
recreation of that nature ever were to be allowed, I would like to write 
a book which would be entitled: 
Conversations with My Wife 
In the preface, the author will say that his wife was nineteen years old 
the day of their marriage, that the conversations, as we will see, stem 
from the first half of their marriage. They should be dialogues, I would 
portray the humorous side of this relationship, the husband is 
intellectually superior and yet genuinely in love, the feminine figure 
charmingly naïve. 320 
 
Alas, Kierkegaard was reckoning without the power of the unconscious, for 
thoughts of Regine continued into 1850 and beyond 321. 
 
Eventually, Regine became almost iconic and saintly, a person about whom 
he knew less and less, but to whom he attributed more and more. Along with 
the Common Man 322, Regine became an unreal wholly good object, in 
contrast to the rest of humankind. As his narcissistic supply crumbled, as 
the bitter realisation of his failure to match his impossible narcissistic 
expectations took hold, and as the rage against all of society intensified, 
opposing the all-consuming bad object that was Christendom was just one 
small child - the wholly good Regine. He retained the illusion that she never 
forgot him, that he remained the most special person in her life.  
Up to this day I have unconditionally kept my resolve to pray for her 
at least once every day. 323 
 
Whatever he felt in writing these words, whatever the degree of honesty with 
which he wrote them, it sadly remains that this relationship was one of 
fantasy and of need, born out of incomplete love as an infant, and a lifetime 
                                                
319 JP 6539. 
320 JP 6584. 
321  entries are to be found as late as 1854 (JP 6906). 
322  to be discussed below. 
323 JP 6470. 
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of battle with largely imaginary foes (his projected bad objects). It was 
matched by the elevation of someone he by now hardly knew into something 
approaching a saviour, a source of complete narcissistic supply, and, 
probably, a perfectly nurturing mother. Very late on, he considered 
dedicating a book to her: 
To RS – with this little book is dedicated an authorship, which to 
some extent belongs to her, by one who belongs completely to her. 324 
 
The lie is that Kierkegaard belonged to a totally unreal version of Regine, to 
an internal object simply and privately constructed for his own well being 
and own happiness, invented to overcome early narcissistic injury, bearing 
little or no resemblance to that real human being, and hence completely 
incapable of any real interaction with him. Was there ever such a tale of woe, 
indeed. 
 
 
6.8 Kierkegaard’s Sexuality 
 
This is now an appropriate time to consider Søren Kierkegaard’s sexuality. 
The task is both enormously important and enormously difficult. The claim 
for importance is justified if the axioms of psychoanalysis are to be taken 
seriously as they are in this thesis. The claim for difficulty can be 
summarised by what is perhaps the only written evidence from Kierkegaard 
himself that refers to an overt, physical, sexual act on his part: 
The bestial sniggering… 325 
 
This is not propitious. About any other part of this private sexual life, we 
know nothing. There are implications that he lived a somewhat bawdy life as 
a student, but these come from secondary sources and perhaps inventive 
biographers. In his own papers there is nothing; none of the contemporary 
sources suggest much above smoking cigars and drinking at student bars in 
his youth. We know nothing about visits to bordellos, to individual sex 
                                                
324 JP 6675. 
325 JP 5176. Note that the remaining text of this entry is actually missing. All we 
have is this entry in Barfod’s list of key words, but without the relevant text. See JP 
vol 5 note 241 (p 481). There is no certain date, but it is probably mid-November 
1836. 
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workers, certainly nothing to suggest homosexuality or any of the sado-
masochistic perversions that some biographers favour. We know nothing 
about the shape of his penis, even though some biographers claim to. 
 
At least, that is, he tells us nothing directly. But there are hints: there is a 
reference to a visit to the Doctor. And from time to time his writings – The 
Seducer’s Diary, for example – suggest an acquaintance with some elements 
of lust that surely beckon further investigation 326. Then there is the matter 
of 'the thorn in the flesh', a Freudian phrase if ever there was one.  
 
But let us begin by considering what we know about his upbringing. He was 
brought up in a household with three sisters. The realities of female 
anatomy and physiology must have been known to him. He must have been 
aware of the schoolgirl passions of his older sisters. He also had older 
brothers, whose own adolescent physiology would have been very apparent 
to him. Did they share rooms, the boys? Did they share sexual secrets, as 
brothers often do? Schoolboys, then as now, surely told dirty stories; the 
childish and adolescent fascination with bodies, excretory processes and 
emerging sexual physical characteristics must have been as present for 
Søren as for any other boy. Copenhagen in this Golden Age had prostitutes 
and brothels; contemporary accounts of European cities suggest a sex 
industry on a scale that we might find unimaginable. The household in 
which Søren was raised may well have been refined, strict, cerebral in the 
extreme; but it is difficult to believe it was an environment in which sex and 
sexuality were totally absent. Mother presumably was at least content with 
her own sexuality, producing seven children at fairly regular intervals; 
indeed the very origin of her relationship with Søren’s father was extra-
marital sex. Father, despite his own upbringing and whatever social and 
psychological pressure he may have felt, nevertheless fathered these seven 
children – presumably not an onerous task – including one when he was in 
his 50s. We have no idea of the extent to which overt physical sexuality was 
ever present or observed by Søren in the household. We do not know how 
physical or affectionate father was with mother in the presence of any of the 
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children. But the epitaph on Ane’s grave suggests a caring, loving 
relationship between husband and wife 327. The other siblings married and 
the sisters procreated, albeit tragically for two of them. All in all, this does 
not sound like a household in which sex and sexuality were denounced or 
denied.  
 
But we know nothing of what was going in Søren’s head. Did he have sexual 
fantasies? He must have. Did he masturbate? He surely did. At the height of 
his love affair with Regine, what lustful thought did he take home to his 
private room from their encounters? Was he so unmoved by her teenage 
body? Did he ever kiss her passionately? While in proper Copenhagen circles 
little more than kissing would be permitted or expected during an 
engagement, what was the basis of his physical attraction to her? 
 
Some answers come from The Seducer's Diary. One could suggest that this 
essay is pure invention, or suggest instead that every author calls on their 
own experience when inventing. I would like to suggest the latter, and 
despite the claims that the hero of the Diary is based on the reputation of 
the critic Peder Ludvig Moller 328, I believe that the details, the intimate, 
manipulative, voyeuristic, wholly narcissistic details, must have come from 
within Søren Kierkegaard himself. One reading is that the Diary, allegedly 
produced after the break-up as an invention to convince Regine how much of 
a bounder he really was, in fact may have produced that very result but 
through its verisimilitude. One could well strike out the word 'Seducer' and 
replace it with 'Narcissist', and reprint the text, for this is a chilling 
description of just how narcissists view their conquests. Cordelia is a pure 
object, one to be manipulated, one with whom to play out long distant 
imagined afflictions and sufferings 329.  
                                                                                                                                       
326 There are many references to white bosoms, creamy bosoms, heaving bosoms, 
and bosoms in general.  
327 Ane Kierkegaard aged 67 has ‘gone home to the Lord…loved and missed by her 
surviving children and friends, but especially by her old husband’.  
328 see Watkin (2001) p 405.  
329 There is easily another thesis here. The text is full of suspect psychodynamics 
that Kierkegaard puts into the mouth of Johannes. For instance: 'Cordelia hates and 
fears me. What does a young girl fear? Intellect. Why? Because intellect constitutes 
the negations of her entire womanly existence' (KW E/O I p 362). Here Kierkegaard 
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This is not to say that Kierkegaard had no insight about his issues of 
sexuality. Famously, he went to visit his doctor 330. 
I therefore asked my physician whether he believed that the structural 
misrelations between the physical and the psychical could be 
dispelled so that I could realise the universal.331 This he doubted. I 
asked him whether he thought that my spirit could convert or 
transform this relation by willing it. He doubted it; .. 
 
From that moment I have made my choice. I have regarded that tragic 
misrelation, together with its suffering (which no doubt would have 
driven to suicide most of those lacking sufficient spirit to comprehend 
the utter wretchedness of the agony) as my thorn in the flesh, my 
limitation, my cross; I have looked upon it as the high price at which 
God in heaven sold me a mental-spiritual capacity unequalled among 
my contemporaries. 332 
 
If, as I suggest below in some detail, sexual intimacy is abut the 
transgression of boundaries, especially the boundary of the self, then if that 
self is less than robust, is fragile for whatever reason, sexuality becomes a 
threatening process. So Kierkegaard the man admits to his understanding of 
his potential inability and failing, and Kierkegaard the narcissist consoles 
himself with the idea that he is special, chosen by God, and unequalled 
among men. Narcissistically, this is an excellent arrangement - troublesome 
and threatening sexuality is traded for a profound sense of grandiosity.  
Of course, there remains insight: 
- but O, what would I not have given, especially during my younger 
days, to be an ordinary person333 for just half a year! 334 
 
Though even here, in the admission of another life that was never to be, 
Kierkegaard still adds the narcissistic twist: 
                                                                                                                                       
sets up femininity as something to be envied, in the Kleinian sense. He displays a 
fear of women, and a need to destroy their potency. 
330 As Alan Bennett put it: ‘For men, there are two kinds of visits to the Doctor: those 
that involve taking down the trousers, and those that don’t.’  Much ink has been spilt 
trying to establish which of these it was. 
331 by ‘the Universal’ he means marriage and procreation. 
332 JP 5913. 
333 This can be translated as either ‘person’ or ‘man’. From our point of view, there is 
a major difference in inference. 
334 JP 6500. 
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Had I been an ordinary human being, the danger no doubt would 
have been something else, that of being taken too much with women, 
and I possibly could have become a seducer. 335 
 
So, no ordinary 'ordinary human being', then, but a seducer! For narcissists, 
it is ever thus. 
 
And as for the thorn in the flesh, this occurs throughout the diaries. Despite 
some esoteric interpretations 336, the most common conception is that 
Kierkegaard used this term to refer to his own, perceived inadequacies as a 
sexual human being. It is a suitably vague term, and is used in several ways. 
It sometimes refers to ‘frightful mental depression’ 337, his relationship with 
his father 338, or as a synonym for suffering in general 339. It is sometimes 
used defiantly: 
At times I am buoyed up by the thought that the thorn I have in the 
flesh… will itself be or will help me be a thorn in the eye of the world. 
340 
 
At other times, he uses the term simply to indicate he is set apart from 
ordinary men 341. But in general, whatever it is, there is a mixture of regret 
and pride in how he refers to it. A typical entry is entitled ‘God’s Special 
Upbringing’: 
It probably goes something like this for a man who is the object of this 
special upbringing. At an early age he is bound to a suffering which is 
a thorn in the flesh to him, places him outside of the universally 
human. Thus hinders him from being able to enjoy life – and forces 
him into a God-relationship as the only consolation and salvation. 342 
 
I suspect that Kierkegaard was not much given to sexual introspection, and 
that the thorn in the flesh, whatever it referred to when it emerged in the 
consciousness of a young man, soon became a much less somatic and much 
more cerebral concept.  
 
                                                
335 JP 6500. 
336 see Garff (2005).  
337 JP 6659. 
338 JP 6906. 
339 eg JP 6532. 
340 JP 6492. 
341 JP 6021. 
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If there had been a visit to a bordello to precipitated the comment about 
‘bestial sniggering’ in his diaries, I would suggest that this one encounter 
would be more than enough sexual involvement to last Kierkegaard a 
lifetime. In reality, we have a complete instance of Freud’s defence 
mechanism of sublimation, the transformation of libido into intellectual 
activity. Of course, this is not quite as nature intended, so we must not be 
surprised to find that his life contains a very great deal of real misery, 
something that psychoanalysts would not hesitate to ascribe to his lack of 
direct sexual involvement and activity.  
 
6.9 The Corsair Affair 
 
The essence of the Corsair Affair is contained in two documents: the first is a 
review, essentially of Stages on Life’s Way, but really about much of 
Kierkegaard’s output to date. This was written by Peder Ludvig Moller and 
published in the so-called Yearbook Giea in December of 1846. Moller, it will 
be remembered, has been suggested by many 343 as the role model for 
Johannes the Seducer in Part I of Either/Or. Moller’s review, entitled A Visit 
to Soros, is undoubtedly vituperous, but retains an at least superficial 
respect for Kierkegaard’s intellect. Moller was associated with Meir 
Goldschmidt, who owned The Corsair, an influential satirical paper, read by 
more or less all of the intelligentsia of Copenhagen, ruthless in its exposés of 
sham and self-delusion.  
 
In Moller's review, Kierkegaard’s philosophy and style are the subject of 
deliberate denigration: 
Writing and production seem to have become a physical need for him, 
or he uses it as medicine, just as in certain illnesses one uses blood 
letting, cupping, steam baths, emetics, and the like…..he does not 
care about the reader, for he writes for his own comfort. 344 
 
                                                                                                                                       
342 JP 4654. 
343 The earliest suggestion seems to have come from Frithiof Brandt. See the Hong’s 
Introduction to The Corsair Affair, KW XIII. 
344 The Corsair Affair, KW XIII p 100. 
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Moller particularly attacked Kierkegaard’s attitude to women, quite openly 
accused him of abusing Regine. The defence of Regine is performed through 
an attack on Kierkegaard: 
Here one meets a masculine individual who has lost everything that 
constitutes personality. Feeling, understanding, will, resolution, 
action, backbone, nerve and muscle power – all are dissolved into 
dialectic. 345 
 
He parodies Guilty/Not Guilty in just 170 words (in the Hong’s translation), 
and a vicious parody it is. Moller speaks of Kierkegaard putting ‘the feminine 
nature on the experimental track’, and: 
If you regard life as a dissecting laboratory and yourself as a cadaver, 
then go ahead, lacerate yourself as much as you want to...But to spin 
another creature into your spider web, dissect it alive or torture the 
soul out of it drop by drop by means of experimentation – that is not 
allowed… 346 
 
And Kierkegaard’s religiosity is not spared: 
Despite his intelligence, reflection for him has become a severe 
sickness; his religiousness….appears to me to be a pusillanimity at 
which our Lord and the angels must laugh. 347 
 
Moller concludes: 
Meanwhile I am glad to acknowledge him as a intellectually gifted 
author, but he appears to me to be a decrepit old man, or more 
correctly an unusually intelligent man with a sick imagination….If he 
had lived under conditions that had forced him to concern himself 
with something other than his own whims, he no doubt would have 
developed his talents to a higher degree; but now he stands like an 
ironisation of irony. 348 
 
For Kierkegaard this must have been terribly wounding. Moller 
systematically criticises and undermines Kierkegaard’s presentation of his 
philosophy, the relationship with Regine, his religiousness, and his physical 
person. Each of these, for Kierkegaard, is a carefully erected mirror that 
essentially hides a truth. And Moller had revealed those truths to all of 
Copenhagen. 
 
                                                
345 ibid p 101. 
346 ibid p 102. 
347 ibid p 104. 
348 ibid p 104. 
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Kierkegaard immediately wrote a response, published in The Faedrelandet 
on 27th December. It is a long-winded piece, but concludes with the oft-
quoted last paragraph in which two things happen. Kierkegaard states his 
wish to be talked about in the Corsair, and reveals, to a Copenhagen that 
perhaps knew this truth but chose not to talk about it, that Moller was the 
editor of The Corsair. The implications of the first were to be beyond 
Kierkegaard’s worst nightmare; the implications of the second would be 
particularly damaging for Moller, since to be associated with the magazine 
effectively scuppered his opportunities in the world of the academy. 
 
Before considering why Kierkegaard made these two points, both of which 
had terrible consequences in very different ways, I want to ask why Moller’s 
review had such an effect on Kierkegaard. There had been other reviews - 
poor, lukewarm, indifferent, offensive, aggressive even. So why did this one 
cause such pain? I would like to suggest that Moller was in a very special 
situation in terms of Kierkegaard’s object relations. Moller was the sexually 
proficient object that Kierkegaard was not and could not be. In Kohutian 
terms, Moller was an idealised imago, set on a pedestal, revered, but also 
identified with. Moller was the hero of The Seducer’s Diary, and that text is a 
particularly revealing presentation of Kierkegaard’s own narcissistic views on 
women: Moller was the sexual being that Kierkegaard wishes he had been. 
So here was a very special wholly good object. But when the good object 
attacked Kierkegaard, it was immediately denigrated and replaced by the 
bad object, whom Kierkegaard now wanted to punish, even to destroy. The 
anti-libidinal ego, as ever, won out against the exciting object, and whatever 
secret ambitions Kierkegaard might have had in the sexual arena were 
utterly quashed by this process. Hence Kierkegaard’s fury, his rage, and his 
need for revenge. That which was wholly good was now wholly bad, beyond 
redemption. No punishment was too severe, no fate too terrible.  
 
The response was complex. On the one hand, Kierkegaard knew 349 that the 
revelation about Moller’s editorship of the Corsair would be damaging, and 
                                                
349 see Poole (1990) p 149.  
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this was the straightforward revenge. On the other, we have the curious 
invitation for parody in the Corsair.  
Would that I might only get into the Corsair soon. It is really hard for 
a poor author to be so singled out in Danish literature that he…is the 
only one who is not abused there. 350  
 
Why? Rationally, he must have been aware of the possible outcome: he must 
have calculated the risk. To invite parody in this organ was to be assured of 
parody. I suggest he did indeed calculate the risk, but not the risk of 
ridicule. What positive outcome might come of his invitation to the Corsair?  
Might it soberly apologise, run an editorial on the special attributes of Mr 
Kierkegaard? Rationally, there was not the slightest chance of this 
happening. To invite parody would be rewarded with just that. 
 
We have to move to object relations to understand the spat. At the moment 
of writing and submitting his response to Goldschmidt, the magazine 
became a bad object against whom Kierkegaard raged, wishing to control, to 
punish, to destroy. The omnipotent Kierkegaard defied the bad object that 
was The Corsair, the bad object, introjected from father and now projected 
out on to the newspaper. Simultaneously, the wholly narcissistic 
Kierkegaard truly believed that The Corsair would have to admit his 
omnipotence. The false self that held up a mirror for the world to like and 
admire while hiding his true self behind it, the very part of Kierkegaard that 
truly believed he was special, he was omnipotent, this self believed The 
Corsair would retract. Having revealed Moller for what he was, the paper 
would back down. This was an appeal not to The Corsair but to the town, the 
country, the world, to acknowledge who he, Kierkegaard, was. But just as 
had happened at school with the school mates who were similarly taunted, 
the bad object retaliated, not this time with a bloody nose or a thrashing on 
the arse, but with an immensely more damaging punishment - ridicule. At 
their most omnipotent, narcissists cannot begin to imagine the process of 
ridicule (although for those around them and who suffer them it is the most 
obvious and tempting response). Ridicule is barred from consciousness 
because it immediately performs that very task that narcissism exists to 
                                                
350 The Corsair Affair, KW XIII p 46. 
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prevent - the realisation, the admission, of the poverty of the self. Narcissism 
and narcissistic responses are there only because the true self was deemed 
to be unacceptable by some primary carer, and a false self was instituted in 
its place. Ridicule, of any kind, circumvents all the narcissistic defences and 
permits visibility of that one thing the narcissist needs to hide. 
 
From another point of view, Kierkegaard's engagement with the Corsair was 
an instance of maintaining narcissistic supply. Shortly before this spat, a 
case can be made that life for Kierkegaard was becoming uneventful. His 
publications were selling fewer and fewer copies - nothing matched the sales 
of Either/Or; the reviews were usually negative; his finances were getting 
worse; personal relationships continued their downward spiral.  Above all, 
Kierkegaard was in danger of being ignored. As Oscar Wilde put it, ‘there is 
only thing in the world worse than being talked about, and that is not being 
talked about’. 351 For the narcissist, the only thing worse than bad 
narcissistic supply is no narcissistic supply. I suggest that the incursion 
with The Corsair was not so much a catastrophe that happened to befall an 
essentially innocent victim, but rather a plan that went wrong, a plan 
executed by a narcissist with the purpose of maintaining public attention 
and attraction. It was a means of keeping himself within the public 
consciousness, at a time when all of his phenomenal output seemed to be 
failing to achieve that. Nowadays, one would appear on reality TV. When life 
has not gone to plan for the narcissist, when narcissistic supply is 
dwindling, there is always the appeal to the great public. In psychodynamic 
terms, this equates to an appeal to a truly unreal good object - the common 
man, the true patriot, the trusting soul - a terribly vague but potentially 
supportive fiction. Just as on ‘The Jerry Springer Show’ the wronged 
narcissist secretly hopes the entire audience - nay, the entire watching world 
- will arise and acclaim him, so Kierkegaard's entry into dispute with The 
Corsair was meant to result in an acknowledgement of all within him that 
was great and special. 
 
                                                
351 The Picture of Dorian Gray, Ch 1 (not referenced). 
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But it didn’t. Kierkegaard was to be lampooned, caricatured and ridiculed. 
He, of course, never got over it, and much of his output from this date, 
literary as well as private, can be seen as a narcissistic response to the 
helplessness and resentment within him. 
 
 
 
6.10 Kierkegaard and the Common Man 
 
In the period after the Corsair affair, Kierkegaard systematically demeaned 
and devalued those of the establishment who were once his friends: they no 
longer provide him with the sense of specialness he needed. When the 
Corsair affair broke, none of the coteries came to his defence. So from being 
a special and cultivated group to whom he, Kierkegaard, felt he naturally 
belonged, the establishment became the enemy, and a worthless, derided, 
devalued enemy at that. 
 
In their place he put the common man, the simple classes, now identified as 
his true friends, now a source of anticipated future endless adulation. But 
this is a complex substitution, since in reality the common man had already 
turned against him as a result of the Corsair affair. So I suggest we can see 
in his Journals how he splits the common man into two objects. The first is 
a true friend, but one who has been corrupted by the press and the 
establishment, but is still an essentially good object; the second is the evil 
common man, who taunts and harangues him, but who will suffer 
retribution, clearly a very bad object.  
 
This involvement with the common man was not only to do with 
psychodynamics. Kierkegaard lived through a period in the economic and 
political history of his native Denmark that was to see profound change, 
essentially from an absolute monarchy to a democracy with widespread male 
suffrage 352. Many, including Kierkegaard, have referred to this as the ‘age of 
the common man’, and this identification of a new political and social class 
                                                
352 Bruce Kirmmse has provided a most thorough and complete description of the 
changes that the country underwent during the century following 1750. See his 
Kierkegaard and Golden Age Denmark (Kirmmse (1990)). 
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affected Kierkegaard, both in his conscious writings and in his 
psychodynamics. 
 
The relationship with the common man makes its appearance throughout 
the 1840s. Consider this entry, probably written in September 1846: 
.. it has saddled me with a crowd of riffraff with whom I do not have 
and do not care to have any fellowship. Things I can laugh at so 
heartily in the company of, for example, Carl Weiss, I cannot really 
laugh at in the company of Jewish peddlers, shop clerks, prostitutes, 
school boys, butcher boys, etc. 353 
 
Or this from January 1848: 
For example when I have sought recreation by driving twenty or thirty 
miles away, and I step down from the coach, and it happens that I am 
received by a mocking assembly; and some of these present are even 
nice enough to call me names; it has a very powerful effect on my 
physical well being…. I have the ability to make any man listen to 
reason. But I cannot talk to a crude boor, much less three of them 
that have been given their marching order by the press. 354 
 
But at the same time we have, in December of 1847 this: 
Never in my life, not even when I was most preoccupied with an idea, 
have I ever been so busy that I did not have time to stand still if I were 
being addressed by a poor person.. 355 
 
And at the end of a long entry, this: 
This is also the source of my almost exaggerated sympathy for the 
simple class of people, the common man. And therefore I can become 
depressed and sad because they have been taught to laugh at me, 
thus depriving themselves of the one person in this country who has 
loved them most sincerely.. 356 
 
We have an analysis of Kierkegaard’s relationship with the Common Man 
through Jurgen Bukdahl’s eponymous book 357. It must be said that this is a 
very sympathetic reading of the life of Kierkegaard, and perhaps falls foul of 
Kirmmse’s own strictures that there is very little real evidence on which to 
base conclusions about his life and living. For example: 
People doubted Kierkegaard’s sincerity (as they still do) and he was 
suspected of conducting psychological experiments – which, in good 
                                                
353 JP 5937. 
354 JP 6105. 
355 JP 6085. 
356 JP 236. 
357 Bukdahl (2001).  
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Socratic fashion, he did in fact carry out with his more sophisticated 
contemporaries. But in matters concerning the common man, 
Kierkegaard’s sincerity was absolutely fundamental….. In matters 
concerning the common people, he was direct, without ulterior motive 
or condescension…..He had a rare capacity for sharing his thoughts 
of other people, for entering into their mental universe, whether it was 
Bishop Mynster or a coachman. 358 
 
 
Bukdahl quotes just two sources 359 for this psychological summary: a letter 
to his brother Peter’s second wife Jette, who had been bed-ridden for much 
of her adult life; and the memoirs of Hans Brochner (‘incidentally these are 
the only recollections about Kierkegaard that are fully trustworthy.’)  
 
I want to consider the fifty paragraphs of Brochner’s memoirs. They do 
indeed read as if they might be authoritative and trustworthy. The really 
positive and supporting memory comes in a relatively short passage in 
paragraph 8: 
He had his own way of greeting at a distance with a glance. It was 
only a small movement of the eye, and yet it expressed so much. 
There could be something infinitely gentle and loving in his eye, but 
also something stimulating and exasperating. With just a glance at a 
passer by, he could irresistibly “establish a rapport” with him, as he 
expressed it. The person who perceived the look became either 
attracted or repelled, embarrassed, uncertain, or exasperated. I have 
walked the whole length of a street with him while he explained how it 
was possible to carry out psychological studies by establishing such a 
rapport with the passer-by. And while he expanded on his theory he 
realised it in practice with nearly everyone we met. There was no one 
on whom his gaze did not make a visible impression. On the same 
occasion he surprised me by the ease with which he struck up 
conversations with so many people. In a few remarks he took up the 
thread from an earlier conversation and carried it a step further, to a 
point where it could be continued again at another opportunity. 360 
 
This, I suggest, is actually the mark of the narcissist. Making eye-contact 
with all he meets, engaging them, seeking the immediate rapport, these are 
very much the signs and symptoms of one seeking constant, new 
admiration. Narcissists easily strike up conversations with many people. 
They need new people for a continuing narcissistic supply. But these 
                                                
358 ibid p 85. 
359 ibid p 86. 
360 Hans Brochner’ Recollections of Kierkegaard, para 8 quoted in Kirmmse’s 
Encounters with Kierkegaard p 229 (Kirmmse (1996)). 
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meetings, these instances of rapport, were indeed psychological experiments; 
they were about establishing new objects who potentially would refill the 
ever-emptying well of admiration. The very act of treating strangers in this 
way shows the state of Kierkegaard's object relations - rather than 
encountering and getting to know a true individual, Kierkegaard meets and 
exhausts the object during a stroll.  
 
There is another source on this topic: one Andrew Hamilton, a surely 
unimpeachable source. 361 His account of something over a year spent on 
Denmark includes the following: 
Kierkegaard’s habits of life are singular enough to lend a perhaps 
false interest to his proceedings. He goes into no company, and sees 
nobody in his own house, which answers all the ends of an invisible 
dwelling; I could never learn that anyone had been inside of it. Yet his 
one great study is human nature; no one knows more people than he. 
The fact is he walks about town all day, and generally in some 
person’s company; only in the evening does he write and read. When 
walking he is very communicative, and at the same time manages to 
draw everything out of his companion that is likely to be profitable to 
himself. 
 
I do not know him. I saw him almost daily in the streets, and when he 
was alone I often felt inclined to accost him, but never put it into 
execution. I was told his ‘talk’ was very fine. Could I have enjoyed it, 
without the feeling that I was myself being mercilessly pumped and 
sifted, I should have liked very much. 362 
 
In that Mr Hamilton admits not having spoken to Kierkegaard, we can only 
presume that he has gleaned his character evaluation from others. What is 
interesting is the implied common perception that Kierkegaard used those 
walks and conversations to gain things – information, data, knowledge, 
wisdom – profitable to himself. ‘Mercilessly pumped and sifted’ are strong 
words. Those who had walked and talked with Kierkegaard must have been 
the main source for such an evaluation. 
 
Consider this, from Kierkegaard's earlier years: 
At the beginning of the forties, K took a trip to his father’s birthplace 
on the west coast of Jutland. He told me of a typical little incident 
from that trip. 
                                                
361 He was a Scotsman. 
362 Quoted in Poole’s Kierkegaard p 169 (Poole (1993)).  
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They went to a local school where Kierkegaard’s father had made a generous 
endowment to the school.   
When (Kierkegaard) was ready to depart, he drove past the school. 
There stood the schoolteacher with all the children lined up to sing a 
song the schoolteacher had written in SK’s honour. The teacher, who 
was about to direct the song, had a copy in his hand, and was about 
to give the signal to begin when K’s carriage (came to a stop) next to 
him. SK leaned over with his friendliest smile and took the copy from 
his hand as if to read it though, and at the same moment gave the 
driver the sign to drive on…. SK rolled down the road, nodding and 
waving, inwardly amused at the teacher’s disappointment. 363 
 
And what emotion did Kierkegaard engender in the schoolteacher or the 
schoolchildren in his father’s home village? In honour of a visitor, a song had 
been composed and rehearsed, much effort expended to put on a small rural 
school show. Kierkegaard took this opportunity to show his grandiosity and 
his indifference, to show how great he was compared with the pathetic 
efforts of these young citizens. 'Inwardly amused at the teacher’s 
disappointment.' Where was compassion? Where was empathy? Where was 
any sense of valuing what the teacher and children had done and were 
presenting?  The word ’cruel’ does not seem too strong; 'revenge' is better, 
revenge against external objects onto whom Kierkegaard projected the 
disdain and shame that he internalised from his father. Both teacher and 
children were devalued objects, used simply to reassert the specialness of 
Kierkegaard, devalued objects used as part of his unending need for 
narcissistic support and feeding. This, I suggest, is a pure example of the 
deep rage that all narcissists hide; their fury at the original narcissistic 
injury, and their eternal need to seek revenge on the original withholding 
internalised object. These poor children became the focus of Kierkegaard's 
hatred, and he lived this hatred by spoiling their efforts and by wholly 
demeaning them as people. 
 
These memoirs would seem tell us as much as there is about Kierkegaard’s 
relationships with ordinary people. There is simply no other 
contemporaneous collection of fond anecdotes of a gentle, kind, concerned 
human being, pausing to speak, as part of his everyday life, to the common 
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man or woman. It may have happened, but nobody appears to have noticed 
it enough to mention it in any memoirs. But we do have snippets of 
anecdotes somewhat to the contrary364: 
One trait emphasised by all of them was his delight in jokes – and 
mockery. Yet there can be no mistaking the fact that his nature also 
contained the need to mock. 
 
…his pretentions were unbounded and his demands were extremely 
difficult to satisfy if one refused to make oneself  into a blind admirer 
and parrot of his own view. 
 
I must say that K was a thoroughgoing egocentrist… 
 
Kierkegaard around this time lost objectivity, and object constancy was 
impossible for him. Things were to get worse:  
It seems to me that it cannot be long before death makes an end of 
the matter….. I am not complaining, even though it might seem to be 
a hard fate that I – who, had I lived in any other country, would have 
earned a great fortune, would have been counted among the most 
eminent geniuses, and would have enjoyed wide and pervasive 
influence – by having been born in a demoralised provincial town, 
have quite predictably achieved status as a sort of local madman, 
known and insulted by quite literally every guttersnipe, even by 
convicted criminals. And all the while the envious upper classes were 
quietly amused and enjoyed their triumph… For three years 
everybody has maintained absolute silence while this has continued 
daily…Only a dead man can stop and avenge such infamy, in which 
an entire nation is more or less implicated. But all you who have 
suffered will be avenged!….Retribution is coming. 365 
 
Oral rage indeed. Note how one by one whole groups are involved in the plot 
until the entire nation is seen to be at fault. This was written in early 1849; 
here is clear evidence of the totality of splitting: nobody is now a good object. 
What is more, primitive emotions are coming to the surface. It is no longer 
possible to forgive the (bad object) common man because of his ignorance, or 
collusion by other groups against the (good object) common man and 
Kierkegaard. Now it is time to punish all those who stand against him. The 
world has become a bad object. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
363 Kirmmse ibid p 236. 
364 ibid, all in Ch 10. 
365 JP 6382. 
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7 Narcissistic Influences in Fear and Trembling 
 
 
7.1 Preface 
 
The next three chapters look at three major works out of the Kierkegaardian 
canon – Fear and Trembling, Works of Love and The Sickness Unto Death. 
These are chosen not only for their influence throughout Western thought 
and Christian theology, but also as being paradigmatic of the state of 
Kierkegaard’s narcissism at the time of their composition. In all of what 
follows, I am speaking of these three texts as narcissistic texts, a concept 
defined above in Section 3.6 
 
In considering the texts, I am not concerned to add to the very large body of 
secondary analysis that seeks to elucidate their ‘true’ meaning, nor to make 
philosophical or theological comment on any part of them. Rather, the 
concern is with applying what we have learned so far about the nature of 
narcissism, and how it has been identified in Kierkegaard’s life, to these 
volumes. I will argue that they are part of his narcissistic response to life 
events that preceded each respective composition; they are just another part 
of a way of being that Kierkegaard generated to preserve his false self.  
 
Fear and Trembling, along with Works of Love and The Sickness Unto Death, 
are thus being presented as stimuli onto which we, the reader, project 
whatever we will. At the risk of overstating the case, they are akin to 
Rorschach ink-blots. While Kierkegaard's texts possess enormous 
intellectual content, and ink blots none, in terms of what we might project 
onto them, they are much more similar. Fear and Trembling is based on the 
myth of Abraham, and myths serve as projective stimuli par excellence. So I 
am not trying to draw out another or different philosophical reading of these 
texts, but to present some instances of the kinds of projection that resolved 
and unresolved narcissists might put upon the texts.  
 
In this Chapter I want to argue two points that relate to narcissistic 
influences in Fear and Trembling. First, the entire text is in fact about 
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grandiosity and omnipotence; apart from any undeniable philosophical 
importance, the text is a narcissistic response to recent life events for 
Kierkegaard, and that his choice of Abraham as hero is quite explicable from 
the point of view of a wounded narcissist. Second I look at the all-important 
role of the idea of silence in Fear and Trembling, and in Kierkegaard’s life 
around this time and later.  
 
 
7.2 Approaching Fear and Trembling 
 
Kierkegaard was not the first to pick up on the importance of the Genesis 
story of Isaac’s binding, the Aqedah. Unmentioned by Kierkegaard are the 
biblical commentaries on the story. There are some sixteen references that 
condemn child sacrifice as an abomination before God. There is commentary 
on the Aqedah in Hebrews 11:17ff, James 2:21ff, Romans 4:2ff and 
Galations 3:6ff. Augustine 366 discusses the story, as does Abelard 367, and 
Aquinas 368. There is a large amount of commentary dating from the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, mainly from England 369. And it is not 
as though Kierkegaard was the first and only person to appreciate the 
challenge of the Abraham story. Jewish scholars had long since puzzled over 
the complexity, not to say contradictions, that seems inherent in the tale. 
Moses Maimonides, a remarkable medieval Jewish scholar, in particular 
gives an analysis with much of the Kierkegaardian insight, but written in 
twelfth century 370.  
 
Nonetheless, Kierkegaard’s text remains the most widely known, and 
perhaps the most psychologically analytic of all exegeses. It was written well 
over half a century before Freud’s first writings began, yet it contains a 
significant amount of psychodynamic appreciation of human motives.  
 
                                                
366 Augustine City of God Bk 16, Ch 32. 
367 Abelard Ethics Ch 3. 
368 Aquinas Summa Theologica I-II, 94. 
369 that has been summarised and evaluated by David Pailin. See Pailin (1981). 
370 In The Guide of the Perplexed. For a very amenable summary of the Jewish 
approach to the Aqedah, see Louis Jacobs contribution in Perkins (1981) (Jacobs 
(1981)). 
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This is a text, I will argue, based on relationships and communication, or 
rather, the almost complete lack of both. It draws on some thirty-nine of the 
fifty chapters of the Book of Genesis, all concerned with the life of Abraham.  
It involves a large number of dramatis personae, all of whom can be seen as 
metaphors for the state of Keirkegaard's narcissism: Johannes de Silento, 
the name of the author; God (but not any God, rather the God of the Old 
Testament, the God of Abraham and Isaac); Abraham himself; and 
Abraham’s son Isaac. Non-speaking parts 371 given to Sarah, who at age 90 
becomes the mother of Isaac; and to Hagar, the maid of the household, who 
was the mother of Abraham’s first son Ishmael (this conception happened 
according to the custom of the time, and when Sarah doubted God’s promise 
that Abraham would be the father of a great nation).  
 
Beyond this, we have a series of characters making brief appearances, nearly 
all drawn from classical literature. They are: the Commoner and the Princess 
(an invented fairy tale to illustrate the idea of Infinite Resignation); 
Agamemnon, used to portray the idea of a Tragic Hero; Jephthah, from the 
Book of Judges, similarly utilised; and Lucius Junius Brutus, First Consul 
of Rome, ditto. 
 
In Problema III, Johannes introduces three romantically involved couples, 
and one other character, to discuss the need to remain silent when ‘in an 
absolute relation with the absolute’. The first is the Delphic Bridegroom, from 
Aristotle’s Politics; the augers promise a disaster if he marries his bride: 
what is he to do? The second is a legend, certainly Danish and possibly 
found elsewhere: Agnete and the Merman, a tale of the lust of a creature of 
the deep being tamed by the vision of purity and loveliness that is Agnete. 
Third is the unhappy pairing of Sarah and Tobias from the Book of Tobit in 
the Apocrypha. Sarah’s previous seven bridegrooms have died in the bridal 
chamber: should she confess this to the eighth? And the final character is 
an old friend of Kierkegaard – Faust, who is here presented as ‘doubt 
personified’.  
 
                                                
371 It is very tempting to reflect on the imputed silence of these women, and link this 
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The whole story is told by Johannes de Silento, who repeatedly confesses 
that he is not a man of faith and cannot understand Abraham. As many 
secondary commentators have pointed out372, this puts Silento’s 
commentary outside of faith, and permits a considerable discussion about 
understanding faith from the inside, having faith, as opposed to from the 
outside, and not having faith373. 
 
 
7.3 The Narcissistic Attraction of the Aqedah 
 
In choosing Abraham, Kierkegaard chose a major topic. This is not just any 
myth, but one ‘central to the nervous system of Judaism and Christianity’. 374 
Jews recite Genesis 22 at the service of Rosh Hashanah; reciting the same 
passage is common during Christian celebrations of Easter week; Muslims 
re-enact the event on the most sacred day of the Muslim calendar. Apart 
from being venerated, the story resonates in popular culture also. 375 But it 
is still a myth, transmitted orally and edited repeatedly for many hundreds 
of years before it reached its present form. Speigal gives an appropriate 
perspective: 
Scriptures are not only a record of the past but a prophecy, a 
foreshadowing and foretelling of what will come to pass. And if that is 
the case, text and personal experience are not two autonomous 
domains. On the contrary, they are reciprocally enlightening; even as 
the immediate event helps to make the age old sacred text intelligible, 
so in turn the text reveals the fundamental significance of the recent 
event or experience. 376 
 
So why did Kierkegaard choose this myth as the central issue in Fear and 
Trembling? I want to suggest there are three reasons, all aspects of his 
narcissism.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
to Kierkegaard’s silence about his own mother. 
372 See Lippitt (2003) for a catalogue. 
373 Thus we necessarily have to confront the idea of pseudonymity, as was discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
374 Spiegal (1969) p xvii. 
375 Bob Dylan wrote a song about it; Woody Allen made a comedy sketch about it; 
the Peanuts strip cartoon even makes reference to it. 
376 Speigal (1969) p xvi. 
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First, the mythical tale is about omnipotence: the power of God to command 
Abraham to sacrifice his son, and the power of Abraham to attend single-
mindedly to this command. Kernberg defines omnipotence: 
(It) is based on the identification with an idealised and powerful good 
object and consists in the denial of other internal and external 
aspects of reality. 
It is related to projective identification in that it includes a tendency to 
exert control and mastery of external objects. 
Contempt experienced or expressed towards objects often 
accompanies omnipotence.  377 
  
Fear and Trembling can be read narcissistically as Kierkegaard identifying 
with Abraham. This narcissistic identification permits the intense 
omnipotence of God to be related directly to oneself, in this instance to 
Kierkegaard. The story is about a man alone on a hillside with God; there are 
others involved, but they are mere ciphers. So this is a narcissistic fantasy – 
the absence of competing others, siblings, parents, whomever - with the sole 
concentration of the omnipotent other on this self. Through this 
identification, Kierkegaard was making himself unquestionably unique. 
Perhaps Rothstein’s model of ‘failed perfection’ best describes Kierkegaard’s 
particular narcissism. As Rothstein says: 
The cognitive component (of narcissistic perfection) is expressed in 
ideas of omniscience or omnipotence. A subject or object may be 
thought of as all knowing, most powerful etc. What is common to all 
is a superlative designation such as  “most”, or the number “one” or 
the “one and only”. 378 
 
In complex ways, Kierkegaard repeatedly both projects omnipotence onto 
Abraham, and then introjects it into himself. The story of Abraham is one of 
being special, of being chosen, of being the father of a race and nation, being 
the most venerable man in three monotheistic religions. For the religiously 
inclined narcissist, and leaving aside Christ as perhaps too blasphemous a 
candidate, there is no better, no more laudable person with whom to identify 
than Abraham. 
 
Second, the story of Abraham is about non-disclosure. Because, as I argued 
above, Kierkegaard was neither man nor gentleman enough to explain his 
                                                
377 Kernberg (1985) p 33. 
378 Rothstein (1984) p 18. 
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true predicament to Regine, he remained silent, deluding her, and to a 
significant extent himself. The social stigma of his behaviour in middle class 
Copenhagen in 1833 would have been significant, 379 and he was at pains to 
find an excuse, or more accurately a rationale, for his behaviour, that 
maintained his narcissism, his false self. For the first time, following the end 
of the engagement, he had been obliged to consider his own behaviour and 
reflect upon his motives. The narcissistic response is always to deny 
personal wrongdoing, and blame any other agency. Accepting personal 
blame is to risk destroying the narcissistic mask that has been so carefully 
erected and maintained. Hence at this time Kierkegaard was in search of a 
suitably authoritative and impressive analogue or parallel to his own 
predicament, in order to remove any blame from himself and demonstrate 
that others, even greater than he, had faced a similar dilemma and resolved 
it in much the same way. The story of Abraham is perfect. Abraham is 
venerated, unique, and close to God; but, as Kierkegaard explains in 
Problema III, Abraham never talks about his motives and the events on 
Mount Moriah. He does not speak because he cannot. What has occurred is 
in some sense private between God and Abraham, is outside the universal 
380, and hence cannot be communicated. God chose Abraham, and no other, 
to be part of this conversation. This excuse, this narcissistically perfect 
rationale, was what Kierkegaard needed to explain to the world why he 
treated Regine the way he did, and why he remained silent about it. By 
telling the story of Abraham, and allowing the reader to link Abraham’s 
situation with that of himself, he narcissistically believed others would 
excuse him as he invited the reader to excuse – actually to admire – 
Abraham. 
 
Third, Abraham’s story demeans other, intimately related human beings. For 
many, this is the most difficult aspect of the Aqedah story. 381 As Delaney 
asks: 
                                                
379 See Kirmmse (1990) or Kirmmse (1996). 
380 Most of the discussion of Problema III is about Abraham’s need to remain silent. 
See Fear and Trembling, KW VI pp 82-120. 
381 Delaney (1998) is a text wholly critical of the patriarchal underpinning of 
Abraham’s story. 
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Like that knife eternally raised in mid air, several questions should be 
held in the mind of the reader. Why is the willingness to sacrifice the 
child the model of faith? What is the function of obedience? Why so 
little attention to the betrayal of the child? Whose voice counts? 382 
 
Narcissistically, the very denial of the legitimacy of the views of both 
Abraham’s son, Isaac, and his son’s mother, Sarah, in his decision to follow 
God’s (private) command and sacrifice his son, is quite reasonable. The 
previous analysis of the narcissistic personality has repeatedly emphasised 
the absolute need to remain totally self-centred, to reduce everything to a 
self-object, the absolute danger of admitting other viewpoints, other realties. 
By denying their voice, Abraham’s story denies them reality. The narcissist 
can thus continue in his false self without having to accommodate the 
awkward reality of significant others. Kernberg says of narcissistic intimate 
relationships: 
For the narcissistic partner, life proceeds in isolation; dependency 
upon the other is feared insofar as it represents acknowledgement 
and gratitude for the dependency; dependency is replaced by self-
righteousness. Resentments are resolved by splitting disparate 
experiences from each other. In a worst case, a stifling sense of 
imprisonment and persecution by the other evolves. 383 
 
As was described above, almost immediately after proposing marriage to 
Regine, Kierkegaard was engulfed in a very private narcissistic crisis. With 
Regine having initially been elevated and idealised, having become in part a 
Kohutian idealised imago, the only possible narcissistic response to the 
crisis was to devalue and demean her. Kernberg again: ‘if an external object 
can provide no further gratification or protection, it is dropped and 
dismissed’. Poor Regine was thus devalued. Despite many claims to the 
contrary, I maintain that any secret message of Fear and Trembling is not 
aimed at Regine at all, for she now has little significance for Kierkegaard’s 
false self. The text is aimed at the world, at middle class Copenhagen to be 
exact, to reassure them that he had not treated his fiancé badly at all, but 
rather that they, ordinary Copenhageners, shared their town of a very 
special human being indeed, one that could at the very least be compared 
with Abraham. 
                                                
382 Delaney (1998) p 14. 
383 Kernberg (1995) p 144. 
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All of this came out of rage. Kernberg says, of the narcissist struggling with 
any intimate relationship: 
the incapacity to experience gratitude, the sense of humiliation at 
needing the other person, and the deeper difficulty of facing the 
intense guilt over having destroyed a potentially good relationship 
with another makes for very pathological object relations.’ 384 
 
 
I suggest that Kernberg’s description is precisely what was happening for 
Kierkegaard: the guilt and fear and humiliation, unacceptable to the 
narcissist at the best of times, become overwhelmingly intense in intimate 
relationships, and sooner or later these emotions must be rejected and 
projected onto the beloved. Narcissistic rage remains behind. One has to find 
a reason for why the beloved is unworthy, unfaithful, simply not good 
enough. Kierkegaard set up a humanly impossible condition for a girl to be 
in love with him, thus relieving him of any obligation to love her. 
 
 
7.4 Narcissistic Silence 
 
As a concept, silence has a long history 385, and serves a purpose in many 
aspects of critical theory. We could agree with Bauman386 that modernity as 
opposed to post-modernity is concerned with the repression of 
indeterminacy, contingency and ambivalence. Language and linguistic 
classification are thus part of the modernistic process of imposing order and 
reducing chaos. Silence, by contrast, increases ambiguity, reduces fixedness 
and changes boundaries. Psychoanalysis, including object relations theory, 
has as its goal the unifying of parts of the self through the talking cure, the 
removal of silence. Freud’s early work demonstrated the conflict that exists 
in the unconscious, while his later model posited a structure that defined 
the conflict. Psychoanalysis therefore works by enabling the process of 
verbalisation about these conflicts, so that the underlying unity can be 
perceived. Transference is just a means of making the concealed conflicts 
                                                
384 Kernberg  (1985) p 145. 
385 I am concerned only with aspects of silence that relate to psychopathology. 
386 Bauman (1991). 
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evident; hence silence is the indicator of the conflict and of the disparate and 
unreconciled aspects of the self. Freud’s process of analysis, as is widely 
known, simply invited the patient to say the first thing that came into their 
head. In all cases, the patient eventually fell silent. The silence was the 
symptom of the conflict, repressed and unconscious. Talking - removing the 
silence - led to the cure 387. 
 
So why is Kierkegaard so concerned with silence in this book? Why does he 
choose Abraham’s silence as such a key idea? Actually, even a superficial 
reading of Genesis 22 suggests that Kierkegaard’s premises (or is it de 
Silento’s) are not necessarily sound. Problema III asks: ‘Why was it ethically 
defensible for Abraham to conceal his undertaking from Sarah, from Elizer, 
and from Isaac’. But nowhere does any verse of this chapter state or imply 
silence on Abraham’s part. To be sure, neither does it give verbatim 
accounts of what Abraham did say. But Kierkegaard’s case is built around 
what Abraham left out of his dialogue with Isaac and the others. The exact 
dialogue in Chapter 22 is: 
v7: ‘And Isaac spoke unto Abraham his father and said, My Father: 
and he said here I am my son. And he said Behold the fire and the 
wood: but where is the lamb for a burnt offering? 
 
v8: And Abraham said, My son, God will provide himself a lamb for a 
burnt offering: so they went both of them together. 
 
None of the three key figures are mentioned by name again in the chapter. 
From this, Kierkegaard presumes an active omission towards the three 
individuals, even though the Genesis story gives no inkling of the lines of 
communication that might have happened between these four.  
 
The motivation for Kierkegaard’s line of argument does not follow from a 
logical analysis of Abraham’s actions, but is deeply narcissistic. The Genesis 
story is surely neutral. Leaving aside any of the already mentioned 
omissions from the text that have accrued over the ages, there is still no 
necessary reading of the chapter that implies secretiveness on Abraham’s 
                                                
387 Not all would agree with this; Lacan, in particular, used silence as part of the 
therapeutic process, and insisted that silence in psychoanalysis was more complex 
than the above representation suggests. See Lacan, J. and Wilden, A. (1994). 
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part. With a stimulus as sparse and hence as arbitrary as this, any response 
is possible. So what did Kierkegaard see in it, and why? He found there 
Abraham’s silence – arbitrarily – and in Abraham’s silence justification for 
his own silence towards Regine, and that these were found because he was 
still dealing with the affront to his narcissism that the break with Regine 
engendered.  
 
Kierkegaard did not speak after the ending the engagement. Famously, he 
went to the theatre within half an hour of ending the relationship388. The 
Journals speak of little other than relief that it is over389. Over the period 
almost from the very start of the engagement to the formal breakup, the 
Journals speak increasingly of his permitting Regine to escape from the 
relationship. Kierkegaard did not speak, nor did Abraham: 
Abraham remains silent – but he cannot speak. Therein lies the 
distress and anxiety. Even though I can go on talking night and day 
without interruption, if I cannot make myself understood when I 
speak, then I am not speaking. 390 
 
Abraham cannot speak, because he cannot say that which would 
explain everything; that is an ordeal such that, please note, the 
ethical is the temptation. 391 
 
The issue for Abraham is whether communicating with Isaac would have 
destroyed Abraham’s second movement of faith. Kierkegaard’s repeated point 
(see the long paragraph in FT p119) is that Abraham did not speak because 
the truth he knew made no sense to everybody else. How could Abraham say 
that he was both about to kill his son, and that God would give him his son 
back, by virtue of the absurd? How could he tell Isaac that he was about to 
be murdered, but he would not die. This is not comprehensible, Kierkegaard 
maintains. Hence Abraham’s’ silence. The temptation, de Silento maintains, 
is to give in and tell all to Isaac; but in doing so, Abraham would be acting 
from the ethical and not from the religious. 
 
                                                
388 see Hannay (2001) Ch 7 for a comprehensive description of the breakup 
389 see for example JP 5548, along with any of the other letters to his friend Emil 
Boesen. 
390 FT p 113. 
391 FT p 115. 
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The issue for Kierkegaard is that he had never loved Regine. He loved her 
only as a self-object. When the narcissistic crisis resolved itself, shortly after 
the engagement was announced, the false self had won, and he was left with 
the uncomfortable process of dealing with reality. Ethically, he had treated 
her shamefully, maintaining the deceit of an intimate relationship long after 
he knew there was none. Ethically, he dared not speak, for that way would 
lead to the crumbling of the false self. So he identified with Abraham, 
promoting a religious motive for his actions, a motive above the ethical. He 
did not need to communicate it, since none would understand. 
 
There is more. Even though Problema III discusses the ethical issue 
surrounding Abraham’s silence towards his son, his wife and family, having 
headlined this as the problem, Isaac and Sarah are barely mentioned again 
in the discussion that follows. Presented in the Genesis story, and more 
tellingly, as presented in three of the four Expectorations, Isaac is quite 
clearly, in object relations terminology, a self-object. Crucially, Isaac’s voice 
is not heard – effectively he is silent. He is valued only insofar as he is part 
of, and enables, Abraham’s trial. As a person in his own right, he is a cipher. 
Even the one version of the four Expectorations in which Abraham lies about 
his motives, it is still to the greater glory of Abraham, that he acts to enable 
his son to retain his faith. So what of Isaac? What did the youth feel or 
imagine during the journey? What did he feel during the binding, as the 
knife was raised? What did he feel when his father never talked to him about 
the whole episode? Where was the relationship? What kind of father does 
this make Abraham? Father of faith, doubtless; but father to his son? From 
Isaac’s point of view, his ordeal was initiated and perpetrated by his father, 
and then prolonged by continued silence.  
 
The presumption, certainly on Kierkegaard’s part, as for many 
commentators on the Aqedah, is that there was unity of will between father 
and son, much as is presumed between God and his Son 392. But in the case 
                                                
392 This issue, often referred to as ‘prefigurement’ has been discussed at length. See 
Ch 6 of Delaney (1998), Ch 6 of Lippitt  (2003) and especially Ronald Green’s 
Chapter Developing Fear and Trembling in Hannay and Marino (1998) (Green 
(1998)). 
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of the former relationship, both are depicted as completely human, and 
hence we have the right to doubt and question why there should be such 
unity of will. How was Isaac to understand what was going on? Is not the 
power of the story that Abraham was asked to sacrifice not an object but a 
real person? But to be a real person there has to be independence of will, a 
will that cannot be manipulated. Instead, the enciphering of Isaac is 
everywhere in the Genesis story: Isaac was, even for God, a symbol of a 
promise kept; for Abraham, he was a vessel in the trial of faith. He truly is 
an undervalued, demeaned self-object. His very existence serves only to 
enable Abraham’s relationship with God (in Old Testament language), or 
with an idealised parental imago (in Kohutian language).  
 
I suggest that this is how Kierkegaard came to think of Regine: that he 
wished she could be silenced and enciphered in the same way as Isaac. The 
story of the Aqedah is doubtless but a myth, and Kierkegaard’s deep 
analysis of the psychological internals of this myth is very revealing about 
Kierkegaard’s motives. The silencing, the demeaning, exactly this obedience 
is what any narcissist demands of the other. To go against the will of the 
narcissist is to invoke intense rage. An unreal other, a self object, can be as 
silent as one wishes, and is thus a much more comfortable entity with which 
to relate.  
 
The purpose of silence for Kierkegaard is thus to conceal: to conceal one’s 
relationship with God, to conceal one’s changing inner self. It is about 
avoiding communication, which in turn is a means of avoiding confrontation, 
either with the significant other, or with the false self, exactly as Freud 
described. In a poignant effort to maintain a hopelessly narcissistic self, 
Søren Kierkegaard identified with the most powerful man in the history of 
Christianity. He projected his own inner conflict on to Abraham, found 
silence (where perhaps none existed), and through this concealment of self 
and motives, sought reflected redemption. 
 
But in this our time, while we respect silence, and while Winnicott helps us 
understand the critical importance of silent play, and the impossibility of 
making external what is in the intermediate space, nonetheless we require 
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that communication is attempted. We are defined by relationships, and the 
way we encounter relationships can only be through communication. 
Certainly one unconscious speaks to another, without words being uttered; 
and we know the treachery that can be language, or assumptions about 
shared language. Nonetheless, we try, we struggle to turn unspeakable 
thoughts into sentences, to communicate the incommunicable. For us, here 
lies the essence of an intimate relationship, that we try to explain to the 
other what we feel, with all the impossibility thereby entailed. The point is 
that the success of the attempt is not in the accuracy with which 
indescribable states of mind are described, but in the very act of trying, of 
keeping faith, of not giving up and losing hope. In our time, it is not clear 
that there is any imperative higher than trying to communicate with others.   
 
Above, I have tried to draw out a psychodynamic interpretation of but two 
themes from Fear and Trembling. There are very many more themes, as the 
voluminous literature indicates, and endless psychodynamic interpretations 
of them. This thesis is concerned with how we respond to these themes, with 
what the text does to us. For some readers, Kierkegaard's notion of the 
teleological suspension of the ethical makes complete sense, both cognitively 
and emotionally. Others may not feel so comfortable with this absolute. 
Kierkegaard's treatment of the people in the myth and the justification of 
silence, while cognitively coherent, may make little sense in terms of 
relationships for some readers. Others may see the story as no more than 
myth, and not be concerned with the issue relationships. Neither of these 
views is any more correct or perceptive than the other. And there are very 
many other issues that can be drawn out - Fear and Trembling truly is a 
projective stimulus. But this thesis is arguing that the state of our 
narcissism will tend to push us toward different responses to this text. The 
response may seem entirely rational, but this rationality is founded upon 
our own way of being in the world, our own narcissism. 
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8 Narcissistic Influences in ‘Works of Love’ 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
It is up to my own dear reader to discern whether Kierkegaard’s 
depiction of love was his own evasion – whether due to fear of 
intimacy he increased the requirement beyond his and our possible 
reach. 393 
 
It would be difficult better to introduce the key question raised by an object 
relations study of this text from Kierkegaard. Written by one who is 
essentially an apologist for Works of Love, Amy Hall’s question is quite 
perceptive. But her incorporated answer is incomplete. It was not fear of 
intimacy alone that fuelled much of this text: it was also a narcissist’s 
response to a crumbling public life and a recognition of his own motives. The 
mirror had by now cracked, and this text is in part a plea from a depressed 
and humbled man for mercy, for love and for pity. It is a book about the way 
in which Søren Kierkegaard now wants the world to love him. 
 
Ostensibly, Works of Love is simply about the Love Commandments. 394 The 
book, in David Gouwens felicitous phrase, is ‘an extensive grammar that 
examines and tests the quality of human love in the light of divine love.’ 395 It 
is widely quoted, is viewed as pivotal in the Kierkegaardian canon, and has 
been the basis of much ethical debate. 396  
 
But the text has not been well received by everyone. Karl Barth had 
strenuous objections to it. He summarised Works of Love as ‘unlovely, 
inquisitorial, and terribly judicial.’ And censuring Kierkegaard’s concept of 
love as duty, he hissed:  
it is not the case that a love which is imposed and enforced as a duty 
- however it may be understood - can ever be more than an eros with 
its back to the wall, as it were. 397 
 
                                                
393 Hall (2002) p 10. 
394 Usually taken to be Matthew 22:39. 
395 Gouwens (1996) p 197. 
396 see for example Kierkegaard after McIntyre for a discussion of Kierkegaard’s 
contributions to ethics. Davenport and Rudd (2001). 
397 p 782 in Barth (1978).  
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Theodore Adorno’s criticism centred on Kierkegaard’s obsession with the 
interiorisation of love: 
K is unaware of the demonic consequences that his insistence on 
inwardness actually leaves the world to the devil. For what can loving 
one’s neighbour mean, if one can neither help him nor interfere with a 
setting of the world which makes such help impossible?’ 398  
 
Perhaps one may most accurately summarise Kierkegaard’s doctrine 
of love by saying that he demands that love behave toward all men as 
if they were dead. 399 
 
Martin Buber has criticised much of this text. His thesis is that to reach and 
attain God through the renunciation of objects in our lives would necessarily 
turn God into another object. As he famously charged: ‘God wants us to 
come to him by means of the Reginas he has created, and not by 
renunciation of them.’ 400 As he sees it, Kierkegaard’s view on the essentially 
exclusive relationship to God makes for the irrelevance of others in creation. 
 
Peter George condemns the text for its exclusion of preferential love, and its 
reduction of all relationships to the God-relationship. This is not, he 
concludes, a social text at all, but a remnant of the earlier pseudonymous 
emphasis on the single individual:  
For a relationship to be genuinely social, it has to be interactive and 
reciprocal. It requires more than the self to relate to the other person; 
the other person must also relate to the self. 401 
 
And finally, in a highly influential critique, endorsed by Alasdair McIntyre 
among others and first published in Danish in 1956, Knud Logstrup 
savagely summarises Kierkegaard’s ethic: 
..the relationship to God is meant to serve as a way of liberating 
people from having anything to do with others. Love of one’s 
neighbour must be used, in the most efficient way, to keep people at a 
distance. Works of Love is a brilliantly thought out system of 
safeguards against being forced into a close relationship with other 
people. Not least when the relationship threatens to become intimate. 
402  
 
                                                
398 Adorno (1939) p 420. 
399 Adorno (1939) p 421. 
400 Buber (1965) The Question to the Single One. p 52 in Smith (1965).  
401 George (1998) p 74. 
402 Logstrup (1997) p 232. 
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The admirers and the apologists of the text also have to accept its 
difficulties. Ferriera, whose views I will quote consistently throughout this 
chapter, confesses that: 
I have gone out of my way to offer a charitable reading of Works of 
Love, not because it is a work by Kierkegaard, but because the 
hermeneutical principle of charity seems to me to be the most fruitful 
one to use with any text. 403 
 
Amy Hall, in a text that is also essentially sympathetic, and already 
mentioned, admits: 
Kierkegaard’s writing style is often self-superior in the extreme. (He) 
writes at times down from the pinnacle of philosophic wisdom, 
expressing disgust for the self-deluded reader. He…includes himself 
among the self-sacrificial saints, seeing himself as the one, persecuted 
truth teller in an otherwise iniquitous world. 404 
 
 
The book is in two parts, delivered separately to the printer, the first in April 
1847 and the second in August of the same year. A frequent topic in 
secondary texts is whether Works of Love was indeed a work of love for Søren 
Kierkegaard. The Hongs in their introduction suggest that the chapter on 
Mercifulness was written with his crippled Nephew Hans Peter in mind; and 
The Work of Recollecting One Who is Dead the Hongs ascribe to an act of filial 
piety towards his dead parents 405. Undoubtedly, this is a much more direct 
book than any before: there is no pseudonymity; there is much direct 
instruction; above all, we see the beginning of the emphasis on works, and 
on action, and the whispers of disagreement with Luther about whether 
justification by faith, without action, is enough. Luther’s sentiment: 
In this faith all works become equal…. For the works are acceptable 
not for their own sake but because of faith, which is always the same 
and lives and works in each and every work without distinction. 406  
 
can be seen to be less and less sufficient. 
 
It is a commonplace among commentators that this text sits midway 
between the intense interiority of the pseudonymous works, and the call to 
                                                
403 Ferreira (2001) p 258. 
404 Hall (2002) p 10. 
405 Works of Love, KW XVI p xiv. 
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radical action in the last polemical works. 407 This book is also a transitional 
text in that it was written by a narcissist in transition. We have left behind 
the golden years of youth, of idealism and idealising, of certainty and 
confidence. The grandiosity, not to say arrogance, that gave Kierkegaard the 
ability to write Fear and Trembling is here replaced, following The Corsair 
affair, by the realisation of psychical vulnerability. The sense of omnipotence 
has been well punctured, and all the narcissistic damage that has been so 
carefully contained over thirty years and more now seeks expression. 
 
As a transitional text, it thus reflects two conditions or phases of narcissism. 
The initial grandiose phase we have met and discussed in the previous 
chapter: what we might see as Abraham’s outrageous contempt for the social 
and the moral is typical of the omnipotent narcissistic phase, and I have 
previously suggested Kierkegaard’s motivation in using this story. The 
second phase is one of crisis and catastrophe, the ending of the impossible 
narcissistic dream, and the terrible hurt and pain that follow from this 
crisis. It is the misfortune of most middle-aged narcissists to have to come to 
terms with reality. So the parallel presence of both of the two aspects of the 
syndrome accounts for what can only be described as the contradictory 
nature of the book. All the critics quoted above are accurate in their 
attribution – Kierkegaard does say all these things and in his own name. But 
the apologists are also correct: he also always says more or less the very 
opposite. 408  
                                                                                                                                       
406 Atkinson (1971).  
407 The International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol 16 is dedicated to Works of Love 
and contains some thirteen essays, some of which will be quoted in this chapter.  
(Perkins (1999). Also, the 1998 volume of Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook contains a 
series of relevant essays. (Cappelorn (1998)). 
Another collection, this time of twelve essays, with many of them directly relevant, is 
that edited by George Pattison and Steven Shakespeare (Pattison and Shakespeare 
(1998)). 
Further, there are several important essays in other compendia. Of note is Philip 
Quinn’s Kierkegaard’s Christian Ethics in the Cambridge Companion (Quinn (1998)). 
408 Ferriera in particular presents a most comprehensive account of how even the 
most apparently direct and uncompromising statement can be modified to mean 
something quite different in the light of contextual reading.  Edifying though this is, 
one is left with the feeling that Kierkegaard’s position on any of the key points I raise 
in this chapter is ambivalent at best and contradictory at worst (Ferriera 2001).      
C Stephen Evans largely agrees with both Hall and Ferriera. See especially Ch 9 of 
his Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Love (Evans (2004)).  
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In order to demonstrate some compatibility, we could view this text as 
having been written, as it were, by a dissociative, one with a dissociation 
disorder, one in two states of mind 409, by someone quite unsure of what 
they really feel. The text does contain the old, frequently exceedingly 
disagreeable Kierkegaard, simply telling us how to lead our lives. But it also 
contains a damaged, depressed and humbled Kierkegaard, who is asking for 
our pity, for our compassion, and for our love. On this reading, Kierkegaard 
mingled two texts: the first written as a retiring member of the obnoxious 
narcissists’ club, and the other written as a probationary member of the 
association for humbled narcissists. The manifestations of both motives, and 
both perceptions, are present on almost every page. The very real 
contradictions that trouble so many critics can thus be seen as no more 
than a side-effect of Kierkegaard’s changing object relations. 
 
All of this relates directly to us, his reader. Many if not most of us will be 
beyond the early youthful phase of narcissism, and we are all coming to 
terms with our mortality. What Kierkegaard gives us in this text, then, is a 
set of vignettes and narratives, against which we can reflect on and gauge 
our own view of love. He states, often with shocking clarity, the logical 
implications of our sometimes woolly notions of what we think it is to love 
someone. Beyond that exposition of what it is to love, there remains another 
agenda, a narcissistic agenda: how we respond to the implicit narcissism 
expressed in his text is of course an indicator of our own narcissistic state. 
 
I begin the remainder of this chapter by considering the difficult question of 
self-love in Works of Love, and then contrast Kiekegaard’s view with an 
object relations view of sexual love. Then I consider Kierkegaard’s systematic 
undermining of the ‘you’ in any relationship, and finally consider whether 
                                                
409 see McWilliams Ch 15 for a general introduction. A dissociative disorder is one in 
which a person can be in two states of mind. The lay understanding of 
schizophrenia – a split personality – is if course quite wrong: the splitting is from 
reality, not from another person or self. The dissociative, by contrast is indeed in two 
minds, each split from the other. This can be a benign condition, or can extend as 
far as the fictional Dr Jeckyll and Mr Hyde. This latter example is probably truly a 
Fugue state, derived from the Latin ‘to flee’. The alternate selves usually exist 
apparently independently of the other, alongside a geographical dislocation 
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much of the motivation of writing the text stems from Kierkegaard’s sense of 
shame and humiliation. I conclude with some thoughts on what happens 
when we read Works of Love. In all of this, I am not concerned with ethics as 
such. The focus as always is on Kierkegaard’s motivation, and the 
explanation of his actions through object relations theory, and my 
contention that he lived his life very much as a narcissist. As in the previous 
Chapter, I am anxious to draw out the basic psychodynamics of 
Kierkegaard’s ideas, in order that we his readers can consider the effect of 
Kierkegaard’s narcissism on our own reading of his texts. 
 
 
8.2 The Problem of Self Love 
 
Since a psychiatric definition of narcissism is that it is largely about self-love 
(albeit not in a lay sense), and in that self-love preoccupies Kierkegaard 
throughout this entire text, this would seem to be fertile ground for a real 
confrontation of ideas. In fact Kierkegaard is surprisingly vague about what 
self-love is, though not vague about how it is to be condemned. In the early 
part of the text, he makes several statements about the need to be loved, the 
value of being loved and the general desirability of love in one’s life: ‘life 
without loving is not worth living’ (WL p38) and ‘how impoverished never to 
have loved...’ (WL p 63, 101, 175.) Further, we cannot be secretive about love 
that we feel: ‘Others have the right to the expression of our love if in fact we 
love them.’ And ‘..whoever is an object of your love has a claim upon an 
expression of it.’  Along with ‘the emotion is not in our possession but 
belongs to the other; the expression is your debt to him’ (WL p 12). So some 
kind of loving is desirable, necessary and good.  
 
The problem is self-love, loving of the self. The nearest he comes to a 
definition of self-love is:  
To love yourself in the right way and to love the neighbour correspond 
perfectly to one another; fundamentally they are one and the same 
thing. (WL p22) 
                                                                                                                                       
Dissociative disorders are surprisingly common, and the two views of the self (or the 
two selves) can happily coexist. 
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In fact he postulates two forms of self-love. The first is the selfish and 
exclusive love of self, which essentially ignores the good of the other. The 
second is the proper love of the self, which encompasses the good of the 
other; the measure of the love for the other is also the measure of the self-
love. But there does not really need to be another involved: 
As far as thought is concerned, the neighbour does not even need to 
exist. If someone living on a desert island mentally conformed to this 
commandment, by renouncing self love he could be said to love his 
neighbour. (WL p21) 
 
In all of this, Kierkegaard is concerned with the distinction, easily seen in 
the Danish language, between sexual and preferential love (Elskov) and 
spiritual love and friendship (Kjerlighed). It would seem that Kierkegaard has 
some difficulties with Elskov; he never expands on what sexual love is, but 
defines it as selfish, and then attributes selfishness to it: ‘passionate 
preference is actually another form of self love’ (WL p 52-53). Any unselfish 
act cannot be the product of Elskov, he claims, but must be a result of 
Kjerlighed. Having set up this tautology, there is little point in our trying to 
argue with him; but we might already be wondering if this uncompromising 
approach is not the result of a mixture of fear of intimacy and, as George 
suggests, sour grapes. 410 
 
Further, the beloved loved in Elskov is viewed by the lover as ‘the other self, 
the other-I’ (WL p 66). And by defining the beloved in Elskov as the other-I, 
from this it follows that in loving the beloved we are loving the self. 
Kierkegaard repeatedly states that Elskov is selfish because it is preferential, 
because it is selective.  
 
Object relations theory would have considerable trouble responding to this, 
as have very many commentators. 411 The philosophical issue is whether a 
non-selfish act can occur within preferential love – is Kierkegaard’s definition 
or axiom debatable? The psychological issue is whether erotic love can ever 
be other than selfish, can ever be other than about projecting the needs of 
                                                
410 George (1998) p 71. 
411 for supportive arguments, see Green and Ellis (1999).  
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the self onto the beloved. Of course this occurs (though not unremittingly) 
for all of us in erotic love. But it is not pathological: it would seem to be, 
from an object relations point of view, how the world works. And rather than 
condemn it, we should accept that in part this is what it is to enjoy sexual 
love. There is a very selfish ‘I’ involved in erotic passion, and there are very 
good psychodynamic reasons why this is so. But it does not follow that erotic 
passion must always be selfish and that it is incapable of unselfish acts. 
 
What is Kierkegaard’s objection to preferential erotic love? Apologists would 
maintain that he is at pains to preserve the validity, the alterity, of the other 
in the relationship, to ensure that the other is neither subsumed nor 
submerged. 412  Selfish love, erotic love denies in part or in whole the 
uniqueness of the other. Neighbour love, by contrast, is the only way we can 
be sure that the other is not reduced to an other-I. Note that Kierkegaard is 
not suggesting that the two loves are additive or complementary or even in 
opposition; nor is he suggesting any kind of supplementing of neighbour love 
with erotic love. He states quite clearly: ‘there is only one kind of love, spirit’s 
love’ (WL p 143). He talks at length about the need to wrest self-love from us, 
about the need to take away preferential love. He asks that we locate and 
remove ‘the selfishness in preferential love’ (WL p44). Preferential love 
necessarily involves making judgements and choices, essentially about 
people who are or are not like us. But critics 413 maintain that he has set up 
a quite unreal version of erotic love in order to condemn it.  
 
It is difficult to avoid some sense of confusion in reading the early parts of 
Works of Love. Is erotic love actually different from neighbour love? 414 Can 
one love both as a neighbour and a preferred lover? 415  Is erotic love 
condemned? 416 I want to suggest that this apparent confusion is the mark 
of the depressed narcissist. Having moved from omnipotence and 
grandiosity, he has reached a stage where he has some insight into the 
impossibility of his fantasies, and is confronted by the crushing realisation 
                                                
412 see Ferreira p 91-2. 
413 George (1998) p 73. 
414 see WL p 60. 
415 see WL p 61.  
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of his inadequacies, of how pathetic he must seem. Privately, it would seem 
there has never been sexual love for Søren Kierkegaard, and there is now 
envy of all those that enjoy it. This envy is easily translated into resentment, 
and hence to early narcissistic omnipotence: you shall not enjoy sexual 
relations. 
 
From an object relations point of view, Kierkegaard’s analysis of this is too 
simplistic, even, perhaps, suspicious. I suggest that Kierkegaard is in fact 
deliberately destroying the concept of the sexual self, of the erotic self. He is 
denying sexuality and intimacy, he is negating the ‘I’ in the erotic ‘I-you’ and 
especially the ‘I-Thou’ relationship. To discover why, to continue this 
analysis, I need to compare Kierkegaard’s approach with an object relations 
view of the human sexual response, for that is what is specific about 
preferential erotic love. 
 
 
8.3 The Sexual Experience 
 
Where does sexual desire and a sexual response come from? I suggest, along 
with the vast majority of writers on sexuality, that four elements are involved 
in the development of sexuality: the diffuse excitability of the skin from birth 
417; early attachment behaviours 418; the sexually exciting qualities of the 
erogenous zones 419; and the cognitive imprints of unconscious fantasy 
developments, linked to intense pleasurable affect activation 420. All of these 
lead to the specific cognitive-affective experience of sexual excitement. 
 
But there is a difference between sexual excitement and sexual or erotic 
desire, and the former is transformed into the latter through the choice of an 
object. (Sexual excitement too has an object, but it is a primitive part object, 
remaining from symbiotic days and the wish for fusion. 421)  For most object 
                                                                                                                                       
416 see KW WL p 267.  
417 see for example Bancroft (1989).  
418 see Fonagay (2001). 
419 see Freud SE VII. 
420 see Kernberg  (1995). 
421 see Kernberg (1995) Ch 2. 
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relations writers, erotic desire is sexual excitement linked to a particular 
kind of object, an oedipal object. I will not rehearse the theory here. But it 
leads to questions about the anatomy of erotic desire. The four elements of 
sexual excitement may be clear, but why is such excitement translated into, 
and why does it remain as, a specific desire, a desire for a single individual, 
for a preferred individual? There are, following Kernberg 422 and others, three 
components.  
 
First is the search for pleasure, to penetrate or be penetrated, a search for 
closeness; we can relate this to Melanie Klein’s insights. The desire for 
penetration begins as simple erotic attraction, essentially instinctive, and is 
about the obvious sexual characteristics of the other - breasts, buttocks, 
shape, face etc. But it is grounded in a sense of personal closeness, and 
personal mutual attraction.  
 
Second is identification with the partner’s orgasm, so that one becomes at 
that moment both genders, with a feeling of intersubjective transcendence. 
Here is where we see the remains of the oedipal situation. This is a clear 
case of triangulation, of fulfilling the oedipal wish. (There are, as Freud 
famously said, always four people in the sexual bed: the two partners, and 
their respective oedipal objects.)  
 
The third element in erotic desire is the transgressions that are thereby 
involved: nudity, breaking of taboos, and violating oedipal inhibitions - a 
defiance of, and a triumph over the oedipal rival. This is an intensely 
personal and preferential process. Our erotic partner must have some 
semblance of the oedipal object for the taboos to be broken. We are close to 
the areas of private fantasy, even of fetish: this is as preferential as it can 
get. As Kernberg puts it: 
The body of the beloved becomes a geography of personal meanings 
423  
 
                                                
422 Kernberg (1995). 
423 ibid p 26. 
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So in psychodynamic terms, the sexual object is always, in essence, an 
oedipal object, and the sexual act is a symbolic repetition and overcoming of 
the primal scene. The wish is to be the triumphant, preferred, unique and 
exclusive love object of one’s sexual partner.  
 
Apart from these three very immediate components of erotic passion, there is 
perhaps a background process of idealisation. As Chasseguet-Smirgel 424 
suggests, the state of being in love enriches the self and increases the 
libidinal investment in the self because it fulfils an ideal state of self and 
because the relation of the exalted self to the object at that point reproduces 
the optimum relations between the self and the ego ideal. 
 
All this is driven, from the earliest sexual encounters, by the oedipal 
longings in children, the unspoken feeling of an exciting, forbidden and 
gratifying relationship that links the parents and correspondingly excludes 
the child. Because of this childish longing about forbidden knowledge, envy, 
jealousy and curiosity maintain the active search for the idealised oedipal 
object. Later, in mature sexual love, the early idealisations of the body of the 
loved other, and the later idealizations of the total person of the other, evolve 
into the idealisation of the value systems of the love object – an idealisation 
of ethical, cultural, and aesthetic values – a development that engenders the 
capacity for romantic falling and staying in love. Thus sexual passion spills 
over into the whole of a couple’s relationship - into the sexual, object 
relations, ethical and cultural spheres. In passion, self-love and object love 
fuse: 'I sexually love you because in so many ways you are like me.'  
 
So how can we relate all of this to Kierkegaard’s views on erotic love as 
selfish love? In the sense that he writes about erotic love, he is correct: 
sexual love is highly preferential. It is, au fond, highly selfish. Of course it is. 
How could it be otherwise, the object relations theorist would ask? It is 
about overcoming our own personal oedipal conflicts through involvement 
with one significant other onto whom we project unresolved issues with the 
hope of resolving them. The process of resolution is highly personal, 
                                                
424 Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985) p 38.  
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exclusive, is certainly preferential, and carries the highest possible risk to 
the self. We cannot normally complete this process with other than one 
person at a time (although we can, it would seem from the divorce rates, 
attempt this process repeatedly sequentially).  
 
Why does erotic desire involve profound risk? Passion is about crossing 
boundaries. The most important boundaries crossed in sexual passion are 
those of the self. The process of merger with the other also replicates and 
regenerates, however unconsciously, the forceful penetration of that 
dangerous interior of the other’s body (actually of mother’s body) as 
described by Klein; we are in the realm of primitive projected aggression. 
Merger is therefore a risky and dangerous venture that can only succeed if 
the basic emotions are erotic excitement and trust rather than aggression 
and fear. If it fails, if aggression wins over the erotic, then either we destroy 
the beloved or are ourselves thereby destroyed. So sexual passion involves 
the courage to trust the self in a desired union with the ideal other in the 
face of unconscious but once-terrifying dangers. As Kernberg succinctly 
describes things: 
The beloved presents themselves as a body which can be penetrated 
and a consciousness which is impenetrable. 425 
 
To put this another way, the contradiction of love is that desire aspires to be 
fulfilled by the destruction of the desired object, and love discovers that this 
object is indestructible and cannot be substituted.  
 
There are, I suggest, two obvious points. First, erotic passion with a 
preferred other is a great part of what makes us both human, and complete 
as a human. According to object relations theory, erotic desire is both 
generated by and is the resolution of issues (oedipal issues) that affect every 
person. To deny the erotic is thus to deny humanity. And secondly, many 
would argue that it is only through the validating process of erotic love with 
a preferential other that we have the internal strength, completeness and 
ability to love others. Without the sense of authentic self and independence 
that comes with oedipal resolution, we cannot properly take our place in the 
                                                
425 Kernberg (1995) p44. 
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world, we cannot thereby love others for themselves, for their alterity. For 
without an oedipal resolution, we continue to love, in however slight a way, 
the oedipal object in everyone we meet, and in this sense, Elskov precedes 
Kjerlighed. 
 
There is no easy reading of Kierkegaard’s analysis of sexual preferential love. 
For one who complains about the lack of passion in general in life, 
Kierkegaard is remarkably demure about sexual passion. His views on the 
married state are perhaps best expressed in Either/Or part II, where the 
interminable words of the estimable Judge convey a tale of a marriage of 
some boredom, some complacency, and an apparent lack of any kind of 
desire. Kierkegaard’s views on lust may perhaps best be summed up in the 
Diary of a Seducer, which has previously been discussed. Whatever the 
psychology of this seducer, his actual sexual passion would seem to be 
minimal. So we are left with Hall’s question about fear of intimacy and 
George’s observation about sour grapes. Object relations links the one to the 
other, suggesting that Kierkegaard’s profound and narcissistic fear of failure 
in intimacy brought about his arrogant denial of the importance of the erotic 
in life.   
 
 
8.4 Narcissistic Abstraction as the Denial of Alterity 
 
In Works of Love, Kiekegaard talks about many aspects of our relationships 
with the other, with ‘you’. He writes of our duty to love the other, he 
considers the needs of the other, and talks especially of the importance of 
God in any kind of relationship. I propose to coalesce these into a 
consideration of the psychological role and status of the other, of ‘you’, in 
Kierkegaard’s ethic. 
 
It was suggested above that the narcissistic Kierkegaard had a very poor 
view of other selves, stemming from a parallel troubled view of his own self. 
What is evident is the narcissistic fury at other selves having significant 
others apart from him, indeed having significance that does not depend 
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upon him. The contradiction in his both supporting and denigrating love is, I 
suggest, a result of two opposing object relations processes. His discussion 
of erotic love is both an omnipotent and furious response to the existence of 
significant others that do not include himself, as well as an unconscious 
plea that he be loved even though he is not significant to others. 
 
In this section I try to indicate how the angry and omnipotent half of 
narcissistic Kierkegaard needs to go further, to denigrate the very concept of 
the other. For as we have seen from a consideration of theory, if others can 
no longer serve the maintenance of the narcissistic self, what reason do they 
have to exist? In Works of Love, Kierkegaard comes close to denying the 
value and virtue of existence of the real other, the real ‘you’. Despite 
appearances to the contrary, the ‘you’ that is derived from Kierkegaard’s 
ethic is a devalued ‘you’, and his motives for this devaluation are 
narcissistic. To achieve this, I want to consider in detail what is perhaps the 
most poignant of all the sections in Works of Love: Discourse IX ‘The Work of 
Love in Recollecting One Who Is Dead’. This has been the subject of intense 
debate. 426 I have mentioned the Hong’s contention that this section is 
prompted by a meditation on the death of his parents. What is odd is that 
Kierkegaard raises to such an extent the virtue of loving in this way. 
Certainly, object relations theory would have exceptional difficulties with 
most of his claims:   
Truly if you want to ascertain what love there is in you or in another 
person, then pay attention to how he relates himself to one who is 
dead.’ (WL p 347) 
 
The work of love in recollecting one who is dead is a work of the most 
unselfish love. (WL p 349) 
 
His logic revolves around the fact that those who are dead cannot change, 
therefore love of the dead is the most faithful and unchanging love; and that 
in loving those who are dead, one cannot expect any kind of repayment. 
You cannot say that the one who is dead has grown older, become 
colder, become more ugly or become involved with others. 427 
 
                                                
426 see Ferreira (1999); see also Keeley (1999). 
427 WL p 356-7. 
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The work of love in recollecting one who is dead is a work of the most 
faithful love. 428 
 
And  
When one wants to be sure that love is unselfish, one can of course 
remove every possibility of repayment. But this is exactly what is 
removed in the relationship to one who is dead. If love still abides, 
then it is truly unselfish. 429 
 
This is a most naïve and psychologically simple account of our relationships 
with those who have recently died. For one proclaimed as a master 
psychologist, Kierkegaard’s insights in this section would appear to be 
superficial. The process of living though the death of a loved one has been 
explored by many 430, and object relations theory has its own views. 431  
 
The section is both poignant and remarkable, however, for its insistence of 
the lack of the real other in relationships.  Kierkegaard suggests: ‘If one 
wishes to observe a person, it is very important for the sake of that 
observation that one, in seeing him in a relationship, look at him alone’ (WL 
p 347). Clearly, object relations would claim the very opposite is true. It is 
only through relationships, both objective in the external world, and 
subjective in the internal world, that we exist as meaningful human beings, 
that we are defined, that we can comprehend and be comprehended. 
Kierkegaard does not accept the view that selves are defined though others, 
that the ‘I’ is ultimately bound up with the ‘You’. Nowhere is his denial of 
relationships more clearly exemplified than in the paragraph where he 
speaks of two essentially interpersonal processes – boxing and dancing. He 
says:  
If you could manage to see someone shadow-boxing in dead earnest, 
or of you could prevail upon a dancer to dance solo the dance he 
customarily dances with another, you would be able to observe his 
motions best, better than if he were boxing with another actual 
person or if he were dancing with another actual person. 432 
 
                                                
428 KW WL p 355. 
429 WL p 349. 
430 ‘A Grief Observed’ by C S Lewis remains a masterpiece of self-observation and 
analysis.  
431 See Kernberg (1985) Ch 7. 
432 WL p 347. 
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Here, Kierkegaard chooses two social activities linked to the two most 
fundamental drives – the first emphasising the aggression in all of us, and 
the second symbolising the erotic in all of us. Both aggression and eroticism 
are fundamentally directed towards an other, whether real or imaginary. 
Neither of them works without the other, except in pathological situations. 
To deny the other in these two most essential social activities is to court the 
surreal. The ‘Work of Boxing’ is about hurting, punishing, damaging, even 
murdering the other, just as Klein suggests. The ‘Work of Dancing’, in 
Western cultures at least, is about erotically touching the other, about 
forbidden feelings, sensual caresses, the breaking of taboos. 433  
 
Recollecting one who is dead is, above all, about loss, and I suspect the loss 
for Kierkegaard at this time in his life is truly terrible, and loss’s pain 
immense and unremitting. He is now having to come to terms with all the 
losses of nearly forty years at much the same moment: the narcissistic 
injury from childhood; the loss, never mentioned, of Mother; the family 
members who died; the death of Father, so complex and never properly 
talked about; the loss of something that never was - marriage, the loss of his 
early brilliance at the hands of an unforgiving society; the loss of pride, 
dignity and his own sense of goodness at the hands of the intelligentsia; the 
loss of his so carefully nurtured omnipotent and grandiose self, a self that 
remained his sole comfort for much of his adult life – all these condense into 
this small section on Recollecting One Who is Dead. What has died is the 
original narcissistic Kierkegaard, ‘the fork’, that brilliant youth, that object of 
self-idolatry. His grief is very profound and very moving. His immensely real 
and deep pain is there in much of this text, but this section is a distillation 
of his sorrow.  
 
In the first part of the text, Kierkegaard attacked and marginalized the ‘I’ in 
relationships, especially erotic relationships. He demanded that the erotic be 
subjugated to neighbour love, that there is no place for preferential love, that 
                                                
433 I am aware that it was later in the 19th century that the more outrageous forms of 
bodily contact while dancing came into being in middle and upper class society. But 
that does not detract from the manifestly erotic process of dancing, even in a formal 
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the only love is spirit. Later he attacks the other half, the ‘You’ in the 
relationship. He systematically dismantles anything that can make the ‘You’ 
concrete. We are not to look at our neighbour; we are not to note differences; 
we are to love them regardless of what they are like. We are not to give them 
any cause to thank us for our love; indeed our love should be unnoticeable. 
We are not to concern ourselves with ameliorating their plight or misery or 
changing their station. And we must recognise that it is not them that we 
love, but God. It can be no surprise that critics have alighted upon these 
themes to question the very nature of Kierkegaard’s view of the other. This 
does sound like, as Adorno puts it, a general principle of otherness, a 
universal human. This is a denial and a stripping out of all that makes the 
individual special. Ferriera has to admit that Kierkegaard is in danger of 
exchanging the blindness of self-love of the other for an equally unloving 
blindness to the other. But this is Kierkegaard at his most uncompromising, 
and most direct: 
The neighbour is the common watermark, you see it only by means of 
eternity’s light when it shines through the dissimilarities.  434 
 
The key question in coming to terms with Works of Love is: what kind of 
ethic, or rather in what tradition of ethics does Kierkegaard write? Is this no 
more than a restatement of the Reformation ethic of self-sacrificial love, or 
has he added more? Is the text, as Ferriera asks, 'an example of an ethic 
that promotes neighbour love as unilateral, self-denying, impartial, and 
disinterested’ ? 435  Her answer is ambivalent; but there is less ambivalence 
about Kiekegaard’s psychological intention: much of the thrust of Works of 
Love is about demeaning the individual, out of revenge and out of rage, 
stemming from both his own failure to live up to exaggerated expectations 
primarily of his father, and his own demeaning at the hands of, principally, 
The Corsair. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
situation – the whole point about dancing with a partner was to observe the body of 
the other, with all the responses and fantasies that follow. 
434 WL p 89. 
435 Ferreira (2001) p 256. 
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8.5 Conclusion 
 
So what does happen when we read Works of Love? This is much more 
complicated than reading Fear and Trembling. The earlier text calls out to 
the narcissist in all of us, the omnipotent, grandiose narcissist that Kohut 
tells us is a remnant of everyone’s normal development. Kohut describes 
exactly the situation in which Søren Kierkegaard found himself in 1847 
when writing Works of Love. Kohut speaks of the 
guiltless despair of those who in late middle age discover that the 
basic patterns of their self as laid down in their nuclear ambitions 
and ideals have not been realised. 
 
And he speaks of a time 
of utter hopelessness, for some utter lethargy, of the depression 
without guilt and self-directed aggression, which overtake those who 
feel they have failed and cannot remedy the failure in the time and 
with the energies  still at their disposal. The suicides of this period are 
not the expression of a punitive super-ego, but a remedial act – the 
wish to wipe out the unbearable sense of mortification and nameless 
shame imposed by the ultimate recognition of a failure of all 
encompassing magnitude. 436 
 
In Chapter Six I argued that Kierkegaard’s willed and wanton involvement 
with The Corsair was, at one level, akin to an act of suicide. Though no one 
could accuse Kierkegaard of lethargy as far as his writing was concerned, I 
contend that Works of Love is a most personal statement about 
Kierkegaard’s own sense of failure. We have come a long way from Fear and 
Trembling, with its implied carefree grandiosity. This was narcissistic 
Kierkegaard at his most optimistic. Quite where Fear and Trembling was to 
lead was uncertain, but we have in that text and about that time an 
enormous self-confidence, arrogance and sense of power. Along with King 
Lear, he might have said: ‘I will do such things – What they are I know not – 
but they shall be the terror of the earth.’ 
 
But after the Corsair we have shame, a recognition that despite all the 
words, all the efforts, there remains the narcissistic void in his life. Works of 
Love is therefore a taking stock, a coming to terms with this loss. It is a work 
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of grief, and full and irreducible dismissing of all that it is to be human. Both 
the ‘I’ and the ‘You’ are systematically destroyed. The only hope Kierkegaard 
has of any relationship is with God, and I have to suggest that for Søren 
Kierkegaard at this time, God is a true projected omnipotent other, Kohut’s 
idealised imago, the one other that will truly mirror Kierkegaard’s own 
greatness. 
 
When we read Works of Love I suggest there are two responses, that actually 
reflect the responses discussed at the very start of this chapter. For some, 
whose abnormal narcissism is effectively neutralised, Kierkegaard’s claims 
verge on the outrageous and bizarre. The man is talking nonsense. 
Logstrup’s long Polemical Epilogue sums up the complaint: 
‘As far as Kierkegaard is concerned, he regards the attitudes 
comprised in a zest for life as incompatible with the relationship with 
God because they cannot at the same time capture the mind.’ 437 
 
Those for whom narcissism has receded as a major driving force in life are 
free (although perhaps only freer) to engage with life, to enjoy life, to find 
fulfilment in life. This is not to deny God, but it is to live whatever ethic 
follows from faith, to live that ethic through life as it is encountered. 
Logstup’s complaint is that Kierkegaard’s ethic requires us to withdraw from 
life, or at least to lead life in what he sees as an unnatural way – ‘loving 
everybody as if they were dead’. Kierkegaard’s ethic demands a wholescale 
denial of much of what it is to be human. For those with healthy narcissism, 
reading Works of Love is in part reading the work of an arrogant and 
obnoxious writer: empathy or congruence with Kierkegaard’s unreasonable 
demands is difficult to the point of being impossible. And pointless: why live 
life like this?  
 
And this very writing still triggers resentment from the residual narcissist in 
even the most healthy. ‘I have had to deal with my narcissism, why cannot 
he?’ is a wholly unspoken, even wholly unformulated thought. But if the 
unconscious speaks to the unconscious, as Freud proposed, much of the 
vitriol to be found against this text may well stem from such a sense of 
                                                                                                                                       
436 Kohut (1977) p 238-241.  
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grievance.  Eventually, as every psychotherapist learns with every narcissist, 
there is a sense of wanting to give up and abandon this most difficult and 
persistent of conditions. One tries to make sense of what is said or read, but 
one cannot. Every counter is met by more excessive claims; every attempt at 
compromise is met with yet more unreasonable demands. McWilliams, 
speaking from the heart as a practicing psychotherapist, says of the process 
of treating narcissists: 
Treatment of narcissistic clients feel qualitatively different from what 
one is used to with most other kinds of people…. Therapists receive 
devaluing transferences as well as idealising ones. If it is any 
consolation for the misery one endures at being the object of subtle 
and relentless disparagement, being the recipient of idealising 
transference is not much better. Extreme drowsiness is perhaps the 
most unpleasant of the countertransference reactions to narcissistic 
patients. Above all, to treat narcissists, one needs infinite patience; it 
is a permanent temptation to give up on them. 438 
 
The critics of Works of Love have done just that. 
 
But for the reader whose normal or abnormal narcissism has not been 
properly resolved, Kierkegaard speaks to us through the ether in a very 
different way. He awakens in all of us our narcissistic self-pity, our outrage 
at the failure of others to maintain our narcissistic supply. His writings in 
Works of Love make sense. We engage with him in his denials and his 
rewriting of human nature. The shame that Kierkegaards feels, and the 
contempt thus generated for humanity, become our shame and our 
contempt. Through projective identification, he displaces his own shame and 
humiliation, and we hear it and accept it. He projects, and, if the state of our 
narcissism is conducive, we identify. In this way, such narcissists can see 
the sense in what he writes. For them, his is a difficult ethic, it might be an 
impossible ethic, but that does not mean we should not attempt to live it. 
Kierkegaard’s ethic does require humankind to be different, and the 
unresolved narcissist in all of us agrees that humankind should be different, 
loving me regardless, never loving others more, not taking account of my 
failures or errors. Kierkegaard is right - it is your duty to love me.
                                                                                                                                       
437 Logstrup (1997) p 240. 
438 McWilliams (1994) p 178-9. 
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9. Narcissistic Influences in The Sickness Unto Death 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I want first to appraise the text itself, and briefly review 
some of the responses it has generated. I do this to gather evidence for my 
thesis that narcissistic texts bring about narcissistic responses. Second, I 
consider the text from an object relations point of view. Thus seen, it stands 
or falls on the idea of the self accounting for itself, relating to itself, and to 
the Other. Inherent in this is the assumption that the self is unitary, 
singular, at least known – available to itself, whether or not, as Kierkegaard 
demands, it relates to itself. I look at evidence that mitigates against such a 
simple reading of the concept of the self, considering the self from a post-
Freudian point of view. It seems undeniable that the idea of the self has 
become a highly complex one in the century since Freud, and I examine 
what this term, this concept, has come to mean. I examine the pertinent 
comments from Donald Winnicott. The psychodynamic problems that are 
inherent in The Sickness Unto Death now come into relief, for if the self is a 
more complex and less certain a concept than Kierkegaard suggests, what 
are we to make of his text? Essentially, this text is Kierkegaard at his most 
revealing. With age, some of the intensity of narcissism is modified, and self-
awareness becomes apparent. I discuss towards the end of the Chapter some 
of the insight that Kierkegaard may well have been experiencing at this time 
about his own psychology. 
 
This is a text of late narcissism, when the initial fury at the failure of the 
narcissistic project has receded, when depression is taking hold, but when 
there remains the need to reassert narcissistic ideals. This is an instructive 
text, literally a text-book, telling us how we ought to behave, in the way the 
author knows to be right. Against apparently massive disconfirmation, 
Kierkegaard tells us that there are only two ways to live a life: in sin and 
despair, or with God. There is no middle road, no other option, no 
alternative. Against what would almost certainly be a rejection of such an 
unforgiving demand, Kierkegaard none the less writes his instruction 
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manual. This is by no means a pseudonymous text: this is an authoritarian 
‘how-to’ compendium. I conclude that this is a narcissistic text, again, and 
that our response to it is both a response to what Kierkegaard has written as 
well as a reflection on where we have each arrived in terms of our personal 
narcissism.   
 
The Sickness Unto Death is authored by one Anti-Climacus, 439 although 
there is broad agreement that this is not really a pseudonymous text, and 
many commentators dispense with the courtesy requested by Kierkegaard of 
assigning ideas to the pseudonymous authors, and not to him. 440 
 
SUD begins with what is probably the most famous of all Kierkegaard’s 
dense passages – about the self relating itself to itself. Whether or not the 
opening section, or even the whole text, really was written to mock Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit or Martenen’ s contemporaneously published 
Christian Dogmatics as many suggest, 441 remains a matter for conjecture. 
Actually, the abstraction present in those opening ninety-seven words in the 
Hong translation is nothing more than extreme efficiency. Once the ideas are 
unpacked, the section remains a model of conciseness. There is simply no 
more precise way of saying what Kierkegaard wants to say. Somewhat like 
attempting to paraphrase Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, one realises there is 
really very little point.  
 
It is the unpacking that is the problem, if only because the opening section 
of the text is stuffed with ideas, each of considerable weight and import. 
There are at least six, and it is worth spelling them out. 
 
In the first two pages of SUD, we have a definition of the self. The primary 
attribute of the self is that it is a synthesis of bipolars: ‘the finite and the 
infinite, temporal and eternal, freedom and necessity’.442 Second we have the 
fact that the self is self-relating, that it is not just a mixture as it were of 
                                                
439 see the Hong's Introduction to SUD for the relationship between Kierkegaard, 
Climicus and Anti-Climacus. 
440 For a detailed discussion of the exact status of Anti-Climacus, see Crites (1992). 
441 See for example Hannay (1987) and Kirmmse (1981). 
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chemical compounds, but can reflect upon itself, the ‘relation that relates 
itself to itself’. And third, the self is dependent upon, and can only be itself, 
through a relationship with God: ‘a derived established relation, a relation 
that …in relating itself to itself relates to another’. The Sickness unto Death 
is another name for a lack of faith – Despair, in fact, which in Part Two is 
called Sin. So the remaining concepts in the first part of the text explore the 
degrees or presentations of despair. The fourth concept presented by Anti-
Climacus is despair as a misrelation of the components of the self, with the 
bipolar elements being in incorrect balance (too much finitude or too little 
necessity, etc). Fifth, we have despair as self-awareness and defiance. Finally 
(a topic that takes up much of Part Two) we have the true understanding of 
despair as sin, a refusal of the relating self to relate itself to God. The 
opposite of sin is not virtue, but faith, and the self who attains faith comes 
to a state in which ‘in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self 
rests transparently in the power that established it’. 443 
 
Much of the text is a filling out of these condensed ideas. Indeed, on one 
reading, apart from the initial pages, this is another of Kierkegaard’s long 
lists of human behaviours, with notes on the psychological process that 
underpin them. It is, as in Fear and Trembling, an incomplete glossary. Some 
of the bipolars, for example, he appears to like, and other to shun. So we 
have a great deal on finitude and infinitude, something on possibility and 
freedom, but precious little on the temporal and eternal. (Arguably Either/Or 
fulfilled that: the story of A in Part I of E/O paints a defining picture of 
someone who has failed, totally, to come to terms with any of the three 
bipolars.) 
 
True to form, Kierkegaard’s language can be confusing, for example in 
sentences such as ‘the self not willing to be itself’. He seems to have several 
meanings in mind for the word ‘self’ – the actual self as is; the higher or 
potential self that could and should be; and a denied self. I shall consider 
                                                                                                                                       
442 SUD pp 13-14. 
443 SUD p14. 
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this confusion below. But let me first consider the important first section of 
The Sickness Unto Death. 444  
 
The three levels of intensification of despair correspond to the three levels of 
increasing complexity within one’s consciousness of the structure of the self. 
At the lowest level is spiritlessness, at the next level is weakness, and at the 
highest is defiance. Kierkegaard is keen to give real world examples of his 
taxonomy. So he speaks at some length of the bourgeois philistine as 
representing the spiritless form of despair. Interestingly he singles out the 
comfortable urban middle class, rather than the poor or the ordinary, as 
typical of this lack of spirit. The middle type of despair he summarises 
through the contemplative Christian, one who acts in every way, from an 
outside point of view, as a caring, thinking respectable Christian, but who 
has real doubts about the message of Christendom: ‘He goes to church very 
rarely, because it seems to him that most of the priests don’t know what 
they are talking about.’ 445 For the highest level of despair, Kierkegaard gives 
us no social types or examples: this is a much more abstract concept. 
 
It is, of course, considerably more complex than that, and many varieties of 
despair can be found in the long section between pages 42 and 74, and their 
phenomenology can be summarised by degree.  
 
At the lowest level of despair, the person certainly does not feel despair, but 
lives a life of pure immediacy, with a lack of self-consciousness, and 
unaware of any need to reflect upon himself or his life. Kierkegaard would 
suggest that such a person is still in despair (although that must be a 
philosophical or logical use of the term rather than anything 
phenomenological). At the next level of despair, a life event can occur such 
that our seemingly oblivious person is required to reflect upon their life and 
themselves. Kierkegaard suggests there are two outcomes from such an 
event: to wish that the life event had never happened, or to wish that one 
was somebody else, someone less affected or troubled by the event. At the 
                                                
444 pages 13 to 74 in the Hong translation. 
445 ibid p 175. 
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next level of despair, this single event can precipitate reflections about life in 
general, precipitate self-reflection as a way of being.   
 
So these first three levels involve no more than reflection or its lack – there is 
no imperative for action, whether physical or psychical, no recognition of a 
need to change. But at the fourth level, our subject despairs over life in 
general, and insists that he can himself remedy the despair, that self-help is 
the road to salvation, that there is no need to invoke the eternal. Note that 
this is in no sense a defiance – the subject is essentially unaware that the 
eternal has a role to play in overcoming despair. At the fifth level of despair, 
by contrast, our subject may well understand that the road to salvation is 
through the eternal; but for whatever reason he cannot accept this truth, 
and despairs over his weakness and failure to live up to what he knows is 
the truth. Sixth, our same subject may despair at his own weakness and 
inability, and replace this with pride and self-reliance, such that he denies 
his weakness. Then finally we have Kierkegaard’s demonical defiant despair, 
in which, in fury, the subject would rather be the imperfect creature he is 
than submit to the will of the eternal. 
 
This is long and subtle list. But there is a troubling conclusion to all of this 
analysis. For Kierkegaard, there is only one real despair, and that can only 
be known by overcoming it. So the only people who really understand 
despair are those no longer in despair. This may turn out to be a 
surprisingly small number of souls.  
 
Finally in this exposition, mention must be made of the difficult long 
footnote 446 in which Kierkegaard seems to view women as a different species 
in terms of having independent selves. As Stephen Crites puts it, it is as if a 
radio announcer ‘had interposed a few strains of Waltzing Matilda over a 
recording of the Mozart Requiem.’ 447 Sylvia Walsh 448 presents an heroic 
defence of Kierkegaard’s notorious footnote, although, as she concludes, 
several aspects of Kierkegaard’s analysis remain unsatisfactory: it 
                                                
446 ibid p 49-50. 
447 Crites (1992) p 144. 
448 Walsh (1987) p 134.  
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accentuates stereotyped views; it ignores external influences; it does not take 
adequate account of interpersonal relationships in the formation of the self, 
particularly for female development 449; and Kierkegaard’s notion of feminine 
devotedness involves a form of submissiveness which itself is the basis for 
male dominance. 
 
This thesis is not in any way a feminist critique of The Sickness Unto Death, 
but it goes without saying that male narcissists typically have a no more 
honest view of women than they do of the human race in general. Their 
object relations turn real people into good and bad objects. It is tempting to 
conclude that Søren Kierkegaard is revealing something of what kind of 
objects women are for him. 
 
 
9.2 Reception 
 
The text has had a mixed reception. In terms of contemporary scholarship, it 
is undoubtedly revered and respected. It has been called a work of 
‘vertiginous abstraction’, 450 ‘Kierkegaard’s most perfect book’, 451  ‘The first 
text by a clinical psychologist’ 452. I want to suggest that the book, far from 
being perfect, contains large elements of narcissism, pointing to the first 
steps on the path that will lead Kierkegaard metaphorically back to the 
monastery; and that while this may be a text on psychopathological 
taxonomy, it is an inhuman, asocial, somewhat punishing treatise on 
human redemption, and certainly the opposite of what clinical psychology 
might set out to achieve. 
 
Nonetheless, it has acted as, and continues to be, inspiration for a very 
considerable number of essays, though it lacks popularity as the basis for 
book-length analyses. There is a rich and immensely varied set of 
interpretations of this ‘psychological’ text. (And if any evidence were needed 
                                                
449 when considered from the point of view of neuropsychological, neurohormonal 
and neuroanatomical suggestions; see Schore (1990). 
450 Rudd (1993) p 21.  
451 Kirmmse (1981) p 167. 
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of the thesis that a text written by a narcissist touches the narcissism in the 
reader, the range of psychological speculation to be found in this set of 
essays surely makes the point. Kierkegaard's very economy in the text 
makes it a veritable Rorschach ink blot, with interpretations - as is always 
true with the Rorschach - ranging from the dubious to the fabulous.) 
 
Vincent McCarthy’s 1978 study 453 on Kierkegaard’s four primary moods is 
both a careful explanation of the ideas surrounding Kierkegaard’s use of the 
term despair, and a reminder of the difficulties of working with translations. 
‘Despair’ is the Hong’s translation of Fortvivlelse, a word with roots implying 
both doubt and a twinning or two-ness, a double-doubt, as it were. Simple 
doubt is a philosophical concept; despair is about existence. As McCarthy 
puts it: ‘The sickness of despair is the state of being cut off from the future, 
from possibility. Without a future one is self-condemned to an ever repeating 
present.’ 454  
 
Stephen Crites 455 also has problems with the translation, just five words in, 
questioning the Hong’s use of the indefinite article in ‘a human being is spirit’ 
as opposed to the narrower Danish meaning of ‘the human being’ or just 
‘human being’. 456 Crites is proposing that there is an essentially social 
reading of SUD, and that the self relating to itself can be an individual, but 
could also be ‘a pair of lovers, or a family, or a sisterhood, or a string 
quartet, or a labour union.’ 457 And ‘strictly as defined, the self is 
intersubjective, social, and an individual human being can be a self relation 
only because he or she can also be related to others.’ 458 I am not sure that 
any such interpretation is in the spirit of Anti-Climacus, or Kierkegaard for 
that matter. Further, not only is such a reading difficult to discern in the 
text, it is inventing a social aspect of SUD that I suspect Kierkegaard would 
have hated.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
452 Westphal (1987). 
453 McCarthy (1978). 
454 ibid p 85-6. 
455 Crites (1992).  
456 ibid p 149. 
457 ibid p 150. 
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In order to make sense of the expository passage in Part C of SUD, Crites, 
who is sure that SUD can be read as a text on clinical psychology, 
introduces the two notions of the given self and the potentiated self: the 
former is historically who we are, the latter ‘is the…..self that has faith in the 
divine horizon of possibility.’ 459 And critically, ‘for the potentiated self to 
materialise in faith, the given self must be acknowledged.’  460 This is all 
reminiscent of the early Freud, with its archaeological metaphors. There is a 
real but damaged ( = repressed) self, and there is a potentiated ( = healed 
through psychoanalysis) self; the trick is to get from the first to the second, 
when all will be well. This is but one example of attempts to meld recent 
psychology (or more usually psychoanalysis) with Kierkegaard’s psychology, 
and I would suggest that often these attempts end up as exercises in 
psychodynamic confusion. 
 
C Stephen Evans provides another such essay. His writing on Kierkegaard’s 
view of the unconscious 461 is surely guilty of sloppy scholarship 462 if not 
confused thinking. 463 Evans’ thesis is that there is a correspondence 
between contemporary psychoanalytic theory and despair as described in 
SUD. He likens the despair caused by an unwillingness to be oneself to the 
primary splitting process described by Melanie Klein. 464  
 
‘Of course the psychoanalytic thinker sees the faulty relationships to 
be primarily with the care-giver, while, as we have seen, Kierkegaard 
                                                                                                                                       
458 ibid p 150. 
459 ibid p 156. 
460 ibid p 156. 
461 Evans (1995) . 
462 for example ‘Object Relations Theory is a form of psychoanalysis developed in 
England by W.D Fairbairn.’ (ibid p 80). Leaving aside the fact that Fairbairn was 
born, raised and worked (apart from a two year stint) his entire life in Edinburgh in 
Scotland, rarely visiting that other country, it is a travesty to claim that one person 
could be responsible for the British School of Object Relations theory.  
463 For example ‘The unconscious is what I choose not to recognise or intentionally fail 
to perceive.’ (ibid p78). At best this is confused thinking. In Freud’s topographical 
model, this is more or less what was meant by the pre-conscious (system pcs), but 
not the unconscious (system ucs). But the concept of repression caused Freud to 
redefine the unconscious, in order to answer the questions ‘who is the ‘I’ that 
chooses to repress material?’ Freud expressly developed his structural model exactly 
to account for the problem that in some sense we must be aware (although equally 
we must be completely unaware) of what we repress.  
464 Although he mistakenly attributes the concept to Fairbairn, and to Harry 
Guntrip, no less (ibid p 95). 
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focuses attention on the relation to God. Once we recognise however, 
that different [developmental or physiological] ages are involved here, 
there is no real contradiction between the two views.’ 465  
 
Evan's thesis would seem to ask as many questions as it answers. 466 I fear 
that such a line of thinking simply underlines the danger in ever trying to 
equate the process of psychotherapy with the process of finding salvation 467.  
 
Westphal is another psychologist with a mission: 'Kierkegaard's psychology 
is a clinical psychology.' 468  Westphal does actually consider in what modern 
sense Kierkegaard uses the term and concept ‘psychology’. He concludes it 
might be nearer to phenomenology. But he still sees a therapeutic process 
here: 'Its starting point is sickness; its goal diagnosis and healing', 469 a point 
of view with which I disagree, and which I discuss further below. And 
Westphal interprets Kierkegaard's view of the self as essentially a task, a 
process, of becoming a self-conscious freedom that asserts God as its 
ground. Despair and faith are the terms used to describe failure and success 
at this task.  
 
Roberts is a further psychological analyst, raising a topic he has discussed 
anon - the exact phenomenological status of despair. Is it an emotion? What 
is an emotion? Can it be enacted (as in: I will make myself angry) or is an 
emotion by definition only passive. 470 Kierkegaard has it that despair is 
always conscious, even if we are not particularly aware of it: 'The ever 
increasing intensity of despair depends upon the degree of consciousness or 
is proportionate to its increase' (SUD p 42). But if we do not feel in despair, 
can we be in despair? 
 
                                                
465 ibid p 94. 
466 For example, Klein's point is that the splitting of the integral person (mother) is 
into good and bad objects. Does Evans believe that God is a similarly split object for 
each of us? Is object constancy therefore equal to the avoidance of sin? 
467 See Appendix II. 
468 Westphal (1987) p 40.  
469 ibid p 40. 
470 For a discussion of emotions as seen by Kierkegaard, see Roberts (1985), 
especially the section on The Anxiety of Possibility, p 135.  
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Others have written about both the sociological ideas within the text. 
Kirmmse (1981) links the publications and concepts of SUD with the 
revolutions across Europe in 1848. The work, as Kirmmse points out, was 
written during the first five months of 1848, and published a year later. He 
views it as a refutation of the rise and writing of H. L. Martensen, ‘a brilliant 
and suave intellectual’ 471 who became the protégée of both Bishop Mynster 
and the playwright Johan Heiberg, pillars both of the Golden Age 
establishment, representing the Church and Culture respectively. (The vitriol 
that Kierkegaard displays in the text has been discussed in the previous 
biographical chapter. A psychodynamic reading of SUD reveals intense envy 
and fury about Martensen, along with his outrage that Copenhagen citizenry 
will not see the truth he proclaims.) 
 
Alastair Hannay, sticking with the social aspects of SUD, suggests that the 
maieutic Kierkegaard is challenging his fellow citizens, who profess belief in 
Christendom, to reflect on what they are claiming. Just as Fear and 
Trembling challenges the local vicar and his sermon, Sickness unto Death 
demands that the good citizens of Copenhagen be shocked at the real 
demands of their faith. And, decontextualising this idea, we could equally 
employ Kierkegaard’s analysis to challenge current complacent agnosticism. 
472  
 
Edward Mooney gives a highly speculative account of SUD. His mode of 
explication is to use musical analogies and terminology. Thus he uses the 
idea of keys and tonal gravity (echoing Daniel Dennett’s idea 473 of self as a 
narrative centre of gravity); the idea of ensemble playing grounded in the 
music to be performed; and the idea of ensemble members as representing 
relations relating to themselves. 474 
 
While almost without exception commentators find, as has been seen, 
enormous depth and complexity with SUD, there is dissent. Peter Mehl has 
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given us a major critique of The Sickness unto Death in his recent text, 475 
although many of the ideas expressed can be found in at least two earlier 
papers. 476 Mehl’s avowedly pluralistic criticism is that Kierkegaard in SUD 
is too restrictive in his cure for despair. There are other ways of living a life 
that may not involve such strong mediation through spirit, and the author 
describes an authentic way of life that need not involve such strong 
evaluative identity. 
 
Haim Gordon has written against the simplicity of Kierkegaard’s monism of 
despair, 477 and his criticism deserves consideration. He points out that 
there are three implicit assumptions in SUD: despair is a universal sickness; 
Christian faith is the only panacea for despair; and the only way to reach 
this true faith is through eradicating despair. Gordon suggests that this is 
an unreal view of both the human condition and its resolution. 
 
Kierkegaard’s point, that one may not know one is in despair, just as in his 
analogy only a physician knows whether you are really sick, is highly 
contentious. At the least, Kierkegaard is asserting that there are only two 
ontological states for humankind - in Christian faith or in despair. This is 
bordering the fanatical, negating so much of human existence. And as many 
have suggested, Kierkegaard's definition of self is the definition of a recluse: 
neither others nor society are important, let alone crucial. To be sure, 
Kierkegaard spends some time negatively explaining how different groups in 
Copenhagen and Danish society are in different kinds of despair. But for the 
self to be in despair (according to the definition in SUD - p 30, for example) 
involves only two entities: the self and God.  
 
Gordon gives an alternative definition of despair:  
The consciousness of a person that he is in a situation in which he is 
unwilling or unable to live his freedom creatively in society and to act 
lovingly to other persons. 478  
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So Gordon's definition broadens Kierkegaard’s to include active love, 
creativity and joy. In that these are very human activities, any faith that 
ignores them can appear empty. Gordon further suggests that any faith that 
places such emphasis on sin can lead to a dehumanising spiral of despair. 
And this is the problem with SUD. Where are the positive examples? Where 
are the instances of active living, creativity or joy? As Walter Kaufman put it: 
Kierkegaard is often extremely perceptive when he deals with 
inauthenticity, but quite disappointing when he deals with 
authenticity. 479 
 
But, suggests Gordon, for much of human existence, the struggle of 
creativity, the intensity of loving and the sheer feeling of joy are themselves 
acts of faith through acts of spirit. The truth is that in becoming oneself, a 
person develops a relation to transcendence, to beauty, or to truth or to 
good, a relationship that may develop into a relationship to God. But there is 
not, in SUD, a single mention of a worldly endeavour that is itself worthy in 
itself. 
Worldly joy does not fit into Kierkegaard’s ontology of human 
existence primarily because his is not an action-oriented 
philosophy….his writing is a result of contemplation and intense 
internal suffering, and not of active experience with other persons in 
the world. He brings us to the very brink of acting, he suggests in very 
broad terms what should be done, but he does not acknowledge the 
dialectics of growing through doing in the world, or the joy of 
interaction with this specific person, or with a portion of nature, or 
with works of the spirit. 480 
 
These critics make an important corrective, and point to a theme that runs 
through Fear and Trembling and Works of Love as well as this presently 
considered text. Abraham doesn’t speak, interact with his wife or family; 
Kierkegaard demands that we love our neighbour abstractly; the only route 
to redemption is not through the world but through a personal relationship 
with God. So why does Kierkegaard shun the real world? The asocial charge, 
once again, seems justified. The charge of being acosmic is by no means 
inappropriate either; and the reason, as I have claimed before, is about 
narcissism. However, the key psychodynamic, the premise in SUD, the 
single assumed concept on which the text depends is that of the unitary self. 
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Kierkegaard’s corrective for despair is that the self comes to know itself, and 
in this knowing comes to know God. Is it that simple? Kierkegaard, in Part II 
of SUD, compares his analysis with that of the Greeks: 
The intellectuality of the Greeks was too happy, too naïve, too 
aesthetic, too ironic, too witty – too sinful – to grasp that anyone could 
knowingly not do the good, or knowingly, knowing what is right, do 
wrong. The Greek mind posits an intellectual imperative. 481 
 
But for Kierkegaard: 
This means that the Greek mind [says]: If a person does what is 
wrong, he has not understood what is right….Christianity begins in 
another way: man has to learn what is sin by a revelation from God; 
sin is not a matter of a person’s not having understood what is right 
but of his being unwilling to understand it, of his not willing what is 
right. 482 
 
This is fierce stuff, harsh even. And it begs a fundamental question about 
the nature of understanding, especially about the self. Is it that easy? Is it 
just a matter of effort and discipline? Do we fool ourselves about ourselves 
because of nothing more than sloth? Is there any possibility that for some 
people, or for some of the time, we truly do not, and cannot through our own 
effort, know ourselves? Is there a possibility that for some proportion of 
human existence, the self really cannot relate itself to itself?  To answer this 
we must turn to a further analysis of the concept of the self, and ask: can 
there be more than one self? 
 
 
9.3 The True and the False Self  
 
The distinction between the true and false self is generally ascribed to 
Donald Winnicott, although others, including Freud, had spoken of the 
much the same idea. Interest in such a distinction is by no means recent, 
and Baumeister 483 is one who has given an extended history. Thus, 
centuries before Freud, an interest in deception, pretence and mendacity 
was to be found in much of European literature and life; later, the Puritans, 
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for example, were concerned that they may be deceiving themselves about 
the veracity of their own virtues of good Christian living; and the Victorians 
notoriously repressed so much in their society. Much of the thinking about 
the self was linked to the only partially formed idea of the unconscious, and 
Whyte 484 has provided an excellent history of this concept up until Freud's 
time. So in one sense, Freud's thinking was no more than a culmination and 
focusing of ideas that had been around for half a millennium.  
 
Winnicott 485 points to Freud's distinction in his separation of id-based and 
ego-based processes. In principle, the primary and secondary processes 
could easily be thought of as the true and false selves respectively. Winnicott 
is also insistent that deeply regressed patients approach the same psychical 
situation as the neonate and its mother, and reveals that much of his 
theorising comes from his work with such patients as much as with babies. 
 
He gives us five grades of false self, from the most unhealthy to the most 
healthy (his terms). At worst, all one ever meets is the false self, it ‘runs’ the 
person, and the true self is completely hidden from the outside world. At a 
less extreme stage, the true self has a secret life, which is acknowledged, but 
the false self exists to defend this secret true self from any harm, aggression 
or annihilation. Here we have the possibility of psychological symptoms in 
the service of preservation of the true self. At another level, less damaged 
still, the false self exists to enable the true self to come into its own, to exist. 
So modes of existence are tried, until one is found that offers minimal threat 
to the true self. But, notes Winnicott, if such a safe way of being cannot be 
found, then in extremis the false self will do anything to preserve the true 
self. The logical limit is clinical suicide, where in order to protect the true 
self, the false self brings about the annihilation of the whole self. But in 
normal health, the false self is no more than that socialised side of our 
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selves, it exists to help us ‘avoid wearing our heart on our sleeve’, so that 
society may function. 
 
Midway through this paper, almost as an aside, are Winnicott’s thoughts on 
the mind as the false self. Winnicott puts the case so well, so efficiently, and 
in just two hundred words, that there is no point in trying to paraphrase it.  
When a false self becomes organised in an individual who has a high 
intellectual potential, there is a very strong tendency for the mind to 
become the location of the false self, and in this case there develops a 
dissociation between intellectual activity and psychosomatic 
existence.  
 
Where there has taken place this double abnormality, (i) the false self 
to hide the true self, and (ii) an attempt on the part of the individual 
to solve the personal problem by the use of a fine intellect, a clinical 
picture results which is peculiar in that it very easily deceives. 
 
The world may observe academic success of a high degree, and may 
find it hard to believe in the very real distress of the individual 
concerned, who feels ‘phoney’ the more he or she is successful. 486 
 
I surely cannot be alone in finding resonance with Søren Kierkegaard in 
these words. 
 
In terms of aetiology, Winnicott tells us that we are examining the stage of 
the first object relations. Again, he repeats, with emphasis: 
To get to a statement of the relevant development process, it is 
essential to take into account the mother’s behaviour and attitude, 
because in this field, dependence is real, and near absolute. It is not 
possible to state what takes place by reference to the child alone. 487 
 
Winnicott introduces his idea of the ‘good-enough mother’, the mother who 
repeatedly sees in her baby the gesture coming from the true self, sees the 
omnipotence contained, and to some extent makes sense of it. So the child’s 
ego is strengthened by the extent to which he is allowed to believe he has 
power in the world, and the extent to which his gestures, indications of the 
true self, are allowed existence and confirmation. The not good-enough 
mother, by contrast, cannot meet the child’s gesture, but substitutes her 
own, which is given viability by the compliance of the child. Here, at these 
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most tender moments, we have the origins of the false self and thereby of 
narcissism. The compliance of the child, forced by the lack of empathy from 
the mother to the gestures of the true self, results in the false self complying 
with the primary care giver. It stems from ‘the mother’s inability to sense her 
infant’s needs.’ 488 
 
So the true self only becomes real through the mother’s success in 
identifying and holding the omnipotence hallucinations of the child. If all 
goes well, the child begins to feel it controls the world, including and 
excluding its own self. And in due course, as the differentiation between the 
two accelerates, the child can, as Winnicott says, abrogate omnipotence, safe 
in the knowledge that the true self has spontaneity, and can engage with the 
real world. So the same symbol begins as an omnipotent hallucination, but 
ends as a real object onto which the child can cathect.  
 
But when the mother is not good enough, the child becomes ‘seduced into 
compliance’. The false self then builds a set of false relationships, although, 
depending on the severity, may still enjoy an apparently normal, though 
phenomenologically empty life. But the great purpose of the false self will 
have been achieved: it will be successful in hiding the true self. Winnicott 
concludes: 
Here is the origin of the true self, which cannot become a reality 
without the mother’s specialised relationship, one which might be 
described by a common word: devotion. 489 
 
And, when discussing the degrees of the false self, Winnicott comments, 
interestingly from the point of view of this thesis, that 
sometimes this false self defence can form the basis for a kind of 
sublimation, as when a child grows up to be an actor. In regard to 
actors, there are those who can be themselves and who also can act, 
whereas there are others who can only act, and who are completely at 
a loss when not in a role, and when not being appreciated or 
applauded (acknowledged as existing). 490 
 
And, importantly, both clinically and conceptually: 
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the analyst can only talk to the false self of the patients about the 
patient’s true self. It is as if a nurse brings a child, and at first the 
nurse discusses the child’s problem, and the child is not directly 
contacted. Analysis does not start until the nurse has left the child 
with the analyst, and the child has become able to remain alone with 
the analyst and has started to play. 491 
 
 
9.4 Is the Self Divided? 
 
So with these insights, can we speak of a unitary self, of the self really 
knowing the self? From a psychodynamic point of view, there would appear 
to be two distinct approaches to the concept of mind. The first is to view it as 
unitary, as continuous and as spatially layered. This view owes a great deal 
to Sigmund Freud. Both of his models (topographic and structural) were 
immediately viewed as Newtonian-type concepts. So the mind is a place 
where psychic events take place, and there are subdivisions of that place; it 
has a geography. Such a mental image obliges us then to consider whether 
the self has a core; it induces questions about the true and false parts of the 
self; it promotes the idea of uncovering or analysis in the archaeological 
sense. In many ways, as Ryle 492 pointed out very many years ago, Freud’s 
adoption of the historically ancient idea of a spatial metaphor for the mind is 
highly regrettable. But it has entered our consciousness, and it is difficult to 
ignore.  
 
However, this is not the only way of talking about the self. The other way of 
thinking about the mind is in terms of temporal metaphors, that are every 
bit as helpful and explanatory. Object Relations theory has at its heart the 
idea of a self formed through relationships, and these relationships evolve, 
change and develop. And each relationship can involve multiple selves – the 
self as child, as parent, as daughter or sister or mother. Stephen Mitchell 
summarises it: 
The object relations approach focuses on phenomenological units, the 
kind of person one experiences oneself as being when one does what 
one does with other people. These phenomenological units are 
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understood to derive either from how one felt with a significant other 
in a particular context, or from one’s sense of how it felt to be that 
other in relation to oneself. 493 
 
But these senses of separate and continuous selves are somehow smoothed 
into at least the illusion of a unitary, stable self.  
 
This personal sense of self is difficult to define; it is ineffable, and perhaps 
easier to sense than to describe. But this sense of self, the inner, most 
private self, is still defined through the other. Just as we can only see our 
physical self through a mirror reflection, so our true self comes into being 
only through relationships - pathological or healthy - with others. The idea of 
a real, true, inner, isolated self is, for Object Relations theory, an illusion. 
More and more the nervous system is viewed as being formed through social 
interaction rather than some physiological unfolding. 494 And as Mitchell 
puts it, self-definition necessarily implies the definition of others. By stating 
what I am, I am also stating what I am not, what separates me from others. 
‘I’ dialectically implies ‘you’. 
 
In summary then, much of recent psychoanalytic thinking has favoured the 
idea of a multiple self, ever changing and ever responding, a relationship 
based self. Object Relations theory demands that we avoid a reductionist 
model of the true self, that sees this self as essentially present at or before 
birth, and which unfolds aided or thwarted by interactions in the real world, 
a true self that is somehow prior to relating existence, a bud that turns to 
blossom. Rather we should consider all experience to be authentic or 
inauthentic, true to myself or not, even if there are multiple selves operating 
in differing way at any given time.  But authenticity or the lack of it does not 
refer to a resulting inner core or true self, frozen at some primitive age. 
Authenticity refers to congruence with the history of who I am, what I really 
feel and believe: 
I view the analytic process as one in which the analysand is created 
through an intersubjective process. ….Analysis is not simply a 
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process of uncovering the hidden; it is more importantly a process of 
creating an analytic subject who had not previously existed. 495 
 
 
In object relations theory terms, a self that relates only to itself is barely a 
self. A self develops through relating to objects - internal and external - and 
anyone who avoids the input of the external, who avoids, that is, the world, 
can become only the most impoverished self. Such a self is defined very 
carefully by Laing, 496 in his analysis of the splitting that comes about when 
ontological security fails to materialise to an adequate degree. Such a self 
relates only to itself, and lives in a world of fantasy. But this true self cannot 
encounter reality - only the false self can do that. So consequently, the true 
must eventually whither and perish, for the self needs the other in the real 
world to attest and affirm its existence. Hence Laing's existential analysis of 
the true and false self, not in a spatial, geographical or archaeological sense, 
but in terms of authentic knowing of the self and the other. With or without 
insight, Kierkegaard has postulated a true self that has little or no 
dependence (as he describes it) on external reality, save for relating to 
Kierkegaard's other, which, we learn, is God. 
 
 
9.5 Re-reading The Sickness Unto Death 
 
So what can we draw from this discussion of the true and false self?  Was 
Kierkegaard aware of their phenomenology? How practical, how realistically 
helpful, is his prescription for overcoming despair?  What does reading The 
Sickness Unto Death do to the reader? 
 
Young Søren was well aware, and from an early age, of the need to find the 
true self. Certainly, the Gellelelje letters contain the realisation that a person 
must ‘first learn to know himself before he can learn anything else.' 497 This 
Delphic injunction, however, is easier said than done, and perhaps one 
major achievement of the twentieth century was to demonstrate just what is 
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involved in fulfilling such an apparently simple dictum. But knowing one's 
self is at the heart of this text. Kierkegaard opens Part C of SUD, perhaps 
the most instructive part of his most perfect book, with a discussion on the 
role of consciousness in despair. It seems they are intimately linked, for:  
consciousness - that is, self-consciousness - is decisive with regard to 
the self. The more consciousness, the more self; the more 
consciousness, the more will; the more will, the more self.  498 
 
So something about the true self, and implications of living as a false self, 
are clearly present in Kierkegaard and in The Sickness Unto Death. And there 
is considerable psychological insight into the phenomenology of despair 
throughout SUD. Each of his layers of despair is exemplified with 
phenomenological descriptions. 
 
In his discussion early in the text of the first pair of bipolars, finitude and 
infinitude, there is to be found a good approximation of the ideas of the true 
and false self. When the emphasis is on the infinite, says Kierkegaard, the 
self lacks finitude, and he gives us examples of how this detracts from being 
a true self by indulging in the fantastic, in phantasy. Kierkegaard comments:  
The fantastic is generally that which leads a person out into the 
infinite in such a way that it only leads him away from himself and 
thereby prevents him coming back to himself. 499 
 
And:  
The self, then leads a fantasised existence in abstract infinitising or in 
abstract isolation, continually lacking its self, from which it only leads 
further and further away. 500 
 
And when speaking of the second bipolar, of too little necessity and too 
much possibility, Kierkegaard nicely predates Laing in his awareness of the 
attraction of fantasy over action: 'Thus possibility seems greater and greater 
to the self; more and more it becomes possible because nothing becomes 
actual.' 501 
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In the final description of despair Kierkegaard is at his most profound, and I 
suggest, his most revealing. The relevant subsection is titled In Despair to be 
Oneself: Defiance. In this, we meet a comprehensive and startlingly modern 
understanding of defiant despair and its psychological constituents, 
(although there is not a word about a remedy – this is strict nosology. And 
regrettably from a modern point of view, Anti-Climacus begins by labelling 
the previous accepting kind of despair ‘feminine’, and this, new kind of 
despair ‘masculine’. I make no comment.) Defiant despair is a third step: 
First comes despair over the earthly, or over something earthly, then 
despair over the eternal, over oneself. Then comes defiance, which is 
really despair through the aid of the eternal, the despairing misuse of 
the eternal within the self to will in despair to be oneself. 502  
 
Kierkegaard makes a distinction between an acting self and a self acted 
upon. And in this extended description, he conjures with concepts very close 
to those in Object Relations Theory. 
If the self in despair is an acting self, it constantly relates itself to 
itself only by way of imaginary constructions, no matter what it 
undertakes, however vast, however amazing, however perseveringly 
pursued.  503   
 
And: 
In so far as the self in its despairing striving to be itself works itself 
into the very opposite, it really becomes no self. 504  
 
This is close to Laing’s description 505 of the false self, the self that creates 
fabulous invented states, all with the goal of protecting the true self. Anti-
Climacus says of the self in defiant despair: ‘The self is its own 
master…however, it is easy to see that this is a King without a Country, 
actually ruling over nothing’, and we are surely close to Laing’s analysis of 
the split from reality and the implications for the impoverished true self.  
 
When talking about the other option, the self that is acted upon, Kierkegaard 
speaks immediately with his favourite metaphor for things dark and 
personal – the thorn in the flesh. For the self acted upon and in despair to 
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will to be oneself, the self becomes convinced that a particular affliction or 
suffering cannot be healed, ameliorated or overcome by any force – it is a 
condition, a curse that must be endured: 
He has convinced himself that this thorn in the flesh gnaws so deeply 
that he cannot abstract himself from it, (whether this is actually the 
case or his passion makes it so for him) and therefore he might as 
well accept it forever, so to speak. 506  
 
And ‘he wills to be himself with it, takes it along, almost flouting his agony.’ 
507.   In a particularly insightful section, Kierkegaard then analyses the 
psychological dependency of being helped, the humiliation of being obliged to 
accept any kind of help unconditionally: 
A self that in despair wills to be itself is pained in some distress or 
other that does not allow itself to be taken away from or separated 
from his concrete self… so now he makes precisely this torment the 
object of all his passion, and finally it becomes demonic rage. 508 
 
Kierkegaard is here foreshadowing a very Fairbairnian analysis of the role of 
the anti-libidinal ego. This agency in Fairbairn’s endopsychic structures has 
the power to denigrate and deny any sense of good and worth that might 
come about through the libidinal ego. Even without Fairbairn’s sense of 
structure, or his portrayal of the process, Kierkegaard very accurately 
describes the resultant behaviour:  
it is of particular significance to him to make sure that he has his 
torment on hand, and that no one takes it away from him - for then 
he would not be able to demonstrate and prove to himself that he is 
right. 509  
 
And, crucially: 
This eventually becomes such a fixation that for an extremely strange 
reason, he is afraid of eternity, afraid that it will separate him from 
his demonically understood infinite superiority over other men, his 
justification, demonically understood, for being what he is. 510 
 
This surely is autobiographical. The emotions Kierkegaard describes are 
surely those he himself felt? The phrase ‘his demonically understood infinite 
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superiority over other men’ is surely something bubbling into Kierkegaard’s 
consciousness from his repressed narcissism. 
 
SUD was written in a remarkably short space of time – probably between 
March and May of 1848. Kierkegaard never explained exactly what this 
‘extremely strange reason’ was: it would be a century before we had any kind 
of answer.  Anti-Climacus concludes with a disturbing analogy, worthy of 
Laing or Winnicott. Speaking of defiant despair, he says: 
Figuratively speaking, it is as if an error slipped into an author’s 
writing and become conscious of itself as an error – perhaps it 
actually was not a mistake but in a much higher sense an essential 
part of the whole production – and now this error wants to mutiny 
against the author, out of hatred for him, forbidding him to correct it 
and in maniacal defiance saying to him: No, I refuse to be erased; I 
will stand as a witness against you, a witness that you are a second 
rate author. 511 
 
Whether one speaks of the Kleinian phases, Fairbairnian structures, 
Laingian ontological insecurity or Winnicottian true and false selves, this 
long sentence that closes Part One of The Sickness Unto Death holds 
remarkable parallels to each.  
 
But there is a problem for the reader of Kierkegaard who lives after Freud’s 
century. Kierkegaard gives an often exceptional analysis of the feelings of 
being in despair. He also prescribes the way we have of responding to a life 
even. But: in his psychology, there would seem to be only one response for 
every life stimulus. For Kierkegaard, the responses invariably involve one or 
more of his levels of despair. For most of us this is not common experience. 
Different people do respond in different ways, and not all of the responses, 
even with the most generous interpretation, can be called despair. Or to put 
it another way, Kierkegaard is guilty of a logical sleight of hand. He defines 
despair in such a way that by his definition it is a place we all inhabit. But 
its very universality makes discussion about the amelioration of despair 
almost pointless, certainly meaningless. Kierkegaard’s answer is another 
universal process – simply to acknowledge oneself before God. But he gives 
                                                
511 ibid p 74. 
  
 
Page 216 
 
 
us precious little help in how to go about doing this, and issues of 
impediments to knowing the self are ignored or dismissed. 
 
Kierkegaard gives an example to make his point about the universal nature 
of despair. He tells of an ambitious man whose slogan is 'either Caesar or 
nothing'. If this man fails to become Caesar, he is in despair. But, maintains 
Kierkegaard, he despairs, in a deeper sense, over the self that has failed to 
become Caesar. He wishes to be rid of this self that has failed. 512   
 
It seems to me that there is at least room for debate here. Traditional 
psychology would have it that there are two types of personality in such a 
situation - intrapunitives and extrapunitives. The intropunitive would indeed 
blame themselves, and see their shortcomings: 'it's all my fault' they might 
say. The extrapunitive would blame everybody else: 'it's not my fault' runs 
their mantra. So Kierkegaard’s unequivocal answer may be incomplete. 
Some people may wish to be rid of themselves for their failure, others may 
see nothing wrong with themselves but blame the world. Psychodynamics 
has taken such a facile analysis very much further, into providing models of 
why people respond in different ways. But the idea that there is only one 
response is surely difficult for us to accept in this, our time. Immediately, 
object relations theory questions the very idea that we all respond in the 
same way to a life event. A life event is decomposed, according to theory, into 
good and bad objects, and we respond to these objects according to our 
individual psychic development. Knowing thyself is, on this reading, about 
appreciating the pervasiveness of this splitting process, being aware of it, 
and, so to speak, putting the various objects in their proper place. But there 
is no objectivity here – there is no single correct way of responding to a life 
event. We are who we are, and our responses are part of who we are. We 
have moved beyond the Freudian archaeological metaphor, and we know 
there is no single piece of antiquity of the self waiting under layers of sand. 
There is no single correct analysis to replace an incorrect one, and there is 
no need to assume a response involves despair. 
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Is Kierkegaard aware of this? In Part B, Kierkegaard discusses the 
universality of despair, and here we see the narcissistic nature of 
Kierkegaard's analysis, and the essentially unhelpful and indeed arrogant 
nature of his remedy. Kierkegaard favours a comparison between physical 
illness and despair. Each needs a physician. The role of the physician is 'not 
only to prescribe remedies, but also, first and foremost, to identify the 
sickness….. Such is also the relation of the physician of the soul to despair.' 
513 And: 'Therefore, the common view that despair is a rarity is entirely 
wrong; on the contrary, it is universal.' 514 
 
I suggest that this is about the depth of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the 
phenomenology of despair, compared with his inability to comprehend how 
despair is overcome in the world. It is about his asocial and acosmic view of 
the universe, which in turn is the product of his narcissistic self. Perhaps 
the difference between Kierkegaard’s analysis - and hence prescription -
about despair, and that of Laing, is the sense of resolute control. The self in 
Kierkegaard’s analysis chooses to be in despair rather than in any sense 
being driven to it through lack of ontological security. There is a certainty in 
Kierkegaard’s description of despair that is wholly missing from the Laingian 
analysis. For Kierkegaard, one is in despair for reasons of personal failure - 
failures of perception, of effort, of openness and responsiveness, of insight, of 
honesty, of humility of will. We are all in despair, we are each to blame, and 
there is no health in us. 
 
                                                
513 ibid p 23. 
514 ibid p 26. 
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10 Reading Kierkegaard’s Texts 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
 
This thesis is a development of some eight ideas, each of which I have tried 
to substantiate in the preceding pages. 
 
First, there is the contest between emotion and cognition 515. Cognition, 
reason, has traditionally been the province of philosophy; emotion, up until 
recently, was best considered through the language and constructs of 
psychodynamics, although the neurosciences have been making very 
considerable inroads into basic models of emotion over the last thirty years. I 
will make no attempt to define reason; and emotion remains a difficult 
concept, as many have pointed out.  516 But the basic hypothesis is that 
emotion interferes with cognition; that there is effectively no cognition 
without emotion. This may be disputed by, for example, the Logical 
Positivist, who would claim we could arrive at pure reason. But after 
Wittgenstein perhaps we are more concerned with usage and less with 
meaning, and emotion can thus easily be seen to play a part in how we use 
words and how we reason. At the extreme, there is pure emotion, pure rage 
or hatred, such that we are, even if only momentarily, incapable of reasoning 
at all. This happens because the emotional centres of the brain flood the 
neocortex with neurochemicals, inhibiting rational thought. 517 Some, 
usually much more modest version of this process, is happening to us for 
much of our lives. But before the neurosciences, Freud nevertheless 
understood the interdependence of thought and emotion: ‘where there was Id 
there shall be Ego’ is a mantra that runs through his entire work.  
 
Second, there is a particular process of emotion affecting reason, and this is 
called narcissism. This is in fact no more than a label for a set of underlying 
                                                
515 There is clearly a subtext here, that of neuroscience. I take a materialist position, 
and agree with the distinction that neuroscience makes between cognitive reason 
and emotion. For a discussion of this dichotomy, see Pankseep (1998) Ch 16.  
516 See, for example, the entry in the Oxford Companion to the Mind. (Gregory (1984)). 
517 See Bear et al (2001) Ch 15.  
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primary defences that the neonatal self invokes in the face of, as it sees it, 
annihilation. Once invoked these defences are very difficult to remove in 
later life. The analogy is with the physical survival of the baby. If any infant 
is effectively starved during the early months of life, there will be damage to, 
among other things, the liver, eye and brain, and no amount of, for example, 
vitamin A in later life will make up for the structural damage to the retina 
caused by the starvation. This seems to be reasonably uncontentious. 518 A 
similar situation applies to early psychical damage, usually in the form of 
poor care from the primary care giver. Narcissism begins as a universal 
condition, but ‘good-enough’ mothering, or caring from the primary carer, 
mitigates against the permanence of the syndrome for the majority of people. 
Vestiges remain for us all; for some, there is not ‘good-enough mothering’, 
and the need for omnipotence is not resolved but repressed, only to appear 
throughout the life of the narcissist. At the extreme, this blights the person’s 
life - every moment, interaction or sensory input is processed through their 
narcissism, leading at the very least to a very inefficient way of living and 
often a very unhappy one, for the narcissist certainly, and for those around 
them. 
 
Third, when any of us reads any text, we are involved in a particular 
psychodynamic process called projection. This is a psychodynamic 
construct, with no neurological basis, but a construct that makes sense for 
us in our time. Any author must put some part of their personal experience 
into their text. Even in the most abstract texts, what they put in, what they 
project, is about their organisation of their material, its presentation. In less 
abstract texts, it is often about their personal history, their own narrative. 
Allegedly neutral figures or situations become imbued with that narrative. 
This is the writer’s projection. Readers, too, have their projection. When we 
read that text, we project our own narrative onto the text; it may or may not 
coincide with the narrative of the author; but if we judge the text to be good 
or insightful or praiseworthy, it is because the projections of the author 
enable in some sense our own coherent projections. But there is no great 
                                                
518 See Chusid (1970) Ch 4.  
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element of control – we are free, generally speaking, to make our own 
projections. 
 
Fourth, what I have called narcissistic texts add another layer onto this 
process, one called projective identification. For the narcissistic author does 
care very much about what his reader projects. Indeed, on one reading, that 
is the reason the author writes the text. The author wishes - needs - to 
project into the reader emotions that are difficult or incapable of being 
contained within the psyche of that author. The text is written so that we 
receive, accept, and identify with what is being projected, so that our own 
projections are thus secondary. The primary purpose of the narcissistic text 
is to control the responses of the reader, even to control the reader. 
 
Fifth, what is projected by narcissists is based around the two poles of 
narcissism – omnipotence, a making up for the lost and unresolved 
omnipotence of infancy; and shame (which may show itself as rage), the 
shame of having failed to live up to the (wholly impossible) expectations of 
narcissistic youth.  
 
Sixth, when readers read narcissistic texts, there is a spectrum of responses. 
For the essentially resolved narcissist, the emotion generated by the 
narcissistic projection is essentially ignored, or noted only in passing, and 
the cognitive component of the texts can be inspected without much 
emotional intervention or overlay. For the particularly unresolved narcissist, 
the emotion can be the primary response to the text; the projections of the 
authors are identified with by the reader, and then reprocessed to reflect 
their own narcissistic situation. Clearly, there is no such thing as a totally 
unresolved narcissist, nor a totally resolved one either, since we are all born 
of very human parents, with their own baggage from their own childhood, 
and this to a lesser or greater extent they inflict upon us as children. We all 
sit on the continuum, and depending upon which ‘self’ is in play in any given 
situation, we move our location, and hence our responses, along that 
continuum. 
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Seventh, Søren Kierkegaard was nearer the unresolved end of this 
continuum, and he wrote essentially narcissistic texts. He wrote, especially 
and in some sense uniquely, about matters close to the heart of any 
narcissist: relating to God, the idea of the self, truth. This thesis contends 
that any unresolved narcissist reading these texts must recognise, even if 
unconsciously, the narcissistic elements in these ideas, and respond to 
them. 
 
Eighth, it is important that we do not continue the tradition of medicalising 
Søren Kierkegaard. This would give us his readers the power to diminish the 
importance and effect of what he says. We should be open to receive all of 
his messages, cognitive and emotional, for they speak to us equally 
importantly in their own way. And we should be open to reflecting on quite 
how these responses affect us. 
 
So this thesis is asking no more than that, when we all read Kierkegaard, 
regardless of where we are on the narcissistic continuum, we reflect even if 
only momentarily on our emotional response to these eminently cognitive 
texts. I am hence presenting what might for some be a new Kierkegaard, a 
new life; but I am not presenting a new version of his 'true life': that 'true 
life', if it has any meaning at all, is beyond our ken, for reasons explained in 
Chapter Two. And this is done, not to blacken the radiant and drag the 
sublime into the dust, but to give another understanding of a self, and a self 
that seems to have a particular effect on us his reader. And I am not 
suggesting that Kierkegaard’s narcissism was the only influence in his life, 
but it would seem to me to be an important aspect of how he lived his life. 
Reflecting on his life and his ideas, with narcissism in mind, can help an 
understanding. It presents us with a new Kierkegaard, a new life, a way of 
peering into how he was motivated. And we may take from it whatever we 
wish.  
 
But this thesis is about more than an inspection of a life and output. It is 
also about how we respond to that paring of life and work, and what our 
response to it tells us about ourselves. I want by way of summary to reflect 
from a psychodynamic point of view on some of the great themes in 
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Kierkegaard's work, and what happens to us when we read Kierkegaard 
writing on these topics. I am more concerned to ask questions than give 
answers, since our answers are so intimately bound up with how we 
conceive of ourselves. To offer generalisations is surely to risk allocating 
people to medical categories, to return to 'truths for all', something this 
thesis has tried very hard not to do. I am asking the reader, then, to ponder 
upon their own response to Kierkegaard’s ideas and presentation: how does 
the analysis presented here make the reader feel? What does is it say about 
their own understanding of narcissism? Regardless of the intellectual 
stimulus that Kierkegaard’s ideas provide, what emotion does he generate 
within the reader? Let me begin with a challenge to the received view of 
Kierkegaard. 
 
 
10.2 Grunberger’s Challenge 
 
The time will come  when not only my writings but my whole life, the 
intriguing secret of the whole machinery, will be studied and 
studied.519 
 
Consider this description of the psychodynamic processes typically used by 
charlatans:  
Enigma per se is a sadistic genre, for posing a riddle is always laying 
an anal trap. 520 One confronts the other with a problem or obstacle, 
while enjoying absolute mastery oneself. One sees the other become 
entangled, and their grief is all the greater as the wager becomes 
linked to a loss…. Obscurity is in itself an anal trap, one “hoodwinks” 
one’s victims or “keeps him in the dark.” 521 
 
The entire quotation is lengthy but highly pertinent: 
 
For one thing, the obscurity of the oracle’s language permits all sorts 
of interpretations in terms of the narcissism of the person inquiring, 
even if he must pay with fear and trembling, which at a deeper level, 
                                                
519 JP 6078. 
520 Grunberger is a French classically trained psychoanalyst who writes in the 
language and style of high psychoanalysis. The anal stage is one of Freud’s three 
stages of personality development – being sequentially in the middle of the oral, anal 
and genital stages. The anal stage is associated essentially with control, a 
generalisation of the toilet training process. An anal trap is thus, in straightforward 
terms, a trap set up in order to control. 
521 Grunberger (1979) p 299-300. 
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moreover, are really linked to pleasure. (The technique of doling out 
obscurities is familiar to those who abuse the public’s credulity, and 
an unbroken line leads from sorcerers and seers to astrologers, 
diviners, conjurors, and fortune-tellers.) Fortune-tellers both conceal 
and promise, lead on and then put off until tomorrow, which assures 
them a faithful and permanent clientele. They are constantly making 
out drafts against the future, a system that allows them to remain in 
the abstract, the vague and the hazy, in allusions, paradoxical 
statements, and slogans, in order always to leave a window open into 
a future where everything will be possible…. 
Contact with the astrologer or fortune-teller immediately plunges the 
subject into the primary process 522 where reason and logic lose their 
power. A few seductive gestures suffice, but also merely ambiguity or 
obscurity (the language itself must be marked by the ineffable). With 
regression thus established, one is carried away in rapture, and the 
doors open onto a narcissistic universe of infinite possibilities – one 
need only believe. But, if the diviner installs the subject in that 
universe, at the same time he deprives him of the necessary means to 
get out of it. 523 
 
Many Kierkegaardian scholars may well be surprised at linking this eminent 
thinker and writer with sorcerers and fortune-tellers. For some, such a 
comparison is incomprehensible, insulting even, showing a lack of depth of 
understanding of a complex writer by whoever posits such a linkage. For 
them, Kierkegaard is the very opposite of a charlatan, in that he demands 
the most intense intellectual rigour and courage from his readers. But 
Grunberger is not in the world of philosophy, theology or of belle-lettres. He 
is contemplating what is in many ways a simpler, certainly much more 
primitive world, that of how we respond, how we feel. The more we learn of 
neurophysiology, the more we have to confront the evidence that rational 
brain processes appear to be affected by emotional brain processes. There is 
a spectrum, from extreme emotion overpowering reason, to clinical reasoning 
barely aware of what emotion might be. The point is not the degree of 
involvement of the one with the other: the point is the principle; and that 
principle, since Freud, has been established. We are not just rational 
engines, under our own control, but complex engines, not always able to 
                                                
522 Another key Freudian term. It refers to essentially unconscious thinking, use of 
condensation and displacement, and occurs early in life, though obviously remains 
to some extent. It can best be understood by contrast with the secondary process, 
which is conscious, of the real world, able to accommodate reality, and involves logic 
and language. Quintessentially the primary process is about dreaming; the 
secondary about reasoning. 
523 ibid p 300. 
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reason with the clarity our observing ego might wish. From the viewpoint of 
evidential psychology, our minds are a product of our evolution - what else 
could they be - and our evolution includes emotion: any hermeneutic that 
pretends otherwise is missing a significant part of what it is to be human.  
 
The received view of Kierkegaard is that, despite what might be called his 
excessively emotional over-reaction to a moderately unfortunate life, he is a 
cerebral man, a thinker and writer, who must be approached, and can only 
be understood cerebrally. Whatever he says about the subjective nature of 
truth, and those Assistant Professors (to be discussed below), Kierkegaard’s 
ideas, as he presents them, require all our cognitive power to be understood, 
if indeed we can understand him at all. Whatever he says about his or our 
age lacking passion, the passion he speaks of is about involvement in ideas, 
about the relentless, logical pursuit of where an argument may take us. His 
thoughts are sometimes akin to those described by his fellow Dane 524 as 
Gedankenexperiment, thought experiments that take place in the mind, 
because the testing of the ideas in reality may appear impossible.  
 
But the engendered desire to concentrate on and understand what his 
elliptical writings are saying and what they mean is not the only effect 
Kierkegaard has on us, as by now should be clear. We respond not only 
cerebrally, but also emotionally. And Grunberger paints perhaps an extreme 
picture of what happens to us emotionally when we meet such ideas and 
writings. I am not wishing to reduce Kierkegaard to a fairground astrologer, 
but I do want to acknowledge Grunberger’s insight about playing the game 
set by the conundrum master. For example, Fear and Trembling both 
conceals and promises; it clearly has a faithful and growing clientele; it 
deals, demonstrably, in allusions, paradoxical statements and slogans. Fear 
and Trembling suggests, demands even, that traditional reason and logic lose 
their powers; and from Freud onwards, all agree that the primary process 
inevitably follows such a loss. The language of de Silento is nothing if not 
ineffable; and anyone who has wrestled with what happened to Abraham on 
Mount Moriah will have experienced the irresistible and persuasive invitation 
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from Søren Kierkegaard as he beckons us to join him in regression, to 
approach his universe of infinite possibilities. The intellectual content of 
Fear and Trembling may make the above précis seem ludicrously superficial. 
But in psychical terms, it is perhaps less ludicrous. Kierkegaard seduces us 
into a trap that denies the value of the secondary process, and leaves us 
there.  
 
It takes a singular effort to escape from this seduction. Kierkegaard, the 
narcissist, induces narcissistic responses in us. This is projective 
identification through the ether – the words of the long since dead author 
obliging us to own a set of feelings, emotions and motives that are not really 
ours but his. Narcissistically, Søren Kierkegaard resolved a particular crisis 
in his narcissistic life by invoking a narcissistic explanation. There were far 
simpler, far more down to earth explanations he could have used, that the 
world would have accepted. But any of those would have removed his façade 
of grandiosity. So as we read his fantastic explanation, it touches and 
awakens the narcissist in us. And for some, this reawakening is persuasive. 
It may not be in quite the way he would have wished, but from the point of 
view of this thesis, here is why, as Søren Kierkegaard famously predicted, 
Fear and Trembling alone is sufficient to guarantee his reputation across the 
centuries. 
 
The essential point is that Kierkegaard demands that we do all of this in 
isolation. Cerebral, Kierkegaard was; social, he wasn't, not, at least, at the 
level of relating. And it is when we withdraw from external reality, when 
reality testing is banned by the very nature of what is being discussed, that 
Grunberger's strictures come into being. This intellectual isolation is the 
hallmark of Kierkegaard’s demand on us: the use of silence, abjuring the 
other, thinking through paradox, eschewing teachers, denying reason. The 
problem is that Kierkegaard inflicts this upon us, while, it would seem, 
withholding any solution that he himself has discovered. His own words: 
My life, my work as an author, will be explained höchstens as a 
special kind of genius, by no means as serious and by no means as 
                                                                                                                                       
524 Kierkegaard’s contemporary, Hans Christian Orsted is credited with the first use 
of the term. 
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consistent as the lives of various others. I am the only one who can 
explain this. …. alas, and I am silent. It is as though someone had a 
great treasure and hid it so securely that he threw the key away. 
What troubles me most is whether or not I have the right to do this, 
whether in relation to God this silence is permissible, whether it is 
permissible to let a productivity which is so infinitely indebted to him 
for its ingenuity remain an enigma and for many somewhat odd. 525 
 
Here is the essential psychodynamic conundrum about Kierkegaard. Did he 
do this for our own good, that we might to the best of our ability seek after 
truth as he understood it and in the only way he believed would be effective; 
or was this all a game, a huge game, played with the intention of self 
aggrandisement to repay earlier narcissistic injury? This need not be 
presented as our own either/or. While taking nothing away from the 
intellectual products of Kierkegaard’s mind, just as we must pause when we 
read him to consider what intellectual points he makes, we should pause 
and consider what these texts are doing to us, as whole, relating people. So 
how do we respond to this conundrum master? Do we applaud? Do we 
despair? When we wrestle with the impenetrability of Kierkegaard, indeed 
the vertiginous abstraction, do we ponder what projective identifications we 
are permitting? Setting enigmas was Kierkegaard's way of retaining mastery 
of his universe. Our emotional response to Kierkegaard's traps must surely 
say something about our view of our universe, and our place in it. 
 
 
10.3 Relating, The Other and Silence 
 
As early as just eight days after birth, it would seem that the neonate has 
some kind of mental representation based on what is happening to them in 
the world. Sander 526 showed that if a mother put a pair of ski goggles on her 
face while breast-feeding, the baby was very disturbed and feeding was 
disrupted. 
 
                                                
525 JP 6345. 
526 Sander (1985) . 
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In current psychodynamic theory, thought is not synonymous with verbal 
language and symbols. Psychodynamics now seriously entertains the idea 
that many important levels of psychodynamic meaning are held and enacted 
through non-verbalised processes. The previous belief was that meaning can 
only be generated through symbolisation, and that an infant incapable of 
reflecting on its actions cannot act meaningfully. 527  But much recent 
developmental psychology and neuropsychology has radically doubted this. 
Hobson 528 has very capably summarised this work, and his summary is that 
observation or videotaping of mother-neonate interactions bring broad 
agreement that the mother’s actions mean something to the baby, and that 
the baby’s responses reflect meaning generated within them. A primary, 
unworded apprehension of relationships is foundational to our meaning 
systems and to our subjectivity.  
 
This topic, the development of the self through the other, is fundamental to 
this thesis. It has been well known throughout human history (at least to 
primary carers, usually mothers) that mother and baby mirror each other 
during intimate play sessions: the expression on the mother’s face and on 
the baby’s when playing wordless ‘goo-goo’ games match to a remarkable 
extent. When, in a somewhat cruel experiment, an unknown caregiver was 
required not to mirror the baby but remain expressionless for just two 
minutes, the baby remembered that face and actively avoided it for a period 
of up to twelve months. 529 Why should this be? The argument is that we 
come to know the world not through solipsistic exploration, but through the 
other, the caregiver. The external world is not an independently existing 
given that is there to be discovered: we create this external world through 
others, through teachers. And this wish and need stay with us. The 
neurobiological work on eye contact 530 confirms this view: shared 
consciousness in infancy is now a cornerstone of developmental theory. 531 
                                                
527 The idea that there can be no thought without language has a certain hold in 
philosophy, but less so in post-Freudian psychodynamics. For a detailed discussion 
and an attempted rapprochement, see Cavell (1993).  
528 Hobson (2002). 
529 Haley and Stansbury (2003).  
530 For a summary of this vast area, see Farroni et al (2003). See also Fonagay et al 
(2003). 
531 see, just as an example Trevarthen (1993).  
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This and other research suggests that human external reality is inherently 
shared. It is constructed out of shared feelings, shared intentions and 
shared plans. This is an essentially relational process, and one that 
continues through adult life. The objective world always retains its historical 
connection with the earlier sense of shared interpersonal reality. 532 Infants 
for whom there is not a mirroring and engaging caregiver develop somewhat 
disorganised forms of attachment, and under stress will look within 
themselves rather than risking a shared experience involving the external 
world. So frightening parenting, helpless feelings on the part of the infant, 
mismatches between parental and infant emotions, false and inappropriate 
mirroring, all lead to a loss of the shared external, and a consequent 
searching for meaning only from within. 
 
On this reading, then, turning inward is not just asocial: it would seem to 
approach being ahuman. We can learn little about the world around us 
without joining the mind, the subjectivity, of the person teaching us. All of 
this links to narcissism and to Søren Kierkegaard. The narcissist has failed 
in infancy to trust the objective world and resorts instead to a certainty that 
he can control - a certainty within. Probing of other minds in real dialogue is 
to be feared, and hence real self-knowledge, which comes only through 
exposure to the other, also retreats. The playful exploration of thoughts with 
an other becomes impossible, because we cannot anticipate what the result 
might be. With early learning processes that engender risk, narcissists 
evolve strategies that turn inward. The narcissist thus learns less about how 
outside minds work. 533 Eventually, there is no real external reality - the 
process fails, and the narcissist then looks to project stimuli into others in 
order to experience vicariously what they feel. It is not that the external does 
not exist, but that their own sense of self is so fragile they dare not 
experience the external as real.  
 
Kierkegaard wrestles perpetually with the difficulty of putting into any words 
anything about his Wholly Other God despite its complexities, and perhaps 
ironically all of his two million words are an attempt to explain the problem 
                                                
532 For a foundational discussion, see Gergely and Csibra (2005).  
533 For a general discussion, see Fonagay et al (2007). 
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of silence. Beyond the literal and superficial, there is another point about 
silence: in highlighting the difficulty of talking about God, Kierkegaard offers 
a legitimisation of silence in our relationships. The former is a philosophical 
point; the latter very much one about psychodynamics. 
 
References to silence are to be found throughout the canon. They are telling, 
and the deep attraction of silence for Kierkegaard is very apparent. In Two 
Ages he speaks of the need for silence: 
Only the person who can remain essentially silent can speak 
essentially, can act essentially. 534 
 
And from his Journals, 
 
Authentic intensive actions spring from an individual and from 
silence. 535 
 
Silence is necessary for my life, and precisely through silence it gains 
its power. Even if I wanted to speak, I would have to keep silence 
about that which is most important to me and most deeply 
determines my life. 536 
 
 
But it is in Fear and Trembling that Kierkegaard surely comes very close to 
denying language and defining silence as the true path to an encounter with 
God. The point about Fear and Trembling is that it tells the story of Abraham 
as a narrative, rather than as an analytic essay. We cannot get to Abraham 
as a person, to his theology, indeed his logic, through rational analysis: we 
can only approach him through living his story. Abraham’s silence follows 
from the impossibility of logical, worded analysis. To murder a son is 
unethical: there is no other logical basis for commentary. From a religious 
point of view there is another commentary, but it is one which is unworded, 
one that necessarily demands silence as a constitutive part of itself. So the 
story of the Aqedah is told repeatedly in the text, over and over again, with 
different nuances and subtleties each time. The intention is that we will 
approach Abraham through this indirection, in our own way and for 
ourselves.  
 
                                                
534 Two Ages, KW XIV p 97. 
535 JP 3986. 
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I commented in the chapter on Fear and Trembling about how, in our time, 
Abraham's silence would be countenanced less. I want to continue this idea 
by returning to the germane theories of Donald Winnicott, especially that of 
the intermediate space. When we read Fear and Trembling, when we ponder 
on Kierkegaard’s cry for silence in our lives, we enter our own intermediate 
space, and play with the story of Abraham. And as was pointed out, this 
space remains private, unworded, unwordable, and necessarily secret. It is 
the place where we can ask questions about God, as Abraham does. We can 
sit between the polarised extremes of a god that we invent, and a god that is 
eternal. Both realism and anti-realism can co-exist in our intermediate 
space. 537 And we live in this space with the paradox, both gods coexisting, 
the one found and the other invented. But in this place, what we never do is 
ask the question: which is the true God?  
 
Nicolas Lash perhaps best sums up the conundrum in his 1966 text. He 
says: 
Where our knowledge of God is concerned, are we constructors, 
explorers or pupils? Thus, do we invent our gods and project them 
beyond ourselves; do we search the world to find signs of the god; or 
do we listen, perhaps in silence, and wait for our god to appear? 538 
 
Perhaps we are now condemned to be all three of his categories. We 
construct, but often in the sense of taking a formal statement of religion and 
faith and making it our own. We explore, perennially hoping to find a newer 
or better means of conceptualising and speaking of God. And we remain as 
pupils, listing, learning, often in silence as befits pupils, sometimes praying. 
But we can hold all of these positions with some equanimity. And 
Winnicott’s theorising is helpful in understanding why. What Winnicott 
exposes very carefully is the indeterminate, the unreal nature of the 
intermediate object: 
                                                                                                                                       
536 Letters and Documents, KW XXV 187. 
537
 The realist/antirealist debate asks: is a god really out there or just in our minds? 
For the realist, religious language, or god-talk, refers to an objective other; we do not 
project or create that other out of human needs or values. For the anti-realist, we 
can never know whether there is any objective referent; rather the language is a 
means of expressing a way of life and a set of values. See Shakespeare (2001) Ch 3. 
538 Lash (1996) p 77.  
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..the essential feature in the concept of transitional objects and 
phenomena (according to my presentation of the subject) is the 
paradox and the acceptance of the paradox: the baby creates the 
object, but the object was there waiting to be created and to become a 
cathected object….In the rules of the game we all know…., we will 
never challenge the baby to elicit an answer to the question: did you 
create it or did you find it. 539 
 
So hence the collusion, the permission given to the infant to relate to 
something that is neither pure subject nor pure object, neither me, nor the 
other. This seems to me to be very close to Buber's notion of the 'Between':  
On the far side of the subjective, on this side of the objective on the 
narrow ridge where I and Thou meet, there is the realm of between.540 
 
Hence also the question of what is 'really' there is not entertained - that is 
the whole point. The intermediate space is not an area of pure reason, nor of 
pure emotion. It is a safe place, but one nonetheless fragile. For the illusion 
must be maintained. In real life, the physical embodiment of intermediate 
objects, teddy bears, often become notoriously smelly and dirty. This is for 
the simple reason that to put teddy through a wash cycle would utterly 
destroy the colluded illusion: Teddy would have to come out of the 
intermediate and become immersed, literally, in a very objective world 
indeed. Necessarily he would lose his magic: he would become just another 
object to be washed. 
 
So here is the problem with God talk, that Kierkegaard has very well 
identified. Our language about God is poor in the extreme, and Kierkegaard 
repeatedly tries to put us in a position where we both recognise this and 
seek out our own solution to it. By the very use of the word God, it is as 
though we are forced, in Winnicott's phrase, 'to elicit an answer to the 
question: did you create that or did you find it?' The word God is required to 
take on a referential load it cannot bear.  
 
The point about the intermediate space, then, is that even though it 
remains, and remains a place to which we return, it is nevertheless an 
unreal place; it is not a place where we can live our lives. We live in fact in 
                                                
539 Winnicott (1971) p 119.  
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something usually called the real world, a place of subject and object, and I 
and It, sometimes I and Thou. We cannot remain in our intermediate space - 
reality calls us. But above all, so object relations theory would have it, 
relating calls us. Relations, relationships are the stuff of living, and we 
cannot escape these encounters if we are to call ourselves human. This very 
point is the narcissistic attraction of Kierkegaard. He is pointing up the 
immense difficulties that come when something unworded becomes worded, 
and he is appealing to the attraction of an unwordable place. And I fear he 
actually wishes us to remain there, in what is demonstrably an asocial and 
acosmic place. This perhaps is what Kierkegaard himself tried to do, and 
Fear and Trembling, Works of Love and The Sickness Unto Death in different 
ways stand as statements to that.  
 
This is the appeal of Kierkegaard in our time. Language about the reality of 
God simply fails us. We understand language about God only by living that 
language. In the intermediate space, a state of unworded unknowing, silence 
would seem to be a quite appropriate response. But silence only makes 
sense by reference to word. This is a familiar theme throughout philosophy 
and indeed depth psychology. When I use a word to express something 
immediate, something from my unconscious or immediate consciousness, I 
transcend whatever it is I am trying to refer to, because words mean other 
things. Words can refer to universals, and not just the ideas or concepts to 
which I am attending. There are echoes of this certainly in Lacan’s analysis 
of how we use language, not to mention Wittgenstein’s. Hence the attraction 
of silence. Silence makes explicit language’s inability to make reality present 
to us. The use of words is treacherous; allowing words destroys the illusion: 
it invokes Winnicott's forbidden question 'did you create it or was it there?' 
 
But we cannot live like this if we are to take our place in the world. As was 
discussed in the consideration of Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard seems to 
be suggesting that in some situations, all language is effectively null and 
void, that wording is impossible. He does not, its seems to me, pause to 
consider the human implications of such a position, that it can lead to 
illusion and delusion, to silent collusion in matters; in classical terminology, 
it risks a return to the primary process, in short, to Grunberger’s challenge.  
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10.4 Approaching Kierkegaard's Texts 
 
 
Does Kierkegaard deliberately make himself difficult to understand? The 
pseudonym Climacus says so. It is his task to 'create difficulties everywhere' 
541 and 'it is thus left to the reader to put two and two together…but nothing 
is done to minister to a reader’s indolence’. 542  
 
Kierkegaard specifically says 543, perhaps narcissistically, that he has 
discovered regions which do not exist for others as such, but he has, in his 
own words, thrown away the key to this treasure. The use of pseudonyms 
necessarily prohibits immediate and sequential understanding of this 
thought. He says, again perhaps narcissistically, that 'the time will come 
when not only my writings but also my whole life, the intriguing secret of the 
whole machinery, will be studied and studied'. 544 And he actually spoke of 
giving his output 'the appearance of chance and caprice' 545 just in order to 
make things difficult for the reader. He required intense effort and a desire 
to penetrate his thinking through his writing to discover the ingenuity of his 
work, but 'The task must be made difficult’, for 'only the difficult inspires the 
noble hearted'. 546 
 
What of the use of pseudonymity? This was not by any means unique to 
Kierkegaard at that time. 547  We have Kierkegaard’s quite clear instruction 
that he is not to be regarded as the author of anything written in a 
pseudonymous author’s name: 
I am impersonally or personally in the third person as a souffleur 
[prompter] who has poetically produced the authors, whose prefaces 
in turn are their productions, as their names are also. Thus in the 
pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me. I have no 
opinion about them except as a third party, no knowledge of their 
meaning except as a reader. 548 
 
                                                
541 Postscript, KW XII p 166. 
542 ibid pp 264-5. 
543 already quoted, JP 6345. 
544 JP 6078. 
545 JP 5891. 
546 JP 656. 
547 See MacIntyre (1984) pp39-43.  
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But this doesn’t quite make sense. There seem to be two separate styles of 
interpretation here. The first is Kierkegaard’s proffered explanation, and 
there is evidence of how he went to great pains, especially early in the 
polyonymous authorship, to conceal his authorship, by for example 
concealing his handwriting through the use of amanuenses, and how, more 
bizarrely, he lounged around the Theatre every evening to give the 
impression of being a socialiser, before rushing home to work on Either/Or 
into the small hours.  On the other hand we have a very plausible 
interpretation from Mackay: 
When Kierkegaard signed his books with impossible names …..no one 
in the gossipy little world of Danish letters had any doubts about their 
origin. Nor did he mean they should; his purpose was not 
mystification but distance. By refusing to answer for his writings he 
detached them from his personality so as to let their form protect the 
freedom that was their theme. 549 
 
So was Kierkegaard really trying to deceive the Copenhagen public, as he 
played a game with them, or was this a genuine literary device, part of his 
declared meiotic method, his means of engendering inward reflection on 
subjective truth? Was it another enigma, another anal trap, that he enjoyed 
enormously, or was this a pure hearted continuation of a solemn and pious 
process? I suggest it was some of each. Without reducing the process that 
Kierkegaard evolved for the communication of his vision of man’s relations 
with God, let us also perhaps consider what else is going on for us when we 
read these texts. We now know, demonstrably, that all the words written by 
the pseudonymous authors were put on paper by the hand of Søren 
Kierkegaard. So what else is this single author doing to us when we wrestle 
with the conflicting commentaries from Climacus and Anti-Climacus on the 
same topic? Was there an easier way of doing this that would engender 
better understanding? Was there, actually, any virtue in the sometimes 
opaque and contradictory statements Kierkegaard has these authors make? 
There may be for a very few, but I cannot see how there might be for the 
common man. The daunting complexity of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous 
writings calls for an extraordinary effort and intellect to work with his 
challenging ideas. His alleged intended target, the single individual, may 
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turn out to be a very small, but very special subset of the population. This is 
just what any narcissist would wish. When we read Kierkegaard, do we 
aspire to be part of that very few? Does this author set up a club with 
criteria of membership so high that most of us can only hope to be at the 
perimeter? Does he draw us in even though we are unsure of what he is 
actually saying, or even more unsure that his insights apply to us? What is 
the nature of our attraction to Kierkegaard? Is it purely intellectual? 
 
In a final revelation (and this can be seen as narcissism of the highest order 
if one wishes), Kierkegaard wrote in his Point of View that there was indeed a 
cohesion to all of his output, that everything he did was planned, that he 
had at the very beginning of his writing an inclusive understanding of the 
path that writing would take. This might be true, that he did indeed in his 
early twenties have his entire plan of writing already worked out; it might, 
instead, be a delusion, genuinely felt by Kierkegaard, and as is so often the 
case by those reflecting near the end of their life, a story told to bring 
narrative cohesion to what were at the time a series of unrelated events in a 
life; or it might have narcissistic undertones, be another claim to his 
greatness, another instance of his seeing clearly what lesser mortals dimly 
stumble towards. In any case, what does this do to us his reader? Do we 
accept this Kierkegaard, ennoble him to an omnipotent status, acknowledge 
his superiority and share in his remarkable achievement through classical 
Freudian identification? Do we feel humbled, reduced and incompetent by 
the gap between his intellect and our own? Do we feel resentment, which on 
reflection is rage and hatred, at his mastery that causes our sullen 
response? How, in other words, does our own narcissism conjoin with his? 
 
Apart from Kierkegaard believing that difficulty is good for the soul, and the 
no doubt profound belief that one can only approach truth through the 
inward engagement with that truth, why else would he write in this way?  
What underpinned his whole literary life? The answer, of course, is that this 
is exactly what narcissists do. In Either/Or, Kierkegaard described precisely 
his own situation, exactly what he was feeling. This is the curse of the 
                                                                                                                                       
549 Mackay (1971) p 247. 
  
 
Page 236 
 
 
narcissist. Much of life has no meaning at all, is empty, lacks any fulfilment; 
and Kierkegaard’s entire strategy then is a search for meaningfulness 
through his reader, since for him, a narcissist, there is none. The permanent 
sense of loss he describes in Either/Or Part I was to a large extent what he 
felt; and the partial solution offered in Part II was his fantasy of what 
marriage, actually of what relating, might be like. But these were written 
vicariously: Kierkegaard imagined what each of his characters might be 
feeling because he himself felt so very little. Some readers might wonder if 
Kierkegaard revelled in the effect all this would have on his them; imagining 
their bafflement, frustration and anger, while delighting that he was both the 
cause of these intense feelings in his imaginary audience, while he, 
Kierkegaard, held and withheld the key to the solution. At the same time, 
other readers might consider that this is whole point of the existential 
approach, that no solutions are or should be offered, that Kierkegaard is 
wholly neutral in this process, and there are no emotions to be attributed to 
him. These very differences in response are at the heart of this thesis, and 
cannot, I am claiming, be discussed in terms of pure reason. 
 
 
10.5 Withholding and the Assistant Professors 
 
No doubt, intellectually, Kierkegaard’s withholding follows primarily from his 
avowed methodology, his pedagogic practice: 
When the question of truth is raised in an objective manner, reflection 
is directed objectively to the truth, as an object to which the knower is 
related. Reflection is not focussed on the relationship, however, but 
on the question of whether it is the truth to which the knower is 
related. If only the object to which he is related is the truth, the 
subject is accounted to be in the truth. When the question of the 
truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively to the 
nature of the individual’s relationship; if only the mode of his 
relationship is in the truth, the individual is in the truth even if he 
should happen to be thus related to what is not true. 550 
 
This, described as ‘possibly the most debated and controversial passage 
penned by Kierkegaard’, 551 sums up the problem of Kierkegaard and his 
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enigmatic nature, his propensity for anal traps. This paragraph has indeed 
been the subject of intense scrutiny and debate by that most lowly of 
planetary species, the assistant professor. 552 Kierkegaard declares a 
vituperous disdain for these ‘infamous rascals’ 553: 
Whenever someone existentially advances the cause one inch further 
– then a whole generation of assistant professors and lecturers appear 
who transpose this advance into a doctrine - that is, the cause moves 
backwards. 554 
 
For the professor is even longer than the tapeworm which a woman 
was delivered of recently (200 feet according to her husband…) a 
professor is even longer than that – and if a man has this tapeworm 
“the professor” in him, no human being can deliver him of it. 555 
 
The issue, surely, is Kierkegaard’s complete ambivalence: he decries his fate, 
that his work will end up as the subject of scrutiny by these academics, 
while at the same time writes in a way that demands the highest logical and 
intellectual rigour and effort for its understanding, such that assistant 
professors may actually be the only species capable of comprehending: a 
double bind if you will. Consider the above quoted paragraph. It has 
remained a particularly difficult, but pivotal, expression of something very 
close to the epicentre of Kierkegaard’s thought. We have seen a good handful 
of serious attempts to make sense of it. Apart from the explanation from 
Jacoby, we have alternate views from George Lindbeck 556, Stephen 
Emmanuel 557, Timothy Houston Polk 558, and Louis Polman 559  
 
The point I wish to make is not philosophical but psychodynamic. The above 
listed members of the academy, almost certainly full professors (although 
they doubtless do not thereby escape Kierkegaard’s strictures) all find this a 
perplexing and indeterminate paragraph. What hope has a casual reader of 
making sense of this dense script? In our time, do we not look to learned 
                                                
552 Kierkegaard makes over seventy references Assistant Professors or Professors, 
always derogatory. 
553 JP 6872. 
554 JP 3574. 
555 JP 6817. 
556 Lindbeck (1984).  
557 Emmanuel (1996). 
558 Polk (1997).  
559 Polman (1984).  
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professors to help us understand things that are not immediately apparent? 
The professors, it would seem, are damned if they do and damned if they 
don’t. There is no end to Kierkegaard’s contempt, referring to them as 
‘cannibals’  even ‘castrates’ 560, and liking their output to ‘filth and vermin’. 
561 He speaks of them as ‘drivelling’. 562 While the underlying sentiment from 
Kierkegaard - the need to live rather than inspect - chimes with us, his 
chosen style of presenting this essential point makes the involvement of the 
professors unavoidable. Kierkegaard, on this reading, knew exactly what he 
was doing, and set up the double bind himself: more enigmatic mastery for 
Kierkegaard, more grief for the assistant professors as their wager is linked 
to a loss. 
 
The issue is that the professors are bad objects for Søren Kierkegaard. His 
unusually blunt writing about them, continuous from the earliest to the 
latest of his Journals entries, tells us something about how he viewed that 
profession. Resentment towards them is everywhere. 563 He compares 
himself bitterly to them and their clique and their standards: 
I should have lived in professorial seclusion in cliques; then I would 
have had a great reputation and also would have had the security of 
belonging to the great aggregate of public officials who stick together 
according to the laws that when one suffers, all suffer. Instead I have 
lived as a single individual in whose fate not a single one participates. 
564 
 
In fact, I suspect the majority of Kierkegaard’s readers have a personal 
relationship with the role of assistant professor: a few have been promoted 
from it, a good many remain as such, and an even larger number perhaps 
wish they were one. So when we all, as assistant professors, whether ex, 
extant or merely manqué, read these strictures, what do we feel? We feel, I 
suggest, Kierkegaard’s repressed rage and hatred. He at once wrote for, but 
despised, his readers. He wrote for the assistant professors, and then 
derided them for their attempts to make sense of his opaque prose. But of 
course he wrote narcissistically: because his intellect was his unique, 
                                                
560 JP 3316. 
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aggrandising property, the one lifelong thing that fed his narcissism; above 
all this was to be protected:  
If an assistant professor could steal my ideas from me, he would be a 
tremendous hit. 565 
 
Had he made his ideas simple to understand, had he written without 
enigma, his narcissistic supply would have dried up. His words says it all: 
What troubles me most is whether or not I have the right to do this, 
whether in relations to God this silence is permissible, whether it is 
permissible to let a productivity which is so infinitely indebted to him 
for its ingenuity remain an enigma and for many somewhat odd. 566 
 
Kierkegaard’s god alone was allowed to know the greatness of Kierkegaard’s 
genius, and Kierkegaard never wavered from his trust in this god. On an 
object relations reading, Kierkegaard’s god remained his source of 
narcissistic supply as all the rest failed him. We, the assistant professors, 
the readers of his texts, were both good and bad objects. We were good 
objects when we sat, breathless in amazement at the incredible complexity of 
his literary production. We were bad objects when, as assistant professors 
are prone, we claimed to understand, or worse, to minimise, what he had 
written. In claiming to understand we take away his remaining earthly 
fountain of wished-for glory. With the demise of the impenetrability of what 
he wrote would go the final hope of narcissistic grandeur. 
 
But we all have our very own Assistant Professors. We all have those whom 
we fear just as Kierkegaard feared his. These are the people who would strip 
us of that which makes us special: deny us, reduce us - choose your 
metaphor - castrate us. We may not call them Assistant Professors, and they 
may not loom in our lives as this species did for Kierkegaard. But consider 
our own response to reading about his. What does his unconscious say to 
ours? What projective identification do we admit? Do we do no more than 
puzzle over Kierkegaard’s vindictiveness towards these ordinary people? Do 
we identify with his heroic struggle against a mean spirited and oppressive 
system that demands the compliance he adamantly and piously refuses? Are 
we strengthened, though his example, in our own struggles against those 
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who would oppress and demean us? How much of this is our own 
narcissistic response? To what extent are we narcissistically living out our 
demands for omnipotence and special regard through reading Kierkegaard? 
 
It comes back to projective identification, that ubiquitous process. This is for 
some: 
a general theory of human functioning. It is about the relations 
between people, between groups; of the relationships between internal 
objects; of the relationships in the symbolic world between thoughts, 
ideas, theories experiences etc. 567  
 
Projective identification is the most ubiquitous construct for explaining how 
we control an object, acquire its attributes, evacuate a bad quality, protect a 
good quality, and above all, avoid separation. Indeed it is the sovereign 
defence against separation. 568 Projective identification is the process basis, 
on this view, of all relationships, but also is the mechanism for some of the 
most alarming instances of psychological dysfunction as well as our worst 
inhumanities to each other.  It is the basis of all human interaction. 569 We 
attempt to solve our internal unresolved inconsistencies by splitting off 
unwanted bits and projecting them wherever - onto blacks, Jews, women, 
across the Atlantic, to the Middle East - while saying the problem is not in 
me but in them. That is what projective identification attempts to achieve, 
and we all do it, all the time. So there is no easy line, as I discuss in 
Appendix III, between the normal and the abnormal in matters 
psychological, nor is there any line between normal and virulent or 
malignant projective identification. But the results are disastrous: 
In malignant projective systems the self is impoverished, realty testing 
fails, the other is not recognised for what he is but rather as the 
container of disowned aspects of the self, to be hated, feared, idealised 
etc, and relations are unreal and narcissistically intense up to the 
point of insanity. 570 
 
The phrase, originally written about intense anti-Semitic gangs, is not far 
from the picture I have been painting of Søren Kierkegaard. And I do this not 
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to liken him to any anti-Semite, but to show the ubiquity of projective 
identification as a process governing human thought. And I further want to 
say that when joining any group or club or party or institution or society, the 
price of admission is to enter into the splitting and projective identifications 
of that group. This is most obviously true in violent gangs, who must have an 
external other onto which to express all their hatred, and into which to place 
all their fears. The existence of the external is essential to the existence of 
the gang - the one defines the other. The same is true, though much hidden, 
in academic or professional circles. 571 The mechanisms are the same 
though: taking on the group values as a given, and adapting thereafter one's 
own primitive anxieties to that group's particular version of splitting, 
projection, stereotyping and scapegoating. This is not without cost: it leads 
to a significant impoverishment in the ability to think and feel with 
moderation and to deal with anxiety and reality:  
And there is the other side of the matter. When positive aspects of the 
self are forcefully projected, similar degrees of de-personalisation 
occur, with feelings of personal worthlessness and with dependent 
worship of the other's contrasting strengths, powers, uncanny 
sensitivity, marvellous gifts, thoughts, knowledge, undying goodness 
etc. This is the world of the devotee, cults and hero-promotion.' 572 
 
The convention has it that we approach Søren Kierkegaard intellectually, 
that he poses riddles, that his techniques of exegesis engender difficulty. 
And the outward response to this makes the case. Kierkegaardian 
scholarship, it could easily be argued, is predominantly managed by a 
relatively small group - a society - of Western, mainly English speaking, 
mainly male academics. Almost all references to Kierkegaardian texts refer to 
the same set of translations (from the Hongs), and the review process of this 
scholarship would appear to involve the same small group of scholars. Entry 
into this club demands a ferociously high level of rational scholarship, and 
increasingly, given what has gone before, a perpetually new view on what 
Kierkegaard said or meant. Post-modernism in particular has given a whole 
new life to this academic invention, such that any of Kierkegaard’s more 
elliptical statements is now capable of almost endless interpretation. 
                                                
571 The classic description of virulent projective identification in the UK Health sector 
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What, in preceding Chapters, the analysis of three of Kierkegaard's texts 
shows is the varying degree of ease and difficulty with which the members of 
Kierkegaard's club, Søren's gang, can assimilate their leader's splitting and 
his projective identification. Fear and Trembling is easy. We can all perform 
the splitting Kierkegaard performs, all see ourselves in sole communion with 
our god, alone on some metaphorical hillside with that which is all-powerful 
and all-loving. But Works of Love poses problems, since it ignores that one 
area that, in our time, can even be the basis of gangs and societies - 
sexuality. This remains a difficult text for the club members to assimilate. 
And in The Sickness Unto Death, we can see how the group members make 
attempts to translate an unacceptable process of splitting into something 
more benign. Above I précis seven attempts from members to make the 
unpalatable palatable, seven attempts, from McCarthy, Crites, Evans, 
Westphal, Roberts, Hannay and Mooney, to show that if a group can modify 
unacceptable splittings in its leader to something more benign, then the 
group can remain intact. 
 
All of this is a long way away from Kierkegaard's common man. The common 
man has no hope of joining this club, and little chance of understanding the 
scholarship about Kierkegaard currently being produced. Is this what 
Kierkegaard would have wanted? More to the point, is this what we want? 
What is our motive for studying Kierkegaard? Can we each say that it is 
entirely rational, that the ideas of the man challenge our intellect alone in a 
way that other authors do not? Is there, as well, or even instead, some 
emotional attraction to the man and his ideas that remains essentially 
unacknowledged? 
 
In 1663 in Rome, Galileo Galilei was tried by the Church for blasphemy, for 
claiming that the earth was not the centre of the universe. The Bishops and 
Archbishops present refused to look through Galileo’s lenses at the moon 
and the stars, for fear that what they might see might question their reason. 
When we read Kierkegaard, we respond with reason, but also with emotion, 
and I am asking in this thesis that we be prepared to look through the lens 
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of our emotion to understand better our reasoned response to this most 
cerebral writer, philosopher and theologian.  
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Appendix I:  A Clinical Vignette 
 
What follows is an extract from a full case study to be found in a standard 
teaching text that accompanies DSM-IV 573.  
(Nick is a 25 year-old African American man, presenting for 
depression) 
 
Nick is tall, bearded, muscular and handsome. He is meticulously 
dressed in a white suit and has a rose in his lapel… 
 
When asked why he has come for an evaluation, he replies laughingly 
that he has done it to appease his family doctor “who seemed worried 
about” him. He has also read a book on psychotherapy and hopes 
that “maybe there is someone very special who can understand me. 
I’d make the most incredible patient.”… 
 
Nick pulls out of his attaché case a series of newspaper clippings, his 
resume, photographs of himself, including some with famous people, 
and a photostatted dollar bill with his face replacing George 
Washington’s. Using these as cues he begins to tell his story… 
 
(Speaking of a relationship with a famous actor): When the actor came 
to town, Nick rented a limousine and showed up at the gala “as a 
joke” as though he were the star himself. The actor’s agent expressed 
annoyance at what he had done, causing Nick to fly into a rage. When 
Nick cooled down, he realised that he was “wasting my time 
promoting others, and that it was time to start promoting myself”. 
“Someday”, he said, pointing to the picture of the actor, “he will want 
to be president of my fan club”… 
 
Nick (an actor) has had little previous acting experience of a 
professional nature but he is sure success “is only a matter of time”. 
He pulls out some promotional material he has written for his actors 
and says “I should write letters to God – He’d love them!” 
 
When the psychiatrist is surprised that some materials are signed by 
a different name than the one Nick has given the receptionist, Nick 
pulls out a legal document explaining the name change. He has 
dropped his family name and taken as his new second name his own 
middle name. 
 
Recently he has dated and adored a man with the same first name as 
his own; but as he became disenchanted, he realised that the man 
was ugly and was an embarrassment because he dressed so poor. He 
has no relationships with other homosexual men now, describing 
                                                
573 There is a small industry surrounding DSM. Examples of supplementary 
pedagogic texts would include Spitzer (2002) and LaBruzza (1994).  
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them as “only interested in sex”. He considers heterosexual men 
“mindless and without aesthetic taste”. The only people who have 
understood him are older men who have suffered as much as he has. 
“One day, the mindless happy people who have ignored me will be 
lining up to see my movies”…. 
 
Nick described a tortured childhood, being picked on by his peers for 
looking odd, until he began body-building…. 
 
At the end of the interview, Nick is referred to an experienced clinician 
associated with clinic, who charges a minimal fee ($10) which Nick 
can afford. However, Nick requests a referral to someone who would 
offer him free treatment, seeing no reason for paying anyone, as the 
therapist “would be getting as much out of it” as he would. 574 
 
It is easy to find, in this not atypical case, all of the elements of Narcissistic 
Personality Disorder. Nick’s grandiosity is overwhelming, his sense of being 
special overwhelming. He needs constant attention, and is rapidly dismissive 
of those no longer able to sustain his narcissistic supply. From this follows a 
likely lack of empathy for the feelings of others. So we can readily tick off all 
of the DSM-IV traits: he has a grandiose sense of self-importance; is 
preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, etc; believes that he is 
special and unique and can only be understood by other special people; 
requires excessive admiration; has a sense of unreasonable entitlement; is 
interpersonally exploitative; lacks empathy; is often envious of others, and 
believes that others are envious of him. 
                                                
574 Spitzer (2002) p 84. 
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Appendix II: God and Psychoanalysis 
 
II.1 Introduction 
 
One other topic that might well be considered when exploring the life and 
works of Søren Kierkegaard is the perception of God in psychoanalytic 
thinking, and thereby the relationship between a very twentieth century way 
of thinking about subjectivity and a somewhat older approach. We can look 
at the relationship between God and psychoanalysis for one obvious reason. 
Freud had it that religion is a neurosis. If this be true, then Kierkegaard, 
among many others, was theorising pointlessly: his words are just the 
ranting of a neurotic. And while philosophically interesting, and of doubtless 
literary merit, Kierkegaard’s ideas along with all other discourse about 
religion should, on Freud's view, be bracketed awaiting a cure for the 
religious neurosis. Apart from that, using Kierkegaard as an examplar 
becomes pointless if Freud is right. If Kierkegaard is the purveyor of nothing 
more than neurosis, then our response itself may be little more than 
neurotic. 
 
My view is that Freud was, at the very least, superficial in his assessment 
and diagnosis, and in the first section of this appendix I follow through the 
inverse of Freud's proposition, by considering that psychoanalysis is no 
more than a revision of religious belief. More to the point, I look closely at 
Winnicott's idea of the intermediate space, and suggest that here we have a 
set of concepts and terminology, a private language if you will, that permits a 
more reasonable and consonant explanation of the primacy of religious belief 
and experience. I do not believe that Kierkegaard's ruminations need be 
bracketed at all; rather, Kierkegaard addresses us in this very intermediate 
space, this third term between the subjective and the objective, this place to 
which we return, an altogether sacred space. 
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II.2 The Freudian View 
 
The question that has to be answered in any discussion of psychoanalysis 
and religion is: which is the narrative and which the meta-narrative? Freud 
himself had it, in writing Totem and Taboo, 575 that Judeo-Christian beliefs 
stem from a tribal murder of the father by his sons, followed by his 
reification out of their guilt, with the Oedipal situation arising directly from 
this brutal act. The key argument in Freud’s text is worth quoting: 
One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed 
and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal 
horde. United they had the courage to do, and succeeded in doing, 
what would have been impossible for them individually. Cannibal 
savages as they were it goes without saying that they devoured their 
victim as well as killing him. The violent primal father had doubtless 
been the feared and envied model of each one of the company of 
brothers; and in the act of devouring him they accomplished their 
identification with him, and each one of them acquired a portion of 
his strength. The totem meal, which is perhaps mankind’s earliest 
festival, would thus be a repetition and a commemoration of this 
memorable and criminal deed, which was the beginning of so many 
things – of social organisation, of moral restriction, and of religion. 576 
 
Freud thus was positing a psychoanalytic meta-narrative, and hence that all 
religions descend from this primal act 577; Judeo-Christian beliefs were an 
instance of such a subordinate narrative. There has since come about a very 
large secondary literature on this Freudian view of the origins and nature of 
religious belief 578 (though since it is not germane to my argument I will not 
pursue it here). Of late, however, Freud's foundational text and the 
supporting ideas have been severely criticised. 579 Nonetheless, the idea 
                                                
575 Freud, SE XIII. 
576 ibid pp141-142. 
577
 he did elaborate on this model somewhat in The Future of an Illusion. Freud, SE 
XXI. 
578
 For example Erich Fromm offered a particularly insightful but faithful recasting of 
Freud’s key ideas in The Dogma of Christ (Fromm (1963)). Most of the earlier 
psychoanalytic theorists also had their own version of the Freudian model.  
579 Freud’s original explanation is, for many, akin to one of Rudyard Kipling’s ‘Just 
So’ stories, fantastic tales about how the elephant got his trunk, the giraffe his neck. 
Totem and Taboo is, in not dissimilar language, about how humankind got religion. 
For a general introduction to the problems of the strict Freudian view, see Kung 
(1979).  For a real riposte, turning the tables on Freud, see William Meissner’s 
Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience (Meissner (1984). To be more specific, note 
that even in Ricoeur’s sympathetic reading, he concludes that ‘Totem and Taboo is 
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remained important for Freud, for example in his continuing development of 
the concept of the superego, and it remains a crucial part of strict Freudian 
theory. But it does now seem a trifle slight a basis for all that is 
encompassed by the idea of religion. On this reading, Kierkegaard can be 
dismissed as trite and flawed, as just another author writing up his neurosis 
for the world to inspect. 
 
Much more insight can be gained, I suggest, by reversing the situation and 
entertaining the view that psychoanalysis is the narrative to religion’s meta-
narrative. A summary of that view and its implications can show 
Kierkegaard to be the opposite of trite; rather he can be seen as a writer very 
much in tune with key post-Freudian concepts. First, let me show the 
derivation of first Freudian and then post-Freudian psychoanalysis from the 
story that is Christianity. 
 
The essential biblical narrative is easy to summarise, although doubtless 
there are many such summaries. Here is one: God creates the heaven and 
earth; this creation culminates in humankind in the form of Adam and Eve; 
Adam and Eve live in paradise; they fall from God's grace; they are cast out 
of into a world of sin and evil and suffering; Christ's birth is a sign that God 
has promised redemption; redemption has not occurred, yet 580. 
 
Following Abrams 581, and without entering the labyrinthine complexity of 
biblical narrative, I would make three points that relate the biblical story to 
psychoanalysis. First, the Bible story is linear: it tells of events occurring in 
a single temporal span, with, as it were, a beginning, a middle and an end. 
Second it is what might be called prospectivist: there was bliss in the past, 
the present is a fallen time, the future is filled with hope; and it is obviously 
an eschatological story, looking towards the last things, the vision of the end 
                                                                                                                                       
simply a huge vicious circle in which an analyst’s fantasy responds to the 
analysand’s’ (Ricoeur (1970) p 208).  
580 I do not want to enter into the profundities of this narrative, only to make a point 
about the ease with which psychoanalytic metaphors can be seen as derivative of 
more biblical metaphors.  
581 This is taken from Abrams Natural Supernaturalism, pp 35 – 65, his sections on 
The Design of Biblical History, Christian History and Psychobiography, and 
Alternative Ways to the Millennium (Abrams (1973)).   
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of history. Third, it is about suffering and evil. The story describes the 
problem of evil, but also offers a solution in the form of God's redemption 
through Christ. 
 
Freudian psychoanalysis is surprisingly similar in outline. It posits a linear 
path through life, with the neurotic self capable of being cured through 
analysis. We leave the initial state of postuterine bliss to become, courtesy of 
the oedipal crises, imperfect. We then live our lives having fallen from 
psychical innocence. But analysis will reverse the course of any such 
neurosis, and hold out the possibility of living the perfect and happy life. 
However, analysis is not a perfect science, and the proffered cure, or 
redemption, may or may not materialise. 
 
So the origins of psychoanalysis on this view could be Christian. There has 
been a secular reinterpretation 582 of the original religious story about how 
the soul has fallen away from God and how we might reunite with him; the 
original biblical story has been transformed into a wholly secular story about 
the self – its origins, development and vicissitudes. According to this view it 
was the Romantic era, in response to the broken promises of the 
Enlightenment, which translated some key Christian themes into non-
theological issues 583. Essentially, the soul was reworked as the self, and 
God quietly receded. As Abrams summarises it: 
Romantic writers revived these ancient matters with a difference: they 
undertook to save the overview of human history and destiny, the 
experiential paradigms, and the cardinal values of their religious 
heritage, by reconstituting them in a way that would make them 
intellectually acceptable as well as emotionally pertinent, for the time 
being. 584 
 
 
 
 
                                                
582 for a general discussion see Kirschner Ch 1 (1996).  
583 again, this is a very large area. I have drawn on Abrams (1973). But this is not 
my central thesis there. I am arguing only for the relativism of things, the 
reversibility of narrative and meta-narrative. The details of how the relativism might 
have come about, though fascinating, will not detain me. 
584
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II.3 The Protestant Influence 
 
This late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century move has been 
greatly added to by the arrival of Object Relations Theory and Self 
Psychology in psychoanalysis over the last fifty or so years. The particular 
issue that has occupied Anglo-American psychoanalytic practitioners since 
Freud is that of the self and its formation through relationships. And this 
has focused on personal life and events prior to Freud’s important Oedipal 
phase. A case can, and indeed has been made 585, that British School object 
relations theory (and its US counterparts) is a psychoanalysis extolling 
essentially Protestant and Presbyterian Christian values. Much Anglo-Saxon 
post-Freudian psychoanalysis is about self-reliance, self-direction, and 
verbal expression. It is about self-reliance in the sense of knowing the self, 
the true self, having self-awareness. It is about self-direction in the sense of 
using this inner certainty to attain independence. It is about being skilled in 
verbally expressing what one wants, feels and fears.  
 
Self-reliance, I suggest, is a Calvinist influence, for it was Calvin who, 
building on others, particularly emphasised the attainment of salvation 
through one’s own effort. 586 This devolving of salvation, in whatever sense of 
that term, to the self, is both a mark of Protestantism, and a mark of Anglo-
Saxon post-Freudian psychoanalysis. Independence of spirit, the soul and 
salvation have migrated from faith to psychoanalysis.  
 
Self-direction on the other hand is about knowing what is in one’s heart, and 
then living one’s life according to those truths. Know Thyself 587, but more 
importantly, live accordingly. Implicit is that one must live according to one’s 
own desires, not those of anybody else. It is again about true and false 
selves, about knowing what a truth for oneself might be, and not yielding to 
following a life path that is directed from anywhere else. But this idea of a 
true self might in turn be seen as a derivation of the concept of inner light, 
whereby the human sprit may be illuminated by a spark, a lighting from 
                                                
585 see Kirschner (1996) Ch 2 for a discussion. 
586 Perry (1944) pp 93-94.  
587 inscribed on the temple at Delphi. 
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God, such that one may thereby apprehend what is right, in which way lies 
salvation 588. So on this view, the concept of inner light has also become 
completely secularised. 589 Finding and knowing oneself through 
introspection and self-awareness, and then living a life by those precepts, is 
an endemic and dominant world-view in certainly in the US and increasingly 
the United Kingdom cultures. 
 
(But, demonstrably, this is not a universal set of cultural values. Nor is it 
even a universal set of values that can be embraced by all varieties of 
psychoanalysis. It is distinctly Anglo-Saxon, Protestant and recent. It is true 
for Freudian theory and its developments in the US and the UK, along with 
some other northern European countries. It is how we do psychoanalysis 
here, but this is not true for other parts of Europe, or say South America, 
where a there is much less emphasis on the self. Psychoanalysis in 
Mediterranean countries, for example, has embraced these concepts to a 
much smaller extent. In Paris, Lacan retains a considerable influence, and 
he finds the concept of the self to be one to be done away with, or at least 
‘dissolved’. 590 Winnicott’s distinction between the true and false selves is 
viewed with some disdain by probably a majority of French psychoanalysts. 
Latino nations, European and otherwise, still emphasise the role and 
importance of family and tradition, and one’s place, role and independence 
in the world much more circumscribed by this view.) 
 
Nonetheless, I suggest it is not difficult to make the link between 
Protestantism and the Freudian world-view. Protestantism, it has been 
summarised, emphasises religious individuality, as well as the priesthood for 
all believers, emphasising the individual’s personal relationship with God 
(with respect for individual conscience, thus emphasising the individual’s 
own right to his own spiritual practice), along with responsibility for his own 
                                                
588 The term was much used by Quakers, deriving from "That was the true light, 
which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."  See Moore (2000) for a 
discussion.  
589 see Paul Tillich (1968) 'The rationalists were all philosophers of the inner light…. 
Rationalism was born out of mysticism in both Greek and modern culture. …This 
happened in many places…The one term which grasps their unity is the term 'inner 
light' pp 317-318. 
590
 See Olinor (1988) p 12.  
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spiritual condition. 591 This version of Protestantism particularly emerged in 
England and Germany during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and 
has been successfully exported particularly to the United States. It was 
perhaps a similar non-conformist mentality and desire to challenge 
orthodoxy that generated the post-Freudian psychoanalytic theories I am 
discussing. Interestingly, Fairbairn was raised and stayed with the Scottish 
Presbyterian Church, while Winnicott was raised as a Methodist. Harry 
Guntrip, the third member of the core of the British School of Object 
Relations, was himself raised as a dissenting Congregationalist. 592 
 
I comment on this simply to make the point that viewing psychoanalysis as 
any kind of meta-narrative is difficult to support. It is easy to show a 
cultural influence for the particular brand of psychoanalysis that is now 
prevalent in the Anglo-Saxon world.  Hence, I remain very suspicious that 
object relations theory, the status of the primary defence mechanisms and 
the other unconscious processes that I refer to in this thesis, are in any 
sense objective and ultimate. Rather, they are of our time, and useful and 
convenient constructs, but I do not seek in this thesis to reify them. So the 
theories I here espouse, and the implications they carry for our views of what 
it is to be human, I believe to be culturally constituted, value-laden and 
involve issues relating to power and status. In particular, the concept of the 
psychoanalytic development of the self is quite culturally embedded and 
socially meshed; it is a product of this time and place. I especially reject the 
psychodynamic tenet, implied in the opening quotation of this chapter, that 
God and the soul are merely symbolic, whereas the self and the object are 
essential, ontological and permanent. We have no certain means of knowing 
which is which. The key I think is in a phrase from David Walsh: 
A historical picture that emerges is not of a world increasingly 
separating itself from God, but of a world progressively absorbing the 
divine substances into itself. 593 
 
On this view, then, issues about the ultimate meaning of life have come to 
reside in us, in relationships, and in ordinary life. We can talk, as never 
                                                
591 Lukes (1973) p 94.  
592 See Sutherland (1989) and Phillips (1988). 
593 Walsh (1983) p 9.  
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before, about what happens for people when they wrestle with the most 
existentially important issues for them. There are of course limits to any 
language, and still whereof we cannot speak clearly we really ought to 
remain silent, for in any given context silence has its own meaning. But we 
have, through psychoanalysis, another set of mechanisms and above all 
another language for thinking about how we connect and reconnect with 
what is most profound within our selves.  
 
 
II.4 The Intermediate Space 
 
There is a variation on the basic triple-phased psychoanalytic model, 
outlined above, of an initial bliss, a falling from grace through the legacy of 
Oedipus, and then a promise of redemption through psychoanalysis. This 
variation retains the idea of a dialectic, of an endless tension and desire to 
return to a state of fulfilment, while acknowledging that some kind of 
rupture has occurred and occurred irrevocably. Such a view perhaps 
originated in the Romantic period. Again, I do not wish to pursue the 
minutiae of this view, other than to make the case for the arbitrariness of 
metaphors in psychoanalysis, while showing that psychoanalysis in fact, 
rather than dismissing Christian religion, has provided another language 
and another set of concepts for talking about it.   
 
The Romantic era, though heirs to the Enlightenment, found dissatisfaction 
in its rationalist view. 594 The great Romantic writers countered the 
Enlightenment dogma with a need to return to an inner spirituality. 595 The 
civilised human had become estranged from his natural instinctive self, and 
nature itself. This is not to suggest there should be an unmediated return to 
that self of instincts; rather that there is an unavoidable dialectic between 
the undoubted benefits of rationalism, and the necessity of more primitive 
and emotional ways of being. The division between the rational self and the 
natural world, while in some sense lamentable, is also unavoidable. So there 
                                                
594 Abrams (1973) provides the basic story. 
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is a need to undergo the suffering that division, alienation and conflict bring 
about, so that man may come to know his own identity and hence his 
relation with the rest of the universe. 
 
It is easy to see how his more refined view has been taken up by the post-
Freudians. They would deny the simplicity of Freud's monolithic model, and 
see the concept of cure as superficial at best. We remain in a persistent 
dilemma between wishing to return to some neonatal bliss of fusion, and the 
drive that leads to inevitable separation that is our destiny. No one has 
explored this tension so well as Donald Winnicott; he coined the terms, as 
well as effectively inventing the concepts, of the intermediate space and the 
intermediate object. He, perhaps more than any other, realised the dialectic 
nature of personal development, which mirrors the biblical story of a falling 
away from God followed by a desire for reuniting. In Winnicott's language, 
this is to do with returning whence we came to a blissful and primitive state, 
where we were united and not yet separated from the source of life and love. 
To lead a fulfilling life means that we necessarily, from time to time, return 
to this place. 
 
Winnicott's insight was that, notwithstanding half a millennium of dualism, 
there is a third term between the 'I', the self, and the 'you', the object. This 
he called the intermediate space, and it is populated by intermediate objects:  
The third part of the life of a human being, a part that we cannot 
ignore, is an intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality 
and external life both contribute. It is an area that is not challenged 
because no claim is made on its behalf except that it shall exist as a 
resting place for the individual engaged in the perpetual human task 
of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet interrelated.  
 
This area of playing is not inner psychic reality. It is outside the 
individual, but it is not the external world… In his play area the child 
gathers objects or phenomena from external reality and uses these in 
the service of some sample derived from inner or personal reality….In 
playing, the child manipulates external phenomena in the service of 
the dream and invests chosen external phenomena with dream 
meaning and feeling. 596 
 
                                                                                                                                       
595 See Abrams (1973) Chs 6 - 8. 
596 Winnicott (1971) p 2.  
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For every person born into this life, Winnicott suggests, the initial move is 
from omnipotent merger with object (all the world is me) to disillusionment 
and realisation of separate selfhood and limits of what the self can achieve. 
It begins for Winnicott as the basic linkage: 'there is no such thing as a 
baby', he famously said. It is the mother, through what Winnicott called 
maternal immersion, who mirrors the infant to a sufficient degree to enable 
the baby to believe that they control the world about them: what they want, 
through the good offices of the good-enough mother, they get. They want the 
breast, they cry and usually it appears. This enables the infant to develop a 
sense of a true self. By her attunement to the baby, the mother ensures the 
baby can enjoy states of omnipotent fantasy.  
 
In play, the child invests external things with internal meanings, and does 
so in a psychological space resonating with the earliest experiences of 
intimacy. The baby was able to begin to comprehend the idea of the external, 
the 'not-me', only because mother, the good-enough mother, gave sufficient 
early intimate mirroring and support for this initial omnipotent state to be 
transgressed. This very experience of play resonates with the very earliest 
memories: 'the playground is a potential space between the mother and the 
baby '. 597 It is a state about which we never lose our attachment or longing. 
 
But even with a good-enough mother, failure inevitably happens, as the 
mother looses her absolute preoccupation with baby. 'The mother's eventual 
task is gradually to disillusion the infant.' 598 As long as this happens at the 
right time, the true self is assured. If this happens too early, there is no 
chance for the true self to emerge and consolidate, and all the child ever 
knows is a false self, responding only to the needs of others. But if all goes 
well, this inner core, the true self remains. It is for Winnicott a very private 
self, uncommunicative, isolationist: 
'Although healthy persons communicate and enjoy communicating, 
the other fact is equally true, that each individual is an isolate, 
                                                
597 ibid p 47. 
598 Primitive Emotional Development in Collected Papers p 145-146 (Winnicott 
(1992)). 
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permanently non-communicating, permanently unknown, in fact 
unfound.' 599 
 
There is thus a part of the self that does not communicate, that does not 
want to be met, to be found, and indeed must be left in that state.  
 
So this is the key process: the attribution to internal objects of external 
reality, and the assimilation of external objects into an internal world. This 
playground may begin as a theatre of teddy bears and similar friends, but 
becomes, in due course, the arena for art, for religion, for creativity, for 
invention. While the intermediate space remains and develops in the healthy 
child, the first intermediate objects do not. In an oft-quoted passage, 
Winnicott says of teddy bear: 
Its fate is to be gradually allowed to be decathected, so that in the 
course of years it becomes not so much forgotten as relegated to 
limbo. By this I mean that in health, the transitional object does not 
"go inside" nor does the feeling about it necessarily undergo 
repression. It is not forgotten and it is not mourned. It loses meaning, 
and this is because the transitional phenomena have become 
diffused, have become spread out over the whole intermediate 
territory between "inner psychic reality" and "the external world as 
perceived by two persons in common", that is to say over the whole 
cultural field. 600 
 
Even though particular transitional objects recede, the driver for them 
remains forever. There is a constant dialectic between the wholly controllable 
world of "me", of subject, and the essentially uncontrollable world on "it", of 
object. We engage with the latter at the expense of the comfort of the former, 
and we return to our intermediate space, therefore, as a more comfortable 
place, a place of retreat, a personal and individual space, but above all a 
space of experience. This is where we make sense of experience in the 
external world by relating it to our personal and more primitive template. 
 
What it clear, I suggest, when reading Klein, Fairbairn, and Winnicott in 
particular, is the non-linearity of their concept of personal growth. Fairbairn 
speaks of the goal of healthy psychical development as being the move from 
                                                
599 Communicating and Not Communicating leading to a Study of Certain Opposites. 
In Maturational Processes p 187 (Winnicott (1965)). 
600 Winnicott (1971) p 12. 
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dependency to independence, but he shows clearly that this is a goal, rather 
than something actually achievable. Winnicott is, I feel, considerably more 
subtle, in his use of the concept of intermediate space. What these three 
writers in particular are talking about is the dialectic of growth. There is a 
continuing and permanent tension between letting go, growth, and social 
development on one hand, and returning, regression and personal isolation 
on the other. It is as if there is a permanent underside to development, that 
we sense the positive, enjoy the trajectory, have pride in our achievements, 
but are less self aware about the need and pressure to return to our safe 
place, to regress.  
The task of reality acceptance is never completed. No human being is 
free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality, and that relief 
from this strain is provided by an intermediate area of experience… 
This intermediate area is in direct continuity with the play area of the 
small child who is "lost" in play. 601 
 
Hence there is a real difference between the essentially Protestant 
secularised version of the biblical narrative (the idea that self-awareness and 
self-reliance are now the road to redemption) and Winnicott’s view of 
personal growth. Though desirable goals, self-awareness and reliance cannot 
be achieved as a single and simple trajectory, he would suggest. There is a 
continuing dialectic between the benign regression he refers to above, and 
the very grown up process of re-connecting at a higher level, once 
independence is achieved. 
 
The self that can be alone in the presence of another, particular another with 
whom it has intimate relations, can reconnect without becoming 
overwhelmed by its own responsiveness to the other's qualities or needs. The 
self that can use objects in this way has attained a capacity to relate to 
another, not as a pathological false self, but by being able to reconnect to it 
at a higher and more individuated way. But most importantly, all of this 
permits the benign regressions to the intermediate state, the intermediate 
place, a place that engenders creativity, culture, and religion, where the real 
dialectics, between separateness and togetherness, illusion and reality and 
boundlessness and limitation can co-exist. For the pathological individual, 
                                                
601 Winnicott (1971) p 13. 
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this threatens sanity; for the normal person, this is a hugely enriching 
process. 
 
So there is a place for each of us between the desire for primary fusion and 
the demands and calls of the real world. In this place we engage in 
dialectical processes; we admit the external, and accept but modify, 
assimilate but accommodate, according to our primary need for fusion. And 
simultaneously we release our most fundamental wishes into the space, and 
test these against the demands of the real world, again, maintaining yet 
adapting what is most precious to us. This is truly a sacred place. For the 
few, it is the locus of inspiration and creativity that results in the novel, the 
sonata, or the architectural construction. For many, this is where we touch 
that most vital to our existence; here we meet the idea of the Holy; here, the 
Ground of our Being. For Kierkegaard, here was the gestation for Fear and 
Trembling, Works of Love, and The Sickness Unto Death. 
 
Thus I maintain that Freud was being at best superficial in his dismissal of 
all religion as mere human neurosis. Winnicott’s post-Freudian view gives a 
psychoanalytic basis for finding a truth about human religion, and shows its 
importance to us all. One could summarise Kierkegaard by saying that, 
when pushed to its limits, human life encounters God, for Spirit is the 
means, the basis, of the self’s relation to itself. For psychoanalysis to 
denigrate this insight to a neurosis is for me unacceptable. In returning to 
our intermediate space, we make contact with that which has been most 
vital in our lives. And we return to this place oft and with good reason; for it 
remains a touchstone of the experience of being human. We assert ourselves 
through relationships with the other in the external world; but we define 
ourselves by relating our self to our self in this most numinous internal 
place. 
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APPENDIX III  
 
The Troubling Matter of Mental Illness 
 
 
III.1  Introduction 
 
 
This appendix outlines my own views on the concept of psychopathology, the 
concept and its language. As the reader will have noted, I have struggled 
with the language of psychopathology, and explicating the theory of 
narcissism has involved very difficult and sometimes convoluted re-
presentations of the ideas of the masters of this field. I would rather view 
narcissism not as pathological, but as a way of being in the world. But at the 
margin, narcissism brings about behaviours that I will call unwanted, for the 
narcissist and those around him. I have to reconcile what seems like a fact 
with what I propose is a value: narcissism in our time brings sufferers to 
seek professional help to make their suffering go away; and those around 
narcissists agree that there is a deep unhappiness associated with this 
syndrome. This suffering and unhappiness, for those affected, does not feel 
like an intellectual option – the suffering is very real, and seems objective, 
not open to fine philosophical discussion. So in what sense we can speak of 
psychopathology?  
 
I want to look at recent innovations in psychodynamic psychotherapy that 
emphasise the atrophy of the concept of cure, and the quite dramatic change 
in the relationship between the analyst and analysand. From this, I draw the 
conclusion that the term psychopathology is very much a convenient 
concept when producing theory. Any theory in the psychological sciences is 
about explaining differences in response in some sense. Any theory about 
mental behaviour will set up what will be called a normal process, and 
compare it with something different, and this different process is often called 
pathological. This value-laden term I suspect is used for historical reasons, 
and in reality is intellectually lazy: pathology has become another term for 
difference.  But before that, I want to consider the cultural change that has 
been taking place in how we think of mental illness, particularly in the last 
  
 
Page 280 
 
 
thirty years, driven in part by pure philosophy and the rise of relativism, and 
in part by the neurosciences, that has questioned to a great extent the 
division between normal and abnormal in anything to do with the brain. 
First, then, let me recklessly sprint through thirty years of theory in 
psychiatry to show the demolition of many of the foundations of mental 
illness. 
 
But prior to that I have to confess that I cannot sit with the most extreme 
schools of anti-psychiatry on this matter. Laing’s revision of Kraepelin’s 
observations on an insane patient being interrogated at a public lecture 602 
doubtless has face validity; when it first appeared it was extremely 
appealing. The problem is that we are dealing, in extremis, with people who 
have lost the distinction between the self and the other, between the ‘I’ and 
the ‘It’. They are living in a world where there is no distinction, no boundary 
between where they end and where the objective world begins. All the world 
is controlled by them and they are in turn controlled by the world. In severe 
psychotic states this is a truly, truly terrifying state in which to be. They are 
trying to bear unbearable states of mind. The vast majority of us have simply 
no idea of the terror involved. 603 It might theoretically be possible to contain, 
                                                
602 Laing (1960), pp29-30.  
603 A personal footnote: I met mental illness - madness - at the age of 19, when I 
worked for three months in a state mental asylum in Lancashire. As part of my 
undergraduate degree, we were encouraged to spend time working in some aspect of 
the psychological disciplines. Hence I became a nursing assistant in a four 
thousand-bed asylum, a dumping ground, truth be told, for the schizophrenics of 
north Manchester. I lived in the Victorian nurses’ home; I was the only guest, since 
the remainder of the nursing staff lived locally and went home after work. The 
rooms, completely neglected since the second-world war, made my previous 
boarding school environment seem quite opulent. I was assigned to a ward of 
seventy-eight men, all deemed schizophrenic and all institutionalised. My primary 
task was to attend to their morning toilette. And so, just one year out of privileged 
education, I was obliged to wet-shave the faces these seventy-eight men, itself an 
indecent intimacy, and then wipe the arses of the same seventy-eight, mainly 
doubly-incontinent schizophrenics, all before breakfast. It was a unique experience. 
But among the ward members was a single teenager, a very disturbed and quite 
dangerous psychotic young man. The neuroleptics of the day, mainly Haloperidol 
and Chlorpromazine, had no effect on him, and he was regularly assigned to the 
padded cell, still in use even though tranquillisers made such a place unnecessary 
for most patients. There he would remain for days at a time, shouting the single 
sentence: ‘I’m not fucking mental. I’m not fucking mental.’ As it happened, the air 
vent for this cell exited just below the window of my room in the nursing quarters. 
So, when not on the ward, I could lie awake, alone in that creaking building, 
listening to the terrible anguish of this young, mad, man. He once continued 
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to understand this world, and so help the patient make sense of it. But the 
gap between the perceived reality of the patient and perceived reality of the 
helper can sometime be so great that any approachement is impossible. 
These people we call mad, not for political, social, moral or control reasons, 
but because there is no possibility, as we see it, either of their entering our 
world, or our entering theirs.  
 
 
III.2 Deconstructing Psychiatry 
 
I want to suggest most psychiatric disease entities, especially as defined 
through DSM-IV, are actually value-laden entities. This is true of narcissism: 
DSM-IV describes a state but considers no underlying process; it is an entity 
generated through a perhaps flawed democratic process in the medicalised 
professions; it is one imbued with values about disease, discomfort and 
disability. As an entity or concept it no doubt serves many purposes – 
economic, political, social, intellectual - but helps little in the understanding 
of what makes anyone live the life they live, or write the texts they write.  
 
The only real issue is the distinction between psychiatric facts and 
psychiatric values. All other issues are footnotes to this debate. However, in 
this post-modern age, there remains a substantial body of medical 
professionals who would view many if not most psychiatric diagnoses as 
based on empirical and objective fact. So within psychiatry we have two 
groups, each claiming philosophical lineage, and each, it would seem, 
implacably opposed to the other. 604 Most recently in psychiatry, Agich 605 
and Fulford 606 might be singled out as major champions of the pro-value 
team; while Kendell 607, Wakefield 608 and Boorse 609 can be mentioned as 
proponents of the pro-fact group. 
                                                                                                                                       
shouting for thirty-six hours without any break, thus giving me much time to reflect 
on what being fucking mental might actually entail. 
604 For a general discussion on this point, and as a guide to the myriad of references 
on this topic, see Fulford et al (2003).  
605 Agich (1994). 
606 Fulford (2002) in Sadler (2002). 
607 Kendell (1986). 
608 Wakefield (1994). 
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But there are attempts at integration. Fulford in particular has suggested 
that while values are everywhere in medicine, they are most obvious in 
psychiatry. He suggests that where values are uniform, they tend to be 
shared and hence implicit and become reduced to facts. Where they are not 
shared, where different values can operate in a given context, then they 
become apparent. 610 But admitting that values, implicit or explicit, are 
everywhere has implications - the very concept of disease is itself 
presumably a value concept. It is possible, though perhaps unlikely, that 
there have been or will be cultures where any kind of disability is not 
thought of as in any way disabling. 611  
 
This primary opposition can be developed into several issues. A mental 
disorder has been defined as an ‘involuntary organismic impairment in 
psychological functioning’. 612 So here is a clear implication of a value 
judgement about necessary, adequate or optimal psychological functioning: 
the diagnosis of mental ill health thus calls for a value judgement about poor 
or inadequate psychological functioning. (The same reasoning is of course 
applicable to physical illness – there is a value judgement about optimal 
physical functioning, equally value laden, though since it is a culture wide 
assumption, it is never mentioned, except for headline cases, for example 
about withdrawal of life support systems).  
 
At some stage one must ask the age-old question: is physical medicine 
actually different from psychiatry? There has been great discussion from 
both philosophers and anti-psychiatrists. Briefly, if the mind is an abstract 
entity, how can it have physical attributes? If the medical model says that a 
physical illness is caused ultimately by the improper functioning of a 
physical organ, does this mean that all mental illness is caused by an 
improper functioning of the brain? This is the stance of neurology, and the 
situation is valid for some psychiatric conditions, reflected in DSM-IV, that 
                                                                                                                                       
609 Boorse (175).  
610 Fulford (2000).  
611 Widiger (2002).  
612 Widiger and Trull (1991) p 112.  
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are based on a malfunction of a part of the brain, just as is the case for 
physical illness. For much of psychiatry, such situations are a rarity. 
Common sense tells us that many mental conditions – simple neuroses, 
many personality disorders - would seem to fall outside this frame. A way of 
being can be called abnormal in one culture, even in one family, but not in 
another. Some argue that true physical diseases have a straightforward 
aetiology and are treated essentially in the same way in every society. Mental 
illness, by contrast, is a whole person acting in a social role. Mental illness 
refers to the identity or being of the person, rather than something apart. 
Neurology can have little to say about this. 
 
But this still begs the greater question about what counts as a disease. Just 
because I have the symptoms of some disease, am I necessarily ill? That 
decision also surely is cultural, psychological, personal. This decision to 
permit or encourage the label ‘ill’ about one’s self, the process by which an 
individual allows themselves to be labelled as ill, with all the personal and 
social implications that contains, has been discussed at length. 613. I suggest 
that even in the case of a complete aetiologically-based syndrome, the 
presence of a disease is not the same as being ill. The former may be 
reasonably objective; the latter is usually cultural and personal.  
 
And of course the roles of culture and history are evident at every point 
throughout the history of psychiatry. This is true to a lesser extent in 
physical illness (though consider the debates during the last century about 
the advisability of otherwise of tonsillectomy or circumcision). But in mental 
ill-health there is much greater opportunity for cultural bias. So here, reflect 
on the diagnosis of draepetomania 614 in the nineteenth century, or the 
diagnosis of homosexuality as a psychiatric disease for much of the 
twentieth.   
 
Further, there is an undoubted ‘pseudoscience’ about the way psychiatric 
disease is currently diagnosed. Let me give the DSM-IV approach to 
diagnosing schizophrenia as an example. For a diagnosis, there must be 
                                                
613 Scheff (1999).  
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found any two symptoms out of a list of six, for a period of one month, along 
with continuous existence of the psychotic symptoms for six months; there 
must not be incidence of mood disorder or schizoaffective disorders. This is 
very exact; this kind of diagnostic process is surely very much along the 
lines of teche or the nomothetic: it is about ticking boxes rather than 
understanding a person. The psychiatric patient is objectivised into a series 
of discrete, atomic facts, and a diagnosis made on that basis.  
 
So what does hold psychiatric classification together? What psychiatric 
diagnoses have in common, I suggest, is an intersubjective judgement and 
agreement between professionals both about what is right and wrong, and 
how to put it right. And this is exactly the complaint of the anti-psychiatrists 
of the 1960s. Intersubjective agreement between psychiatrists increases 
their power and control, and therapies of the day may be nothing more than 
coercions into more appropriate behaviours.615 Psychiatry is unique in 
medicine in that it can oblige citizens to incarceration, and perform 
processes upon them without their consent.  
 
The logical extension of this view is that psychiatric classification is about 
classifying social norms rather than disease, and that it remains a means of 
imposing social control. The archdeacon of such views is Michael Foucault: 
..a society expresses itself positively in the mental illnesses 
manifested by its members; and this is so whatever status it gives to 
these morbid forms: whether it places them at the centre of religious 
life, as if often the case among primitive peoples; or whether it seeks 
to expatriate them by placing them outside social life, as does our own 
culture. 616 
 
Foucault’s point is that social practices, institutions and knowledge serve to 
construct the social phenomenon of madness. This is not to say that 
madness does not exist, but rather that there is a host of social 
determinants: 
at any given instance, the structure proper to individual experience 
finds a certain number of possible choices (and of excluded 
                                                                                                                                       
614 An unreasonable desire for slaves to escape slavery. 
615 For a concise summary of this view, see Peter Sedgewick’s essay in Boyers et al 
(1972).  
616 Foucault (1987) p 63.  
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possibilities) in the systems of society; inversely at each of their points 
of choice the social structures encounter a certain number of possible 
individuals.’ 617 
 
To put this another way, social factors actually construct individuals, and 
what it is to be a person is determined by the potential categories that may 
be used to describe that person. Unlike the classification of things, 
classification of people makes a difference to how we view ourselves, our 
sense of self worth and even our sense of personal history. For Foucault, it is 
all about power, not just power imposed from the top by a monolithic 
hegemony that enjoys that power, but through a matrix of power: ‘Relations 
of power-knowledge are not static forms of distribution, they are matrices of 
transformations’ 618 that determine who we are not only through being 
subject to power from others but through creating power over others. So 
power is a constitutive of madness. On this view, mental illness is not a 
myth, and psychiatry is not just an exercise in social control. But such a 
view would assert the irreducible role of the social in madness. And hence 
there is no psychiatric disorder independent of a cultural and historical 
setting. Further, empirical science cannot in itself bring about any ultimate 
amelioration in psychiatric illness. Beyond empirical science is the need for 
the historical culture of the time and place to understand its own needs and 
actions. 
 
Against what seems to me to be an unanswerable case for relativism, it 
would appear that the DSM-IV classification increasingly acts as a 
monolithic and unimpeachable source of matters to do with psychiatry. It is 
used as the authority in matters legal, 619 in psychiatric research, in more 
fundamental research even at the genetic level 620; in applications for 
funding for research, in supporting funding for hospitals and clinics, in 
reimbursing psychologists and psychiatrists through health insurance 
schemes, in advancing careers of those in the psychiatric guild.621 Clinically 
it is effectively the only source for problem identification, case formulation, 
                                                
617 Foucault (1980) p 380. 
618 Foucault (1990) p 99.  
619 see for example Schuman (1994).  
620 for a summary see Gottesman (2002)).  
621 There is much written on these points. As just one sample, see Radden (1994).  
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and everyday clinical language. 622 It is owned and published by a profit 
making organisation and publishing house 623, and it was drafted through 
the efforts of a large number of sub-groups and committees, selectively 
drawn from the great and the good of the same psychiatric guild 624. On this 
basis, I cannot see how it can be viewed as other than a hegemony. I suggest 
that Longrino’s criteria of science as a social activity are most pertinent here 
625, and that despite appearances to the contrary, disparate and 
contradictory views about the philosophy that underpins DSM-IV have little 
chance of making themselves heard: there is little advocacy for dissent. 626 
This is not to say that there is no dissent; there has been an enormous 
softening in the lay approach to mental illness, in part as the chemistry of 
moods has become understood, and in part as the great asylums of the 
western world have closed. Caring for those called mentally ill is now much 
more a community process, and attitudes have changed accordingly. But if 
these changes have yet to be reflected in much of orthodox psychiatry, what 
about the other arm of the understanding of the psychical – 
psychodynamics? 
                                                
622 see Schwartz and Wiggins (2002).  
623 see Sabshin (1993) for a commentary. 
624 for a discussion see Kirk and Kutchins (1992).  
625 Longino (1990).  
626 The individuals involved in the compilation of DSM were organised into 13 Work 
Groups, each with a responsibility or a part of the final manual. Participants were 
informed they were included as scholars independent of any theoretical standpoint 
or bias. A Methods Conference, attended by all, prescribed the methods to be 
followed in 'finding, extracting, aggregating and interpreting data in a comprehensive 
and objective fashion'. (APA (1994) p xviii).  Each Work Group then performed 
literature reviews to identify the most pertinent issues. The APA believed without 
doubt that it was involved in a purely objective process, and that it is based on 
extensive, empirical and objective information. (APA (1994) Introduction).  It might 
be pointed out that the membership of the Task Force and Work Groups was made 
up almost entirely of professionals with an MD qualification from the USA: their 
representation never fell below 55% on any group, was often 100%, and averaged 
over 80% (ibid). 
More revealing is the story ((Ritchie (1989), p 698)) about the category of Masochistic 
Personality Disorder, with symptoms of remaining in an exploitative relationship, 
sacrificing one's own interests for others etc. A ginger group pointed out that for 
historical, cultural and sometimes religious reasons, a large proportion of the 
world's women behave in this way. Discussions led to a series of revisions of the 
concept, ending with a question from the group to the Working Party about: 
'whether jogging, playing football, or wearing high heels and girdles constituted 
masochism'. The answer they received was that ‘sports activities were not 
masochistic, nor was wearing high heels. But wearing a girdle is, unless the woman 
is over 70’.  
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III.3 The End of the Concept of Cure 
 
Freud's 19th century background is very important in any discussion of the 
history of psychoanalysis. He took reality for granted. The existence of an 
objective reality, a reality that could be empirically verified, was simply not 
in doubt for Freud or many of his contemporaries. We can debate the exact 
meaning of positivism, but for Freud it involved a belief in an external world 
existing independently of human perception, and one which might 
eventually be completely understood by objective observers using the 
scientific methods of the day. 627  
 
So Freud's theories began with the seed of their own destruction. The 
memory of the patient was the receptacle within which all psychoanalytic 
work began and ended, but even during his lifetime he began to doubt the 
absolute verisimilitude of some of his patients. He devised increasingly 
complex theories and theoretical structures to enable access to the very 
deepest memories. One key question remained: What is the reality from 
which a memory is based? How veridical can this be? Slowly Freud accepted 
that memory can be modified, and serially modified. His term 
Nachträglichkeit was invoked to refer to the re-transcription that can occur 
to memories. Clearly they were not as absolute as was initially thought. 
 
There has been endless discussion about the importance of Freud’s 
penchant for collecting antique statues, and his whole fascination with the 
process of archaeology, which mercifully will not need to be rehearsed here. 
628 But archaeology was a powerful model for Freud. As he says in his 
discussion of The Wolf Man: 
the psychoanalyst, like the archaeologist in his excavations, must 
uncover layer after layer of the patient’s psyche before coming to the 
deepest, most valuable treasures. 629 
 
                                                
627 See Wolman (1984) for a comprehensive discussion of Freud's views on 
positivism.  
628 see, just for starters, Gay (1988), Spitz (1989), Bergmann (1989), Gamwell (1989) 
for discussions on Freud’s own character and the influences on his life and work. 
630 Gardiner (1971) p 139.  
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And speaking then of the curative process of psychoanalysis, Freud was in 
no doubt: 
The ideal termination of analysis has been reached when the analyst 
has had such a far-reaching influence on the patient that no further 
change could be expected to take place in him if his analysis were 
continued. It is as though it were possible by means of analysis to 
attain a level of absolute psychical normality - a level, moreover, 
which we could feel confident would be able to remain stable, as 
though, perhaps, we had succeeded in resolving every one of the 
patient's repressions and filling in all the gaps in his memory. 630 
 
The clear assumption is that the analyst knows best, that the analyst's 
understanding is the complete antidote to the chaotic, infantile, primary 
process that the patient brings to the analysis. The analyst alone has 
contact with objectivity and reality. The analyst can see through the patient, 
layer by layer, to the truth. 
 
Compare this with a typically modern view: 
I view the analytic process as one in which the analysand is created 
through an intersubjective process. ….Analysis is not simply a 
process of uncovering the hidden; it is more importantly process of 
creating an analytic subject who had not previously existed. 631 
 
The fundamental shift that these two views represent is away from seeing, as 
Freud did, humanity as a drive-regulated organism, to a view of humanity as 
about generating meaning. 
 
A number of writers have been involved in this rewriting the psychology of 
psychoanalysis by reconsidering, sometimes quite fundamentally, the idea of 
objective psychic reality and the extent to which it is recoverable at all. Four 
names are usually associated with this process: Donald Spence 632, Roy 
Schafer 633, Robert Stolorow 634 and Irwin Hoffman 635.  
                                                
630 Freud SE XXI pp 216-253. 
631 Ogden (1992) p 619.   
632 The ground-breaking text from Spence was Narrative Truth and Historical Truth. 
Spence (1982). Also of interest in The Freudian Metaphor (Spence (1987)).  
633 Schafer’s ideas are somewhat more distributed. See The Analytic Attitude (Schafer 
(1983)) and Retelling a Life (Schafer (1992)).  
634 Robert Stolorow , to be fair, is usually the lead author in a series of important 
papers and texts. The key work is Psychoanalytic Treatment: An Intersubjective 
Approach. (Stolorow et al (1987)). Similarly important is Stolorow and Atwood (1992).  
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These writers are heirs to the twentieth century intellectual climate just as 
much as Freud was to the nineteenth. Oft quoted as one of the bases for this 
change in emphasis is Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. 636 The reading of 
this esoteric principle, that the act of observing changes what is observed, 
can be seen to have acted as a powerful stimulus towards relativism in all its 
forms. That principle, together with the equally oft quoted ideas of Kuhn, 
propelled a genuine shift in thinking about the nature of the psychology of 
psychoanalysis, as summarised in the simple question: ‘what does the 
patient need?’ 637 Mitchell’s implication in the question is to doubt the linear 
archaeological processes beloved by Freud. Freud believed that the patient’s 
need was about uncovering truth, about replacing the primary process with 
the secondary process – that was why they came to see him. 
 
Donald Spence’s contribution to the debate can be summarised in his 
concern with language. If psychoanalysis concerns itself with that which is 
capable of being said, then echoing Lacan, Spence postulates that actual 
experience can be lost when represented in speech. Language, he says, ‘is 
too rich and too poor to represent experience’. 638 and ‘to put a picture into 
words is to risk never seeing it again’. 639 and most troubling: ‘the patient 
must continually translate from the private language of experience into the 
common language of speech’. 640 So for Spence, communication in 
psychoanalysis equals the destruction and remodelling of exactly the 
historical truth that psychoanalysis claims to seek.  This is a potentially 
catastrophic conclusion for the entire process of psychoanalysis. From this 
standpoint, objective reality seems forever gone; alone, this insight requites 
psychoanalysis to drop any claim to scientific pretence.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
635 Hoffman has conveniently reprinted most of his important papers, essentially 
unchanged, in a recent text Ritual and Spontaneity in the Psychoanalytic Process: A 
Dialetical-Constructivist View (Hoffman (1998)). 
636 for a discussion see Weinberg (1994).  
637 posed most eloquently by Mitchell (1993) Ch 1. 
638 Spence (1982) p 49. 
639 ibid p 62. 
640 ibid p 82. 
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Roy Schaffer embraced the hermeneutic mode, and spoke extensively of 
narrative in psychoanalysis. One quotation will summarise his point of view: 
We have only versions of the true and the real. Narratively 
unmediated, definitive access to truth and reality cannot be 
demonstrated. In this respect, therefore, there can be no absolute 
foundation on which any observer or thinker stands; each must 
choose his or her narrative or version.641 
 
So no information acquired within a given meaning system in which it is 
valid can be moved or transferred to a situation outside that system. Any 
such movement will result in a loss of validity. These, clearly, are demanding 
statements for the practice of psychoanalysis.  
 
There is no doubt that Hoffman has tried hardest to liberate psychoanalysis 
from any pretence of scientific mantle.  Like the others, Hoffman emphasises 
the implications of abandoning the tenet that psychoanalytic meaning has a 
verifiable empirical basis. His own constructivist model owes much to the 
insights of the Swiss developmental psychologist Jean Piaget. As Wachtel 
puts it in his Piagetian reworking of psychoanalytic procesess: 
Neither as children or as adults do we respond directly to stimuli per 
se. We are always constructing reality every bit as much as we are 
perceiving it. 642 
 
 
This Hoffman takes very seriously, writing that communication is a subset of 
participation, that ‘Not only is the patient’s life story a matter of historical 
reconstruction, it is also a new piece of new history being made or 
constructed right now it the immediate interaction.’ 643 So all experience is 
constructed as meaning, and as communication; knowledge is replaced 
effectively by impressions, and these are to be understood as constructions. 
 
So how can I summarise the story so far? These writers, (and there are many 
others that have added similar cries of dissent 644) have fathered the growing 
recognition that the problem of not knowing is at the core of modern 
psychoanalytic theory. They have all emphasised not knowing on the part of 
                                                
641 Schaffer (1992) p xv. 
642 Wachtel (1980)  p 62.  
643 Hoffman, ibid p 137. 
644 for a brief summary, see the last three chapters in Mitchell and Black (1995).  
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the client, the patient, the analysand. Desperate questions arise: if there is 
no objective reality on which to ground the psychoanalytic process, what, 
then, is it grounded in? How do we distinguish between the reality-based 
wishes of the Ego with the phantasy based needs of the Id? Actually, on 
what possible basis do we discriminate between normal psychological 
functioning and psychopathology? Only one kind of psychoanalytic 
knowledge still remains for these writers: the knowledge of a particular 
person at a particular time in interaction with another person. 
 
This shift, away from the view that the analyst knows the truth about the 
patient to a view that the analyst may know one or more of but many truths 
about the patient, has given rise to a considerable crisis of confidence in the 
profession and the discipline. Mitchell lists three responses that the 
community has adopted: a retreat to empiricism, an embracing of 
phenomenology, and a dialogue with hermeneutics. 645 
 
The problem with the first solution, appealing to empiricism, is twofold. 
First, psychoanalysis, despite Freud's pleas and wishes, has never been 
considered an empirical science in the way that he wished. But worse, 
empirical science itself has also suffered the inflow of relativism, and the 
certainty that science once provided has been eroded by the writings of, for 
example, Khun. 
 
And the embracing of phenomenology by the likes of Schwaber 646 is 
underpinned by assumptions that many will find difficult. It assumes there 
is a unity of mind and experience that the patients can access. It assumes 
that accessing this unified experience is easy and straightforward. But 
crucially, it assumes that the analyst can also know what this direct truth 
is, without contamination. Few would nowadays agree with this condition. 
647 
 
                                                
645 for a discussion see Mitchell (1993) Ch 2. 
646 Schwaber (1990).  
647 For an additional discussion, see Dennett (1991), especially Ch 4.  
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In contrast to this classical view with its idea of a stream of veridical 
memories, to which either the analyst has access (the traditional view) or the 
patient certainly has access (the phenomenological view), is the hermeneutic 
view, which would deny both of these, suggesting that at best the patient 
can generate a construction of what might have happened, with the analyst 
confined to creating a construction of a construction. 
 
There remains for some, however, a remnant from classical theory, the 
implicit assumption that the neonate at least has a true and pure core, one 
that is affected and distorted by early life. This pure core is arguably what 
Freud had in mind when he spoke of the Id 648. It should be recalled that 
equally influential upon Freud as the siren call of science were the lasting 
effects of nineteenth century romanticism, with its call for a return to 
nature. Freud himself thought of the Id as the wellspring of all that is 
naturally human; it was the Id that represented ‘the true purpose of the 
organisms’ life. …the satisfaction of innate needs.’ It was with this kind of 
reasoning that psychoanalysis became to be called a depth psychology, one 
that sought to discover and unearth these deepest, most central and most 
primitive of aspects of each human being. There has always been a feeling 
that if only we can return to these deep primitive modes of being, we will 
return to the true, core self. This remains a compelling driver for many 
seeking psychoanalysis. But post-modern psychoanalytic theory cannot 
support such a view. The idea that there are more or less authentic views of 
the self, more or less authentic actions, these imply a yardstick, an objective 
measure against which we contrast our actions. Alas, it seems difficult to 
know what this yardstick might be. 
 
In summary, I want to suggest that most of the changes in the century since 
The Interpretation of Dreams reflect changes in the intellectual and social 
milieu. The change has been away from drives to relationships, from Id to 
Ego, from solitary analysis with the neutral other to a highly interactive 
process with two participants as equals; from matters oedipal to matters 
pre-oedipal, critically from the idea of historical absolutism to constructed 
                                                
648 Freud SE XXIII 139-207. 
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relativism; and from a positivist view of psychoanalysis as finding causes to 
a hermeneutic view about meaning. In Stephen Mitchell’s succinct phrase: 
The state of psychoanalytic knowledge is not anchored in enduring 
truths or proof, but rather in its use value in making sense of a life, 
deepening relationships with others, and expanding and enriching the 
texture of experience.  649 
 
 
III.4 Discussion 
 
So, what then is psychopathology, and what is narcissism, and how should 
we categorise Søren Kierkegaard? 
 
Psychopathology I suggest is essentially about psychological and psychical 
difference, about thinking or feeling, behaving or acting in a way that is not 
usual in a place and at a time. It is often about behaving in a way that is not 
wanted, either. 650 When the way a life is being lived is not wanted, we speak 
in ordinary language of suffering that life. And suffering is what is felt both 
by the subject and those around him. What recent psychiatry and 
psychotherapy are attempting to do is relax the limits of the normal, of entry 
into the psychopathological, while respecting the subjective feeling of 
suffering and trying to do something about it. In extremis, the most confused 
or violent psychotic episode remains baffling, and apart from depressing 
whatever part of the brain might be involved in the syndrome, much of 
psychiatry sits quite motionless in response. The psychiatric nosology 
outlined in DSM-IV is simply a product of our time; the primary defence 
mechanisms also discussed above I suggest should be thought of as 
pathologically neutral, neither endorsing nor denying psychopathology. 
                                                
649 Mitchell (1993) p 65. 
650 The terminology of Theodore Sarbin I think is particularly apposite. 650 He has 
traced one particular aspect of the medicalisation of mental abnormality. Teresa of 
Avila (1515-81), in order to save her nuns from the Inquisition, suggested that their 
hallucinations were actually como enfermas – as if they were symptoms of illness 
rather than resulting from commerce with the devil. This metaphor ‘as if’ gradually 
turned to myth and became accepted. But there was one proviso. The diagnosis of 
physical illness depended upon observable symptoms and complaints by the patient, 
two conjunctive criteria. In order to add mental illness, the criteria had to become 
disjunctive: either complaints by the patient, or complaints by others, of unwanted 
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Defence mechanisms are metaphors, simply a language, a means of talking 
about how people live their lives, and make sense of their lives in this world. 
 
Narcissism on this basis is a way of being that seemingly produces more 
unhappiness for those around the narcissist than for the narcissist 
themselves. Living with the arrogant, boastful, bombastic results of early 
psychological damage can be exceptionally difficult. Most narcissists only 
seek professional help when their internal emptiness overwhelms them. It is 
a particularly difficult syndrome to comprehend and sympathise with exactly 
because others are used quite ruthlessly in the service of the self. Freud’s 
original observation remains the most telling: narcissists do not invest 
themselves - cathect - into others, and this lack of the ability to relate makes 
for a particularly unhappy view of the world. It remains convenient to use 
the concept of narcissism because the supporting theory, the metaphors we 
use, permit the beginning of an understanding for the narcissist about 
where his way of being has come from and how it has evolved. Narcissism is, 
as we order things in the world, a useful syndrome, a convenient shorthand, 
just a construct. Traditional psychiatry may view it as an end point, 
psychotherapy as a starting point. But the ideas that underpin the concept 
have value if only in helping make sense of some of the unhappiness of the 
life thus lived. 
 
As for Kierkegaard, my view is that, sometimes for himself, and sometimes 
for those around him, he exhibited unwanted conduct. The teasing of fellows 
at school, the treatment of Regine, his attitude over The Corsair, leaving 
aside the difficult discussion about his later life and writings, all these are 
instances of conduct that resulted in some kind of suffering at least for 
Kierkegaard himself. His diaries are full of his misery, and he uses exactly 
the language of misery to describe it. I cannot go along with any of the 
diagnoses about bipolar disorder, or simple depression, or any form of 
epilepsy. I suspect that discussion about matters sexual, while perhaps 
entertaining, will lead us not very far. Rather, this is how Kierkegaard lived 
his life. This is how he made sense of his life. So I am not willing to bracket 
                                                                                                                                       
conduct. For a summary see Sarbin (1990). For a narrower focused view, see his 
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Kierkegaard's writing as the work of a damaged and unhealthy individual. 
This is not to deny motivation or the intrigue of discussing texts with 
reference to some historical origin and difference: it is still valid to ask why 
Kierkegaard wrote the way he did. But it is not valid to deny either the 
authenticity or the relevance to our time of what he said because he can be 
given a psychopathological label. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Schizophrenia: Medical diagnosis or moral verdict? (Sarbin (1980)). 
